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Abstract
Social Control and Incarceration in Lesotho: A History of Strategies, 1850-1970
Samuel John Severson
2021
This dissertation explores how technologies and infrastructures for promoting control and
cohesion have interfaced with the social and political history of Lesotho over the longue
durée. This approach allows for tracing lines of historical continuity and change during a
period spanning the coalescing of the nation from communities on the Southern African
Highveld in the early-19th century, the onset and grinding realities of British colonial rule
and the rise of a local economy dependent on labor migration to South Africa, and the
unravelling of empire and the challenges of governance in the years following official
national liberation in 1966. I detail how social control strategies over the 19th and 20th
centuries interfaced with local and imperial political exigencies, shifts in international
penological, biomedical, and scientific racist discourse, and, above all, the responses and
forms of knowledge produced by Basotho confronted with coercive technologies and
infrastructures. I argue that whereas Highveld technologies disciplined conformity inside
of societies, the colonial state introduced prisons and other new punitive technologies as
engines for producing social and moral alterity within the politically bounded community.
The colonial administration sought to use carceral detention to subjectify and problematize
groups of people as embodied threats, on account of their supposedly essential criminality,
lunacy, and, for a time, leprosy infectiousness. The motivations for these moves were both
ideological and instrumental: in addition to officers wanting to confront conduct which
they viewed as problematic in its own right, the creation of the need to control internal

problem people(s) served as a basis for shared work with local partners. While shifting
punitive regimes did indeed coercively impose a measure of control and open new social
fissures, this process never played out precisely as envisioned. In the late colonial era,
mounting local and metropolitan pressure led the administration to reverse course: rather
than using judicial punishments to simply try to deter crime and stigmatize particular social
groups, prison administrators and staff were charged with rehabilitating supposedly
maladjusted people for reintegration back into the national community. The Prison Service
stuck to this official mission, moreover, even as social tensions and political conflict
escalated in the years following independence.
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Framing punishment in Lesotho and beyond: history and
historiography
Introduction
After Thomas Thabane’s party coalition won victory in snap elections in June 2017,
enabling him to be sworn in again as Lesotho’s Prime Minister after nearly three years in
opposition, the first order of business was the government budget. After observing debate
over a number of items, Thabane took the floor of parliament when the question of funds
for the nation’s correctional services came up. He spoke for over fifteen minutes:
Courts were established so that they can provide a punitive response. However today it
is no longer called punishment but recently has been termed corrections. How do you
correct someone who stabbed a woman with a knife, what is that?... There is no one who
loves a man who is busy raping women, there is no one who loves a boy who is busy
raping grandmothers, these things happen each and every day in our communities,
however we are still busy talking about correction. That boy should be taken to prison
and be sentenced to lashes, and beaten on the buttocks… A person who kills must be
killed as well. But [the Americans] are saying, you Lesotho, because you do not have the
capacity to be self-sufficient, if you want us to give you financial support, you must not
kill these kinds of people?… We will not simply abandon our values because of
foreigners… The cases in which a person decides to ambush a single woman knowing
very well that the she has nobody to protect her, and then forcefully sleeps with her
without her will. That kind of a person should get…this thing that is bothering him cut
off… The preventable misbehavior should be punished harshly so that a whenever a
person thinks about doing such things they will quickly reconsider. The fact is that a
prison is called a Correctional Service, what is it that it corrects, that thing is a prison, a
prisoner is a prisoner, this individual has lost their humanity … People must be terrified
of prison so that they abandon their evil ways which normally result in them going to
prison because if prison is a nice place to be we will forever do these things. What about
victims?... This legislation that is brought here by the whites from the West they never
talk about the victims, they talk about the perpetrator who did bad things to others. They
do not talk about the victim, go and listen to it, that thing, when it is debated there at the
UN there is no one that talks about the victim. This woman who has been raped, this
family whose mother has been killed, this family whose father has been killed and the
kids left as orphans, nothing is said about them, the only thing discussed are the rights of
the person who made the children lose their father... The whole focus today is on this
person who perpetrated these evil deeds… My conclusion is that I maintain that the
minister should be given funds but we should also revisit this issue of correctional service
versus jail, what do we say about it. [Applause].1
1

Hansards, ‘Tenth Parliament, National Assembly: Meeting 1, Session 1,’ 24 July 2017, 18-24
[Sesotho]. The PM’s words, it must be noted, might have been shaped by the assassination of his
estranged wife, some six weeks earlier. Thabane’s current wife (Maesiah Thabane) was charged in
February 2020 with hiring the gunmen, and Thabane resigned as PM in May 2020 and has since
1

I first heard a snippet of the speech on the radio while commuting on a public taxi, and was
surprised by the boisterous laughter and applause the words elicited from fellow
passengers. As I discussed Thabane’s rhetoric with other Basotho over subsequent days,
interlocutors noted how support for the PM’s argument was rooted in growing popular
frustrations with high levels of violent crime and the sense that a loved one might be
assaulted or even killed at any time. Like other populist politicians, Thabane’s rhetoric was
couched in us-versus-them terms, identifying one enemy of the people from within and
another outside the nation: wicked people inside the nation were being given a free hand,
abetted by foreign donors whose demands were not only naively bleeding-heart but also
deeply neo-colonial. The speech also staked out a very clear position on two debates which
have framed discussion of punishment in the territory for at least the last century and a half,
relating to the merits of social control versus socialized conformity, and between Sesotho
tradition and Western progressive universalism.
In arguing for a harsh push to establish firm control over people convicted of
criminal activity, the PM invoked assumptions woven into the historical foundations of
sociological theory, dating back to the discipline’s founding in the writings of Max Weber
and Emile Durkheim.2 Weber argued that creation and maintenance of the state hinged on

maneuvered to avoid murder charges himself: Kabi, P. 2020. ‘Why Thabane Has Not Been Arrested
over Lipolelo Murder.’ Lesotho Times, Sep. 8. https://lestimes.com/why-thabane-has-not-beenarrested-over-lipolelo-murder/.
*
Lesotho was known as Basutoland during the colonial era, spanning from 1868 through 1966. I
use Lesotho throughout, both to simplify matters and to honor the fact that the local name predates
the British arrival. The people comprising the nation (or tribe, in European eyes) of Lesotho came
to refer to themselves collectively as Basotho (sing. Mosotho) over time, and to shared language
and cultural practices as Sesotho.
2
Durkheim, E. 1984 [1893]. The Division of Labour in Society. Halls, W., trans. London:
Macmillan, especially 44-64. Weber, M. 1946. ‘Politics as Vocation,’ and ‘The Chinese Literati’
in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Gerth, H. and C.W. Mills, eds. and trans., New York:
2

the capacity to effectively suppress claims to the right to use of force by other entities
within geographic borders: the state creates its own legitimacy by deeming particular forms
of conduct out of bounds and defending the exclusive right to use coercion to respond to
breeches of its rules. For Durkheim, punishment of criminals served as social and moral
glue: collective identity and shared notions of appropriate conduct were reified through the
act of punishing people who transgressed laws and norms. By letting criminals ostensibly
run rampant, in the PM’s narrative, the state was surrendering its very legitimacy and
fueling the moral dissolution of society. The operational principles of the corrections
department, which Thabane denounced, officially align with the prevailing international
penological consensus: the most individually-rehabilitative, and socially productive, forms
of incarceration look to ensure inmate welfare, including by providing good-conditions,
job-training, and counseling. A key ideological assumption underpinning this welfarist
approach is that crime is not exclusively borne of individual moral weakness but also a
collective failure to provide the offender with the adequate educational resources,
economic opportunities, and moral guidance to encourage conformity with laws prior to
commission of the crime.
Punishment and imprisonment come with a lot of historical baggage in Lesotho. As
throughout much of the African continent, prisons arrived in the territory with the advent

Oxford University, 196–244 and 416-44, respectively. The two theorists fundamentally diverge on
whether punishment is rooted, per Durkheim, in emotion, or, as in Weber, a process of
rationalization of ends as means: for a masterful summary of these theories on punishment and
their compatibility: Garland, D. 1990. Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory.
Chicago: University of Chicago, 23-82, 177-92. Also: Terpstra, J. 2011. ‘Two Theories on the
Police: The Relevance of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim to the Study of the Police.’
International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 39/1: 1–11. For a moral philosophical examination
of state coercion: Benjamin, W. 1986. ‘Critique of Violence,’ in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms,
Autobiographical Writing, Jephcott, E., trans. New York: Schocken.
3

of colonial rule. The first lock-up was built in 1869, by members of an expeditionary force
from the Cape Colony. After a brief period in which colonial magistrates sought to use the
criminal legal system to attack the authority of African lords and laws, engendering vicious
strife, the administration based in Maseru reversed course. As in many other colonies
governed by the logics of indirect rule, the administration maintained an official monopoly
over judicial incarceration, flogging, and execution, while also outsourcing the majority of
violence work – policing and punishing in the name of the state – to local partners, in this
case the ruling family and aristocracy. Maseru and London envisioned that the continued
use of customary punitive logics and technologies would promote political and social
stability. Traditions, as interpreted and fetishized by colonial officers, were leveraged by
the administration to beat back calls from Basotho for political reform from the 1880s
through the late-1930s. After WWII development replaced the defense of tradition as the
official rationalization for colonialism. Maseru stated its intention to build a criminal legal
system in Lesotho in line with the metropolitan system, which was not only heavily reliant
on penal imprisonment as punishment but also sought to leverage incarceration to reform
criminals into productive members of society. This pivot in orientation was much slower
in practice, and proceeded on account of the consistent pressure brought to bear by
prisoners and warders locally, as well as by domestic, South African, and English activists.
In light of these developments, Thabane’s idea that punishments of clear exogenous origin,
like prisons, could and should be effectively Sesothoized through an infusion of a harsher
retributive ethos, is a highly novel, and historically controversial, notion indeed.
This dissertation explores how technologies and infrastructures for promoting
control and cohesion have interfaced with the social and political history of Lesotho over

4

the longue durée. This approach allows for tracing lines of historical continuity and change
during a period spanning the coalescing of the nation from Highveld communities in the
early-19th century, the onset and grinding realities of colonial rule and the rise of a local
economy dependent on labor migration to South Africa, and the unravelling of empire and
the challenges of governance in the years following official national liberation in 1966. I
detail how colonial carceral strategies interfaced with local and imperial political
exigencies, shifts in international penological, biomedical, and scientific racist discourse,
and, above all, by the responses and forms of knowledge produced by Basotho confronted
with state efforts at social engineering.
The advent of colonial rule obviously brought a significant shift in the ways in
which political authorities sought to use punitive instruments. I argue that whereas
Highveld technologies disciplined conformity inside of societies (or necessitated
dissolution of political bonds), prisons and other colonial punitive technologies were
deployed as engines for producing social and moral alterity within the political community.
The colonial state sought to use carceral detention to subjectify and problematize groups
of people as embodied threats, on account of their supposedly essential criminality, lunacy,
and, for a time, infectiousness. The motivations for these moves were both ideological and
instrumental: in addition to officers wanting to confront conduct which they viewed as
problematic in its own right, the creation of the need to control internal problem people(s)
served as a basis for shared work with local partners. Maseru had to contend, however,
with the slow stigmatization of certain forms of conduct which it deemed criminal, and
officials consistently expressed frustration with the lack of bureaucratic integration in the
work of policing and punishment by customary and colonial authorities. An effort to build

5

a different sort of stigma and policing relationship, in fact, led the administration to launch
a multi-decade effort to compulsorily detain Basotho suffering from leprosy.
The late-colonial era, meanwhile, witnessed a partial reversal in the instrumental
goals of penal confinement: following World War II, metropolitan officials and local
activists forced Maseru to reorient the territory’s carceral system around the official goal
of healing and rehabilitating inmates to be productive members of an inchoate democracy,
using ostensibly universal best practices, rather than continuing to produce social and moral
hierarchies in a putatively traditional and tribal kingdom. While these shifts did profoundly
improve the conditions of detention and work in the territory’s prisons over the late-1950s
and 60s, Basotho politicians representing interest groups forged by missionization,
colonialism, the growth of racialized industrial capitalism in South Africa, and the struggle
for national liberation, sought to weaponize the state’s penal machinery to punish political
rivals after independence in 1966. In the wake of a 1970 coup by the Basotho National
Party, prison guards and administrators, the majority of whom were sympathetic to
opposition parties, were able to temper the use of carceral facilities as instruments of state
repression by invoking their technical authority and the discursive strength of the
rehabilitative ideal. While this stance continues in the present, Thabane’s remarks before
parliament also serve as a powerful illustration of how internal debates and political
contests over the use of prisons as instruments for generating social control versus
cohesion, honoring approaches imagined to be traditional versus universal, and producing
conformity versus difference, remain very much live questions in the political and social
life of Lesotho.

6

Literature Review
An English-language metanarrative of just state punishments first took shape in
hagiographies to the Great Men like John Howard (and, in a few cases, Great Women, such
as Elizabeth Fry) who advocated for incarceration as a humane and socially productive
alternative to corporal and capital sanctions.3 With time, debates over the ostensible
successes and failures of various carceral approaches gave rise to more rigorous, if
similarly teleological, historical investigations and theorizing by policymakers and social
critics on the march towards progress.4 In the 1930s, the Frankfurt School Marxists Georg
Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer offered a particularly novel critique of penal reform, arguing
that such ideologies, and punitive regimes since time immemorial, were overdetermined
by labor dynamics and economic modes of production. The rise of social history fueled a
wave of new scholarship on incarceration in the 1970s: rather than enlightened individuals
catalyzing penal reform over the late-18th and 19th centuries, the emergence of penal
reformism was one manifestation of a broader post-Enlightenment shift in discourses of
class and gender, fueled by the growth of capitalist political economies.5

3

See, for example: Field, J. 1850. The Life of John Howard with Comments on His Character and
Philanthropic Labours. London: Longman; Gordelier, C. 1862. A Lecture on the Public Life and
Character of Elizabeth Fry. London: Ward; Richards, L. 1920. Elizabeth Fry, the Angel of the
Prisons. New York: D. Appleton.
4
Webb, B. and S. Webb, 1922. English Prisons under Local Government. London: Longmans;
Wines, F. 1895. Punishment and Reformation an Historical Sketch of the Rise of the Penitentiary
System. London: Swan Sonnenschein; Ruggles-Brise, E. 1921. The English Prison System. London:
Macmillan; idem 1924. Prison Reform at Home and Abroad: A Short History of the International
Movement since the London Congress, 1872. London: Macmillan; Lewis, O. 1922. The
Development of American Prisons and Prison Customs, 1776-1845. Albany: J.B. Lyon; Teeters,
N. 1955. The Cradle of the Penitentiary: The Walnut Street Jail at Philadelphia, 1773-1835.
Philadelphia: Temple University; Whiting, J. 1975. Prison Reform in Gloucestershire, 1776-1820:
A Study of the Work of Sir George Onesiphorus Paul. London: Phillimore.
5
Rothman, D. 1971. The Discovery of the Asylum; Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic.
Boston: Little, Brown; Ignatieff, M. 1978. A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the
Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850. New York: Pantheon; Melossi, D. and M. Pavarini. 1981. The
Prison and the Factory: Origins of the Penitentiary System. Cousin, G., trans. London: Macmillan;
7

The publication of Michel Foucault’s 1975 Surveiller et punir (translated into
English in 1977 as Discipline and Punish) transformed the study of prisons. The French
theorist posited that an epochal shift from corporal punishment towards incarceration was
coeval with the industrial age: the need for disciplined workers and states’ desires to better
surveil and control subject populations led to the construction of an array of disciplinary
technologies. Institutional archipelagos – including schools, hospitals, mental institutions,
and prisons – were established to apply varying degrees of coercion to inculcate discipline
in their charges, and to differentiate and stigmatize deviance from norms. In this way the
state created ‘capillary power,’ diffused into the very psyches of subjects, as a replacement
to the infrequent displays of punitive corporal violence in the name of the sovereign. In so
doing, Foucault incorporated central elements of Weberian, Durkheimian, and Marxian
social theory: punishment was indeed about control, specifically in the interests of
economic and political elites over subaltern people, but it also served to mold epistemology
and moral principles. Such a narrative, moreover, offered a potent counterpoint to old
narratives recounting the march of humanity towards ever higher plains of civilization: as
Clifford Geertz wryly observed, Discipline and Punish reads like a ‘Whig history in
reverse—a history, in spite of itself, of The Rise of Unfreedom.’6
While historians quickly took issue with the periodization and motivations of
officials offered up by Foucault, the focus on the epistemic foundations which produced
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ideas about crime revolutionized the study of states and punishment, including in the global
south.7 Scholars focused new attention to interrogating the various impacts of shifting
punitive interventions on societies.8 The conspicuous political weaknesses, popular
illegitimacy, and lack of technological and financial resources of colonial administrations
compared to metropolitan counterparts deeply complicated the travelability of the notion
of capillary power to colonial space. One particularly valuable concept gleaned from
Foucault, however, which runs throughout the French theorist’s scholarship, is
governmentality: states took shape by producing and reifying knowledge about the
populations they sought to control, including through measures like censuses and
penological classification.9 Matthew Arnold, Clare Anderson, and Stephen Pierce
demonstrated that colonial punishments and penal colonies were vital sites for the
production of knowledge that circulated and cross-pollinated future projects in both
metropolitan and colonial spaces.10

Other writers detailed the production of moral

knowledge and processes of subject formation in additional sites, including the hospital,
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bedroom, and mission compound.11 In these spaces, as in prisons, colonial knowledge
about Africans focused on the production of racial and tribal difference.
At the same time, the bevy of new scholarship revolutionized colonial studies by
drawing into focus the areas of profound weakness and ambivalence of European
authorities, as well as spaces of considerable power by Africans to shape their own lives.
This realization challenged the old conceit – shared by imperial and radical historians alike
– that colonial states were capable and bent on unilaterally projecting power. Indeed, in
Frederick Cooper’s memorable phrasing, ‘If Foucault saw power as “capillary,” it was
arguably arterial in most colonial contexts––strong near the nodal points of colonial
authority, less able to impose its discursive grid elsewhere, often little interested in
obtaining or dispensing much knowledge about its subjects.’12
Florence Bernault provided an early and influential comparative analysis of African
prisons as the beating hearts of the colonial disciplinary machinery made in the wake of
the paradigm shift in colonial studies.13 Despite a cursory nod to the notion that the
diversity of African socio-cultural approaches to producing cohesion and control prior to
the advent of colonialism, as well as variations in the precise political economic aims of
empires and officials, meant the processual hybridization or ‘vernacularization’ of punitive
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regimes in different African territories over time, Bernault also identifies a number of
patterns ostensibly demonstrating the ways ‘that the colonial prison did not supplant, but
rather encouraged penal archaism.’14 She argues that prison systems ‘grafted’ on to African
societies during the colonial era were wholly different in form and function from parallel
models in Europe: the former facilities differed from that latter in being shaped by
indifference to rehabilitation and were, instead, sites for the application rather than the
phasing out of sovereign violence. From the late-19th century onwards, the primary
hierarchy these institutions were designed to reify was racial, evinced by the fact that an
element of penal design which was uniform across the continent – despite other
architectural variations – was segregated space for the detention of Africans and
Europeans. In addition to facilitating state repression of political opponents, colonial
regimes widely relied on penal systems as instruments for engineering extractive
economies: judicial incarceration served both as a source of cheap convict labor for public
and private sectors, and generated ‘free labor’ by coercing Africans to sell their labor to
get the cash necessary to pay taxes (and thereby avoid imprisonment for tax default).
Bernault rounds out her arguments with the idea that the general illegitimacy of colonial
regimes, and the specific illegitimacy of their penal practices, poisoned the politico-cultural
well for African societies after the end of formal colonialism:
Colonial jails ... submerged African prisoners in corporal punishment, the
personalization of sentences and authority, and the confusion between political
and economic imperatives. Colonial legacy, moreover, has encouraged radical
forms of political detention, later practiced extravagantly by post-colonial
regimes. African prisons today reflect the exasperation of colonial modes of
governance and social control.15
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While each of Bernault’s observations provides food for thought, scholars focused
on African history have roundly critiqued the work.16 Two limitations are most
pronounced. First, the chapter traffics in the fallacy Frederick Cooper terms ‘leapfrogging
legacies.’17 Bernault connects very real instances of brutality in the prisons of independent
African nations to the cynicism and brutality saturating the use of these prisons under
colonial regimes working to coerce taxation and inscribe racial difference in the years
before WWII, but accomplishes this feat by saying very little about a period in the 1950s
and 60s in which penal development was an animating cause for many people in both
colony and metropole alike. Indeed, during this intervening era, African activists and
politicians in locales around the continent displayed a keen interest in building up the
trappings of putatively modern states, including penal institutions oriented around social
welfarism. To be sure, decades of colonial underdevelopment of penal infrastructure and
training of prison workers constrained the possibilities for post-independence states to
mirror penological approaches in the Global North, but it is far less clear that these
dynamics overdetermined the shape of things to come. This leap-frogging also facilitates a
second move of dubious historical and analytic rigor: framing African penal systems as
particular founts of backwardness, thereby channeling the afropessimism animating much
human rights literature and Western journalism.18 These treatments overwhelmingly tend
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to focus on the worst abuses, and pay little heed to stories of African prison administrators,
guards, lawyers, and sometimes even politicians, toiling to defend and improve prison
conditions with an eye towards building kinder and more law-abiding societies. The move
to situate deteriorating prison conditions in much of the continent over the last two decades
in a register of resurgent atavism or underdevelopment, moreover, elides consideration of
the way that the broadly observable turn away from a commitment to penal welfarism and
towards a control-oriented paradigm in Africa is but a small piece of a global phenomenon
accompanying the rise of neo-liberalism from the late-1970s onwards.19
The last two decades have also witnessed the production of many illuminating
historical studies of colonial incarceration, and punitive regimes more broadly, firmly
rooted in time and place. Stacey Hynd has diligently mapped the tensions marking imperial
legal and rhetorical pretensions, as well as the brutal forms of penality – including not just
imprisonment but also flogging and execution – meted out by European and/or African
authorities during the colonial era.20 The literature further maps how imperial spaces served
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as experimental landscapes for new approaches to incarceration and prisoner of war
detention, which were subsequently used in facilities and conflicts elsewhere in the world;
these studies have also illustrated the ways that brutal displays of sovereign power largely
coincided with moments in which colonial regimes felt their own weaknesses most acutely,
notably at the onset and crumbling of imperial rule.21 Dior Konaté’s Prison Architecture
and Punishment in Colonial Senegal, pairs an illuminating study of infrastructure with
detailed analysis of the ways that structures shaped the lives and responses of prisoners.22
Laurent Fourchard and David Killingray, meanwhile, examine the halting processes
through which ideas of rehabilitation, juvenile justice, and professionalization of
correctional personnel gained pace in the waning years of colonial empires.23 Katherine
Bruce-Lockhart’s pioneering dissertation offers perhaps the most sustained and trenchant
critique to the Bernaultian vision, revealing the enduring efforts of prison workers in post-
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colonial Uganda to try to run a professional and self-consciously modern penal regime in
the face of tumultuous national politics, including under the murderous regime of Idi
Amin.24
The literature on colonial and post-colonial punishment has also witnessed new
attention to the ways that local people shaped carceral practices. Mirroring broader
patterns, this historical scholarship has focused on three principal avenues: resistance,
intermediation, and cooptation. Adding to an older body of literature arguing that banditry
and other varieties of crime embodied a form of protest, scholars have drawn into focus
how prison rebellions were not the mindless riots portrayed by colonial authorities but
rather political uprisings.25 Particularly in light of the pioneering scholarship of James C.
Scott, increased attention has also been placed on ‘infrapolitics’ amongst inmates, or small
acts of indirect or ambiguous protest which serve both to telegraph an unbowed state and
to accumulate small victories over time: examples include hunger strikes, graffiti, and
political prisoners whistling resistance songs.26 A great deal of compelling scholarship on
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African history over the last quarter century has focused on the role of local intermediaries
– including clerks, translators, police, soldiers, and, recently, prison warders and jailers –
in shaping colonial practices.27 Other scholars have drawn attention to the ways that
intermediation happened in the everyday, including beyond the ambit of the state: subaltern
people were sometimes able to leverage their way into statuses, roles, and discourses,
which not only facilitated claims-making but seized space to reimagine and rearticulate the
social and moral world.28
The study of prisons in Lesotho has received little attention from scholars, and has
yet to be explored in a book length history. Details of the construction of prisons in Lesotho,
Botswana, and Eswatini (then Swaziland) feature as a chapter in the 1969 volume African
Penal Systems: the chapter, and the work as a whole, detail as process whereby colonial
underdevelopment, fueled by cynicism and parsimoniousness, created prisons systems in
Africa far out of sync with the best penological practices on display in More Developed
Countries.29 Rolland Mokoma’s 1985 essay ‘The Criminal Justice System of Basutoland’
provides a short but insightful account of the construction of the prison system during the
early colonial era, if one that tends, like much of the literature of the era, to overstate the
27
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administration’s power.30 The colonial criminal-legal and penal systems also make notable
appearances in scholarship detailing the relationship between the colonial state and
traditional authorities, including Burns Machobane’s 1990 Government and Change,
Elizabeth Eldredge’s 2007 Power in Colonial Africa, and the 2006 Medicine Murder in
Colonial Lesotho by Colin Murray and Peter Sanders.31 In addition, Itumeleng Kimane has
produced pathbreaking sociological work on juvenile justice and incarceration in Lesotho,
which includes a historical perspective.32 In his 1994 seminar paper, ‘A Prison or a Place
for Recovery?,’ Owen Kalinga makes the point – which I expound upon in chapters 3 and
4 – that Botsabelo Leper Asylum effectively represented a biomedical jail.33 Motlatsi
Thabane’s 2021 article ‘Public Mental Health Care in Colonial Lesotho’ article, moreover,
makes an important contribution to the literature, noting the centrality of the colonial penal
system for state interventions into the lives of Basotho facing mental health crises.34
In addition to providing the first sustained examination of prisons in Lesotho, this
dissertation represents one of the first longue durée studies on the social and political
history punishment in an African territory. By taking this long view I am better able to
identify and interrogate the emergence, shifting interpretations, and re/inventions of
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discourses and strategies of social control than would be possible if analysis was centered
more narrowly on one or a pair of the pre-colonial, colonial, or post-independence era(s).
Moreover, while there have been many excellent works of historical scholarship on
Lesotho produced over the years, scholarly interest in the territory has ebbed somewhat
since the official defeat of Apartheid in neighboring South Africa in the early 1990s. As
such, there remains significant work to be done incorporating theoretical perspectives and
innovations of the new colonial studies. In this dissertation I focus a great deal of attention
on exploring ways that Basotho continued to shape their own history, even if not precisely
as many would have liked, during the colonial era. This includes through understudied
moments of active resistance, such as uprisings at Botsabelo Asylum in 1914, Maseru Gaol
in 1949, and Maseru Central Prison in 1955, as well as infrapolitical acts, like mass
desertion from Botsabelo, in shaping carceral strategies. I also detail the ways that inmates
detained in asylums and prisons were able to coopt and reinterpret colonial discourses to
agitate for policy change. Lastly, my treatment of the role of prison staff in the colonial
(and early independence) era draws into focus the profound way that intermediaries shaped
the realities of life and work in Lesotho’s carceral system.
Sources and Methods
The research for this dissertation was carried out across four countries, on three continents.
The bulk of the archival and oral history fieldwork was carried out in Lesotho. I conducted
over forty formal interviews – as well as a great number of informal conversations – with
30 policymakers, academics, folk historians, and people who spent time in Lesotho’s
prisons or Botsabelo asylum. Although interview subjects granted me formal permission
to use their names in this study, I’ve decided to use pseudonyms for the former residents
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and inmates of carceral institutions in order to protect their privacy. The interviews were
carried out in both English and Sesotho. In Lesotho I carried out research at the Lesotho
National Archives in Maseru, the Thomas Mofolo Library in Roma (both the general
collection and the Leribe Collection), the Morija Museum and Archives, the Matsieng
Royal Archives, and the archives of Senkatana Clinic. I also examined documents in a
number of places in South Africa: in Bloemfontein at the Free State Provincial Archives
and Archives Depot; in Cape Town at the Western Cape Provincial Library, the National
Library, and the University of Cape Town; and in Gauteng at the Pretoria-branch of the
National Library, the South African National Archives, and the University of the
Witwatersrand’s library. In the United States I made extensive use of the manuscript and
archive collections of the library systems of New York City, Columbia University, and
Yale University. And, in the United Kingdom, I carried out research at the British National
Archives in Kew, the British Library, the Wellcome Library, the Archives of the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, the Imperial War Museum, and Oxford
University’s Bodleian Library.
Roadmap of Chapters
The dissertation contains three parts, each comprised of two chapters. The first pair
explores how narratives about the purpose of punishment interfaced with politics and
strategies of governance. In Chapter One, I detail how Lesotho came into being by
providing a refuge from period insecurity on the Highveld, (re)producing order by using
economic and psychological technologies to discipline a diverse array of peoples into
particular stations in life, without imputing an essential moral hierarchy to social groups
on the inside. The first generation of missionary observers – deeply impressed with the
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lack of brutal punishments which their fellow non-conformist humanitarians were then
toiling to reform in metropolitan Europe – crafted a heroic story of progress in the kingdom
of Lesotho, under the enlightened monarch Moshoeshoe, beginning in the 1830s. This story
came under fire with the arrival of European settlers from the Cape, and fresh waves of
missionaries and colonial officials, from the 1840s onwards: the communities lumped
together as members of the Basotho tribe were branded as a confederation of brigands. A
series of wars with the expansionist European community in the Orange Free State over
the 1850s and 60s led to tremendous suffering and death in Lesotho, and the hemorrhaging
of swathes of arable land. In 1868, with the collapse of Moshoeshoe’s capital on Night
Mountain seemingly imminent, the British agreed to intercede. ‘Basutoland’ was annexed
to the Cape Colony, which sent soldiers and magistrates to directly administer the territory.
Policymakers and magistrates, informed by missionaries who were less sanguine about
how social control in Lesotho worked than their predecessors, sought to use the criminal
law to fundamentally reorder society. The people at the top of the local political hierarchy,
African nobles, were at the bottom of the new moral hierarchy which Cape officials sought
use judicial incarceration and other coercive measures to inscribe. This effort to undermine
the powers and authority of lords, paired with other hasty reform measures, fomented
armed resistance which led to the collapse of Cape Rule in the early 1880s.
Chapter Two explores the elaboration of social control strategies in Lesotho during
the period spanning from 1884 through 1938. The British officials who replaced outgoing
Cape magistrates approached the task of building up power within the territory’s social and
political order following the general imperial strategy of ruling directly through local elites,
relying on ethnological theories blending contemporary scientific racist theories about so-
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called Natives with particularistic ascriptions about the essence of the Basotho tribe. The
idea of giving wide latitude to lords to carry out the violence work of policing and
punishment in the interior of the country made sense, in the colonial imagination, not only
because Basotho were supposedly innately law-abiding and utilized humane forms of
punishment, but also because this was the best possible system. The old idea of rapidly
importing universal institutions would not due, as Basotho were culturally (and/or
biologically) unsuited for such techniques. Instead, while outsourcing the majority of work
to traditional authorities from the aristocracy, the administration set up a parallel
infrastructure of punishment, reliant on its monopoly on judicial incarceration, flogging,
and execution. This system might be used to single out for punishment those crimes which
were deemed particularly morally repugnant, such as murder, or politically sensitive, such
as tax default and cattle-rustling across the border. While the colonial punitive
infrastructure did fill out with time – particularly as the rise of labor migration across the
border in the wake of the 1899-1901 South Africa War meant more Basotho passing
through spaces where the colonial state was directly responsible for policing and punishing
crime – Maseru was perpetually frustrated about the lack of integration and cooperation
between the aristocracy and its own officers when it came to surveillance and punishment.
The system also provoked significant criticism from Basotho activists, and particularly
from mission-educated elites who believed that the criminal justice system should be
organized around a universal Western model, and organic intellectuals who criticized the
ways that the politico-juridical system perverted the priorities of lords, making them
dependent upon the colonial regime for their authority rather than looking to their subjects
for legitimacy. Escalating social conflict and crime throughout the interwar period led the
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administration to officially pivot towards implementing universal best practices of policing
and punishment in the years immediately preceding and following World War II.
In Chapters Three and Four I examine the history of the largest carceral institution in
the nation from 1914 through the early 1950s: Botšabelo Leper Asylum. While
international lepraphobia spiked in the early 20th century, this fact alone does not explain
why Lesotho emerged as the only non-settler colony in Africa to face a stringently enforced
policy of compulsory segregation of persons suffering from leprosy. In Chapter Three, I
demonstrate how Maseru seized upon biomedical detention in hopes of securing the sort
of surveillance cooperation with the aristocracy which it was failing to secure when it came
to the problem of crime. Officials imagined that people infected with leprosy would be
easier to police and confine, both because of the visibility of the malady’s symptoms and
the expectation that a broad-based stigma would emerge once Basotho viewed the sick as
infectious. In the weeks after the facility opened, 700 patients passed through the gates.
The asylum quickly ran into difficulties. In May, a group of inmates rebelled, seizing hold
of the male compound for two days. In October patients began to slip under the facility’s
barbwire fence. By the end of the 1914 over a third of inmates had fled. The administration
proved unprepared to conduct its own violence work at the asylum. Meanwhile, the
aristocracy failed to return escapees, per the administration’s expectations. Lords and their
communities did not fear leprosy as expected. With the asylum on the verge of collapse,
the administration approached patients with both carrots (including visitation rights and
jobs which allowed for remittances to be sent home) and sticks (including jails inside the
asylum for punishing deserters), while continuing to pressure traditional authorities to
police more aggressively for new infections and deserters. In 1928, under imperial pressure
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to alter its leprosy policy, Maseru came up with a new plan: the administration created its
own force of leprosy inspectors charged with surveilling the countryside for sick people
and monitoring the diligence of lords in policing the malady.
In Chapter Four, I examine many of the same events covered in the previous chapter,
but focus on the administration’s evolving relationship with patients instead of with lords.
I use the sociological concepts of social death and the sick role to examine the elaboration
of asylum policy over the period spanning between 1914 and 1960. A key mistake of
asylum planners in 1914 was engaging residents as biomedical prisoners; officials expected
inmates to meekly accept social isolation, emotional alienation, and rapid physical decline.
Beginning in 1915 the administration was forced to acknowledge that the success of
compulsory segregation hinged on institutionalization of sets of rights and responsibilities
inhering in residents’ statuses as asylum patients/sick people. The articulation of these roles
interfaced with the construction of both extra- and intra-asylum social life. Botšabelo was
institutionally unique in Lesotho in the way that it brought non-missionary European
officials into close and long-term contact with a Basotho social cohort who were both
socio-economically subaltern and – as a matter of colonial policy, if not always ideology –
morally blameless for their detention. Out of these relationships patients both secured
powerful advocates and, especially, versed themselves in the moral language and pretenses
of colonial policymaking. Asylum residents leveraged and redefined myriad institutional
and societal roles – including as dutiful patients, heartsick mothers, wayward Christians,
helpless outcasts, and aspiring citizens – to make moral claims on the administration. The
arrival of sulfa drugs in the late 1940s, however, profoundly altered life at Botšabelo:
leprosy was transformed from a frightful malady, ostensibly best checked by keeping the
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sick segregated from the healthy, into a readily curable infection. These changes
undermined the longstanding compact of rights and obligations between ex/patients and
the administration. As waves of asylum residents were discharged as cured over the 1950s,
a large number opted to settle nearby the asylum rather than returning to their places of
birth. These decisions were not only motivated by shared interest in utilizing and
maintaining hard won entitlements, but also a testament to the real stigma of leprosy the
administration had inculcated into society over time and the vibrancy of the community
patients had built inside the asylum.
In Chapters Five and Six, I examine the relationship between penal reform and
national politics in the late-colonial and early post-independence eras. In 1947 a new Prison
Proclamation was introduced in Lesotho, creating a Prisons Department and Prisons
Service distinct from the police. This move was part of a broader imperial effort to
standardize and putatively modernize approaches to crime. Under the new laws, the
primary official mission of prisons was to reform inmates. In Chapter Five, I trace the shift
from a rhetorical penological pivot in the late-1940s into a genuinely welfarist model by
the late 1950s. Basotho activists – first with the League of Commoners and, later, the
nation’s first political party, the Basutoland African Congress – forced these reforms,
leveraging contacts in the British Left to create and publicize scandals in the metropole.
The biggest and most important scandal came following an uprising in the new prison in
1955, resulting in the death of four prisoners and one warder, the wounding of dozens more,
and the escape of over thirty inmates. In the wake of the rebellion, and speeches on the
floor of the British Parliament, significant funds and energies were poured into securitizing
penal infrastructure and professionalizing the prison service, as London sought to outrun

24

the emergence of a scandal concerning prison conditions in Lesotho. New regulations and
facilities were also introduced for capital and corporal punishment, and for female and
juvenile male prisoners.
In Chapter Six I detail the history of the prison service during the lead up and
aftermath of independence in 1966. I also seek to reframe and complicate understandings
of anti-politics in Lesotho. While James Ferguson and others demonstrate how an emphasis
on technical matters by Western donors obfuscates the ways that development initiatives
produce clear political winners and losers, I show that there are also sound reasons why
Basotho acting in good faith have embraced anti-political strategies. I trace how the
Lesotho Prison Service (LPS) was able to hold itself together during a period of escalating
political strife in the 1960s, and outright repression after 1970, by emphasizing its
apolitical, bureaucratic orientation. I demonstrate that the approach of prison
administrators and officers during this time must be understood as anti-political, rather than
simply apolitical, because the discourse of preserving best penological practices and
furthering national development was used to mask the true nature of LPS’s efforts – to
provide active comfort and aid to the opposition party – from the ruling party

25

Part I. The Birth of Prisons in Lesotho,
1850-1938

Chapter 1

The moral symbolism of punishment: making a tribe
in the 19th century Mohokare River Valley
1.1 Introduction
The drop likely killed the condemned instantly. The distance from the top of the most
precipitous ledge on Night Mountain (Thaba Bosiu) onto the rocks below is over 50 feet.
When a local prince and an American tourist stopped to peer over the edge at the execution
grounds of King Moshoeshoe’s capital in the early 1860s, their imaginations conjured far
different associations.1 Tlali Moshoeshoe drew a corollary to the classical Tarpaien Rock
described by Plutarch, a site atop Capitoline Hill in Rome where traitors were thrown to
their deaths during the republican era. Reginald Fenton, meanwhile, merely saw
confirmation of his prejudgments that his hosts were uncivilized and cruel. The site meant
something different still to the French missionary Eugene Casalis, who some years before
was accompanying Moshoeshoe on a walk when the king pointed out the krantz from
below, and related how a sense of guilt followed him after past executions; in the monarch’s
comments the missionary sensed the universality of Christian conscience, and the vast
potential for moral government to flower in a rugged, beautiful land.2
The idea that judicial punishments provide a gauge for the moral condition and
relative ‘level of civilization’ of a society is commonsense, today, within liberal
communities in places as geographically disparate as Lesotho, the United States, and
1

Fenton, R. 1905 Peculiar People in a Pleasant Land: A South African Narrative. Girard, KS:
Pretoria Publishing, 342-44. Tlali kindly provided the visiting Fenton with a tour of his father’s
capital. The pro-Boer American did not write up and publish his notes from the journey until 1905.
On the Tarpaean Rock, see Plutarch. 1859. “Coriolanus,” in Plutarch’s Lives, John Dryden, trans.
Boston: Little, Brown, & Co, 73.
2
Casalis, E. 1861 (published in French in 1860). The Basutos, London: J. Nisbet, 220-1.
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France.3 Advocates of criminal justice reform invoke the idea that the persistence of capital
punishment, high rates of incarceration, and violence within penal institutions demonstrate
the moral regressiveness of some political communities compared to others. The logic of
these appeals is not timeless or innate, but rather quintessentially modern. Until the 19th
century, most communities around the world employed violent punishments to judicially
sanction crime. As the industrial revolution took hold in western Europe and the
northeastern United States in the early 19th century, nonconformist Christian intellectuals
– fired by Enlightenment ideals of individual rights and human rationality – spearheaded
movements to reform judicial sanctions in the name of civilization and productivity. An
array of new institutions, including penitentiaries, reformatories, and workhouses, emerged
in centers of industrialization.4 Technological innovation went hand in hand with an
ascendant discourse of progress; reforming individuals to live more upright lives was
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critical to the work of creating not just better workers, but also better societies. The same
impulses which rallied some evangelicals to advocate reforming systems of punishment at
home, pushed others to forge mission societies to carry gospels and moral frameworks into
the global south.5
In any history of punishment and confinement in Lesotho, institutional technologies
like jails and asylums stand as obvious products of the colonial era. The stories of how
these technologies were articulated in Lesotho as infrastructure animates the subsequent
chapters of this dissertation. The construction of these disciplinary institutions, however,
required more than just bricks and iron. As in the North Atlantic, the revolution in
mechanisms for social control was built upon an intellectual foundation which
simultaneously framed the old way of effecting social control as anachronistic, and the new
as more moral and efficient. A technology which was more inconspicuous than the total
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institution, but no less impactful for the remaking of Highveld societies, from the 19th
century through the present, has been the instrument of comparative social morality and
levels of civilization.
This chapter explores the strange political career of the ideas of Eugene Casalis and
other early missionaries in the creation and positioning of Lesotho within a narrative of
linear moral progress. The Frenchman’s writings are a rich source of data on the early
history of Lesotho, beginning in an era when the nation was largely still in the mind’s eye
of Moshoeshoe. The weight given to Casalis’ voice by subsequent generations of historians
comes not just from the fact that Casalis produced some of the first written sociological
and historical portraits of peoples living in the Mohokare River Valley, but also the sense
that his expressions of self-reflexivity, deep knowledge of local language, and evident
affinity for his hosts made him a reliable observer.6 In this chapter I interrogate how
ideology shaped what the missionary focused on in his descriptions of society, and proceed
to detail how these decisions impacted the shape of governance and social control in
Lesotho over subsequent decades. The findings I describe very much echo the phenomenon
the anthropologist Michel-Rolf Trouillot describes as silencing.7 The traces of a submerged
story became visible only when I began to read scholarship on the history of prisons and
penology in the North Atlantic parallel to primary and secondary sources on 19th century
Highveld.8 I was struck by the conspicuous overlap between metropolitan debates over the
essence of human behavior and the ways that European observers and, later, colonial
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policymakers, conceptualized what effective and moral criminal justice looked like in
Lesotho.
When Casalis and two compatriots from the Paris Evangelical Mission Society
(PEMS) took up residence in Lesotho in the 1830s, they drew from constellations of
metropolitan discourse about civilized and productive forms of punishment at home, and
converted it into a metric for assessing (and a medium for describing) the moral health of
their new home and, particularly, the moral legitimacy of its king, Moshoeshoe.9 The
systems of punishment for law-breaking which the evangelists found in place – relying
primarily on fines, rather than performative displays of violence – informed the view that
they were dealing with an advanced African community, albeit one still in need of Christian
salvation and literacy, not to mention pants and petticoats. Over the course of nearly two
decades of living alongside and serving as a political advisor to Moshoeshoe at Night
Mountain, Casalis became a loyal and active supporter of his host. In the 1830s and 40s, a
moment in which evangelicals were toiling to do away with brutal and spectacular
punishments in the North Atlantic, the Frenchman sent a stream of correspondence for a
metropolitan audience noting both the low levels of crime and the dearth of violent punitive
mechanisms in the Mohokare River Valley.
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During the period in which Casalis was living in Lesotho and writing about the
nation in France, spanning from the early 1830s through the late 1860s, a debate raged
amongst North Atlantic prisoner reformers about whether the rationale for humane
punishment was fundamentally a moral or a practical question.10 As noted above, a faith in
the universality of the thirst for atonement with God through Christ inspired evangelicals
to push reforms around the world. As non-conformists advocated for putatively humane
punishments, like imprisonment, over the early- to mid-19th century, penal reform was
also catalyzed from a separate, rationalist direction. This school, rooted in the philosophical
school of Associationism, hinged on an efficiency argument for reforms, rather than a
religious one: incarceration and other physically non-violent punishments were useful
because they could effectively refashion unproductive and depraved individuals into
productive workers and citizens. Atheist reformers like Jeremy Bentham argued the
universal human desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain was the key to unlocking lasting
moral reform in individuals, rather than through Christ.11 In Bentham’s view, behavior
could be reprogrammed by cognitively ‘associating’ rule following with good experiences,
and deviation with bad; his famous panopticon was proffered as the most technologically
sophisticated instrument for carrying out this work.
The monopoly of Paris Evangelical missionaries over the production of written
narratives of society was short-lived. Over the 1840s and 50s new narratives about the
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confederation of peoples coalescing in the Mohokare River Valley emerged, including
from a growing white settler community eyeing African lands and stock, less culturally
relativistic missionaries (or those vested in the success of a different African polity), and
the vanguard of British colonial personnel. Moshoeshoe himself participated actively in
the emerging ocean of letters circulating around the Highveld grasslands and the coast,
relying on Casalis both as a clerk and for advice on how to style his political project to the
outside world. Sons from Moshoeshoe’s junior houses also studied letters in Casalis’
schoolroom and in Cape Town, and began to clerk for their father over time. In February
1858, while studying in the British Cape Colony, Tlali Moshoeshoe dipped pen in ink vial
and proceeded, over several weeks, to pour out deep wells of emic knowledge and Sesotho
auriture on the page. His handwritten ‘Litaba tsa Basutu’ (Story of Basotho), now housed
in the Grey Collections of the South African National Library, is the oldest written history
of Highveld peoples by an African.12
The body of various sources, and above all Tlali’s account, suggest that Casalis
dramatically oversimplified the reasons for the rarity of violent punishments in the
Mohokare Valley.13 Moshoeshoe’s infrequent use of executions and floggings was rooted
12
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in instrumental considerations as much as moral sensibilities. Spectacular displays of
sovereign power were infrequent because they were not necessary; the kingdom possessed
alternative structures for surveilling and socializing its people, deterring crime, and settling
disputes. That morality is foregrounded over efficacy in the writings of Casalis, speaks to
the concerns of the missionary, not necessarily those of Moshoeshoe. Indeed, it is entirely
reasonable to think that had an ardent Benthamite drafted the earliest history of the
kingdom, Moshoeshoe –– with his tightly nested social technologies promoting adherence
to labor tribute, military service, and participation in initiation lodges where young people
were corporally disciplined to abide by their station in society –– would have been cast as
an innovative rationalist on matters of crime, rather than as a proto-evangelical. As we will
see, Casalis’ lack of emphasis on explicating how precisely order was maintained through
psycho-social discipline (including what a Foucaultian-minded theorist might reasonably
call capillary power), in favor of detailing what the system lacked in terms of sovereign
power, unwittingly primed the ground for a second, more socially and politically pivotal
silencing from the 1880s onwards.14
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Over the late 1850s and 1860s, Moshoeshoe and confederated peoples defended
their lands from a series of invasions by white settlers from the Orange Free State. During
this period, the monarch, aided by Casalis and his literate sons, implored the British for
protection. He pleaded for Queen Victoria to admit his kingdom into the empire, and to
rule the land through his court on Night Mountain. The United Kingdom intervened only
in 1868, when Lesotho looked to be on the verge of complete collapse. The British,
moreover, did not proceed to rule through the existing aristocratic hierarchy. After
Moshoeshoe’s death in 1870, the territory was annexed to the Cape. The strategy for Cape
rule was formulated by a son of PEMS turned magistrate, Samuel Rolland, who advocated
a combined assault on the power of nobles by missionaries and magistrates.15 Although
cultural chauvinism certainly infused Rolland’s plans, his blueprint also displayed a keen
eye for how social control in the Mohokare Valley did function.
Rolland’s plan proved so destabilizing, and was implemented in such a breakneck
and aggressive fashion, that Cape magistrates and policymakers provoked two wars in
rapid succession. First came Moorosi’s War, in 1879. This conflict was followed by the
much larger and destructive period of civil strife known as the Gun War, which commenced
in 1880, and saw Basotho rebels fight Cape troops and Basotho loyalists to a standstill.
Even after a peace treaty was signed in 1881, the territory remained politically divided and
ungovernable to magistrates. When the Cape sought to pass to London the political tumult
and the financial tab of its making in Lesotho, British parliamentarians lambasted Cape
policymakers for their abject idiocy, observing that if the latter had only read Casalis they
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would have known that Basotho were inclined to civilization and loyalty as a race. In this
move there was a subtle but significant shift.
As Paul Landau has incisively argued, missionaries created tribes in Southern
Africa.16 Over the early 19th-century Europeans arrived in the Highveld, expecting to find
tribes. In writing down ethnographic and genealogical data about the communities where
the missionaries set up shop, missionaries fixed what had previously been malleable
discourses for describing networks of political affinities.17 The new approach to political
communities of tribes and clans soon took on a life of its own. It was leveraged by
prominent Highveld political players, including Moshoeshoe, as a means of inscribing (or,
in Landau’s words, ‘back-dating’) claims to territory and the fealty of people.18 Tribal and
clan distinctions were also instrumentally useful to European proselytizers as a means of
demarcating the jurisdictional turf of non-conformist mission societies, and as buckets for
comparing their successes and uncompleted work in transplanting universal (liberal
bourgeois) values and mores amongst communities across the subcontinent. Prior to the
1870s and 80s, missionaries frequently referenced the comparative level of civilization and
characteristics of tribal groups. Yet, even if tribal distinctions were held to be natural and
timeless, missionary conceptions of levels of progress were far from static; the supposedly
good and bad qualities of tribes inhered in culturo-political institutions and emerged as
products of leadership, and therefore were changeable over time. There was something far
different, however, about the way that Parliamentarians in the early 1880s used the concept
of tribe when considering how to engage politically with Lesotho’s people.
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Administrative control over the territory was passed back to London in 1884, a
moment in which North Atlantic views about the nature of human behavior were
undergoing a paradigm shift. The growing purchase of social Darwinism over the 1870s in
London and Cape Town interfaced with rise of a new penological science. Expert opinion
coalesced around the notion that criminality – and ‘moral character’ and behavior writ large
– were biologically heritable. 19 This new consensus deflated the old evangelical versus
rationalist debate, as the formerly disparate camps were increasingly bracketed together as
proponents of the quaint idea that post-natal experiences could lead people to meaningfully
change their behaviors and attitudes. Experts looked beyond the scale of individuals and
families, moreover, arguing that moral and intellectual characteristics inhered in entire
groups of people, according to race or tribe or nation and, within racial communities,
according to class.
When the new colonial administration in Lesotho set about trying to establish its
authority in 1884, British officials leveraged the same story as advanced by MPs in
Westminster. The administration looked to the House of Moshoeshoe as founts of the
noblest qualities of the race or tribe of Basotho. The skeleton crew of officers in Lesotho
began working diligently to reestablish the power of the monarch (now glossed as a
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‘paramount chief’) over a weakened and politically riven aristocracy, and divested
themselves of moral claims from Christian commoners who had bought into the missionary
and magistrate promises of liberal political and economic reforms. For the most part,
nobles, who had been under political assault during the period of Cape Rule, welcomed the
return of the narrative of judicious, grace-filled Moshoeshoe, including its new association
with biological essentialism; in sharing the colonial story, local African lords lay claim to
the fealty of diverse groups of people, lumped together as Basotho, in a way which
foregrounded dynasty and pedigree rather than effective administration or popular support.
Casalis’ writings were marshaled in the construction of a politico-legal edifice of tradition,
supposedly suited to the culturo-biological nature of Basotho.20 Although the
administration reserved the prerogatives of judicially sanctioned corporal and capital
punishment, African lords were legally empowered to adjudicate all types of cases and, in
practice, enjoyed sweeping powers to punish crimes as they saw fit. The emerging system
of social control provided the administration with coercive power without having to invest
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in expensive carceral infrastructure. Ironically, the more that Casalis’ writings were
invoked during the era, the more that questions and ideology which had motivated the
missionary receded from discussion and, over time, from memory.
1.2 Technological innovation and social control in a frontier zone
The early decades of the 19th century were a period of breakneck change on the Highveld,
the plateau resting at some 5,000 feet above sea level sprawling across the central-eastern
portion of the southern African subcontinent. The Highveld was a frontier milieu, lacking
centralized political authority. 21 It was marked instead by overlapping edges of territorial
space, occupied by peoples belonging to different socio-cultural groups and swearing fealty
to different local power brokers; this overlap generated competition for resources and
conflict, as well as sharing of technologies, languages, and values. A period of conflict
known as ‘the time of troubles’ (or Lifaqane), lasting roughly between 1815-26,22 spurred
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39

the consolidation of smaller groupings based around networks of kinship ties into
increasingly large polities which could provide better physical and economic security.23
The advent of larger political communities required scaling-up and adapting legal
systems to effectively settle intra-communal disputes and facilitate social cohesion.
Innovating upon longer standing political institutions, an emerging cohort of kings (and
one prominent queen) bound together expanding dominions through networks of
patronage, and used initiation school technologies to discipline young people in rigid
hierarchies based on class roles, gender roles, and age roles.24 Moreover, in order to build
upon rather than undermine existing hierarchies, and limit trampling upon localized
mentalities and sensibilities concerning just punishments, the emerging class of monarchs
largely looked to subordinate lords to settle torts in their own wards and fiefdoms; kings
and queens did serve, however, to resolve conflicts which arose between nobles and
geographically disparate communities. Livestock, and cattle especially, were the currency
of exchange in Highveld societies; the transfer of horns was used in the legal system both
to seal contracts like brideprice, and for judicial punishment. Although stock fines were
certainly the sanction of first resort, nobles also occasionally employed physically and
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socially violent punishments – including beatings, executions, and ostracism – to defend
their power and social order.
One of the most successful of the emerging class of Highveld monarchs was
Moshoeshoe. Over the span of a little more than two decades, he transformed his status
from princely heir to a small band – people nesting themselves within the Mokoteli lineage
branch of the larger genealogical community committed to honor of the Crocodile (Koena)
– in the upper Mohokare River Valley, into subcontinental power broker. Born Lepoqo and
initiated as Letlama, the name Moshoeshoe was drawn from a praise poem referencing the
swishing sound of a metaphorical razor as he shaved the beards (read: stock) of rivals.25
During the time of troubles, Moshoeshoe proved to be a strong long-term strategist. He
leveraged the mountainous terrain of his home to launch cattle raids on neighboring
communities and defend his own stock holdings. Destitute commoners, as well as fellow
princes with their own followings, swore fealty to the young lord as morena oa moholo
(meaning ‘great king’ or ‘great lord,’ later glossed in English as ‘paramount chief’) in
exchange for military defense pacts and a cattle patronage system (mafisa) used both to
generate livelihoods and seal marriage contracts. By the 1830s, the king controlled a swathe
of territory spanning from the Qhaba (Modder) River in the east to the Maloti
(Drakensberg) escarpment in the west.26 Even after finding himself securely ensconced as
the central hub of a powerful confederation, Moshoeshoe continued to scale up his efforts
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to secure internal social control by dispersing patronage and continuing to build his
confederation.
The monarch also vigilantly monitored activity at the edges of his dominion. The
most consistent source of raiding and tension came with the people following Queen
Mmanthisi and Prince Sekonyela, who were referred to as Batlokoa on account of their
leopard (tlokoa) crest.27 Moshoeshoe would eventually send Molapo, a beloved second son
and accomplished tactician, to preside over the northern reaches, a ward termed Leribe,
which abutted the heartland of the people of the leopard. Kings claiming lineage under a
duiker crest (phuthi) were Moshoeshoe’s allies on Lesotho’s Southern flank, adjoining
kingdoms that also spoke Nguni-languages. Moshoeshoe continued to build out his
confederation to the West over the 1830s by securing the fealty of Lord Moroka and his
people of the Kudu (Barolong), centered around Black Mountain (Thaba ‘Nchu), as well
as Lord Moletsane and his people of the lion (Bataung), then based near Mekuatling.28
These confederated lords provided a buffer between the territorial core in the middle
Mohokare Valley, and powerful Afrikaans-speaking, mixed-race Griqua (or ‘Bastard’) and
Koranna polities, feared not only as fellow raiders of livestock, but also as hunters and
traffickers of human chattel. Upon learning of the settling of white missionaries amongst
the Griqua on the Western frontier, Moshoeshoe broadcast his desire that one or more of
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these people come to live amongst his people, hoping to glean new insights into their
worldview and technologies.
1.3 Casalis’ assessment and narrative of a Highveld kingdom’s moral health
In 1833, a trio belonging to the fledgling Paris Evangelical Mission Society (PEMS), who
had effectively been wandering on the veld looking for a place to ply their trade, were
delighted to learn of the king’s open invitation to European missionaries. 29 In 1837, after
working with his colleagues Thomas Arbousset and Constant Gossellin to found the local
mission headquarters – a community they dubbed Morija –– Eugene Casalis established a
mission in the king’s capital of Night Mountain. The monarch and missionary quickly
became close. Both were profoundly interested in the other’s understandings of cosmology,
ethics, and geopolitics. The king was fascinated by the tales of the judges and prophets
from the Old Testament, and particularly by the story of the strange clothes, trials, travels,
and redemption of Joseph; perhaps he saw something of Joseph’s capacity to be a wise
vizier in the young Frenchman.30 Over time, Casalis did indeed become a trusted
diplomatic advisor. In his capacity as scribe and clerk to Moshoeshoe for some eighteen
years, Casalis generated – along with missionary reports to the Paris headquarter and
publications in its journal – the oldest extant written records of life in the middle Mohokare
Valley.
In his accounts Casalis demonstrates not only the zeal for spreading Christian
civilization broadly shared by fellow non-conformist missionaries, of his and subsequent
generations, but also a far rarer habit of mind. The missionary was only twenty years old
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when he first met the king, and was able to see (if not always countenance) the virtues of
many African institutions and technologies.31 Casalis – known affectionately in Night
Mountain as mahloana-matsoana (little black eyes) for the jet orbs peering out from
beneath wire-rimmed glasses – was animated by a deep stripe of reflexiveness.32 He was
troubled to report to the king ‘that the nations which recognised Jesus Christ still loved
war, and applied themselves to perfecting the military art.’33 In Moshoeshoe, the
Frenchman saw a monarch as committed to mercy and peace as any of the Christian kings
of Europe. Having been raised in a household, moreover, where tales of the repression that
befell his Huguenot ancestors following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes were drilled
into him as a child, Casalis was moved by the king’s openness to freedom of conscience
amongst his people.34 The missionary was perhaps most astounded by the practices of
criminal justice in the kingdom, and the ways that fines used to try to ‘wipe away the tears’
of victims predominated in place of judicially imposed suffering engineered to generate
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fear and, ostensibly, deterrence. Casalis was well acquainted with the brutality at work in
metropolitan penal facilities, having first ministered to shackled, half-starved, and
sometimes raving inmates at a military base in Bayonne.35
As noted in the introduction, the birth of Christian missions in Lesotho coincided
with a revolution in punitive technologies and infrastructure in Western Europe and North
America. Non-conformist Christians played an important political and intellectual role in
this process, by agitating for reforms and by creating institutions which would ostensibly
facilitate the redemption of persons through honest toil and structured prayer. The penal
reforms promoted by these activists circulated widely in the Atlantic. During his training
for mission work in Paris in 1831, Casalis might have passed Alexis de Tocqueville in the
streets as the latter prepared for his own journey, to inspect and report on the cutting-edge
penal system emerging in parts of the United States – particularly under Quakers in
Pennsylvania – for the new July Monarchy.36 The missionaries brought beliefs about the
need for humane mechanisms of preventing and responding to crime with them from
Europe to Africa. Having heard numerous legends of African kings who killed or sold into
slavery their followers without compunction, Casalis was not prepared for the society he
actually encountered.37 The depth of his misassumptions fueled the strength of his efforts
35
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to tell a different story. Just as Moshoeshoe perhaps favored the biblical story of Joseph for
what it said about his friend in a patched frock coat, two of the local stories Casalis and his
compatriot Thomas Arbousset, stationed in Morija, most frequently dwelt upon in their
writings – those of Mohlomi and Rakotsoane – cast the lord of Night Mountain as a protoevangelical.
Mohlomi was a noted doctor, rainmaker, and philosopher over the 18th and early
19th centuries, who travelled widely throughout the subcontinent.38 As a young man
Moshoeshoe sought out the polymath for advice on how he might become a great lord.
Like Huldah to Josiah, the Mohlomi of legend warned Moshoeshoe about the impending
‘time of troubles,’ but also foretold that the king could effectively shepherd his people
through the destruction with moral leadership.39 When the ambitious prince asked the best
medicine or sorcery for acquiring followers, the sage responded: ‘Motse ha o na sehlare,
sehlare ke pelo’ (power is not won by medicine, a [good] heart is the medicine). Mohlomi
further advised his mentee on the merits of various methods of securing the consent of the
governed. In lore, the meeting was a pivot in Moshoeshoe’s life, setting a rash and illtempered young man on an upward trajectory towards monarchical grace. Moshoeshoe’s
encounter with Mohlomi was a parable of wisdom.
Rakotsoane was the leader of an independent following in the Mohokare Valley.
Crazed with hunger and the violence of the time of troubles, his group began hunting people
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too weak to fight back. Amongst the victims of these malimo (devourers of
people/cannibals) was Moshoeshoe’s paternal grandfather Peete.40 When Moshoeshoe’s
first capital in Butha-Buthe was faced with being overrun by the people of the leopard crest
in 1824, the prince led an exodus of over 100-miles through rugged terrain to the more
defensible Night Mountain. While the group was traversing Lipetu Pass, however, the
malimo fell upon stragglers, including Peete. When Rakotsoane was later captured and
hauled before Moshoeshoe’s court, the king’s people demanded blood for blood. The king
rejected the calls for revenge, however, saying that this would be an unfit way to honor the
‘living sepulchers’ of kin. Casalis wrote, ‘These words were sufficient to rescue the
wretches whom he wished to bring to repentance. They saw in the clemency of their chief
an unhoped for means of restoration, and resolved themselves to avail themselves of it.’41
The malimo were not only spared death, but also provided with land and cattle so as to
have a less macabre means of generating sustenance. Moshoeshoe’s encounter with
Rakotsoane was a parable of mercy.
As with many other missionaries, Casalis also had a strange obsession with Shaka,
founder of the amaZulu nation and empire.42 The former caricaturized the latter as a leader
who amassed power ‘by putting to death, without mercy, anyone who would not submit to
his authority.’43 Although such statements are resonant with the martial race stereotype that
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would explode following the victory of people grouped as amaZulu over British troops at
Isandlwana in 1879, jumping to correlate the two streams of discourse elides at least one
important distinction. There is no evidence that Casalis believed that there was a prenatally
determined Zulu nature. The story of Rakotsoane is instructive here. As with Shaka, the
supposed cannibal was cast as a foil to the wisdom and decency of the lord of Night
Mountain. Unlike Shaka, however, Rakotsoane was presented with the opportunity to
abandon his wicked lifestyle under the enlightened tutelage of a great king. Although far
less of a reclamation project, Moshoeshoe was himself cast as having undergone a moral
rebirth following his meeting with Mohlomi.44 Even as Casalis and other nonconformist
missionaries reified (or ethnografied) tribes into existence, populating these conceptual
containers with stereotypes and assessments of the relative progress towards a civilizational
ideal, they believed progress was both possible and desirable. As we will see, however,
their work was ultimately used as the basis for more deterministic discourses.
1.4 Tlali Moshoeshoe’s ‘Story of Basotho’
While missionaries and travelers began the process of chronicling events in the early 19th
century Mohokare Valley, it was not long before local elites began to create their own
written accounts.45 Tlali Moshoeshoe compiled one remarkably early and divergent view
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on the history and sociology of the region in 1858, while attending school in Cape Town.46
The project began at the behest of Tlali’s host, the British Governor of Cape Colony, Sir
George Grey, who suggested the prince write the history of his tribe. In the evenings, after
putting down his studies of Alexander, Herotodus, and the Tarpeian Rock, the first son of
Moshoeshoe’s fifth house began writing down everything he could recall about his
homeland. Beyond the events which Tlali personally witnessed, it includes snippets of
praise poems and numerous anecdotes related to the prince by his grandfather Mokhachane
(Moshoeshoe’s father).
The document is raw and honest. Tlali, for example, notes the absurdly comic
circumstances of the earliest encounters with missionaries to pass through his father’s
community; an itinerant Irvingite preacher visited Night Mountain accompanied by a
translator with a thin understanding of negation in the local tongue, so it appeared the
missionary spent several days shrieking at the community to ‘pray to small dolls’ and
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‘covet the wives and cows of your neighbors.’47 While the prince was immensely proud of
his father, the portrait of Moshoeshoe is far less grandiose than in the accounts of Casalis
and Arbousset, or later imperial and liberal scholarship. Moshoeshoe was not presented as
a man of singular decency and wisdom, nor as a predestined nation-builder.48 The lack of
instrumental political goals for the text makes it a compelling document to assist in ‘reading
against the grain’ of missionary reports and official correspondences. Despite the name of
the document, flagging Basothodom, the text itself supports Landau’s argument about
tribes being a politico-cultural bucket of exogenous origin: Tlali described communities in
terms of shared stories of common ancestors, charting dozens of lineages living in the
Mohokare Valley. A critical reading of ‘Story’ also supports the theory that the nonviolent
sensibilities imputed to Moshoeshoe were exaggerated, both by interlocutors and at times
by the king himself.
By the 1840s Moshoeshoe frequently proclaimed his commitment to eschewing
warfare and violent punishments, having ostensibly turned the page on the rash actions of
his younger self.49 For the missionaries this transformation was all about personal growth.
As the king aged, he took more to heart the wise advice of Mohlomi and, of course, the
missionaries themselves. Tlali offers some additional insights into the complexities and
motivations underpinning his father’s zeal for nonviolent governance. First, the sociopolitical status quo was in his father’s favor.50 The king had effectively crushed or
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subordinated rivals, and violently smashed groups of brigands who preyed upon his
people.51 While successful raiding had paved Moshoeshoe’s path to the apex of regional
power, providing many of the cattle dispersed to solidify his own patronage network,
shaving of rich men’s beards was no longer in the king’s own interest. Second, the king
was not forced to deal with questions of intra-communal violence frequently, because of
the decentralized nature of political and juridical power in the kingdom.52 Moshoeshoe was
only responsible for enforcing the law in the first instance within his own community of
Night Mountain, while subordinate lords were allowed to enforce laws according to their
own ethical standards in their own communities. Third, Moshoeshoe was highly cognizant,
particularly with Casalis at his side, of the need to be mindful about representational
politics with the outside world; the path to British favor, and support against rivals, was
imagined to be moral respectability.53 Fourth, as we shall see below, there were still times
when the king felt it necessary to display his sovereign power with acts of extreme violence.

success in raiding and parlaying the gains into new allies which allowed his father to become ‘a
lion amongst the Basotho’ (s. 29) and made it so ‘there was no longer anyone who could scratch a
louse from himself onto Moshoeshoe’ (s. 31). As for Casalis and Arbousset, it was not that they
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Perhaps the great lacuna in early missionaries’ assessment of the peaceful
maintenance of order in Moshoeshoe’s kingdom was their lack of attention to psychosocial controls. Gender, class, and age-based conceptions of honor and shame were drilled
into young people through their families and, especially, in mephato (initiation lodges).
From a young age girls and boys were socialized to know and abide by expectations of
appropriate conduct organized around rigid social hierarchies: younger siblings deferred to
older, sisters deferred to brothers, wives deferred to husbands, age-mates deferred to the
lord’s son, village leaders deferred to nobles of higher rank, and so on across all manners
of social stations. For Casalis, a democratic ethos pervaded the king’s court.54 It was a site
the lowliest commoner could make his voice heard (women were generally denied access
to the court). Tlali’s account, however, makes clear that there were deeper cultural
dynamics at work that the missionaries failed to observe:
As for the lord of the Basotho himself [Moshoeshoe], he is not troubled by what the people
say, because he knows that the people are poor and of no importance at all. All that
concerns them is to be given meat. That is all. For a commoner to say anything is very
difficult in Lesotho. If a man is to speak he must be called… Even if a man is the son of a
lord…he will not try to speak…for they may criticize him and he would feel ashamed.
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The institutional technology of lebollo (initiation) represented the culmination of
the socialization process within gender roles. In addition to learning skills, notably
including fighting, young men’s bodies were disciplined with tests of endurance and
intense physical violence to loyally follow orders.55 Young women were schooled to be
dutiful wives and mothers. Violation of codes of conduct could result in public scorn,
corporal sanctions from family members, and in more extreme cases, ostracism. Networks
of patronage reinforced codes of behavioral conduct with a coercive edge, as access to the
means and fruits of production could be revoked from above; clients who displeased
patrons – whether commoner to lord or lord to king – might be punished by the loss of
cattle or lands, just as a male head of a household might deny his children or wife access
to food.56 Psycho-social dynamics also cast the story of Rakotsoane in a slightly different
light. By looking past the personal harm, Moshoeshoe created a legend for himself as a
magnanimous leader. The legend of king who could look past such a horror and personal
grievance was a tool for recruiting new followers. The incorporation of a former enemy
and his people not only reduced the number of opponents, but added a group of seasoned
warriors into the ranks of those honor bound to fight when called upon by their new king.
While willing to forgive raiding and even attacks from rivals, we shall see that Moshoeshoe
was less kindly disposed towards those who broke vows of fealty.
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The decade following the arrival of missionaries in 1833 was a period of relative
peace and abundance in the inchoate kingdom. Conflict with rival polities ebbed. The local
economy thrived, blessed by good rains and the introduction of wheat and peach trees by
the missionaries. The first three Paris Evangelicals were joined by new colleagues, opened
new missions, and slowly secured converts, notably including two of Moshoeshoe’s wives
and Molapo. Missionaries also successfully prevailed upon the king to outlaw witchfinding and European alcohol in the kingdom, as well as to temporarily discontinue
initiation schools on Night Mountain for much of the 1840s.57 While ecstatic about the
trajectory of their project, the missionaries also spied an ominous cloud on the geopolitical
horizon when wagonloads of European, Afrikaans-speaking settlers calling themselves
trekboere (sing. trekboer) began to trundle across the Senqu (Orange) River over the late1830s. The settlers secured Moshoeshoe’s permission to settle in an area they dubbed
Transoranje (‘Across the Orange,’ Transorangia in English), centered around present-day
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The initial witch-finding ban, applying to Thaba Boisu, was promulgated in response to an elderly
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was recalled to Paris (1848-51) to work at headquarters, missionaries clashed with Moshoeshoe
over the king’s decision to mount a campaign on Sekonyela. Missionaries ordered their
communicants not to fight and even denied communion to any individuals who ate meat from
captured stock; this stance caused many converts (including Molapo) to renounce Christianity, and
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Bloemfontein. The number of Europeans continued to grow over the early 1840s, and
engage in tit-for-tat cattle raids with Moshoeshoe’s allies (and trade for kidnapped slaves,
legalistically styled ‘apprentices,’ with the Griqua and Koranna).58 While no match for
Moshoeshoe’s people militarily in the 1830s or 40s, the increasing numbers and
organization of the white settlers alarmed both the king and the missionaries. The growing
political tensions of the frontier over the 1840s led Casalis to redirect much of his epistolary
output from musings on political and moral philosophy to Politics.
The PEMS missionaries in Moshoeshoe’s kingdom widely cast the Dutch-speaking
settlers as the worst purveyors of violence on the frontier. It seems the former regarded the
latter with the particular contempt of the faithful for apostates; in their vision the settlers
were fallen people who, unlike Africans, had been born with civilization at their fingertips,
but had made the active choice to continue to pursue rough lifeways and, most damningly,
to continue to trade and exploit slaves. The callousness which farmers ostensibly treated
humane life, and their imperiousness in dispensing justice in Moshoeshoe’s territory, was
a particular cause of concern.59 The king filed a formal complaint with the Cape in
November 1839, penned by Casalis, following an egregious incident. In October, while
Moshoeshoe was away from Night Mountain, a score of armed settlers rode up to the
mountain fortress hunting for two men. The fugitive pair, both of Griqua descent, had
recently arrived. The posse charged that one man had stolen sixteen cattle and the other
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had struck a farmer. After searching out and returning the stock in question, Moshoeshoe’s
councilors handed over the two alleged criminals under the promise that the pair would be
taken for trial in a magistrate’s court. The sight of vultures led residents of Night Mountain
to the men’s bodies. The pair had been shot, while still bound, only a short distance from
the capital. Moshoeshoe was outraged both to learn what had happened and by the fact that
the farmers did not respond to his court summons. He wrote to the Lieutenant Governor in
the Cape:
Both were killed on my ground and near villages belonging to me. Now Your Honor will
readily understand that by such an unwarrantable act of self revenge, they have brought me
into difficult circumstances with the nation to whom the two men belonged… If the farmers
assume the right of acting as Judges and Executioners in my Territories, the security of
myself and people is at once in danger… Joseph and Kievit deserved punishment, but they
had a right to expect that the punishment would be proportioned to the crime, and that it
would be inflicted by a proper authority.

In 1842 Casalis drafted a letter from Moshoeshoe requesting official recognition
from the Cape as the legitimate source of juridical authority in his corner of the Highveld.60
The request blended a bit of fawning with a bit of boasting. As the greatest champions of
civilization around the world, the British should lend their ‘protective aegis’ to the keenest
student of civilization on the Highveld. Moshoeshoe’s mantle of worthiness, moreover,
was most exemplified by his model of judicial mercy. Cape Governor George Napier
agreed, and issued a proclamation recognizing Moshoeshoe’s as ‘rightful sovereign.’61 The
following year the two men signed an official treaty, outlining the boundaries of
Moshoeshoe’s territory and stipulating the terms of alliance with the British Crown.62 The
king was charged to ‘restrain[ing] and punish[ing] any attempt to violate the peace,’
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recovering stolen property, apprehending ‘banditti,’ and extraditing Cape ‘fugitives from
justice.’ The intellectual basis of this alliance was a shared recognition of Moshoeshoe’s
ability to effectively, and humanely, maintain political and social control in his corner of
the Highveld.
1.5 Dueling narratives: the Queen’s greatest subject or Fagin of the Maloti?
The deal with the British did not last long. A story of Moshoeshoe as king of thieves was
emerging to counter the enlightened monarch narrative. Raiding for the stock of
neighboring communities was part of life on the Highveld.63 It provided a means for men,
or boys seeking to be recognized as men, to procure cattle to win followers, or to pay
brideprice to secure wives and thereby reproduce society. The 1840s witnessed not just
white settler complaints about Moshoeshoe’s role in cattle raiding, but also an increasing
number of hostile missionary representations. The arrival of ontologically rigid members
of the Paris Mission in the Mohokare Valley, who were less inclined to acknowledge the
sophistication and benefits of African institutions than Casalis or Arbousset, as well as the
perspectives of Wesleyans who were making inroads and conversions amongst peoples
who Moshoeshoe counted as vassals (people of the kudu) and foes (people of the leopards),
diverged from the glowing portraits flowing from Night Mountain and Morija.64 In 1845
the British sent a representative to monitor relations between the polities in the frontier
zone. Henry Warden was uninterested in the socio-cultural intricacies of raiding, viewing
the practice as theft, pure and simple. Over the late 1840s Warden bought into and

63

On an extended discussion on the history and historiography of raiding, see King 2019, 145-191.
Julian Cobbing accuses historians of being biased towards PEMS and Moshoeshoe, and hostile
to Sekonyela: Cobbing, J. 1988. “The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo.”
The Journal of African History 29/3: 487–519, 515 fn 147-9.
64

57

promoted the view that the inchoate Basotho confederation was a particularly bad actor,
driving conflict by continuously preying on the property of African polities, like the people
of leopard, and upon white settlers.65
Despite Warden’s support for the emerging white settler narrative of Basotho
thievery, and his work conveying this perspective to European and Cape publics, the
trekboere resented British encroachment into their affairs. After a newly installed Cape
Governor, Harry Smith, declared British sovereignty over Transorangia in 1848, the
farmers launched an armed rebellion. The Cape crushed the uprising but quickly followed
up with efforts to placate its conquered foes. To conciliate the vanquished farmer rebels,
and chasten Moshoeshoe for continued raiding by members of his confederation, Warden
redrew the map of regional borders on terms favorable to the settlers and Sekonyela, king
of the people of the leopard. Moshoeshoe accepted the new map, still hoping to retain the
status of ‘the Queen’s greatest subject.’66 The king’s decisions to swallow pride and narrow
self-interest, and effectively turn the other cheek in the pursuit of the higher good of peace,
are widely celebrated in Lesotho’s national memory and nationalistic historiography. The
apotheosis of this vision came in 1852, when yet another Cape Governor, George Cathcart,
marched on Night Mountain to force Moshoeshoe to pay an enormous fine, ostensibly to
compensate the king’s neighbors for lost stock.67 Although Basotho cavalry drove the
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invaders into retreat, Moshoeshoe immediately followed up his victory with a diplomatic
letter playing on Cathcart’s wounded pride:
This day you have fought against my people, and taken much cattle… I beg you will be
satisfied… I entreat peace from you,––you have shown your power,––you have chastised,–
–let it be enough I pray you; and let me no longer be considered an enemy of the Queen. I
will try all I can to keep my people in order in the future.68

This move was a marked political success, injecting new life into the enlightened king
narrative. Cathcart responded with a warm note, and issued a proclamation stating that
because Moshoeshoe made a ‘full and humble submission, and sued for peace’ that a state
of ‘good understanding and amity’ with the Crown was restored.69
While such magnanimous and shrewd deeds are understandably celebrated, the
narrative of cheek turning overly simplifies a complex historical situation. Moshoeshoe
was not willing to purchase peace at any price. Perhaps the most illuminating instances
came just before and just after the king outmaneuvered Cathcart. In 1851, Moshoeshoe’s
longstanding subordinate Moroka made a gambit for independence, and was crushed for
his ostensible disloyalty. A combined army of Moroka’s people of the kudu, Griqua, and
Cape troops under the centralized command of Warden were routed by warriors
commanded by Moshoeshoe’s son Masopha and ally Moletsane; the year of the battle of
Veirvoet was known for many subsequent years as tihela (throwing off, from the verb ho
liha), an allusion to the 152 enemy soldiers killed after being driven by ax and spear from
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the edge of the mountain’s cliff.70 Ten months after the return of good understanding and
amity with the Crown, Moshoeshoe leveraged his political capital and, in the words of
Tlali, looked at King Sekonyela ‘and decided that he would go on fighting him, year after
year if necessary. Then he went and destroyed him.’71 After the battle of Marabeng in 1853,
the people of the leopard scattered, with many families throwing in their lot with new
aristocratic lineages in Lesotho and others taking refuge together in Wittebergen Reserve.72
The threat posed by Moshoeshoe’s other major rival, the white settler community,
presented a more intractable problem for the monarch. By 1854, Cape officials were weary
of the high administrative costs for the Orange River Sovereignty, and allowed the
formation of independent farmer republic of the Orange Free State (OFS). This growing
community, with high levels of gun ownership, and political connections in the Cape,
emerged as the primary military threat to Basotho in the years following Veirvoet and
Marabeng. Over the late 1850s and 60s the OFS launched a series of border wars against
Basotho, repeatedly pointing to cattle theft as casus belli.73 The first invasion – known as
Senekal’s War – came in 1858. Farmers marched on Night Mountain, pillaging
homesteads, villages, and mission stations on their way. The active role of PEMS in
advocating for Moshoeshoe, and critiquing white settler behavior in correspondence with
the Cape, blew back on the missionaries. Commandoes razed the missions at Beersheba
and Morija; the latter attack resulted in the destruction of all written copies of
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Moshoeshoe’s laws and much of Arbousset’s life work.74 Although Basotho forces rallied
and drove the farmers into retreat, a weapons gap was ominously trending towards weapons
chasm.75 A far more destructive invasion, known onomatopoeically as the ‘Seqiti’ war, for
the crack of farmer cannons, commenced in 1865.76 This time the commandoes not only
sought to recoup losses and secure fresh spoils in stock, but worked to extirpate Africans
from the land so as to clear territory for white settlement.77 The cordial relations
Moshoeshoe had enjoyed with earlier settler leaders, like Josias Hoffman (OFS president
from 1854-55), faded away, as presidents like Jacobus Boshoff (1855-63) and Johannes
Brand (1863-1888) promoted the legend of the essential cupidity and feloniousness of
Basotho. The antipathy of this narrative rubbed off in the account of Fenton, who drew
upon Charles Dicken’s Oliver Twist in describing Night Mountain as ‘garret to the “nation
of thieves,”’ and casting Moshoeshoe as Fagin and Tlali as the artful dodger.78
King Moshoeshoe turned eighty in 1866, but worked tirelessly, despite his
advanced age, to secure intercession during the border wars. He reprised the roles of
supplicant and protégé, simultaneously lauding the British sense of justice and arguing that
London could effectively civilize the territory through the king’s office.79 The British
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finally answered Moshoeshoe’s supplications in March 1868, proclaiming a Lesotho now
on the verge of complete collapse before an invading Free State army as British Territory.80
The same month a contingent of Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP), commanded
by Walter Currie, crossed the Mohokare River and established three police camps.81
Unsurprisingly, the primary concern of the force was preventing stolen livestock from
crossing the border. In the Treaty of Aliwal North, signed in February 1869, Cape Governor
Wodehouse and President Brand settled the question of Lesotho’s borders, without even
allowing Moshoeshoe to be present. Outraged but desperate, the king agreed to the new
map, reducing his dominion to a third of the size it had been three decades earlier.82
1.6 A new missionary narrative of aristocratic and patriarchal exploitation
Moshoeshoe died in 1870, only months after the arrival of the first British administrative
personnel. The king’s eldest son by his first house, Letsie, assumed the position of morena
oa moholo. The kingdom, ravaged by conflict for over a decade, now found itself bitterly
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divided politically. The second and third sons of Moshoeshoe’s first house, Molapo and
Masopha, ruling over Leribe and Berea districts respectively, rejected overrule by their
brother. The British debated just how to proceed with governing newly acquired
‘Basutoland’ and, particularly, the appropriate role for a monarchy riven with internal
conflicts. Colonial bureaucrats in London weighed fiduciary responsibility to metropolitan
publics against a moral duty to promote liberal values and institutions.83 In 1871, instead
of opting to govern Lesotho through the monarchy, in the manner proposed by Moshoeshoe
– or coopting nobles under the Shepstonian system as advocated by the police commander
in the territory – London approved the annexation of the territory by the Cape Colony, as
a cost-conscious way of promoting civilization.84 The significance of this move was
compounded the following year, when the Cape was granted self-governing status.
Officials in Cape Town began to dictate policy in their far-flung ‘Native Reserve,’
confident they could cow any local opposition with the protection racket diplomacy of
threatening to withdraw protection against an OFS invasion.
Building new institutions for administration, surveillance, and punishment were
priorities for the vanguard of colonial officials. This infrastructure served as the coercive
backbone of the inchoate state. The territory was divided into the four districts of Berea,
Cornet Spruit (Mohale’s Hoek), Thaba Bosigo (Maseru), and Leribe, each administered by
a Resident Magistrate.85 After Charles Griffith’s 1871 appointment as Cape Governor’s
Agent and Chief Magistrate for Basutoland, he rapidly set about recruiting a local police
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force: Tlali and nine other nobles signed on as officers, and 100 commoners enlisted as the
rank and file.86 Amongst the first messages Griffith sent back to Cape Town was a request
that each magistracy be provided with six pairs of handcuffs and cat-o’-nine tails, as well
as funds for building lock-ups in district capitals.87
While the first generation of missionaries are remembered for vocally advocating
for their royal patron, later waves of French-speaking protestants were increasing hostile
to the aristocracy.88 The growing antipathy towards local political technologies and
institutions was partially rooted in a rising tide of culturo-racial chauvinism. But it was also
based on an increasingly fine-tuned appreciation for how social control operated differently
in Lesotho than in Europe, and the time worn experience of seeing lords check religious
and cultural conversion. Emile Rolland, scion of a prominent PEMS family, was intrigued
by the prospect of using the colonial state to aggressively remake society in the image of
an idealized European form.89 He sent a pivotal memorandum to the Cape Governor
arguing that ruling through the existing aristocracy meant condoning and abetting slavery.
In Rolland’s understanding of obligatory communal labor (mafisa) and bride price
(bohali), nobles used their power and wealth to exploit the unpaid labor of commoners and
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women.90 He recommended a joint push by magistrates and missionaries to undermine
traditional authorities: magistrate courts, mission schooling, and Christian marriage could
be dangled to commoners as instruments for liberating themselves from the bonds of
aristocratic and patriarchal power. In Rolland’s mind, transforming Lesotho into a just
society would require not only the construction of new laws and physical infrastructure
like jails, but also outreach to alter local perceptions about the nature of crimes, culpability,
and justice. In this way, officials and missionaries could ‘pave the way for the introduction
of statute law’ in the future.
In 1872 a newly arrived crop of resident magistrates took up these questions.91 A
Special Commission was tasked with studying existing laws and making recommendations
for new statutes. Tlali, and a handful of prominent Basotho nobles and missionaries,
provided testimony. When the Cape promulgated a revised legal code for the territory in
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1877, it was maximally aggressive towards the aristocracy.92 Not only did the laws vest
magistrates with a wide punitive repertoire, including fines, imprisonment, and flogging
and capital punishment (of males), but it sought to blur the boundaries between civil and
criminal law when it came to the issues which concerned Rolland. It became an assault to
force a young person into a marriage or an initiation school, and to physically coerce the
labor obligations of commoners to chiefs.93 The code also undercut the authority of nobles’
courts by giving magistrates sweeping appellate powers. Given the thinness of the Cape’s
presence, however, fines handed down by chiefs, rather than sentences of time or pain
handed down by magistrates, remained the principal currency of justice. In the next chapter
I describe the elaboration and design of penal infrastructure in Lesotho over the late-19th
and early-20th centuries, but here suffice it to say that magistrates’ actual power to imprison
was severely limited by a lack of infrastructure for women and for men facing longsentences.
Chief Magistrate Griffith’s broad plan was for the administration to bide its time,
allowing for a growing cohort of Christianized elite to seize upon legal and market
mechanisms to gradually supplant the aristocracy.94 The recruiting efforts of mission
churches were bolstered both by the displacement and trauma of the border wars as well as
the rapidly shifting social landscape. The advent of taxation, new market opportunities, and
the growing monetization of the economy, meanwhile, changed the relationship between
lords and commoners. The rush of diamond prospectors to Kimberley in the early 1870s
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gave rise to a ‘golden age’ of agriculture in the Lesotho, as savvy Basotho agriculturalists
began using oxen-drawn steel ploughs to produce wagonloads of grain for sale in the
booming town. Suddenly there were wealthy commoners, some of whom nobles sought to
punish by ‘eating up’ up their newfound assets with judicial fines. Missionaries attacked
local practices of brideprice and initiation schools from the pulpit and in the classroom,
and insisted their flocks use magistrate’s courts. Not everyone, however, embraced the new
order. A prophetic movement emerged calling for a return to traditions of old: female
prophets known as matuela received messages in trance states, introduced healing dances,
and called upon people to discard Western lifeways and technologies.95 The movement,
which peaked in 1876, was an early articulation of the idea that colonialism was a
wellspring of social contamination rather than progress.96 Ultimately, time was not allowed
for Griffith and Rolland to incrementally change society, as imperious district magistrates
and Cape officials precipitated a series of armed conflicts with traditional authorities.
1.7 Clashing narratives and civil wars
The first of two wars against Cape rule, known as Moorosi’s War, came following a
jailbreak in the Southern district of Quthing in 1879.97 Moorosi was king of a following
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bearing the Duiker (Phuthi) totem, and a longstanding and powerful confederate of the late
Moshoeshoe. In the colonial imagination, however, Moorosi was little more than a king of
thieves, a notorious raider who presided over a multi-lingual, multi-racial following united
by a shared passion for pilfering stock.98 John Austen, the magistrate for Quthing, directly
precipitated the war by arresting Moorosi’s son Doda in late 1878, on a charge of horse
theft. Instead of allowing the prince to be sent to the notorious Breakwater Prison in Cape
Town, Moorosi’s men stole into the Quthing magistracy in January 1879 and forced the
door of the ramshackle lockup, liberating Doda.99 In March, with Austen issuing
ultimatums for the surrender of the prince, the king and armed followers took refuge on a
defensible mountain. In November 1879, Cape forces – backed by men sent by
Moshoeshoe’s heir and successor, Letsie Moshoeshoe, to demonstrate loyalty to the
colonial regime – scaled the peak with ladders. The rebels were slaughtered, and the
handful of survivors shipped off to prisons outside the territory. Soldiers mutilated
Moorosi’s body, and sent the monarch’s head to King William’s Town for public display.
Despite the Cape’s seemingly resounding victory, the peace was short-lived. Emboldened
by its victory, the Cape government of Prime Minister Gordon Sprigg and Governor Henry
Bartle Frere immediately pushed aggressive measures seeking to double the hut tax, disarm
Basotho of firearms, and open Quthing to white settlement.100
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The Gun War thus came on the heels of the Moorosi War.101 The sons of
Moshoeshoe disagreed about whether to accept or resist Cape demands, and a civil war
commenced in 1880. The conflict pitted Cape-loyalist mateketoa (those who received
‘tickets’ for their surrendered weapons) led by Paramount Letsie, against mabelete (‘wild’
or ‘unbroken’ persons) led by Letsie’s brother Masopha Moshoeshoe and nephew Joel
Molapo. Cape troops again crossed the Mohokare River, but this time were repeatedly
thwarted and routed by the rebels. Mabelete used their knowledge of Lesotho’s
mountainous terrain to launch quick but devastating assaults on colonial troops over the
summer months of 1880-81. In one attack at Qalabani in October 1880 rebels killed 39
Cape troopers.102 The mabelete were also able to secure rough, if proportionate, justice for
Moorosi in January 1881: John Austen’s severed head was sent to Letsie.103 The conflict
was marked by all the atrocities that attend with war. Combatants preyed upon the
homesteads, kraals, and bodies of civilians.104 Although colonial troops withdrew in 1881
– a face saving measure for the Cape involving Basotho paying a one-time indemnity in
exchange for the lifting of the demand to surrender firearms and preserving the geographic
integrity of the territory – insecurity and internecine strife continued. Nowhere was the
violence more acute than in the northern district of Leribe, where a succession battle known
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as Lepatlepatle, waged between Molapo’s sons Joel and Jonathan, was grafted onto the
fighting and did not peak until 1883.105
The aftermath of the Gun War thus proved to be a continuation of the humiliation
for the Cape. Magistrates were unable to surveil the territory or project power beyond the
immediate reach of a handful of administrative ‘camps’ – the seats of the Cape magistracies
– adjoining the eastern and northern border of the territory.106 Their ally Paramount Letsie,
who moved the royal capital from Night Mountain to Matsieng (meaning ‘place of Letsie’s
people’) after becoming Morena e Moholo in 1870, was also weakened by the war and
continuing disorder.107 Letsie’s authority over his kin had been tenuous from the beginning
of his paramountcy, and was significantly eroded by his decision to relent in the face of
Cape ultimatums and his inability to protect subjects who surrendered their guns. Masopha,
meanwhile, had burnished his image through his principled opposition to the Cape’s
meddling in Lesotho’s internal affairs, tactical brilliance during the fighting, and symbol
decision to take up residence on Night Mountain. As word of the social turmoil in Lesotho
reached London, members of the House of Lords lumped criticism on the Cape
Government for its rash actions, ‘If we traced back their earlier history it would be found
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that … there were no more loyal people than the Basutos, and but for their disarmament
the Cape Government would have found amongst them their most staunch supporters and
most able allies.’108 When the aggressive imperialist partnership of Cape Governor Henry
Bartle Frere and Cape Prime Minister Sprigg collapsed over 1880-81, the new local
government, under Prime Minister Thomas Scanlen, was keen to pass the political
responsibility and financial expense of governing Lesotho back to London.109 And indeed,
Cape Rule had resulted in a humiliating and expensive stalemate, given local people cause
to be suspicious of the motives of missionaries and officials, and exacerbated social and
political divisions. It thus took some time for officials in London to decide how to handle
the ‘prickly hedgehog’ embodied by Lesotho.110
The jurisdictional and technological division of social control that emerged in the
decades following the resumption of British imperial rule in 1884 are discussed in the next
chapter. Before delving into the systems for customary fines and penal servitude, or the
evolving relationship between Maseru and Matsieng, it is first vital to examine how the
rationale(s) for exercising the coercive powers of the state were built on a narrative
foundation which repurposed old stories in new ways. As intimated above, a key issue for
officials in Whitehall and Westminster was how to frame the history of British involvement
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in the territory. During the interregnum between the official end of the Gun War in 1881
and the resumption of British imperial rule in 1884, it became clear that the representations
of the territory carved out by the Cape magistrates and missionaries on the ground would
no longer do. Officials wanted to reestablish a more cooperative relationship with the
aristocracy. However, as a putative champion of freedom, committed to stamping out
slavery around the globe, Britain could not make common cause with African nobles
committed to dominating and exploiting the unpaid labor of commoners. The Free State
tale of Lesotho as a den of thieves, keen to prey innocent neighbors’ property before turtling
within a shell of British protection, was also a problem for an empire committed to the
promotion of law, order, and peace. Further raising concern were the rumors in liberal
activist circles in England – particularly amongst the Aborigines Protection Society – of
growing use of spirituous intoxicants in Lesotho, supposedly threatening the ‘rapid
impoverishment and gradual decay of a fine and industrial race.’111
The Colonial Office and their allies in Parliament gravitated to the idea of reprising
the previous terms of British-Basotho relations. Lord Emly cited a letter from ‘A French
missionary, M. Cassilis [sic],’ who ‘had given an interesting account of Basutoland, where
he had laboured for 40 years,’ describing ‘the state of things which at one time prevailed,
under which the Basutos were united with this country,’ and further averring ‘the great
majority of [Basotho] would desire to return to the state of things which existed in 1869.’112
In December 1883, after reading reports of the sacking of a magisterial fort in Leribe, the
Colonial Office had had enough, and announced plans to officially disannex the territory
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from the Cape and assign administration to the High Commissioner in Cape Town.113 The
commissioner at the time, Hercules Robinson, quickly repealed the Rolland-inspired laws
and, under Proclamation 2B, promulgated on 29 May 1884, granted Nobles’ Courts the
power to handle all criminal or civil cases in the territory. The Irishman Marshal Clarke
was sent to reestablish the imperial foothold on the ground, as Resident Commissioner.
The Colonial Office provided Clarke with straightforward instructions:
Expenditure must not exceed revenue... For the present, it will not be possible to attempt
more than the protection of life and property and the maintenance of order on the border.
The Basutos should be encouraged... to establish a system of internal self-government
sufficiently stable to enable them to suppress crime and settle inter-tribal disputes.114

The mechanics of imperial control in Lesotho beginning in 1884 looked, on the
surface, very familiar. Over the 1850s and 60s Moshoeshoe had implored the British to
take Lesotho as a British Territory which could be ruled via the king’s court on Night
Mountain. Although the British had rebuffed the idea at the time, this idea now appealed
to London, at least rhetorically. In Letsie they saw a partner who might live out his father’s
vision.
1.8 Colonial Governmentality and the Shared Story
The resumption of British imperial control in Lesotho overlapped with a broader sea
change in British governmental rationality, both at home and abroad. As William Forsyth
wrote in a pioneering text on the intellectual history of British penology, ‘By 1880…it was
widely argued [in England]... that moral and intellectual qualities were not primarily the
result of postnatal experience but were transmitted by heredity.’115 At the same time,
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imperial policymakers were beginning to argue that the moral and intellectual qualities of
groups of people, lumped according to nations or races or tribes, were also fundamentally
shaped by heredity.116 In his work on the emergence and circulation of scientific racism in
South Africa, Saul Dubow maps how the discourse surrounding native policies in the Cape
of the late 1870s was marked by a transition from the logics of the civilizing mission
towards ‘the hard edged coin of social Darwinist thinking.’117 Dubow further suggests that
‘no better example of this shift can be found than the 1878 presidential address delivered
by the governor and high commissioner, [Henry] Bartle Frere, to the newly constituted
South African Philosophical Society.’118 In his speech, the architect of disarmament in
Lesotho called for the creation of an ethnological body tasked with scientifically cataloging
the ‘characteristics – intellectual as well as physical – of the native African races,’ which
he imagined could be used to cater governmental policies towards tribal groups.119
Although the Cape was no longer in control in Lesotho after 1884, the new imperial
administration was predicated on assumptions à la Bartle Frere about the existence of a
‘Basotho race’ endowed with discrete tribal characteristics. Instead of launching fresh
ethnographic studies as the former governor had called for, however, British
parliamentarians and colonial bureaucrats mined old missionary accounts – and above all
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Casalis’ rich reports and letters – for data. In the new imperial imagining, the local
aristocracy could be given relative freedom because nobles had demonstrated a proclivity
for humane governance in the past. Moshoeshoe was cast as the apotheosis of the best
qualities of the race, thereby justifying colonial support for the exercise of political power
by his bloodline. This support was all the more essential because missionaries – extending
from Casalis through Rolland – were now held to have been demonstrably wrong on one
important count: there were limits on how far (or, for liberals not quite ready to abandon
the idea of progress, and capable of tolerating discursive dissonance, at least how fast)
Basotho might realistically progress in the bourgeois Northern European cultural and
political molds. The geologist George Stow distilled this argument in The Native Races of
South Africa:
To attempt to establish a history for a race which, from the remotest ages, had been unable
to build up a history for itself, must, one is inclined to believe, always prove a failure and
to expect to turn men... from the debasement and degradation of serfdom and slavery,
suddenly into a race of noble-minded patriots, can be an idea entertained by enthusiastic
visionaries, who hope for miracles in utter defiance of all the experiences of past history.120

The universalistic pretensions of zealous reformers during the period of Cape Rule had
thus been doomed, not because magistrates launched an all-out assault on systems which
enjoyed meaningful levels of popular legitimacy, but rather because of an inherent
incompatibility of the alternative institutions with the essential nature of The Basotho. The
post-1884 order was supposedly premised on a more scientifically sound foundation,
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holding that any social, economic, and political reforms had to be unfurled in such a way
as to ensure no clash with tribal characteristics.
In this moment of transition, in which the expense and futility of forcibly
reorienting society was drawn into high relief by two wars, the old discourse and
stereotypes produced by Casalis and Moshoeshoe resurfaced. The notion of the essential
tendency of Basotho to judicial sobriety and humane punishment was useful to authorities
in both Lesotho and England: lords lodged a claim that they had ruled morally in the past,
and could and would do so going forward, while the British were able to walk away from
a moral commitment to ensuring good governance and a financial commitment to investing
in infrastructure in the territory. For the half century following the resumption of imperial
rule in Lesotho, the shared story of the humane governance of Moshoeshoe – recorded for
posterity by missionaries, and none more proximately, persistently, or persuasively as
Casalis – served as the narrative core underwriting the political compact between the
administration and lords. As we shall see, beginning in the next chapter, this story
profoundly shaped the elaboration of governmental institutions and processes over
subsequent years. In returning to Casalis’ focus on the moral character (turned
characteristics) of leaders, authorities promulgated the notion of political legitimacy
inhering in blood. This move elided consideration of formerly critical technological
components underwriting societal cohesion, like the psycho-social controls observed by
Tlali. Even more fundamentally, the discourse made the delivery of services from
authorities to subjects, like access to land and justice in the courts, into a secondary issue.
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1.9 Chapter Conclusion
Paul Landau has shown how missionaries carried assumptions of the existence of tribes
onto the Highveld over the early 19th century, and actually served to reify these sociopolitical groupings through their work and writings.121 A major factor in this reification
process was the active participation of political authorities vested in solidifying or
advancing claims over land and people. Moshoeshoe was an early and successful adopter
of this strategy. Tribe was not the only socio-political expectation which missionaries
carried with them into the fields of the lord, nor the only one Highveld leaders seized upon
as useful. PEMS personnel, and above all Eugene Casalis, also assumed that judicial and
punitive approaches said something fundamental about the nature of society. As with tribe,
Moshoeshoe deftly leveraged a discourse of his humanitarian approach to social control
and punishment to underwrite a moral claim to power. Over a period of over thirty years,
spanning from the 1830s through the late-1860s, Moshoeshoe, Casalis, and allies worked
to populate the culturo-political container of Basotho tribe with stories of the king’s abiding
mercy and judiciousness.
Casalis and Moshoeshoe were not able to craft a narrative unopposed for long
before being challenged by political and intellectual authorities with different interests.
White settlers sought to undermine the monarch’s moral standing as a pretext to seize lands
inhabited by people with ties of fealty to Moshoeshoe. Other mission societies also
challenged PEMS’ narratives, desirous to extol their own good work inculcating universal
virtues in different imagined communities. A lot more than pride was on the line. With
British political support and trade in arms hanging in the balance, success in establishing
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the truth of moral government could be the difference between holding together a polity or
watching it crumble, between reaping a harvest or losing the land to invaders, and between
life and death for hundreds if not thousands of subjects.
Yet, when the British did formalize their support for Moshoeshoe in 1868, the
discursive landscape was shifting. The emphasis on responsible governance and humane
punishment, which had so inspired Casalis, was receding in import to missionaries as well
as to liberal policymakers in the Cape and London. The generation of European observers
who sought to craft a narrative about Lesotho after the territory became a British colony
foregrounded a different litmus test of social morality and Christian civilization: free labor.
This metric was used to justify attacking, rather than defending, the social order. Emile
Rolland and his fellow magistrates demonstrated little concern about whether use of the
scourge and the rifle were in line with the teachings of Christ.
The political career of Casalis writings took a stranger turn still after the return of
rule from London in 1884. A British desire to attempt indirect administration through the
aristocracy, rather than directly via their own magistrates and other personnel, coincided
with deep shifts in the ways that metropolitan experts understood human behavior.
Whereas early missionaries in the kingdom had cast Moshoeshoe as an exemplar of how
proto-evangelical leadership could lead a community out of the moral wilderness, the
colonial state was committed to the idea of civilization as biologically overdetermined.
Few officials in London or Maseru seemed to care, or even remember, the older debate
which had raged amongst reformers in Europe only a few years before, relating to whether
social and moral reform came from appeals to conscience or responses to stimuli. The old
narratives produced by Casalis, staking out a claim in this debate, and seconded by
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Moshoeshoe to bolster his political position, were recycled for new ends. The old narrative
provided reason, embraced both colonial officials and local lords, for the aristocracy taking
charge of social control in the territory once again.
The legend of the judicious and merciful tradition of Moshoeshoe continued to
grow after 1884. Although the colonial state and descendants of the houses of Moshoeshoe
were the most obvious beneficiaries, they were far from the only purveyors of these stories;
the narratives rapidly trickled through Lesotho’s social strata, from the top on down, and
were seized upon by a variety of interests. The advance of an increasingly brazen antiAfrican and European-supremacist legal order on the other side of the Mohokare River –
stretching from the expansions of pass laws to segregation and beyond – gave Basotho a
collective reason to support a narrative undergirding the continuation of territorial
sovereignty. Over time popular histories became an idiom of patriotism to ordinary
Basotho assailed by overlapping structures of physical and economic violence within local,
national, regional, imperial, and even global systems. Colonialism was rife with
psychological violence, empowering officials and structures that paternalistically
undervalued and dismissed the knowledge, expertise, and even the morality of Basotho;
the existence of a forebearer who understood and acted upon putatively universal ideals –
at a time when British judges were still putting fellow citizens to death – was a symbol
affirming the wisdom and worth of a national collective. The narrative would, furthermore,
come to feature in critiques of the aristocracy as corrupted, and in anti-colonial and
nationalist pronouncements about an august past showing the possibilities of, and
potentially even a path towards, a more just future.
By the early years of the 20th century, the missionary narrative of Moshoeshoe’s
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ardent opposition to capital punishment, extolled for posterity in the writings of Casalis,
was becoming hegemonic in Lesotho. One of the last primary sources attesting to more
monarchical ambivalence about the penalty are minutes of an exchange in the Basutoland
National Council, a body formed in 1903 to allow a select group of elites to advise the
administration on policy.122 During the 1911 session, the administration put before the
council a measure banning judicial executions of juveniles.123 A number of councilors rose
to speak in support of the measure, noting that the law was in line with Sesotho tradition
based on Moshoeshoe’s ardent opposition to the death penalty. A small group of elderly
councilors who had personally known the late king pushed back against this argument,
however, and went on to name a short list of people Moshoeshoe put to death over his long
tenure as king, including young people. Although these dissenters’ words were inscribed
in minutes and remain available at the Morija Archives, their arguments have been all but
forgotten. My decision to rehash these testimonies now is neither motivated by positivist
absolutism nor a dismissal of the real social goods and political space secured by leveraging
the narrative of merciful Moshoeshoe over time. It is based, rather, on questions about the
deeper intellectual and political limitations of these stories.
Here it is useful to return to where we began: considering how and why different
observers looked at the same sheer ledge at Night Mountain and perceived different moral
worlds in the communities stretching out on the plains below. On the surface the portrayals
of society by Reginald Fenton and Eugene Casalis appear to be diametrically opposed. The
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American tourist purveyed a shallow but destructive mythology of exoticism and
barbarism. The French missionary, on the other hand, worked tirelessly for decades to
promote the idea that Moshoeshoe’s kingdom was the greatest purveyor of humane social
order and, indeed, genuine justice, on the Highveld. Yet, despite the marked difference in
the rigor and substance of their arguments, the portrayals shared significant ideological and
epistemological overlap. In their portrayals of life in the middle Mohokare Valley, both
authors engage in inductive arguments about levels of civilization. This approach was
based not just on the commonsense of ideal-types of just and humane government, but also
the premise that closeness or deviation from these ideal types provides a meaningful metric
of the character of a society and, even, of its constituents.
One can simultaneously acknowledge Casalis’ good faith effort to define his host
society, and in a way that served to bolster his patron’s political position, while also
recognizing the ways that the story of benchmarking civilization in the Mohokare Valley
is replete with violence and exploitation. Categorization of this sort is, quite simply, an
instrument of division, designed to rationalize treating groups of people differently than
others. This intellectual architecture, moreover, has often represented a rigged game, in
which economically and politically dominant groups have played an outsized role in
shaping discourse about which institutions, practices, and people are normative and
humane (and what and who is deviant). It would be remiss to fail to also note, with the
hindsight of over two centuries of carceral archipelagos sprawling around the world –
perpetrating ‘slow violence’ against tens of millions of incarcerated individuals, and
facilitating various forms of domination and exploitation against hundreds of millions of
others, particularly the poor and/or brown-skinned people – that the notion that prisons
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represent an obvious improvement over the sovereign violence of European ancien regimes
is clearly more complex than allowed for in either John Howard’s gospel or Jeremy
Bentham’s philosophical proofs.
Although the historiography of Lesotho is deeply marked by teleological theory –
spanning across the hopeful evangelism of Casalis, triumphalist imperial Whiggism, and
Marxist framings of the past as prelude to the ultimate victory of Lesotho’s workers over
capital –– the first son of the fifth house of Moshoeshoe models an alternative approach.
Despite grappling with contentious political issues (involving his own family no less) the
prince was able to recount the past without simplifying events or subjects to make them
cohere to a prefabricated narrative. ‘Litaba tsa Basutu’ also draws into focus the ways that
peoples in the Mohokare Valley adopted systems from one another as well as from
missionaries and officials, and adapted them to their own ends. Tlali’s approach thus serves
as a polestar for this dissertation. Instead of framing elaboration of the systems of social
control as trending towards some end or ideal, or of disciplinary institutions having a
correct form based in a particular ethno-cultural provenance, I seek to trace how institutions
and infrastructures have been re/invented within the particular crucible of Lesotho’s
politics with profound and surprising impacts on the lives of people.
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Chapter 2

By kraal or gaol: social control, punishment, and progress,
1884-1938
2.1 Introduction
Dueling metanarratives animate the history and mythology surrounding penal strategies in
Lesotho: a progressive universalism and a traditionalist critique. The former holds that
penal confinement is the most technologically advanced, socially productive, and morally
upright means for human communities to respond to criminal trespasses by individuals.
The traditionalist critique, meanwhile, foregrounds cultural specificity and relativism: the
fact that Highveld societies did not use confinement prior to contact with Europeans, and
generated forms of social harmony and conformity using other mechanisms, gave rise to
the notion that imprisonment in Lesotho was not only a superfluous technology, but
arguably also one which was culturally out of place.
Events surrounding the crumbling of empire, from the late-1930s through
Lesotho’s independence from Britain in 1966, fixed in place the popular association – in
Lesotho, Britain, and liberal scholarship – of the administration with progressive
universalism and Basotho, both nobles and early nationalists, with traditionalism. Such a
vision, however, confounds and conflates the shifting positions of intellectual and political
authorities during the period spanning the first half century of British imperial rule. This
chapter explores how the elaboration of strategies, technologies, and infrastructures for
social control interfaced with discourses of universalism and traditionalism during the
period spanning from 1884 through 1938. This era witnessed British administrators stand
as vocal proponents of the utility of Sesotho traditions of punishment, some lords support
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the use of some Western techniques of punishment in the name of effective crime control,
African petty bourgeoisie activists continuously press for a transition to putatively
universal punitive regimes, and an association of organic intellectuals offer a powerful
challenge to hegemonic narratives of what constituted tradition and served to prevent
crime.
Traditionalism and universalism emerged as politically charged discourses with the
advent of colonialism. The pugnacious universalism of Cape policies primed Lesotho for
the subsequent British imperial embrace of traditionalism. When the Cape assumed direct
control over Lesotho in 1871, officials set about trying to build up a criminal legal system
aimed to eventually supplant the aristocracy. Policymakers perceived that the hard power
of lords flowed from their ability to wield economic coercion.1 Order was underwritten by
patron-client relationships: commoners followed the social expectations set forth by lords
for fear of the withdrawal of their means of livelihood, including both loaned cattle (mafisa)
and allocations of land plots. This control by the kraal extended into the judicial realm:
legal trespasses were overwhelmingly punished with fines in livestock. Cape magistrates
envisioned replacing the existing system, which was seen as exploitative and economically
stultifying, with control by the jail (or gaol, per period British spelling).2 While the
1

Motlatsi Thabane has trenchantly dissected structures governing class relations in early and mid19th century Lesotho, both in their own right and as a corrective to earlier liberal and Africanist
accounts that presented society as egalitarian: 2002. “The Nature of Social Relations in the
Nineteenth Century,” in Pule and Thabane 2002: 59-77; and 1996. ‘A Mutual-Benefit Utopia
Where Exploitation Was Unknown?’ South African Historical Journal 34/1: 240–48. For more
analysis of the forms of power infusing social relations: Mothibe, T. 2002. “State and Society,
1824-1833,” in Pule and Thabane 2002:15-34, 25-7 and 32-4; Burman 1981, 37-8. As discussed in
Chapter 1, social relations and political legitimacy were further woven together with threads of
fealty and obligation, overlaid with the potential for gendered forms of honor and shame, which
extended from the paramount and high-ranking nobles down through subordinate lords to
‘headmen’ (boramotse) and commoners.
2
Missionaries and magistrates saw the specter of slavery in matsema (tributary labor) and bohali
(bride price, and specifically the fact that polygamous lords and wealthy men ‘purchased’ more
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construction of the territory’s first lock-ups was indeed part of this endeavor, the small size
and structural insecurity of these facilities meant that magistrates themselves used fines, as
well as the cat o’ nine tails, as the primary penalties for breaches of colonial statutes. As
detailed in the proceeding chapter, the aggressive attack on the political and judicial
authority of lords (and African firearm ownership) led to two wars, and the ultimate
collapse of Cape Rule.
When the new imperial government arrived in Lesotho in 1884, the territory was
awash in violence, disorder, and political discord sown by Cape policies. The founding of
a new administration involved a dramatic reframing of what moral wrongs its officers were
imagined to battle against: a campaign to combat lawlessness emerged in place of the
Cape’s crusade to stamp out economic exploitation. Thus, despite the fact that the new
administration concurred on the question of how traditional modes of social control in the
Mohokare worked, it diverged on the question of the morality of these structures. Tradition
and stability instead emerged as fetishes for the new Maseru-based administration. The
underlying ideological rationale was that Sesotho political and legal institutions stood as
the best possible mechanisms for fighting the scourge of crime, and enforcing social control
more broadly, in the territory.
The resumption of imperial rule in 1884 witnessed the construction not only of a
dual legal system,3 much discussed in the literature, but also parallel infrastructures for

wives and also, eventually, children to put to work): see 65n90; Epprecht 2000, 17-24; Burman
1990. The practice of nobles expropriating the independently generated wealth of commoners in
court (‘eating up’) was cast, moreover, as an assault upon the sanctity of private property and the
very spirit of industry in the nation (Rolland, ‘Notes on the Political and Position of the Basuto
Tribe,’ ‘in BR4, 130; Griffith to Southey, 27 Feb. 1872, in BR6, cited and discussed by Thabane
2002, 70).
3
Until the 1980s the notion of African societies having discrete colonial and traditional laws was
common sense: Poulter, S. 1972. ‘The Place of the Laws of Lerotholi in the Legal System of
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violence work.4 The coercive and punitive division of labor, hashed out between the
administration and aristocracy over the first several decades of imperial rule revolved, most
fundamentally, around space. In Lesotho, the specific geographical features of the territory
compounded the more general urban and rural divide that Mahmoud Mamdani describes
as a defining feature of colonial governance in Africa. With the interior shrouded in a
‘mountain penumbra,’ the British built bigger and more closely spaced police and penal

Lesotho.’ African Affairs 71/283: 144–62; Allott, A.N., ed. 1970, Judicial and Legal Systems in
Africa. London: Butterworths. This paradigm came under a torrent of critique with the rise of the
‘invention of tradition’ and ‘legal pluralism’ scholarships, which detailed how ostensibly dual legal
codes were created through the colonial encounter – and, indeed, entangled and mutuallyconstitutive – and therefore part of a ‘plural’ legal order. On invention: Ranger, T. 1983. “The
Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” in The Invention of Tradition, E. Hobsbawm and T.
Ranger, eds., 211–62. Cambridge: Cambridge University; Chanock, M. 1985. Law, Custom and
Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia. Cambridge: Cambridge University;
Starr, J. and J. Collier. 1989. History and Power in the Study of Law. Ithaca: Cornell University;
Spear, T. 2003. “Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa.” The
Journal of African History 44 (01): 3–27. On pluralism: Benton, L. 2002. Law and Colonial
Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University; Merry,
S.E. 1988. “Legal Pluralism,” Law and Society Review 22: 869–96; Mann, K. and R. Roberts, eds.
1991. Law in Colonial Africa. Portsmouth: Heinemann.
4
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(2018. Violence Work: State Power and the Limits of Police. Durham: Duke University, 10).
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punishment are primarily shaped by levels of crime, and instead call attention to the
instrumentalities of criminal legal systems. Seminal texts include: Rusche, G. and O. Kirchheimer.
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facilities in the band of ‘lowland space’ (less than 2000m elevation) adjoining the border.5
The handful of ‘camptowns’ abutting this border represented areas where the Basutoland
Mounted Police (BMP) served as the first line of surveillance and violence work, and where
criminal defendants were generally whisked into the colonial court system. Rural and
overwhelmingly mountainous space, meanwhile, was left almost entirely to nobles to
control.
Notwithstanding professions of confidence in Basotho technologies of social
control, the imperial administration began rebuilding and expanding the carceral
infrastructure inherited from the Cape within weeks of arriving in the territory. New or
expanded jails in the lowlands were built each decade between the 1880s and 1930s. From
the beginning, Maseru maintained that access to institutions of universal criminal legal
system was a right for the small cohort of Europeans in the territory. The early
administration also enshrined an official monopoly over the power to impose corporal and
capital punishment, as well as judicial incarceration.6 In the 1890s colonial officials
invoked moral universalism with the idea that just desserts and effective deterrence

5
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required that Basotho face the jail cell, lash, or gallows – and therefore colonial courts –
for committing select grave crimes. The emergence of labor migrancy to South Africa as
an economic necessity and rite of passage for Basotho men, particularly in the first three
decades of the 20th century, also fueled the growth of the carceral system: migrants
transiting through lowland border space meant more work for colonial police, judges, and
warders.
Lords and princes on the 19th century Highveld adjudicated torts between aggrieved
parties. The advent of imperial rule meant nobles faced pressure not only to mend social
injuries but also to maintain constant surveillance of subjects, and to remit persons accused
of particular crimes to the administration for trial and, potentially, punishment. By the early
years of the 20th century the royal capital of Matsieng served as the effective command
center for a customary ‘franchise’ of police, with footholds in nearly every corner of the
territory. A succession of paramounts used the Highveld technology of ‘placing’ to install
sons and allies in new jurisdictions, subordinating locally-based lords in the process. In this
way it became increasingly difficult for lords to passively, much less actively, resist
colonial dictates – as Matsieng and Maseru were constantly engaged in the work of sharing
intelligence and coordinating action. The creation of a National Council in 1903, moreover,
allowed for the codification of Sesotho legal and political traditions, and the annual liaising
of administrative officials and the highest echelons of the Basotho aristocracy on matters
of tradition, law, and order.7
Claims about the efficacy of customary controls in checking crime became more
tenuous during the period spanning from the 1910s into the 1920s. While the colonial state
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maintained that migrancy was a profound boon to the territory materially, officials were
forced to also acknowledge real social costs. Both prominent lords and colonial bureaucrats
argued that marked statistical increases in robberies, stock thefts, assaults, and murders
every few years flowed from the loss of traditional values and mores attributable to young
African migrants encountering urban life, and reimporting crime and vice into the territory.
Critics from the petty bourgeoisie, meanwhile, blamed nobles: not only were lords
unaccountable and backward, by dint of being empowered on account of blood rather than
qualifications or competence, but the ranks of the aristocracy as a whole included and
protected more than a few jackals clothed as shepherds.8 In the late 1910s a new
organization emerged which centered blame for all social problems – including rampant
crime – on the changes wrought by colonialism, capitalism, and mission churches: Lekhotla
la Bafo (LLB, ‘Council of Commoners’) maintained that Sesotho traditions and
institutions, notably including relationships within and across social classes of commoners
and lords, were once infused with reciprocity and interdependence in ways that facilitated
social harmony for all.9 While framed as a more studious traditionalism, LLB critiques
likely married 19th-century Highveld political ethics with creative applications of liberal
discourse.
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Debates about the morality and efficacy of ostensibly Sesotho-traditional versus
British-modern instruments of social control surged in the 1910s, catalyzed not only by
pressure from mission-educated Basotho elites and peasant intellectuals, but also
bureaucratic pressures emanating out of London to standardize policies towards crime and
punishment within the empire. The administration invoked the supposed centrality of
physical chastisement in Sesotho tradition to deflect metropolitan pressure to curtail its
own use of judicial corporal punishment. Maseru instead took steps to make the legal
infliction of pain more uniform and to rein in the pervasive extrajudicial physical violence
meted out by police, warders, lords, and messengers. The number of offenses punishable
by caning, and actual sentences involving the brutal instrument, expanded dramatically
over the 1910s into the 1920s, as the administration responded to a rising tide of complaints
about lawlessness in the Sesotho press and the National Council. The 1910s also witnessed
a dramatic escalation in the number of hangings carried out by the administration.
The introduction of a Prison Proclamation in 1917 served to assuage concerns
within the colonial establishment about the direction of Lesotho’s penal system, but also
left administrators and warders in a position where they were forced to respond to
discrepancies between policies and practices more than ever. The legislation was lifted
from the statutes of South Africa and colonial Zambia without adequate consideration of
what penological expertise and carceral infrastructure was required for implementation.
Jail officials struggled with basic legal (and safety) requirements, such as procuring
adequate segregated spaces for confinement of female, mentally ill, and juvenile offenders,
and made little effort to maintain biometric records or to classify prisoners as mandated by
law. These realities testify to the fact that incarceration in pre-WWII Lesotho was aimed
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to punish with suffering and deter with fear. The system did not promote the moral reform
of individuals or the differentiation of criminals as a social class, as waxed on about in
London and called for locally by progressive-minded Basotho and expatriate missionaries.
In 1938 the administration passed two laws overhauling Lesotho’s political and
legal systems: officials arrogated the powers to dictate who was (and wasn’t) a lord and to
review (and amend) the decisions of Native Courts. The colonial regime thus took firm
control of the central instruments for effecting social control in rural territory. While the
changes ‘vindicated’ decades of critiques from the BPA, they were only precipitated by a
period of acute crisis and tragedy.10 In the wake of a horrific famine in Lesotho in 193233, London dispatched an economist to carry out a detailed review of colonial policies in
the territory.11 Alan Pim’s report called for recalibrating colonial rule in the territory to an
indirect, rather than ostensibly parallel, mode: that is, lords should be employees of the
administration rather than partners vested with a high degree of autonomy. The case for
these reforms hinged largely on the relationship between lords and crime: the milieu in
which Pim carried out his investigations was rife with rumors and cases of nobles
themselves involved in organizing crime, brutally cracking down on minor offenses, and
seeking to settle scores independently of Maseru and Matsieng.
In the years following the end of WWII, development and modernization emerged
as watchwords of the British imperial establishment, including in His Majesty’s Prisons in
Africa. In Lesotho funds arrived to build a new central prison and provide training for
warders, as we shall see in Chapter Five. Colonial officials at the time cast themselves as
redoubling an older commitment – supposedly evidenced by existing prison buildings and
10
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laws – to pulling a society with 19th century technologies of social control towards the
institutions and standards which were universally the most humane and effective way to
do social control in the 20th century. The problems with this metanarrative of a sustained
British push to build progressive penal institutions are not merely academic: the myth has,
perhaps most notably, enabled colonial and African policymakers in the decades following
WWII to slouch into a fatalistic register, citing the supposedly enduring incompatibility of
Sesotho culture and incarceration, when confronted with evidence of bad conditions of life
and work in Lesotho’s prisons. This chapter offers a very different narrative of the
elaboration of structures for social control in the territory.
2.2 The front side of the law: re/imagining policing in the early colonial era
Prince Lerotholi and a retinue of hundreds of horsemen met Marshall Clarke and Godfrey
Lagden outside Mafeteng camp on March 17, 1884.12 As the eldest son of Paramount Letsie
escorted the new British Resident and Assistant Resident into the colonial capital, the party
passed razed buildings and the skeletal remains of horses, grim evidence of the conflict and
insecurity that had plagued the territory since 1880. The following day, the trio joined the
paramount, outgoing Cape officials, dozens of lords, prominent missionaries, and some
2,000 commoners for a pitso (public forum). Tributes and prayers ceremonially marked the
political transition underway. Direct rule by the government of the Cape Colony was out.
Maseru would now report to a High Commissioner (HC, also in Cape Town) who, in turn,
answered directly to the Colonial Office in London.13 Clarke faced the urgent question of
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how to expeditiously promote the social controls demanded by the High Commissioner
and the Colonial Office in London: namely checking the smuggling of stolen stock and
liquor across the border. These issues took precedence to the generalized insecurity in the
territory on account of the political pressure brought to bear, respectively, by Free State
politicians and the metropolitan paternalistic humanitarians in organizations like the
Aborigines Protection Society.14
Clarke and Lagden were each carefully selected for their roles. Clarke was chosen
because of his experience working with traditional authorities while serving as a magistrate
and military officer underneath Theophilus Shepstone, setting up a system of indirect rule
in Natal.15 Lagden, meanwhile, was recommended by Clarke, and confirmed by the
Colonial Office, on account of his expertise in ethnology, an interest which had nearly cost
the young officer his career on account of an unauthorized expedition into the Asante
Empire.16 London hoped that Lagden’s knowledge of comparative civilization would
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support the pragmatic Clarke in building up an administrative approach that dovetailed
with the supposed ethno-tribal traits of Basotho to promote effective social control.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric about tailoring colonial policies to accord with local
traditions, the new administration adopted a policing approach in line with broader shift in
the techniques and rationales of surveillance and violence work within the British Empire.
Cape policing was predicated on High Victorian Era conceits of the indispensability
of the British to the world. Historians of British metropolitan and imperial policing identify
three central Victorian-era typologies, which were ethnologically fused with discourses of
race and nation.17 In the England of the 1880s, Whig histories presented the creation of the
London Metropolitan Police in 1829 as the apotheosis of an august Anglo-Saxon tradition
of self-government.18 This first ideal type was contrasted against the foil of a foreign,
‘continental’ approach: the paramilitary maréchaussée and gendarmerie created by
absolutist monarchs in 18th-century metropolitan France and its colonies were criticized
(and caricatured) in Britain as the personal brute squad of despots, rather than as protectors
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of and for the citizenry.19 The Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), created in 1822 and
controlled by Dublin Castle (the English colonial administration), represented a third ideal
type. This force was designed to surveil and control swathes of large, sparsely populated
countryside and, in a part of the Union, moreover, where many people yearned for political
independence. Its constables were organized along paramilitary lines, and outfitted with
firearms.20 To English pundits in the late-19th century, the efficacy of the RIC could be
explained by looking to the second branch of the mythical family tree: the Normans. Unlike
at home, where the democratic impulse was vaunted, in Ireland and elsewhere in empire,
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an officer corps bearing the blood of conquerors would deliver ‘divided and confused
people[s] from anarchy.’21
The Irish model had an important early influence on the Southern African
subcontinent, including in Lesotho during the era of direct rule from Cape Town.22 In the
1850s the Cape Colony transitioned away from using the regular military units of the Cape
Mounted Rifles to police the space at the outer reaches of the colony, towards a paramilitary
model called the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP), partially modeled on the
RIC. After Lesotho became a protectorate of England in 1868, the FAMP was immediately
sent across the Mohokare. It established ‘police camps,’ which became the seats of
magistracies. 23 At the time, the presence of this force was widely appreciated by Lesotho’s
population, as physical embodiments of the British promises to prevent further incursions
into the territory by Free State commandoes.24 In 1872, after Lesotho was annexed by the
Cape Colony, police tasks were handed to a newly created, locally-based force: the
Basutoland Mounted Police (BMP).25 The unit was designed to provide magistrates with
investigative wherewithal and coercive muscle independent of the aristocracy. This first
iteration of the BMP was not only made up of Africans but also led largely by Africans:
100 privates recruited from the missions reported to eight NCOs and three officers of noble
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blood, including Tlali Moshoeshoe. The brief lifespan of this African-led, armed, selfconsciously modern police force stands as testament to a moment of ascendant Cape
liberalism.26
When Clarke mulled over the question of how best to police Lesotho in 1884, the
growing strength of the idea that Western political institutions were not readily compatible
with African cultures created a different set of possibilities than existed a mere dozen years
earlier.27 Although the force created in June 1884 was also called the Basutoland Mounted
Police, it was a far different institution than its predecessor. The entirety of the old force
was sacked. Much of the rank and file were later rehired, at lower rates of pay. The old
officers were not brought back. While a handful of nobles did join the force as officers over
ensuing years, these men were always placed under the direct command of a white officer;
from the late 1920s through the 1950s, moreover, an unofficial color bar prevented Basotho
from rising beyond the rank of sergeant.28 The duties of the reconstituted BMP were greatly
reduced. The new force was responsible for patrolling the border, with an eye towards
curtailing the smuggling of stock and liquor. It was also responsible for ensuring order in
the police camps, work that was mostly comprised of guarding prisoners in jails and
checking the passes of Africans to affirm that the holders had secured permission from the
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proper authorities to venture into the ‘colonial reserve.’ Beyond the thin band of space
adjoining the border the new administration ceded virtually all policing and juridical
authority to their partners in the traditional authorities.
Historians of empire have incisively described the latter model of effecting
surveillance and control as a typology in its own right: franchise policing.29 The
paramountcy received the inchoate state’s blessing to wield a measure of legal violence.30
The front line of surveillance for lords were ordinary people. Village ‘headmen’
(boramotse in Sesotho, literally ‘village fathers’) were bound to report land disputes,
threats, and fights to the court of their liege lord; an obligation captured by the axiom ‘blood
and soil [issues] are for the lord’ (mali le mobu ke tsa morena).31 When it came to potential
use of violence, representatives of higher-ranking lords sometimes sent men to support
headmen and villagers. These ‘court messengers’ effectively embodied the police forces of
individual nobles, acting with the authority of their lord when investigating crimes, issuing
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summons, making arrests, and executing judgments. Lagden described ‘The System’ of
policing in early colonial Lesotho:
The Chiefs were given duties… When criminals were wanted or tax had to be collected
they acted… They did the entire Police work leaving the uniformed force drawn from their
ranks little beyond the duty of carrying messages. That was a system [Basotho] liked. It
admitted of no oppression. It was certainly effective.32

The Colonial Office wanted Maseru to administer lightly and Lagden provided a
rationalization for the soundness of franchise policing. Letting his comparative
ethnological imagination run wild, the officer wrote:
The character of the Basuto was a distinct force… Instinctively they were law-abiding.
They were amenable… to control by those whom they respected… Active by nature as all
mountaineers are, more industrious than most native races, eager for education and
advance, they had all the temperament of which promising nations are made.33

As absurd as such sweeping statements of tribal characteristics are on their face,
ethnological science deeply inflected the political and social history of Lesotho. A vision
of a people, united by shared ethno-cultural traits of a mountaineering race, interfaced with
a policy of limited investment in the infrastructures used for surveillance and control in the
metropole. Money spent on these ostensibly culturally anathema technologies was wasteful
and, even, counterproductive. Support for the aristocracy – and, especially, the
paramountcy – as the front line for policing and disciplinary work, on the other hand,
represented a more productive and, even, culturally sensitive approach to establishing
control over the territory. One area of violence work the administration never asked of
lords, on account of the fact that there was no historical evidence of compatibility between

32
33

Lagden 1910b, 629.
Lagden 1910b, 629.

99

Sesotho traditions and forcible incarceration, was to establish or administer the ‘native
prisons’ found in a few corners of the empire.34
2.3 Placing, policing, and the paramountcy
Letsie acceded to the paramount’s throne in 1870, following the death of Moshoeshoe.35
Despite being universally recognized as the agnatic heir, Letsie was treated differently than
his father. The new monarch’s brothers and his late father’s confederates bristled at the
prospect of overrule from Matsieng. This challenge was capped by Masopha’s decision to
move from Berea, the ward he was assigned by Moshoeshoe, to the late king’s capitol of
Thaba Bosiu.36 Masopha’s relocation intimated that Moshoeshoe’s third son, rather than
the first, was the true vessel of their father’s political project. Letsie’s awkward political
position and fissiparous pressures increased further still after the arrival of the Cape
administration in 1871. The Cape provided protection against the existential threat of a
Free State invasion, on one hand, but was committed to undermining and supplanting the
monarchy, on the other. Matsieng’s moral and political standing were deeply tarnished by
the decision to cleave to Cape demands during the Moorosi Rebellion and Gun War.37
During the latter conflict, Masopha burnished his image as the principal rebel commander.

34

OBL, MSS Afr.s 211, Box 3, Lagden, Address to Royal Scottish Geographical Society, 3 Jun.
1901, 358.
35
Blanchet-Cohen, T. 1977. ‘Moshoeshoe, the Chieftainship and the Basotho: The Past Lingers on:
A Review Article.’ Journal of Southern African Studies 3/2: 230–35; Ashton, H. 1938. ‘Political
Organisation of the Southern Sotho.’ Bantu Studies 12/1: 287–320; Jones, G.I. 1966 ‘Chiefly
Succession in Basutoland,’ in Succession to High Office, J. Goody, ed., 57-81, Cambridge:
Cambridge University; Hamnett, I. 1965. ‘Koena chieftainship seniority in Basutoland,’ Africa 35:
241-51.
36
Theal, BR6: Austen to Bowker, 26 Jan. 1871, 5-7; Masopha to Barkly (transcribed by T. Jousse),
15 Jul 1871, 34-5; Griffith to Barkly, 7 Aug. 1871 and 8 Aug. 1871, 86-7. Also: Burman, S. 1979.
‘Masopha c. 1820-99,’ in Black Leaders in Southern African History, C. Saunders, ed. 100–113.
London: Heinemann.
37
Sanders 2011.

100

The arrival of an imperial administration in 1884, professing a desire to work with and
reinforce customary authority in Matsieng, and hostile towards the maverick Masopha,
represented an important boost in Letsie’s political fortunes.38
Letsie’s approach to asserting his political preeminence on the East Bank of the
Mohokare, and extending his authority into the Maloti, used technologies of power which
converged with British expectations. The most basic building block was the common sense
of shared identity as a unified kingdom. During his lifetime Moshoeshoe not only worked
to promote the idea of himself as king of a unified people amongst his own lords and
subjects but also, with the aid of loyal missionaries like Casalis, to the outside world.39
Letsie continued to promote this vision after acceding to the throne. With the 1884
resumption of British rule, the local administration embraced the idea that Matsieng was
the political heart of a unified Basotho political community. Clarke and Lagden viewed the
paramountcy as a foundation upon which to build a standardized – yet wholly traditional –
system for social control.
Officials were optimistic that the Highveld technology known as placing would
facilitate bureaucratic standardization.40 Moshoeshoe used this practice to install (ho bea,
38
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literally ‘to put/place’) kin and allies in strategic locales, thereby creating buffer zones
against rival polities, and facilitating the expansion and defense of the king’s territorial
dominion. After acceding to the paramountcy in 1870, Letsie quickly began to place sons
and allies in the Maloti.41 Other prominent sons of Moshoeshoe did the same within their
own smaller dominions. Although placed lords and their retinues sometimes clashed with
established leaders, the former generally sought to co-opt and build upon the existing
structures.42 They claimed bokhinapere, territory and subjects upon which ‘to graze’ (the
term literally refers to a knee halter for a horse). The new subordinates had little choice but
to assent to a reduction in territory and status, for fear of drawing the wrath of the
sponsoring authority. After 1884, the imperial administration looked favorably at placing.
Officials imagined a network of sons relaying back intelligence from remote and opaque
corners of the territory, and enacting orders from Maseru injected into the political
hierarchy through Matsieng.43 Thus, instead of trying to build up a rural police force, in the
style of the RIC, the administration lent its political support to building out the nodes and
network of the paramountcy throughout the nation.
Pace Maseru’s expectations, the popular political ethos governing placing had long
been one of decentralization and local independence.44 This did not change under Letsie’s
rule. Placed sons of the paramount still expected to govern as lords, not as bureaucrats.
Many jealously defended their newly acquired political and juridical authority, while also
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bowing to certain pre-established obligations related to tribute and legal appeals. Moreover,
rather than the establishment of the Matsieng franchise facilitating the institutionalization
of a bureaucratic aristocracy, subjected to consistent oversight from above, the system
seemingly emboldened the placed nobles to stray from established norms governing the
relationship between nobles and subordinates. As members of LLB would later observe,
leaders with long-standing roots in a community depended for their legitimacy and very
livelihoods on maintaining the support of the people they governed, while placed leaders
derived their legitimacy – at least in the first instance – from connections to a higher
political authority.45
Clarke’s tenure in Lesotho was marked by a sustained effort at relationship
building. The resident believed that a politically-strong paramount, and mutual support
between Maseru and Matsieng, represented the bedrock for building a lasting legal and
social order in the territory. It also embodied a more realistic assessment of power relations
in Lesotho than under Cape Rule, when imperious magistrates had issued ultimatums under
the illusion that they were the most powerful authorities in the land. This approach required
the administration to exercise restraint, so as to build trust between colonial officers and
lords, and avoid embarrassing or undermining Matsieng. Maseru therefore did nothing
when it learned of executions of accused sorcerers by Masopha’s son in 1886, despite an
imperial fixation with stamping out this practice.46 Officials notably also swallowed back
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their bile for several years as Mhlontlo or Umhlohlo (Sesothoized as Mohlohlo), a former
king of amaMpondomise lineage wanted in the Cape for putting to death three belligerent
colonial officials in 1880, went freely about his life in the Maloti foothills.47 The most
politically dicey issue confronting Maseru in the 1880s and 90s was the prevalence of
internecine conflict driven by lords fighting over territory, followers, and succession.48
Lagden replaced Clarke as British Resident in 1893. The aspiring ethnologist
moved to translate the changes of the proceeding nine years into new approaches to policy.
The political and financial footing of the administration was certainly surer than a decade
earlier. Moreover, in the person of Paramount Lerotholi, who had acceded to the throne in
1891 following the death of his father, Maseru saw a partner who was cooperative and
decisive where the late Letsie was, at least in colonial representations, cagey and
vacillating. At the moment in which Lagden came into his new office, however, the
territory was once again on the knife’s edge of civil war. The legitimacy of Lerotholi’s
paramountcy was challenged by a junior half-brother and hero of the Gun War, Maama.49
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After a set of small skirmishes, Maama abandoned his claim in late 1894. Lerotholi
rewarded the administration for its support during the contest by agreeing to a fine for
violently punishing communities under Maama’s control.50 This act of buy-in from
Matsieng proved to be a watershed moment in the process of the administration arrogating
more responsibility for handling both internecine conflict and matters of criminal justice
involving violence committed by nobles more broadly.51
In the months following this victory, Lagden moved swiftly to revise the division
of judicial responsibilities when it came to punishing crimes of physical violence.52 The
administration outlawed not only participation in bloodshed at the behest of lords, but also
the act of mobilizing to attack another community. These crimes were punishable with
fines imposed by a combined court of colonial and traditional authorities. Despite some
internal grumbling from officers in the field, Maseru had no choice to continue to bracket
warfare differently than other forms of assault and homicide, not simply because of popular
pressure, but also because no ‘room could be found in the Gaols’ when small armies of
‘people engaged in such disturbances.’53 Lagden also prevailed on the high commissioner
to remake the laws concerning murders and other forms of criminal homicide: the colonial
administration henceforth claimed the exclusive right to adjudicate these cases.54 Lastly, in
terms of enforcement of existing policies, the administration once again successfully
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pressured Lerotholi to institutionalize new norms by using his house as a model: the
paramount publicly rebuked and fined his eldest son and heir, Letsie II (or Letsienyana,
meaning Little Letsie) for abusing subjects in custody and torturing a man accused of
sorcery.55
From the 1870s onwards, the continuing political independence and moral authority
of Masopha vexed both Matsieng and Maseru.56 Lerotholi’s uncle was viewed as fueling
political instability, including Maama’s bid for the paramountcy. Masopha also flouted
Maseru’s expressed desire to monopolize the application of punitive physical violence,
presenting himself as a model of a more rigid and authentic set of Sesotho values. The
famed general employed a stringent approach to discipline, rooted in a deeply conservative
view of social and class hierarchies. During the cataclysmic summer of 1897-98 – a time
marked also by sustained drought, locusts, and the tail end of a rinderpest murrain which
killed hundreds of thousands of cattle in the territory57 – Lerotholi and Lagden spied an
opportunity to confront the septuagenarian prince directly.
Masopha’s son Moeketsi touched off the confrontation by leading an expedition
across the Mohokare to forcibly repatriate a woman who had fled her husband.58 The
princeling was arrested by Free State police, but managed to escape from custody and make
it home. After Masopha refused to surrender Moeketsi to the administration, Lerotholi’s
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armies marched on Thaba Bosiu. The two sides clashed on Khamolane Plateau in midJanuary. Masopha was defeated, stripped of his powers, and died within a year. A praise
poem (thoko) for Lerotholi’s eldest son Letsienyana, styled as a crocodile, speaks not only
to details of the fighting but also to the growing political hegemony of the paramountcy:
The Crocodile departed from Likhoele on horseback / As a mist crept over the earth / ... He
stood at Liphokoaneng and gave orders/ ... that they pass the night with their Sniders loaded
/… He said: ‘They show off, these people from Masopha’s / They’ve shown off against me
with their sticks of iron.’ / He went to ascend the pass of Khamolane / Close to the village
of his uncle / Where bulls kick up dust against each other / ... With the white clay flying
and the gunpowder reeking! / Then they appeared, and were holding a flag / ... Their lips
were trembling / ... Masopha says, Chief, forgive him, he’s erred. / ... Before he answered
/ They brought Moeketsi / Driving him even with their knees / ... They say that we people
from Matsieng are a rising cloud of dust / We’re a rising cloud, indeed we agree / We arise
like dust in every little pass.59

2.4 A brief history of carceral infrastructure and design in the early colonial era
The network of carceral facilities the new administration inherited from the Cape were both
limited and in poor condition. Spaces of confinement in Lesotho were thrown together
hastily following the arrival of magistrates from the Cape, beginning in 1869. These
windowless ‘lock-ups’ were little more than specially purposed storage rooms, adjoined to
each magisterial district’s court and police barracks.60 While two African constables were
hired to oversee prisoners at each station, the BMP rank and file were also tasked with
guard duty, in addition to carrying out patrols, performing arrests, and executing the
judgments of magistrates. The constables and police had a nearly impossible task, however,
given the architectural insecurity of the structures. Even after the Cape provided handcuffs,
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lashes, padlocks, and wrought-iron door hasps, escapes continued to be common.61 This
system of small and structurally insecure jails was predicated on Lesotho belonging to the
world of the Cape: lock-ups were used for awaiting trial prisoners and short-sentences,
while individuals facing more than a few months incarceration faced the terrifying fate of
being carted off to more secure facilities in Cape Town.62 Flogging and fines emerged as
popular modes of magisterial punishment, moreover, precisely because they presented few
logistical hurdles to carry out.63
The conflict of the late 1870s and early 1880s drew the insecurity of the structures
into even higher relief. The inability of police to detain prisoners and secure the
magistracies when opposed by local lords was plain to see. The escape of Moorosi’s son
Doda from the Quthing magistracy in 1878, discussed in the preceding chapter, was only
the beginning. The same magistracy was razed, and the jails in Maseru and Tlhotse Heights
(Hlotse, Leribe) sustained significant damage, during the Gun War and its aftermath. Lore
holds that police freed inmates held in the lock-up in Maseru in advance of an attack by
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Masopha’s soldiers in October 1880.64 Despite breaking ground to build a new Maseru
Gaol in December, on the site of a model school razed during the fighting, the lingering
insecurity and lack of labor prevented construction from advancing.65
Clarke approached prison design differently than his Cape predecessors. After
rebuilding the badly damaged lock-ups in Quthing and Hlotse over 1884, as a temporary
measure, the administration pivoted away from the structurally and functionally flexible
Cape model of design to specially purposed jails.66 The construction of a new, large jail in
Maseru was completed over 1884-85. 67 It provided the first facility in the territory which
could be used for long-term detention and allow for the segregation (in isolation) of ‘special
class’ prisoners; that is, anyone who was not adult, African, male, and of sound mind. Over
1885-86, the two lock-ups in Leribe, in the headquarters of both the district in Hlotse and
the (then) sub-district of Butha-Buthe, were replaced with jails.68 In 1886, Lagden also
oversaw the building of a cluster of stone cells surrounded by a sod wall in Teyateyaneng,
early steps in the construction of a new administrative district in Berea.69
Although the new penal facilities varied dramatically in size, Maseru Gaol served
as a template for the administration’s approach to prison design. All were imposing
structures with high walls devoid of external windows, simultaneously conspicuous and
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opaque to outside observers. Inside, each of the new jails featured a central yard,
constables’ quarters, a limited number of large sleeping cells, two or more isolation cells,
and open-air kitchens.70 From Maseru’s perspective the construction of new carceral
institutions quickly proved to be a shrewd investment, helping to spur increased tax
revenues. The jails were the largest structures in the territory and visible from beyond the
police camps. While many Africans were understandably skeptical in the mid-1880s about
whether the new administration would last and, therefore, reticent to part with hard earned
grain and coin, the effort and expense of the jails telegraphed a clear intent to stay for the
long haul. Fear of ending up inside one of the austere looking facilities for tax default,
moreover, certainly did not hurt revenue efforts.
In keeping with the larger approach of the administration to the geospatial division
of coercive labor, the jails were all located near the border with South Africa in ‘police
camps’ (likampo in Sesotho), either the seats of the old magistracies or a handful of new
parcels of ‘reserve land’ specially alienated from Matsieng to the colonial government.
Persons arrested by police patrols were marched back to the camps for pre-trial detention,
legal proceedings in the court of an assistant commissioner of the district (or, in the subdistricts, the police officer in charge), and, potentially, a prison sentence. The most
common charges in colonial courts during the 1880s and 90s involving smuggling ––
livestock, guns, and, especially, liquor. A greater array of crimes began to appear on the
colonial roles in the late-1890s, as the ongoing Witwatersrand (Johannesburg area) gold
rush attracted more people into the colonial policed space of the camps and the border.71
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Outbound and inbound migrants seeking to link up with labor recruiters, transit the border,
and spend wages on consumer goods and services, were detained for pass violations,
robberies, and assaults. The effort to exert police control over increasingly bustling urban
spaces, and a resultant uptick in prisoners, fueled increasing specialization within the police
ranks: some officers worked primarily as patrolmen while others began to report to the jail
every day to work as ‘warders’ (reporting to already specialized Constables and Gaolers).
In 1895 Lagden proudly reported to his superiors that ‘prison accommodation has now
been provided at each station.’72 Yet, the penal work remained small for a territory
inhabited by a quarter million people: 338 individuals were processed into the territory’s
jails in fiscal year 1895, with an average of 75 persons detained each day.73
Perhaps the most striking aspect of prison design in Lesotho, prior to WWII, was
what the jails lacked. The emergence of the scientific discipline of penology in the North
Atlantic, over the early 19th century, gave rise to common sense architectural features. The
radial design, believed to be an effective means of discipling and re-socializing inmates
with an internalized sense of omnipresent surveillance, was ubiquitous in metropolitan
England, and became increasingly widespread in the empire from the mid-19th century
onwards.74 Equally common was the use of cell blocks to segregate different classifications
politics. BAR 1906-7, Nattle minute, 48. See also: LC, Box 26/0, ‘Prostitutes and Vagrants,’ on
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of prisoners. Classification and segregation represented the first principles of scientific
penology: reform and rehabilitation could only proceed if more vulnerable and/or
reformable incarcerated people were protected against physical violence, sexual
exploitation, and ‘moral pollution’ by more ‘criminally-hardened’ detainees. The jails built
in Lesotho prior to WWII featured neither radial designs nor the network of cells that would
facilitate classification.75 Almost all African males detained in the colonial jails lived,
worked, ate, and slept cheek to jowl.76 This included individuals charged and convicted of
the gamut of criminal offenses ranging from tax-default and vagrancy to assault and
homicide. It mattered not whether a man was still awaiting trial, nor whether serving a
sentence for a first or fifteenth offense.
Much of the historical scholarship produced over the past forty years on 19thcentury metropolitan and colonial prisons focuses on the institutions as sites of knowledge
production about social groups.77 Prisons in London, Dublin, Cape Town, and Calcutta
were used to study and delimit populations, supposedly by studying the linkages between
morality, criminality, and deviance, on one hand, and other factors such as class, caste,
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ethnicity, and bodily characteristics, on the other. The institutional control over the bodies
of incarcerated persons, and the legal and ideological position that inmates forfeited any
claims to privacy while imprisoned, facilitated the collection of biometric and
physiognomic data, which could then be used to make scientific arguments. Prison workers
in Lesotho, however, not only made no effort to study and classify prisoners based on
perceived social recalcitrance and reformability, but also failed to collect basic biometric
data, such as the weight and build type of inmates upon admission.78 Maseru failed to invest
in either the physical infrastructure or the human labor and expertise needed to classify or
differentiate subgroups amongst incarcerated populations. This indifference to the idea of
using penal institutions for re-socialization and social differentiation –– at the point in
which the second wave of colonial penal infrastructure was laid down, spanning roughly
from 1884 through the early 1910s –– was driven by interrelated ideological and
instrumental conceits rooted in a nexus of ethnocultural mythology and colonial
parsimoniousness.
A deterministic ethno-cultural vision of Basotho character elided the need to
propound on the criminological proclivities of sub-populations in Lesotho. The abiding
wish of the administration for several decades following 1884 was for Basotho to remain
as ‘mountaineers,’ members of an ethno-culturally homogenous kingdom who were
‘innately law abiding’ in character. Criminal conduct during this era was therefore
conceptualized by the colonial state as a kind of ethnocultural deviance with moral
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characteristics. The task of reforming ostensibly ‘bad Basotho’ therefore fell outside the
ambit of the state. Re/socialization was work for families, communities, and lords, as well
as missionaries at the schoolmaster’s desk and the pulpit. The institutional function of jails
in Lesotho was, instead, as a coercive backstop for instances in which tradition, elders, and
lords failed.
The explicit goal of incarceration was punishment and deterrence: the misery of
detention and hard labor, it was argued, would educate wayward Basotho about the
personal misery involved with transgressing colonial laws. Lesotho’s carceral institutions,
therefore, diverged from contemporaneous facilities in the metropole by making little
pretense of inculcating job skills, work ethics, or moral compasses in detainees. Presenting
before the Royal Scottish Society in 1901, Lagden argued this approach was the best the
administration could hope for, as Sesotho norms militated against the creation of stigma
and social differentiation of deviants in Lesotho beyond the prison walls: ‘To be a criminal
is not to be barred from domestic circles or fellow society; [Basotho] are tolerant of each
other's faults, believing that temptation and opportunity are to be blamed rather than human
weakness.’79
This vision was convenient indeed for an administration under immense pressure
to keep down operational costs. Classification schemes required not only sizable capital
expenditure on infrastructure but also recurring expenditure on labor. Segregation involved
more skilled work when it came to penological sorting of detainees and record-keeping,
and even more labor still when it came to supervision and management of jails. The
skeleton crew of British administrative and medical officers were overloaded with duties
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and paperwork, and therefore not required to do more than sign off on detention warrants
and jail intake forms. As we will see in the subsequent two chapters, persons suffering from
leprosy were the one Basotho sub-population who the colonial state took a keen interest in
differentiating, surveilling, and, after 1914, actively stigmatizing through compulsory
institutional segregation. When it came to collecting data on Basotho incarcerated through
the criminal legal system, and working to differentiate the ‘habitual criminal’ or ‘recidivist’
as categories of particularly dangerous people, the administration would persist in the line,
through the 1930s, that it lacked the educated personnel necessary to carry out such work.
2.5 The rise of British subcontinental hegemony and Basotho critiques
The South African War, also known as the Second Anglo-Boer War, erupted in October
1899.80 The outbreak of fighting provoked great alarm for the colonial administration in
Lesotho, as rumors swirled of a potential Basotho uprising against the British. Lagden
expedited the construction of telegraph wires between Maseru and outlying districts and
scaled up recruitment for the BMP. Although no fighting ultimately took place in Lesotho,
the surrender of the last of the last republican guerrillas in May 1902 ushered in a period
of fast-moving changes in the forms and functions of violence work in the territory. The
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administration and lords adapted their strategies of control, first in the face of a fastindustrializing political economy in the subcontinent and, increasingly, the critiques of
Basotho activists leveraging discourses both of universal civilization as well as tradition.
Following the war, the British held dominion extending unbroken from the Cape
past the Zambezi River. This outcome meant a state committed to backing heavilycapitalized industrial mining economy on the Highveld, rather than the ranching and
farming pursuits of a European yeomanry. The problem for Transvaal Governor Alfred
Milner, and his allies in Witwatersrand business class, was a profound shortage of labor.81
Mines shut down at the commencement of hostilities and, despite efforts to resume
production in mid-1900, only a small number of African workers were willing to sign new
contracts. In 1903, the reconstruction government, based in Pretoria, pushed a series of
measures aimed to reverse the continuing labor shortage and economic stagnation, capped
by a drive to use penal sanctions to coerce labor.82 The Milner administration made clear
that Africans would not be allowed to withhold their labor until the market responded with
sufficiently tempting wages. Lagden was promoted to serve as Commissioner of Native
Affairs in Milner’s cabinet, and penned an influential report which went on to provide a
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key rationalization for the suites of segregation and apartheid laws rolled out over
subsequent decades.83
The changes in South African policies were felt in Lesotho in short order. Labor
migration from the mountain kingdom had spiked just prior to the war, in 1898 and 1899,
as Basotho sought to recover from the destruction of wealth caused by drought and
rinderpest, which by some estimates killed eighty percent of the cattle in the territory.84
Following the conflict, however, workers from Lesotho – as from other nearby African
communities, were understandably loathe to return to jobs for a fraction of the pay they
had previously received.85 The economic calculus changed in 1903, when drought
descended once again on the territory: many men were forced by the prospect of impending
famine to secure work in Free State diamond mines. Maseru and labor recruiters, moreover,
worked to entice lords to prevail upon male subjects to sign new labor contracts. As keen
as the administration was to promote migrant labor, it did not stop officials from
simultaneously bemoaning how the system forced Africans to leave rural villages and,
especially, to have greater contact with working class Europeans. Interracial exchanges
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were envisioned to fuel detribalization and cultural deviance amongst Africans, leading to
criminal behavior.86
The predatory penal labor scheme taking shape just across the Mohokare River
represented a significant threat to the liberty of Lesotho’s residents with family, friends,
and business which required venturing near or across the border. The Free State and
Transvaal governments hired veritable armies of ‘justices of the peace’ – largely from the
mid-level ranks of disbanded Afrikaner commandoes – to patrol the countryside, searching
out and summarily sentencing Africans for violations of vagrancy, masters and servants,
and pass legislation.87 Unremunerated ‘convict laborers’ were deployed in securitized mine
compounds, as well as an emerging archipelago of penal camps set up to facilitate the
reconstruction of buildings, railroads, and bridges destroyed during the war. Basotho who
hoped that a British victory would help to protect Africans from exploitation and acts of
cruelty by European farmers in the Free State (empowered by the non-enforcement of
statutes by anti-African landdrosts) were confronted with a new reality where laws were
deployed as instruments for systematically terrorizing and exploiting Africans.88
Although Lesotho’s colonial administration was reluctant as a rule to spend money,
the war and its aftermath catalyzed significant new capital and recurring expenditures in
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policing and penal infrastructure.89 The number of police on the ‘establishment’ of the
BMP was scaled up to monitor the border during the South African War, and remained
higher than pre-war levels once the fighting subsided.90 European police officers continued
to be tasked with combating smuggling and controlling the camps. They liaised with
counterparts in the South African Constabulary, a mobile gendarmerie created by Milner
for rapid deployment to crush any stirrings of African uprising or recrudescence of
Afrikaner republicanism.91 The growth of labor migrancy from 1903 onward meant
increasing numbers of Basotho accessing camptowns – in order to speak with labor
recruiters and touts, transit the border, and spend wages on consumer goods – and,
therefore, more work for the BMP tasked with policing these spaces.92 The BMP had their
hands full during this period: patrol work was quite dangerous, as heavily armed smugglers
plied their trade and repeatedly proved willing to engage in gun battles with police.93 The
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Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940, D. Anderson and D. Killingray, 168–82.
Manchester: Manchester University; Spencer, S. 2018. “Flooding the Networks: The Aftermath of
the South African Constabulary, 1902–14.” Britain and the World 11/2: 153–72; Trew, H.F. 1938.
African Man Hunts. London: Blackie & Son Ltd, 13-25.
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LNA S3/25/1/25, Annual Report for 1907-08, Macgregor’s report on Leribe District, n.p.
Resident Sloley expressed some ambivalence about these developments, arguing that lords
remained ‘the most efficient instrument it is possible to conceive of for the control of the native
population’ (BAR 1904-05, 8).
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LNA S3/16/1/15, Sloley to Gladstone, 19 Sep. 1911 (one private killed) and 25 Oct. 1911 (two
privates killed). LNA S3/16A/3/11, 23 Apr. 1917 (one private killed). While there is an extensive
colonial record of the violence faced by police, it is far harder to assess violence perpetrated by
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activity in towns and along the border, as well as the enforcement of older measures
requiring the involvement of colonial courts for serious crimes, also led to increased
demand for spaces of judicial confinement. Maseru responded by investing tax-payer funds
– as well as a glut of leftover war material, including sheet iron roofs and barbwire – in a
fresh round of jail construction, including in Mafeteng (1903), Mohale’s Hoek (1905),
Qacha’s Nek (1906), and Butha-Buthe (1910).94
Prisons were integrated into the economic life of camptowns over the early years
of the 20th century. The majority of criminal sentences handed by colonial courts included
the option of a fine in lieu of the jail sentence, but most Basotho still ended up serving the
time and being put to hard labor, on account of being unable or unwilling to pay the fine.95
While the levels of incarceration in Lesotho paled in comparison to South Africa, with its
police. Period newspaper articles suggest that such violence was well known: see, for example,
Leselinyana, Motsile, 11 Sept 1909.
94
BAR 1903-04, 7 and 40; BAR 1905-6, 8; BAR 1909-10, 10; BAR 1915, 14. A new jail was also
built in Quthing during the war (BAR 1899-1900). Prior to the construction of the Mafeteng jail,
the administration rented the use of fortified rooms from a private trader. In addition to these jails,
the government also steadily built new police stations, including in Machachaneng and Mokhotlong
(BAR 1904-05: 7, 21, 24). The panels of sheet metal used to patch together a network of observation
posts and blockhouses on the veldt as part of the British counterinsurgency effort became the
standard roofing material in Lesotho’s penal facilities; some of the jails’ walls also began to feature
barbed wire, which had been manufactured to throw up concentration camps on the other side of
the Mohokare: LC 39/1, Mansel to Boyes, 16 Feb. 1906; see May to Sloley, 16 May 1914, on
similarities in asylum construction, in BNA CO 417/545.
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The role of culture in the non/payment of colonial judicial fines warrants further research. The
rarity of Basotho opting to pay cash fines in place of jail time is a conspicuous feature of the records
of colonial Lesotho’s criminal legal system: LNA S3/16A/3/17-9; LC, Boxes 3/1, 3/4, and 3/8. This
held true even for fines of a pound or less, in which default might require a person to instead suffer
through jail and hard labor for weeks. In 1936, Maseru sent a circular enjoining colonial officers to
impose lower fines in order to relieve mounting overcrowding in jails (LC, Box 3/4, How circular,
29 Oct. 1936), but the population of incarcerated persons nonetheless continued to steadily tick
upwards. This dynamic might well simply be a testament to the poverty of Basotho who found
themselves wrapped up in the criminal legal system. But it also conjures visions of James
Ferguson’s (1994. Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power
in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota) notion of a ‘bovine mystique,’ in which Basotho
informants in the 1970s and 80s described livestock as a special type of commodity that should be
bought but not sold. A tendency to opt for jail time instead a fine might well have been driven by
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aforementioned convict leasing system, prisoners provided a vital source of camp labor for
the administration.96 The most common jobs for male prisoners were as groundskeepers on
government properties and at the homes of officials. With the exception of Maseru, where
the government hired a private contractor, prisoners faced the unenviable task of collecting
and burning refuse and ‘night soil’ in each of the camps.97 Inmates were also employed
within prisons as groundskeepers, gardeners, cooks, and tailors. Female prisoners,
overwhelmingly housed in Maseru, were largely sent to work on hospital maintenance and
laundry. The only work outside the camps involved periodic roadwork and, where the
quarries were beyond the reserve boundaries, the cutting of stone.
Lerotholi was highly cognizant of the geopolitical shifts afoot in the subcontinent
in the wake of the South African War. The paramount’s grandfather, Moshoeshoe, had
secured protection from London in the late-1860s in order to safeguard the territorial
integrity of Lesotho, but with the shape of the map in South Africa in flux, it now looked
as if Lesotho’s relationship with England might lead to annexation and the territory’s
undoing. Lerotholi made a display of the paramountcy’s faithfulness and usefulness to the
British by agreeing to create a Basutoland National Council (BNC), fulfilling the
longstanding colonial wish to have a forum for liaising with prominent lords.98 In the dead
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High Commissioner’s Proclamation No. 21 of 1917, Part III, Sect. 2, in Basutoland Gov’t 1918,
Basutoland Proclamations and Notices of 1917-18. Gov’t Printer: Maseru; LNA Box F281, f. 119;
LC Box 3/9, folder 2, Judicial Commissioner, ‘Notes’ on roadwork, 1935; Pim 87-8.
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Macfarlane, N. 1926. Report of Medical Dept. for 1925. Gov’t Printer: Maseru, 8-9, in BNA DO
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Clarke proposed creating a ‘council of advice’ shortly after arriving in Lesotho (HMSO 1884,
Clarke to Robinson, 11 June 1884), and colonial antipathy towards the National Pitso as ‘too large
and unwieldy’ (BLO MSS Afr. s 211: Box 3, Milner to Lagden, 20 Apr. 1899) continued to build
over subsequent decades. Lerotholi worked hard to establish the BNC after the South African War,
as discussions about incorporation of Lesotho into its larger neighbor began to gain traction. The
paramount selected 94 of the councilors, all powerful nobles and overwhelmingly fellow Bakoena
(people of the crocodile). Herbert Sloley – who, as British Resident, automatically became
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of winter in 1903 ninety-nine of the most prominent nobles and public figures in Lesotho
travelled from different corners of the nation to the sleepy administrative capital of Maseru
for the first meeting. In the inaugural session councilors were tasked with building a codex
of traditional law: the resultant ‘Laws of Lerotholi’ (Melao ea Lerotholi) enshrined
ostensibly Moshoeshoean principles of governance.99 While much excellent scholarship on
custom has focused on the problematic and cynical codification of customary laws, the
overriding colonial motivation, it seems, was bureaucratic. The flexibility previously
considered vital for colonial ‘men on the spot’ swimming in ever shifting political waters,
was looked at with growing impatience and unease in Cape Town and London: officials
viewed ambiguous spaces in laws as loose ends which invited abuses.100 The Laws of
Lerotholi clearly demarcated lords’ jurisdiction and powers vis-a-vis both their subjects
and the colonial state. Colonial authorities, moreover, dreamed of using the council as a
means of disseminating orders into the body politic.
Following the founding of the Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA) in 1907,
by a group of petty bourgeoisie intellectuals associated with the Paris Evangelical Church,
the appropriate balance of Sesotho and Western judicial mechanisms and sanctions was

president of the council – consulted with missionaries to fill the remaining five seats with teachers
and clergymen from the ranks of the mission-educated elite (bahlalefi). Machobane 1990, 76-96.
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The 24 councilors who had personally known the late king produced a list of 21 items. These
laws were subsequently debated and trimmed by the entire council down to 18. The ‘Laws of
Lerotholi’ (Melao ea Lerotholi) were applied by headmen, chiefs, and ward chiefs to Basotho in
matters of civil and family law, and in minor criminal cases (with minor revisions in 1922 and, of
course, the much larger reforms of 1938). While the issuing of granting the body legislative powers
was frequently raised by councilors, it did not take place until 1960. See also: BNA CO646/1,
Minutes of First Session; Machobane 1990, 88-93: Elizabeth Eldredge 2007, 143, 145-7.
100
Lagden and Clarke continued to correspond until the latter’s death in 1909: in one letter Clarke
(BLO, MSS Afr. s 210, Box 2, 22 Apr. 1901) reflects on how the system shifted over time from
relying on individuals to institutions. See also: BLO, MSS Afr. s 211, Box 3, Chamberlain to
Rosmead, 5 Mar 1897.
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perpetually a live political question.101 The association leveraged the missionary discourse
of the universality of Western civilization –– and British rhetoric about tutoring imperial
subjects to build up and manage the institutional trappings of modernity –– to frame calls
for political and economic reforms.102 For the BPA, the cause of justice and, indeed
civilization, would be furthered by more use of colonial courts and sanctions, including
imprisonment, in lieu of traditional courts where lords had long been known to use ‘eating
up’ (judicial confiscation) to amass personal wealth, as well as to punish and cow legitimate
critique. Although forced to grapple with an administration in Maseru which was reluctant
to implement changes which might prove expensive, or undermine social control and
efforts to promote migrant labor, the association did win small judicial reforms over the
1920s.103 More importantly, as we shall see, the activists primed the political field for more
sweeping changes in 1938. If the BPA placed pressure on the administration to live up to
the universalist pretensions of metropolitan liberals, another organization soon emerged to
challenge the administration’s governing rationality from the other direction.
Josiel Lefela, a largely self-educated student of local history and tradition, founded
Lekhotla la Bafo (LLB, or the Council of Commoners) in 1919 with the aim of advocating
for the overwhelming majority of Basotho, commoners in the countryside who lived by
means of subsistence agriculture supplemented with cash from stints of migrant labor.104
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F. Seele, Editorial in Naledi, 4 June 1907, cited by Machobane 1990, 131. Mission-educated
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modernization schemes, and hand more of the work of running the nation to people with
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Edgar, 6-8. Josiel attended school through third grade before working in South African mines,
and for a time, as a policeman in colonial Botswana. His younger brother Maphutseng was a key
intellectual influence on Lefela and the organization, supplementing a Form C (10th Grade)
education at Lovedale with a voracious appetite for reading. The Lefelas also found an important
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Although sharing the BPA’s outrage over the judicial abuses of lords, LLB offered a far
different narrative of the historical trajectory of the nation: rather than the arrival of
mission-churches and the colonial state offering a source of assistance for Basotho to
progressively climb towards universal civilization, the foreign institutions fueled social
decay. The problem with the hereditary aristocracy, in this view, was not that it was
incompatible with modernity, but rather that it had been coopted and corrupted. The
soundest method of building a more just society would therefore involve a recentering of
the political ethics which ostensibly animated leaders like Moshoeshoe: the idea pithily
captured in the axiom ‘morena ke morena ka batho’ –– a lord is a lord by [support and
consent of] the people. Although Africanist scholars have long accepted Lefela’s premise
that his was a call to return to an ‘authentic’ tradition, it seems likely that Lefela’s
foregrounding of the political rights, egalitarianism, and the power of the demos in decision
making as definitional to Sesotho tradition involved an innovative fusion of Highveld and
Enlightenment ideals. When it came to a political program, moreover, Lefela did not call
for a rigid reconstruction of old institutions but instead the building of hybridized political
structures that relied on Black leadership and honored Sesotho values. While colonial
officials publicly dismissed Lefela and associates as insignificant rabble-rousers, internal
correspondence shows a succession of British Residents obsessed with policing the
organization’s activities. And while it is true that the LLB failed to directly convert its
critiques into legislation, the organization paved the road to political reforms by both
exposing the intellectual bankruptcy of the notion that governing institutions were wholly

source of political support from the aristocratic establishment near their home community of
Mapoteng, Leribe (especially lords Peete, Boshoane, and Motšoene). On LLB membership:
Machobane 1990, 181.
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traditional and, therefore, sacrosanct, as well as by making the reformist BPA look like a
more palatable organization for Maseru to work with.
2.6 On the laws governing imprisonment, flogging, and executions in the pre-WWII
era
During the first three decades of British rule in Lesotho, the standing orders governing the
administration of prisons were cobbled together from a patchwork of statutes. This
flexibility and ambiguity grew from a quirk in the laws promulgated by Hercules Robinson,
High Commissioner for South Africa, when his office assumed legislative authority over
Lesotho with the end of Cape Rule. Robinson’s General Administration Laws stipulated
broadly applicable principles and regulations,105 but dodged the work of crafting laws for
the territory from scratch by also declaring all statutes valid in the Cape as of May 1884 –
– including those which were defunct but not repealed –– as good law in Lesotho.106 This
act of transplantation left colonial officials in Maseru, and at the district level, to draw up
their own operating practices, essentially by cherry-picking legal pretexts for expedient
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tradition. Berat, L. 1991. “Customary Law in a New South Africa: A Proposal.” Fordham Int’l. LJ
15/1: 92–128, 105-117. Poulter, S. 1969. “The Common Law in Lesotho.” Journal of African Law
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practices from over a hundred years of statutes.107 This approach to prison administration
continued until the passage of a Prison Proclamation in 1917. Commissioner Sydney
Buxton pushed for an authoritative statute after learning details of the internal workings of
Lesotho’s jails, particularly relating to corporal punishment. Rather than narrowing the
space between laws and practices, however, the aspirational nature of the new proclamation
turned the divide into a chasm.
The resumption of imperial rule, and the ostensible pivot to protection of tradition,
gave rise to tortuous logic on the question of corporal punishment. As noted in the
introduction, flogging was a mainstay of the punitive repertoire under the Cape, largely
because it was simpler to carry out than imprisonment. Under Section 12 of General
Administration Law 2B of 1884, however, the new British administration banned corporal
punishment, save for when handed down by a colonial judge as a sentence for rape. Thus,
at the precise moment in which British officials arrived extolling the importance of local
customs, they also made a point of officially locking up the whips, intimating that lords
could not be trusted to use punitive violence responsibly. The rank hypocrisy and the
exoticization of a society by officials like Lagden, who disparaged Basotho for supposedly
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A limited number of new proclamations were introduced in Lesotho over the quarter century
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engaging in a ‘stern tribal punishment of whipping, almost unto death,’ yet had nothing to
say about the conduct of officials like Charles Harland Bell having been known to use the
cat-o’-nine tails so vigorously as to break the instrument of torture, is obvious.108 But the
inclusion of Section 12 in the law also hinted at the growth of real unease about the morality
of corporal penalties in London over the mid to late 19th century, and the extension of
critiques of flogging at home to overseas dominions.109 The historian Bonny Ibhawoh
examines the ideological and legal details of the ‘repugnancy clause’ in African territories
during the era of British indirect rule.110
Questions about prison administration in Lesotho came to light in 1916, when
Herbert Sloley retired after 14 years as Resident and was replaced by Robert Coryndon.
Only weeks after arriving in Maseru, Corydon wrote to Commissioner Buxton to verify the
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legality of the penal practices he discovered at work in the territory: specifically, was a
now defunct Cape ordinance from 1847 a legitimate basis for granting a one-sixth sentence
remission for good conduct to all prisoners?111 The question piqued the commissioner’s
interest in the territory’s jails, and led to the discovery of an ad hoc assortment of
regulations, including many ultra vires practices. Buxton was most alarmed to learn that
warders were regularly lashing inmates for prison offenses and escape attempts. The
legality of these floggings was a matter of debate: while Section 12 of the General
Administration Law 2B strictly limited judicial corporal punishment, Section 14 (the
transplantation clause) also meant that Cape Ordinance No. 2 of 1840, empowering
warders to administratively lash their charges, was also seemingly good law.112 Buxton and
his advisors determined that the simulacral patchwork of prison laws needed to be swept
away and remade from the ground up.113
The process of drafting and negotiation carried out between Maseru and Cape Town
took eighteen months, and resulted in the gazetting of two statues: the Prison Proclamation
(No. 21 of 1917) and the derivative Prison Regulations (Gov’t. Notice No. 63 of 1918).114
The two laws included well over one hundred sections and subsections mandating the
conduct prison guards, inmates, and administrators, including on matters of schedules,
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rations, punishments, remission, executions, sanitation, visitation, legal representation,
inspections, record-keeping, searches, and the grievance process. Rather than adapting the
new laws to local conditions and capabilities, the new legislation was largely transcribed
mutatis mutandis from other territories.115 The primary model, the Union’s Prison and
Reformatories Act (No. 12 of 1911), was an intellectual product of what historian Martin
Chanock describes as the emerging international criminological and penological agendas
of the age.116 A debate animating policymakers and criminologists in Northern metropoles
was how to strike the balance between the liberal operating principle that incarcerated
people were rational actors who could exercise free will to reform their behavior over time,
and the emerging view that humans were programmed by nature or nurture to be either
law-abiding or law-transgressing.117 The text of the Union Act endorsed the liberal
115
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metropolitan view, but the reality was more complex: the law was effectively bifurcated in
its implementation, with expertise and funds allocated to rehabilitative institutions for
European prisoners, on one hand, and a larger network of draconian work-camps and
prisons for African inmates, ostensibly aimed at cowing pathological criminality with
institutionalized terror, on the other.118
The tension which animated the elaboration of jail regulations and practices in
Lesotho was a product of the reflex of officials to reproduce cutting-edge penological
approaches – on display in South African statutes if not practices – and limitations in
infrastructure and expertise which were even more profound than on the other side of the
Mohokare. While the production of Lesotho’s penal statutes emerged from a colonial
bureaucratic impulse to spell out best practices for local officials and warders, the new
rules effectively ensured that the judges and warders on the ground would be out of step
with the letter of the law on a daily basis. Jail administrators struggled to keep the records
mandated by laws, on account both of time pressures and the limited literacy of warders.
The penal segregation stipulated for mentally ill persons, women, Europeans and
Asians, and boys and young men represented an even greater hurdle in a territory with
cramped district jails with a limited number of cells, and a dearth of more specialized
institutions. The earliest transfer of mentally ill persons to asylums and hospitals in South
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African, and particularly to Bloemfontein, began during reconstruction.119 On account of
the maintenance costs and the reluctance of South African officials to accept many inmates,
the administration also used solitary jail cells to hold mentally ill persons with histories of
violence (or, in some cases, relying on families of the individual for home detention).120
The presence of a growing number of women facing long sentences Maseru Gaol, led to
cordoning off and expanding a section of the facility as a Female Annex and the hiring of
three full-time wardresses in 1914.121 Female juveniles and juvenile-adults – girls under
16, or young women between 16 and 20, respectively – were detained in the same facility
as adult women. The creation of the annex did effectively guard against heterosexual
relationships and assaults involving incarcerated women, and incarcerated men or male
warders, in the capital. But women remanded during trial or sentenced to serve short
sentences in outlying district jails, while officially required to be confined in solitary cells,
often had no such protections.122 The handful of European prisoners detained over the
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2017, Roma; S3/16/1/16; LNA S3/25/1/25, BAR1907-08, Sloley minute, 7. On 19th century
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1910s and 20s were also largely sent to Maseru, and Asian prisoners transferred to either
Maseru or to Leribe or Butha Buthe in the north. These institutions were possessed of more
extensive facilities for isolation or group segregation, better equipped to handle the distinct
ration scales required for non-African prisoners, and, critically in the eyes of colonial state,
employed European jailers who might watch over African warders charged with
supervising prisoners of a different race.123
Table 1. Prison Capacity in 1938 (from TML: Prisons Dept. Annual Report of 1951, 2)
Facility
Maseru ("Old Gaol")
Leribe (in Hlotse)
Mafeteng
Teyateyaneng (Berea)
Mohale's Hoek
Qacha's Nek
Quthing
Butha Buthe
Mokhotlong
TOTAL

Official Capacity
150 people
90 people
50 people
40 people
40 people
40 people
40 people
40 people
40 people
530 PEOPLE

Adolescent boys and young men presented the most significant logistical
challenges for the colonial legal system as a social group, on account of being both
overrepresented in criminal behavior and entitled to special protections.124 For the first
123

TML: Basutoland Gov’t. 1918. Proclamations and Notices, 1917-18. Gov’t Printer, Maseru,
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mealie meal, 0.5oz salt, and 2oz rice. ‘Other’ prisoners –– and Africans serving over 6-month
sentences and, therefore, susceptible to wasting from the low-protein diet –– received 0.5lbs meat
and 0.5lbs less mealies. These diets were made more nutritious and interesting, on a seasonal basis,
with sauces made from vegetables and legumes from the prison gardens, carted in from Botšabelo
Leper Asylum, or purchased at market. See also: Macfarlane memo, in Basutoland Gov’t 1926,
Annual Report, Medical Dept., Gov’t Printer: Maseru, 5-8. On the nutritional defects of this diet
and changes in 1938, see: BNA DO35/921/4, ‘Gaol Rations in Basutoland.’
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I. Kimane, author interview, 12 May 2017, Roma. As in human communities across time and
space, bashamane (young men), with active limbic systems and immature frontal cortexes, engaged
in a high share of socially destructive activities: Sapolsky, R. 2017. ‘Adolescence; or, Dude,
Where’s My Frontal Cortex?’ In Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst, 154–73.
New York: Penguin.
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three decades of imperial rule, the administration relied on families and traditional
authorities to discipline and punish young people: although judicial corporal punishment
of young men (and all females) was outlawed by statute, the administration considered
‘physical chastisement’ by guardians to be a cost-effective and beneficial corrective for
children (and, in a disturbing area of agreement between colonial and Highveld
patriarchies, a tolerable one for wives). In the years following the South African War, the
colonial state found itself faced with an increasing number of juveniles in administrative
custody. According to several prominent lords, this trend was exacerbated by social
change, as young men were no longer prevented ‘from mischief by being kept at the
cattleposts.’125 Attitudes towards juvenile crime shifted in other ways, with colonial
officials and mission-educated elites increasingly committed to the idea that teenagers were
less culpable for their actions and, therefore, warranted more lenient sentencing.126
The High Commissioner handed down new legislation governing the sentencing
and punishment of young people in 1920, again copying Union statutes.127 And again
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BNA CO 646/1, 1911 BNC Session, Lord Motšoene remarks, 15. The efforts of the colonial
state to expand its judicial footprint over time also contributed, as acts which were previously quasinormative means of demonstrating manhood were criminalized: injuries inflicted during stick duels
were sometimes charged as assaults, chobeliso (the abduction or ‘seduction’ of a women by a man
for purposes of marriage without or prior to paying bride price) as kidnapping, and, especially,
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‘before this law was made our boys feared,’ others, like the BPA President and AME Rev. Cranmer
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On the intellectual and legal histories of youth criminal culpability in the US, Britain, and South
Africa: Skelton, A. 2011. ‘From Cook County to Pretoria: A Long Walk to Justice for Children.’
Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 6/2: 413-47; Bottoms, A. 2002. ‘The Divergent Development of Juvenile
Justice Policy and Practice in England and Scotland.’ In A Century of Juvenile Justice, B. Dohrn,
et al., eds., 413–503. Chicago: University of Chicago; Midgley, J. 1975. Children on Trial: A Study
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Lesotho lacked the required infrastructure, with the administration possessed of neither
reformatory nor borstal school.128 But this time, recognizing the institutional deficiencies,
the commissioner saw to the amending of the laws of the Union and Lesotho to facilitate
the custodial transfer of juveniles (children up to age 16) and juvenile-adults (persons
between the ages of 16 and 21).129 Officials within South African reformatories turned out
to not be on board, however, and proved quite resistant to accepting more than a handful
of juvenile Basotho at a time.130 By 1925 the population of boys and young men detained
in Lesotho’s carceral system was straining the capacity of the administration to keep this
cohort segregated from men. The administration responded by allocating the bulk of Peka
Gaol (in Leribe, then a distinct sub-district) for males between the ages of fifteen and
twenty undergoing sentences of three or more months. To give the facility an educative
sheen, the detained youth were given technical instruction in farming, brick-laying, and
carpentry as part of their labor duties. In 1933 the facility housed a daily average of 55
young men. In late 1933, however, the posting of a European officer in Peka was
discontinued, and juvenile incarceration took place in a Leribe (Hlotse) Gaol annex.

of Juvenile Justice. Cape Town: NICRO. As on the other side of the Mohokare, colonial Lesotho
had no special juvenile court system, instead treating ‘child offenders as smaller versions of adult
offenders,’ to borrow Skelton’s phrasing, 417.
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The rules surrounding judicial corporal punishment were systematically overhauled
during the 1910s and 20s, expanding the number of offenses subject to whipping while
tightening the regulations governing the application of this violence. Elsewhere in Britishruled Africa, judicial flogging and caning were widely employed to punish men and boys
for a great variety of crimes, both by traditional and colonial judges.131 When it came to
flogging men convicted of rape in early colonial Lesotho, there was a tremendous amount
of variation in the number of lashes meted out:132 normal sentences ranged between four
and 12 lashes, occasionally went up to 20, and once – in the case of a Mosotho man
convicted of assaulting an Afrikaner woman during the South African War – all the way to
70.133 With the passage of the Obscene Publication Proclamation (9 of 1912) the
government not only began expanding the use of judicial corporal punishment to cover a
wider array of offenses, but also began the process of replacing the use of the cat with the
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rattan cane (with the strokes targeted towards a man’s buttocks rather than back) and
clearly demarcating the maximum number of strokes allowable (in this case 24 ‘cuts’).134
While low-level physical bullying of prisoners was tacitly approved of in Maseru, African
violence workers who significantly harmed their charges were increasingly liable to find
themselves subject to administrative punishment over the 1920s.135 In the most high-profile
example of the era, the administration dismissed the jailer of Qacha’s Nek Prison,
Mzozoyana, with only half retirement gratuity for his 28 years of service in the BMP, for
inflicting injuries that landed a prisoner in the district hospital. In reviewing the case,
Resident Garraway observed he was ‘very anxious that an example should be made of this
man, in order to influence other members of both the Prison and Police services that they
must be more careful in the manner in which they deal with prisoners.’
Five out of the six offenses that the administration first sought to punish with
physical agony involved a sexual element, or what Buxton described as a being of a ‘bestial
character:’ in addition to punishing violent rape and, after 1912, the possession of
pornography, statutory rape became a caning offense in 1920, and homosexuality and
bestiality in the 1930s.136 The clear exception to this trend involved legislation allowing
for the caning of ‘habitual stock thieves,’ which came about in 1924 after sustained
advocacy by national councilors keen to crack down on a putative surge of theft inside the
territory.137 An emerging emphasis on technical standardization of the infliction of
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formally-imposed pain in South Africa during the late-1910s was replicated in Lesotho
over the 1920s: the HC issued directives for the use of rattan canes with specific gauges,
length, and levels of flex, to be substituted for the cat.138 The 1930s also witnessed a turn
towards caning juvenile males – using a higher gauge (thinner) instrument – as the
administration became increasingly exasperated and indifferent about the prospects of resocialization by reformatory.
The incidence of capital punishment also increased markedly over the 1910s. After
a quarter century marked by only one execution, Lesotho’s colonial state began hanging
Basotho on an almost yearly basis beginning in 1909.139 According to Maseru the uptick
in executions was driven by the increasing incidence of murder amongst a people who were
beginning to lose touch with tribal virtues. While crime rates likely did increase in the face
of the social tumult and immiseration accompanying the rise of the migrant labor system,
the attitude of the colonial establishment towards the ultimate punishment also changed.
The decision to route final appeals for the judicial decisions to the Privy Council in London
marked a significant turning point.140 Although the High Commissioner was still required

that the punishments meted out have not been sufficiently severe.’ Proclamation No 46 of 1924
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S3/16/1/24: Athlone to Smith, 26 Apr. 1927; Smith to Athlone, 30 Mar. 1927; RC’s Circular 14,
30 Mar. 1927; see also history of Punishment of Offenders Proclamation (55 of 1921), in BAR
1931, 23. While Lesotho’s statutes governing judicial corporal punishment were modeled on South
African law, Basotho and local colonial officials were keenly aware that social order, and labor
discipline for mines and farms, was extra-legally held together with a ‘daily bread’ of ‘hot
sjamboks’ (Afrikaans term for a hide-whip): LNA S7/7/70: Petition from ‘Driekopjes Mining
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in Lesotho.” The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 20 (3): 377–404,
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to furnish the death warrant and could exercise a prerogative of mercy, this power was used
far more sparingly once the council was involved.141 The death sentences for murder
convictions which once had been consistently commuted to 8 to 20 years terms of
imprisonment, now consistently led all the way to the scaffold.
Hangings all took place in Maseru Gaol shortly after sunrise. The facility was
locked down the evening before an execution to prepare the gallows. Condemned prisoners
were held in isolation in special rondavels in a far corner of the jail. Over the 1910s and
20s executions in Lesotho were supervised by (the unfortunately named) Max Cruel, a
public hangman for the Union Government, using the jail warders on duty as assistants.142
The jailer and district medical officer also had to be present for the execution to go ahead.
Cruel’s professional protestations about the shoddy condition of the instruments of death
in Maseru led the administration to commission the construction of a large permanent
gallows in 1917. The structure was built at Bloemfontein Prison and brought in by rail. A
former jailer recalled how this scaffold created an ominous image as the sun dipped
towards the westward horizon in the evening: ‘With the dusk, [the shadow] of the platform
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and crossbeam was there, it moved up the wall, and the prisoners… could also see it at
times… That’s how it was, with all extremely chockablock in Old Gaol.’143
2.7 Aristocratic misconduct, imperial inquiries, and the 1938 reforms
In December 1938 the high commissioner signed two laws which overhauled Lesotho’s
politico-judicial system.144 Under the Khubelu (red) reforms – as they were called on
account of the Sesotho translation being published in a scarlet-covered booklet – the
commissioner arrogated responsibility for selecting legitimate lords and assigning
jurisdictions. The moves officially aimed to adopt a system with ‘a greater promise of
developing a soundly African system of civilization.’145 The reforms shook popular
understandings of the nature of the relationship between the aristocracy and the
administration: the laws made clear that instead of being British allies, Basotho were
subjects and lords were employees.146 The new laws paved the way, moreover, for a
different set of colonial employees – judges, police, and warders – to take on more of the
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work of fighting crime using supposedly universal tactics, while continuing to leave the
bulk of civil matters to lords and tradition.
The proximate driver of the reforms was economic collapse. The Great Depression
ravaged the balance of trade and spiked outward migration beginning in 1929. A drought
– still referred to as ‘Lerole’ (The Dust) – descended on the land, unleashing choking
storms of desiccated topsoil and the loss of the harvests of both 1932 and 1933. A sustained
famine, and surge in opportunistic infections, killed tens of thousands of Basotho. In the
wake of this horrific tragedy London dispatched Alan Pim to carry out an investigation on
how to rebuild the decimated financial footing of the territory. While the imperial
economist’s report superficially functioned as a whitewash, laying blame for mass death
not on the administration’s slow response but on the vagaries of nature and the ostensible
indifference of many lords to the suffering of their communities, it also drew attention to
how the structures of colonial rule perverted lords’ political and financial incentives.
Pim’s wide-ranging report devoted significant attention to the question of crime. The
economist gleaned information from interlocutors from across the petty bourgeoisie,
administration, and aristocracy, who had watched crime rates over the early 1920s and 30s
with a sense of escalating moral panic. The Sesotho and English language press of the era
– catering largely to mission-educated Basotho, on one hand, and the community of
European officials and traders, on the other – served both as an expression and driver of
these fears. News sections detailed brazen thefts, assaults, and murders. Op-ed pages,
meanwhile, were shriller still, splashed with headlines such as ‘THE CRIMINAL
REVOLUTION IS AT HAND,’ and long screeds about Lesotho’s moral declension into
‘a nation of thieves and schelms.’ Pim also accepted written statements from LLB, which

140

shared the BPA’s concern not only with the injustice of ‘eating up’ in its own right, but
also the social consequence of more crime and violence. In the words of Keable ‘Mote,
writing in ANC founder Pixley Seme’s Eshowe-based Ikwezi le Afrika:
I am voicing the complaints of thousands of my countrymen who groan under the burden
of oppression. The Basutos are asking for an Imperial Commission… When complaints
are referred to the Paramount Chief he takes no heed of them and the result is generally
fighting and bloodshed. The Basutos require the door of European jurisprudence opened…
In many cases the Chiefs are the culprits and their indunas … defended them in the most
heinous cases.147

Table 2. Number of persons detained in Lesotho's prisons at some point in given year,
1892-1939

Lords were denounced as driving crime in a variety of ways: through direct
involvement; by turning a blind eye to lawbreaking, either for material gain or from loyalty
to fellow nobles engaged in crime; and by punishing offenses with draconian measures or
otherwise seeking to carve out greater politico-juridical autonomy from Maseru and
Matsieng. The response of the colonial state to so-called ‘criminous chiefs,’ meanwhile,
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Keable ‘Mote, ‘The Awakening of Basutoland,’ 18 April 1931, published in Ikwezi le Afrika,
reprinted in Edgar, 168-171. ‘Mote was a Mosotho from Leribe, who was involved in LLB activism
even while serving as Free State Provincial Secretary of the Industrial and Commerical Workers
Union (ICU) during the 1930s, earning the moniker ‘The Lion of the Free State.’
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was wholly inconsistent, hinging in large part on the political status of the offender. To
examine these phenomena, I turn to three all but forgotten cases of aristocratic lawbreaking.
The pursuit of the fugitive lord Hlajoane Seshophe, over 1930 and 1931, served as
a smarting example for colonial officers of not only their utter dependence on the
aristocracy for the work of policing, but also how security cooperation could break down
in cases where nobles were called upon to pursue their own. It also demonstrated the ways
that LLB could bring political pressure to bear on the administration. The clash began with
the callous decision of Leribe district official to sentence Hlajoane to five months
imprisonment for selling a legally inherited rifle.148 The lord escaped from Leribe Gaol, in
Hlotse, and dug in atop a nearby mountain in May 1930.149 Hlajoane’s displays of
marksmanship led colonial police to decide that the matter would best be resolved by
Boshoane, lord of the ward. LLB pressurized the situation in the eyes of the administration,
by publicizing the case both in meetings and in the press.150 As weeks without resolution
dragged into months, Maseru accused Boshoane – who was known to himself be
sympathetic to LLB – of willful dithering.151 HMD Tsuene, acting as President of LLB,
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seized on the unfolding debacle to lambast the ongoing search ‘by an army of slaves’ and
advised the administration that their demonstrable incompetence was proof that the British
should simply quit the territory.152 With Matsieng under immense pressure from Maseru,
Boshoane was finally cajoled into storming Hlajoane’s position in February.153
The administration’s relief was short-lived, however, as the rebellious lord escaped
from custody again only a few weeks later.154 District officers argued for the need to
respond aggressively, so as to scorch the fraying ends of administrative and social order:
The native man in the street is saying that we are beaten and that any man may go into
more or less open revolt and fire off guns at people and the Government Police are
powerless. They say the Paramount Chief sends up after the lapse of a month or more but
the local Chiefs do nothing… All this is very unsettling to the native mind… The people
up here are only too prone to break loose as you know, if any weakness is shown, and it
seems to me that the time has come to check this growing habit of lawlessness.155

Maseru again implored Matsieng to exert its influence to get Boshoane to act
forcefully.156 But the lord of the ward seemingly shrugged aside Paramount Griffith’s
orders. He – and it should be noted, the self-proclaimed advocates of the common person,
in LLB – appeared equally disinterested when Hlajoane took to raiding peasants who the
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fugitive alleged were too close to the administration.157 Police privates observing
Boshoane’s messengers carry out ‘the alleged search,’ meanwhile, described the operation
as ‘farcical,’ with the real quarry being ‘fowls belonging to villagers.’158 Finally, in
August, Griffith sent his personal messenger and adroit fixer, Sechaba Teko, to lead the
search.159 Hlajoane was quickly tracked down and forced to surrender. The captive was
escorted to Maseru Gaol by Sechaba and a large contingent of police. After a series of trials
and appeals, Hlajoane was transferred to a maximum-security prison in the Transvaal to
serve out a now significantly lengthened sentence.160
If the indifference of Boshoane and other lords to the jailbreaks by a fellow noble
represented one pole of aristocratic responses to crime, the efforts of Paramount Griffith’s
senior son Seeiso to crack down on thefts by commoners in his dominion represented the
other extreme. The paramount placed Seeiso in the sub-district of Mokhotlong in 1925.161
This far-flung posting, in a district already ruled by two powerful, independent-minded
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lords, was accompanied by rumors that Griffith was maneuvering to facilitate the ultimate
succession of a junior son, Bereng, to the paramountcy.162 Seeiso persevered, however, in
consolidating control over the nobles of Mokhotlong over the 1930s.163 As the political
conflict intensified and drought began to ravage local communities, theft picked up and
people desperately sought to unload their starving cattle so as to be able to put food in their
bellies. A European farmer from Natal, visiting the area to buy cattle at a steep discount,
relayed to journalists a story of an atrocity he witnessed. The tale and other murmurings
about Seeiso’s conduct soon appeared in the English-language paper of record in the
territory, The Basutoland News:
In one instance when dealing with stock thieves [Seeiso] is reported to have beaten the men
and then turned his attention to a woman whose only offence, it seems, was that she hid a
piece of stolen meat beneath her blanket. The chief made this woman strip off all her
clothes, beat her himself unmercifully, and left her bleeding and standing naked before
onlookers.164

The story was reprinted far and wide, including in The Farmer in Pietermaritzburg
and in The Times of London.165 The High Commissioner and Dominion’s Office ordered
an inquiry. Another man described his own encounter with the prince to investigators:
Last year while at my cattle post I ran out of food, I took some mealies from a neighbouring
cattle post when no one was there. Next day the owner of these mealies arrived and I told
him I had taken them owing to starvation and I would return them. I was taken to Chief
Seeiso's court and charged with theft of these mealies… [A messenger] made a fire of roots
and then told me to dance the “mohobelo” dance, he then took the burning roots and hit me
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over the head, the sparks falling downwards burning my body...Next day… I was fined two
head of cattle and a horse.166

The administration concluded: ‘There appears to be no doubt that Chief Seeiso did
commit the acts complained of by the correspondent in the Basutoland News,’ but was
unable to proceed with charges because ‘the parties concerned are frightened to speak for
fear of reprisals.’167 Although officials turned up additional cases of people who were
whipped and burned in Mokhotlong and other areas, officials insisted ‘there is no reason
to suppose that there is any particular maladministration of justice by the Basuto chiefs.’168
Instead officials maintained that Seeiso’s desire to prevent economic desperation from
spiraling into a rash of crime led him to understandably, if improperly, deviate from
standard punitive practices. Ultimately the prince apologized to Maseru and Matsieng, and
vowed to desist with violent interrogations and punishments.169
While the administration opted not to prosecute prince Seeiso, the displeasure in
Maseru with lords embarrassing the administration with superiors was soon vented full
bore on another lord in Mokhotlong who dispensed her own justice. Mofumahali
(noblewoman, or ‘chieftainess’ in colonial parlance) ’Mankata assumed control over a
swathe of the territory in 1930 at age 39, following the death of her heirless father-in-law,
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Rafolatsane.170 ’Mankata quickly found herself embroiled in a conflict over land,
followers, and fealty obligations with prince Seeiso and Rafolatsane’s widow ’Makori. In
November 1933 raiders from ’Makori’s village stormed ’Mankata’s community seeking
cattle impounded by the latter.171 ’Mankata led her community in repulsing the raiders,
personally firing with a pair of revolvers while mounted on horseback. When the smoke
cleared, eight people lay dead. ’Mankata was tried and convicted in the Resident
Commissioner’s Court for public violence, and sentenced to six years imprisonment with
hard labor in Maseru Gaol. Shortly after her arrival in the capital, the noblewoman fell ill
with a nagging cough and began to waste. Perhaps on account of her status and notoriety,
jail officials collected biometric data on ’Mankata upon her admission to the jail in June
1934. The administration therefore had clear data on the noblewoman’s physical
transformation when she was examined by the Maseru medical officer (MO) in March
1935: she had dropped from 139 pounds to a mere 95 in ten months.172 The MO diagnosed
the problem as tuberculosis, and recommended ’Mankata’s immediate discharge.
The practice of granting medical remissions to prisoners grappling with debilitating
or life threatening illnesses was standard practice.173 Tuberculosis necessitated particularly
170
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swift action in the name of public health, given that sustained and cramped confinement in
jail meant an ailing individual was ‘liable to infect the other prisoners.’174 In the folder
holding the paperwork for over two dozen medical remissions in the 1920s and 30s, today
preserved in Lesotho’s National Archives, ’Mankata’s case is the only one which was
delayed. Whereas other individuals serving sentences for culpable homicide, public
violence, and sexual assault were discharged swiftly, the Resident deemed ’Mankata’s
offense ‘most serious,’ and therefore determined ‘she should not be released on light
grounds.’175 One year later, with the noblewoman weighing 83 pounds, producing bloody
sputum, and catatonic with ‘persistent melancholia and morbid depression,’ the remission
request was approved.176 Although ’Mankata was released, Maseru and Matsieng agreed
that mofumahali must be ‘placed under the care of certain selected men to look after her’
and subsequently stymied from exercising political authority independently.177 The
retribution visited on ’Mankata by the colonial regime was both a product of timing and
opportunity: with lawlessness and acts of violence ostensibly surging, particularly within
the aristocracy, the administration made a harsh example of a noblewoman whose primary
source of support came from her community rather than a hereditary claim or deep
association with Matsieng.
174
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The report Pim submitted to the Secretary of State in January, 1935, offered a
scathing indictment of colonial administration in Lesotho. The economist argued that the
relationship between officials and lords was wholly out of step with the British imperial
policy of indirect rule. Such a system, Pim maintained, was fundamentally defined by ‘a
degree of supervision as will place the Government in a position to assure justice and fair
treatment to the people.’178 He argued that administration in Lesotho, meanwhile, was
characterized by a policy ‘of non-interference, of proffering alliance, of leaving two
parallel Governments to work in a state of detachment unknown in tropical Africa.’ In
short, British rule offered lords ‘protection without control,’ amounting to a system of
‘parallel’ rather than ‘indirect’ administration. Pim was hardly the first prominent
metropolitan observer, however, to report back to London tales of a system which
incentivized nobles to neglect duties and flout rules. The increased urgency of the situation
in the mid-1930s was certainly due, in part, to the scandal of the famine: there was a strong
impulse to do something, anything, which would enable the colonial regime to plausibly
promise the horrors of recent months would never again be visited on the territory. But
Pim’s shrill warnings about growing lawlessness and disorder also played a major role in
both prompting and determining the shape of the Khubelu Reforms.
Pim relayed local concerns to London of how crime and flagging confidence in the
criminal legal system were mired in a vicious cycle in Lesotho.179 The economist noted
that it was not just Basotho intellectuals and colonial officers, but also noble informants,
who confided an ‘almost unanimous’ belief in ‘the complicity of many Headmen and Sub-
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chiefs while very strong suspicion attaches even to some of the district Chiefs’ in property
crime, particularly stock theft.180 Lords neglecting to address criminal offenses, and a
handful of nobles engaging in criminal behavior themselves, undermined confidence in the
criminal legal system.181 Although not mentioned directly by Pim, Boshoane’s
lackadaisical search for Hlajoane, represents an extreme example of how unresponsive
lords might be to offenses perpetrated by fellow nobles. Frustration and desperation with
the existing order, and unaddressed instances of stock theft in particular, in turn fueled
punitive excesses and vigilantism.182 In different ways, the cases of Seeiso and ’Mankata
embodied these dynamics: the future paramount sought to leverage a harsh retributive
mode of punishment to deter crime; mofumahali, meanwhile, in the words of a later
colonial officer had ‘very bad luck,’ in that she ‘did what all her subjects wanted to do’ in
vigorously defending stock by force of arms, instead of allowing for the cattle to be seized
and allowing the criminal legal system to play out.183
Pim noted two potential approaches to alleviating the problems in customary
administration and crime fighting. One would be to ‘convert’ lords ‘into ornamental
figures, the real work of the administration being taken over by official agencies.’184 Pim
warned, however, that this approach would require a massive investment in infrastructure.
In terms of carceral facilities alone, ‘A very considerable expenditure would be required to
put the gaols into a satisfactory condition by any modern standard,’ given that
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‘accommodation is insufficient to allow of any classification of prisoners,’ a lack of
‘adequate lock-ups or satisfactory arrangements for female prisoners,’ and the ‘makeshift
character’ of ‘arrangements for juveniles.’185 On account of these financial costs, and fears
of ‘intense opposition’ to functionally abolishing the aristocracy, London determined it
would indeed be prudent to take the second option of attempting to ‘preserve and reform
the Native system.’186 The 1938 reforms officially did just this. Yet, even while making
these changes, the Dominions Office continued to investigate how to bring Lesotho’s
police and prison systems into greater procedural alignment with metropolitan
counterparts. While these discussions were placed on hiatus following the German invasion
of Poland in September 1939, and the entry of Britain and its empire into World War II,
the question of reforming colonial institutions of violence work in Lesotho surfaced again
in late 1944.
2.8 Chapter Conclusion
With sweeping reforms to the BMP beginning in 1944, the further paring back of
aristocratic powers in 1946, and the founding of a separate Basutoland Prison Service in
1947, the administration moved to cut the aristocracy out of the business of violence work
altogether.187 As elsewhere in empire, development became the watchword of British
administration in Lesotho, replacing tradition. At the time the administration set about
revising its infrastructure of coercion and control, officials made an important observation:

185

Ibid, 87-8.
Ibid, 181.
187
BNA DO 35/1174: Edmund to Lord Harlech, 15 Nov. 1943; Mavrogordato, A. General Report
on the Police Forces in the Three High Commission Territories, 2. Kneen and Juta 1950: Police
Proclamation (No. 22 of 1944), Vol. I, 543-58; Police – Government Notice (No. 89 of 1944), Vol.
III, 320-9.
186

151

the carceral system as constructed during the first five decades of imperial rule was distinct
from metropolitan institutions not just in technical capacity and appearance but also in
function and aims. Indeed, referring to the changes underway in 1947, Maseru reported to
London: ‘As is customary in most civilized countries, imprisonment is no longer regarded
only in the light of punishment… Efforts are made to educate convicts by teaching them
useful callings… This aim will now also be adopted in Basutoland.’188 Prior to this point
the colonial state used its jails to exact retribution and deter crime, and did not implement
practices –– like biometric record keeping, classification, and job training –– which were
animating concerns for metropolitan peer institutions. The importation of British penal and
policing technologies over time was catalyzed and shaped more by local exigencies than
long-term strategic planning or the ideology of a civilizing mission. The origins of
Lesotho’s penal system were thus indelibly colonial, and only began seeking to replicate a
Western model in the 1940s.
British officials, however, soon ceased acknowledging this reality. In Chapters Five
and Six, I detail the elaboration of new carceral policies and institutions in Lesotho during
the post-war colonial era. When the British directed a slightly greater investment to new
infrastructure, training, and regulations, it led to dramatic improvements in the conditions
of life and work in the territory’s penal facilities over the space of a couple decades; a
reality made all the more extraordinary by how radically the new approaches broke with
the practices institutionalized over the proceeding half century. At the same time these
changes were underway, the colonial bureaucracy engaged in deep historical revisionism:
reforms in the late-1950s and early-60s were cast as being part of a chain of progressive
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British tutelage and investments dating back to the construction of the first lock-ups built
by Cape personnel in the 1870s. When confronted with a number of public failures of penal
administration (including uprisings, frequent escapes, and revelations of abusive conduct
by warders) and the more general divide in technical capacity at prisons in Britain and
Lesotho, colonial officials cited lack of local resources and, even, cultural incompatibility
between Sesotho traditions and modern universal technologies. A history of divergent
systemic priorities was effaced. The story was warped further still as the inevitability of
the end of colonial rule became increasingly clear and the British sought to divest
themselves of any moral or financial debts: officials claimed that after decades of imperial
tutelage and investment in prisons, it was incumbent upon Basotho to take responsibility
for running their own institutions according to modern, universal standards.
The afterlives of this sort of late colonial revisionism continue to influence public
discussions of prisons in Lesotho in the present, and imbue the origin story of the penal
system with more than mere academic importance. A common strain of populist political
rhetoric contends that cramped, squalid, and dangerous conditions for inmates in Lesotho’s
prisons today represents a latter-day defense of Sesotho traditions of austere control,
threatened by the neo-colonial meddling of foreign governments and international
organizations pushing unwanted and unproductive universalist human rights agendas on
Africans.189 This vision of the past is premised, however, on the late colonial conceit that
efforts to reform and improve systems of social control in the Lesotho have been
fundamentally driven by external forces and authorities, often despite local opposition.

189

On this point there was tremendous agreement across the spectrum of MP’s belonging to the All
Basotho Convention, Basotho National Party, and various splinter parties of the Congress
movement:

153

This narrative is not sustained by the history excavated and examined in this chapter. The
colonial state’s embrace of modern penology in Lesotho in the post-WWII period cannot
be understood absent decades of political pressure from Basotho calling for more modern,
more effective, and/or more just mechanisms for promoting social control and cohesion:
the BPA drew attention to local abuses by lords and increasing levels of crime over time
to pressure the administration to actually establish the sorts of institutions its officials
extolled, predicated on rehabilitation (and, later, welfarist) principles; LLB, meanwhile,
spurred colonial unease and action by calling for Africans to build a society rooted in a
vision of progress and modernity differing from that offered by British officials and
missionaries. Thus, while it is certainly true that some sectors of Lesotho’s society have
long embraced and promoted the notion that violent punishment embodies the most
traditional and efficacious approach for stamping out crime and social harming, there are
other old and vibrant discourses and, indeed, traditions, of Basotho seeking to progressively
confront crime through the rehabilitation of individuals and, even, by addressing the
criminogenic aspects of Lesotho’s political economy
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Part II. Leprosariums as Incarceration,
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Chapter 3

As we fear fire: experiments in leprosy policing, detention, and
stigmatization, 1890-1930
3.1 Introduction
On May 20, 1914, less than five months after the opening of Botšabelo Leper Asylum, a
large group of male patients rebelled.1 The men seized control of the facility armed with
stones, farming implements, and sections of piping torn from compound buildings. In the
initial tumult of the uprising, the rebels assaulted several guards, the compound manager,
and the resident chaplain. Colonial police and representatives of local lords rushed to the
scene, encircling the facility with armed men. After two days of negotiations, the rebels
put down their weapons. Inmates were forced to watch a trial of the ringleaders. Before
handing down jail sentences, the British Resident Herbert Sloley admonished the crowd.
Not only was the administration committed to segregation, he crowed, but so too was the
aristocracy. The resident had strong reasons to believe his rhetoric, above all the efficient
manner in which lords rounded up the sick in the weeks following the asylum’s opening.
Based on this confidence, little was done to reinforce the facility following the rebellion.
When patients began to slip out of the facility in mass in October, the administration
again did not take steps to shore up security or even pursue escapees. Maseru believed that
patients returning home to find themselves turned back over to the administration by
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neighbors and community leaders would provide a more permanent form of institutional
security than could be accomplished with armed guards and shackles: it would break the
resolve of patients to escape. By the end of the summer, however, only a few dozen of the
three hundred escapees were back in the administration’s custody. With the viability of the
facility now seemingly hanging in the balance, the administration was forced to reconsider
its assumptions about how best to effect leprosy segregation.
Botšabelo was the largest total institution in Lesotho from 1914 until the 1950s,
holding between 450 and 750 people in custody within its barbed wire perimeter year after
year. The asylum served as the nucleus of a colonial scheme to compulsorily detain all
people infected with leprosy in the territory. This approach to biomedical segregation was
noteworthy both in terms of its ambition and coerciveness. The only other colonial
administrations to launch similarly aggressive public health campaigns against leprosy
were home to sizable populations of Europeans: settler communities not only gave rise to
particularly acute concerns about infection – couched in racial discourses about the threats
posed by indigenous others – but also possessed the political clout necessary to pressure
imperial governments to carry out the expensive work of rounding up and detaining the
sick.2 Instead, colonial governments overwhelmingly relied on mission societies to provide
2
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biomedical care for persons infected with leprosy on a voluntary basis.3 To understand why
Maseru launched such a project, in a territory home to neither a sizable settler population
nor substantial natural resources, we must look to the larger history of policing and
confinement in the territory. As detailed in the previous chapter, the coercive division of
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On the ways that leprosy’s symbolism in Christian doctrine influenced mission societies’
activities: Vaughan, M. 1991. Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness. Stanford:
Stanford, 77-97. This symbolism also had valence for British activist associations: Worboys, M.
2000. ‘The Colonial World as Mission and Mandate: Leprosy and Empire, 1900-1940.’ Osiris 15:
207–18; Vongsathorn, K. 2012. ‘Gnawing Pains, Festering Ulcers and Nightmare Suffering:
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the Caribbean, and Asia, passage of the Loi de Laicization in 1905 led colonial states to build their
own facilities (Silla, 93-4).
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labor in British imperial Lesotho was allocated on spatial lines: the administration was
responsible for controlling a thin strip of land running along Lesotho’s western border,
while nobles controlled the mountainous interior. By the mid-1890s, however, Maseru was
growing frustrated with just how opaque the interior remained. An ostensible surge in
leprosy infections at the same moment led Dr. Edward Long, the principle medical officer
in the territory and the architect of colonial-era biomedical infrastructure, to muse that the
grave threat also presented a tremendous opportunity.
In 1894 Dr. Long seized upon growing Cape hysteria about leprosy to undertake an
ambitious survey on the state of the malady in Lesotho. This experience fueled the medical
officer’s enduring faith that compulsory segregation was an existential requirement for the
territory and that policing could be done on the cheap by using lords. The visibility of
leprosy symptoms, moreover, was perceived to present a particular inroad for addressing
the lack of colonial visibility into the countryside. The first reason was the simple fact that
the symptoms of the malady (at least in its lepromatous or multibacillary form) were readily
identifiable. This fact gave rise to the assumption that Basotho could be marshaled to do
the work of policing with only minimal diagnostic training, so long as lords and
communities were convinced to take the threat seriously. Second, and more fundamentally,
the gruesomeness of advanced symptoms were viewed as conducive to building the fear
and stigma which would underpin compliance by lords and villagers in reporting the sick.4

4

Long subscribed to a common sense that stigmatization or suspicion of people suffering from
leprosy was trans-culturally and trans-historically universal. Rod Edmond examines the history of
this viewpoint in Leprosy and Empire: A Medical and Cultural History (1996. New York:
Cambridge University, 1-9). The universal stigma argument was widely accepted in the West until
recently: see, for example, Skinses, O. 1964. ‘Leprosy in Society III. The Relationship of the Social
to the Medical Pathology of Leprosy.’ Leprosy Review 35: 175–81. This perspective ignored the
observations of numerous Westerners (and particularly missionaries) living in the Global South
who detailed, often breathlessly, the continued involvement of people afflicted by leprosy in social
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Indeed, in a moment in which officials were lamenting the lack of stigma surrounding
criminal behavior, tapping into latent fears of personal disfigurement and death seemed
like a lighter lift. Fear was seen, moreover, as a means of offsetting any need to remunerate
lords for additional work. This vision won the support of a succession of Residents because
of its promise to facilitate greater security collaboration with the aristocracy: local lords
would necessarily become enmeshed in a constellation of administrative machinery while
liaising with medical officers to check the spread of the malady in their domains. This
project did not get off the ground in the 1890s, however, because of the opposition of
Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies.
By the early 1910s, however, several factors converged to clear the political terrain
for the construction of Botšabelo and the experimental use of lords as biomedical police.
First, metropolitan perceptions of the etiology of leprosy had swung decisively towards
viewing the malady as contagious, and expert opinion coalesced around compulsory
segregation as the most effective means of combatting the infection. Second, the threat of

activities: for perspectives on Southern Africa, see Junod, H.A. The Life of a South African Tribe
II. The Psychic Life. London: Macmillan, 1913, 434; Hermann Dieterlen’s observations on Basotho
perceptions are discussed in this chapter and the next. The cultural turn demolished the universal
stigma paradigm: Michel Foucault (1988. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the
Age of Reason. R. Howard, trans. New York: Vintage, 1988, 15-9) famously argued that criminals
took over the central role of stigmatized deviants when leprosy supposedly vanished from Europe
during the late Middle Ages (of course the infection did not actually disappear, and remained
endemic in parts of Scandinavia, Iberia, and the Baltic into the 20th century); Zachary Gussow
linked the social construction of leprosy stigma to the advent of colonialism and scientific racism
(1989; see also Gussow and G. Tracy, 1970. Stigma and the Leprosy Phenomenon.’ Bulletin of the
History of Medicine 440, 125-49, 127-30); Carlo Ginzburg noted the centrality of anti-Semitism in
the Catholic inquisition of ‘the lepers’ in 14th century France, involving a wave of burnings at the
stake and the first large scale segregation campaign anywhere on the European continent (1991.
Ecstasies: Deciphering the Witches’ Sabbath. R. Rosenthal, trans. New York: Pantheon, 31-62);
Mary Douglass detailed how interpretations (and translations) of the third book of the Torah/Old
Testament have changed in step with ontological and epistemological shifts, notably including the
biomedical classification of leprosy as an infection distinct from a host of other dermatological
maladies (1999. Leviticus as Literature. New York: Oxford University, 182-91 and 176-9).
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a debilitating infection catching fire amongst Lesotho’s population took on new political
import in the wake of the South Africa War, with the small territory standing as an
important source of the migrant laborers who were rebuilding and industrializing the
Union’s economy. Third, the creation of the National Council in 1903 enabled Maserubased officials to discuss leprosy with the highest-ranking lords in the land and, thereby,
to secure promises of the aristocracy being onboard with biomedical policing ––
declarations which were essential for winning the support of decision makers in Cape Town
and London. Long pitched the asylum to the Council in 1911, the paramount set aside
ground for Botšabelo in early 1912, construction began in mid 1913, and the asylum
officially opened at the start of 1914.
Maseru’s confidence in the prospects of their new leprosy control measures, both
for combatting the infection and for facilitating closer surveillance cooperation with lords,
came hurtling back to earth over the final weeks of 1914. The failure of the scheme
provides a window into the operation of colonial power, and the circulation of technical
and moral knowledge between colonial administrators and different Basotho social groups.
The vocal support for compulsory segregation by aristocratic members of the National
Council – as well as amongst the mission-educated petty bourgeoisie – did not translate
into consistent cooperation from lower-ranking lords, much less the population of the
territory at large. While virtually the entire aristocracy acquiesced to the demand in early
1914 to send persons on the national registry to Botšabelo, many accomplished this feat
with deceit: falsely promising the sick that a cure awaited them at the asylum. When the
desertion crisis arose over late-1914 and 1915, circulars instructing lords to once again
track down a list of persons to send back – this time without being able to rely on
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misinformation – went largely ignored. Lords turned blind eyes to the stream of escapees
traipsing through and filtering back into their communities.5 Fear of contagion, it turned
out, was more difficult to manufacture than initially expected: leprosy stigma, we shall see,
took decades to take root in Lesotho, not the weeks or months envisioned by colonial
planners.
By the end of 1915, Maseru clearly owned a boondoggle. The project had cost over
£30,000 in capital expenditure, and was running at an operational cost of some £11,000 per
year. In a contentious National Council meeting, prominent lords and officials both
outlined how it was the responsibility of their counterpart to fix the situation. Lords
demanded that the administration securitize the facility so as to staunch the hemorrhaging
of patients, while Resident Sloley and Dr. Long insisted that aristocrats press their
subordinates to do their legal and public health duty by rounding up escapees. Ultimately,
the two sets of authorities agreed to pursue both courses of action. The administration
increased the number of watchmen on staff and built jails within the facility to make
examples of punishing deserters. People the on deserter rolls, meanwhile, were gradually
traced and turned over to the custody of the administration. Yet, even as nobles and their
messengers grudgingly re-detained escapees over subsequent months and years, the
aristocracy failed to play the police role in the way Long envisioned: very few lords made
an effort to identify or report newly symptomatic cases of infection. The administration
ultimately managed to salvage the Botšabelo project over the short term by ceasing to put
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James C. Scott’s concept of weapons of the weak (1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms
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Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University) is useful for framing how mass flight
represented a far greater threat than armed rebellion to the viability of compulsory segregation in
Lesotho.
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singular focus on lords fulfilling a biomedical police role, and attending for the first time
to creating a sick role.6 I explore the details of the patient-administration relationship ––
and specifically the ways that inmates sought to leverage discourses of motherhood,
patienthood, invalidism, and citizenship over time to secure privileges and rights –– in the
next chapter.
By the late-1910s Long’s dream had morphed into a recurrent nightmare for
Maseru. Even as escapes became less of a problem, by dint of the improving asylum
conditions, the administration faced new sets of concerns involving the ways that
traditional authorities were managing leprosy. As noted above, the administration was
continuously frustrated by the failure of lords to report newly symptomatic cases to their
colonial counterparts. Some lords further began neglecting administrative tasks involving
asylum patients hailing from their communities, on the grounds that the sick were no longer
their subjects. The administration thus faced a leprosy management scheme which not only
failed to promote the integration of nobles into the biomedical bureaucracy, as planned, but
also undermined existing systems of allocating land and resolving legal disputes. In the
1920s, the administration set out to use leprosy laws to charge the families and lords of
patients admitted into the asylum with advanced infections. But faced with the grim social
and economic realities of actual cases, which became visible and affectively charged when
officers served as the tip of the coercive colonial spear themselves, Maseru abandoned the
prosecutory route.
The administration created a leprosy inspectorate in 1929. In pivoting towards
reliance on a professional police force in place of the aristocracy, the administration

6
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presaged larger structural changes in policing which would be rolled out in the late 1930s
into the 1940s. Although disillusionment with the prospect of integrating nobles into the
colonial biomedical apparatus colored the policy shift, this move was hastened by external
developments. Over the 1920s and early 1930s the policy of compulsory segregation came
under increasingly forceful critique from organizations like the British Empire Leprosy
Relief Association (BELRA) and the League of Nations as costly and ineffective.7 Maseru
vehemently rejected the notion of switching to a scheme of voluntary segregation,
however, on account of the sunk costs of Botšabelo. Beyond the embarrassment of having
wasted hundreds of thousands of Basotho taxpayers’ pounds, local officials were still more
concerned about how a change in policy might negatively impact their intellectual
credibility with the aristocracy, patients, and the nation writ large, after a quarter century
of shrilly warning that compulsory segregation was the only way to attack an existential
threat to the nation. Inspectors were deployed in hopes of showing rapid progress, which
might forestall a larger change in policy. Maseru was ultimately able to beat back calls
from BELRA to abandon compulsory segregation by selling the idea of Lesotho as a public
health laboratory within empire: as other colonies embraced or pivoted to voluntary
segregation, the scientific method demanded there be at least one small British territory
with an aggressive system of policing and compulsorily detaining sick persons. Patients
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‘British Empire Leprosy Relief Association’ brochure, n.d.; British Library (BL), League of
Nations Health Organisation. 1931. ‘The Principles of the Prophylaxis of Leprosy: First General
Report of the Leprosy Commission.” Geneva: LON.
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who were unwittingly detained as part of an experiment in how to encourage greater
bureaucratic entanglement between colonial and traditional authorities thus remained
incarcerated, an unwitting control group in a new imperial experiment in the efficacy of
different public health approaches.
3.2 On the meanings of leprosy in the British Empire and Southern Africa
While leprosy has existed in human societies for millennia, responses to the malady and its
symptoms have varied a great deal across time and space. British metropolitan consensus
about the dangers of leprosy, and the utility of segregation, swung back and forth over the
19th and first half of the 20th centuries.8 The 1880s and 1890s were marked by a sharp
increase in both scholarly and popular interest in leprosy in many parts of the world, as
well as a drift towards supporting segregation as an effective public health intervention.
Hansen’s discovery of the ‘bacillus leprae’ (mycobacterium lepra) in 1873 fueled new
biomedical interest. Researchers and physicians keenly debated how the bacterium spread.9
The well-reported ‘martyrdom’ of Father Damien de Veuster — a Belgian Catholic priest
who built up a purportedly model leprosy colony on the Hawaiian Island of Molokai, only
to be infected himself and, finally, succumb to the malady in 1889 –– also did much to
boost awareness and fear of leprosy for both the public and policymakers in the West.10 As
the dawn of the 20th century approached, biomedical opinion in Britain, and the West more
broadly, drifted towards a new consensus about leprosy: the infection was communicable,

8

See Edmond, 53-61; Bashford, 81-93.
Rogers and Muir 1946, 50-61: Popular theories included transmission by human touch, heredity,
eating salted fish, and as a side effect of syphilitic infection.
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9
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posed a serious threat to public health, and could only be effectively countered through
segregation.11
As governments formulated new policies for managing leprosy over the 1890s and
the early 1900s, settler colonies gave rise to the most totalized segregation efforts.12 The
Cape Colony — Lesotho’s neighbor and erstwhile ruler — represented perhaps the most
firmly established enclave of segregationist sentiment and practice on the globe.13 The
Cape Parliament convened a commission of inquiry on leprosy in 1883. The commission’s
findings read: ‘Leprosy prevails extensively in this Colony and is steadily spreading among
both white and coloured classes’ and, therefore, there was need for an ‘Act for the
compulsory segregation of all lepers...and the establishment of leper institutions in suitable
locations where perfect isolation can be secured.’14 The Cape Parliament first passed the
Leprosy Repression Act in 1884, making segregation of the sick compulsory, and
promulgated the legislation in 1892.15 A rising tide of race lore and eugenicist fervor
interfaced with growing concern about leprosy, and led to the broad vilification of people
of African (most especially San) and Asian descent, as well as working class Europeans,
as embodiments of poor hygiene and a danger to middle-class and affluent whites.16
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New infrastructure and approaches to the treatment of leprosy accompanied the
Cape’s segregation laws. Although officials began using Robben Island to house leprosy
patients in 1845, the site was essentially a custodial facility, offering few pretenses of
therapy.17 Leprosy patients did not make up a discrete population on the island, being
housed alongside mentally ill persons and ‘those paupers considered incurably sick.’18 This
changed in the 1890s, with the arrival of new staff, facilities, and therapeutic efforts
specifically for leprosy patients. Meanwhile, a second leprosarium called Emjanyana was
launched in Thembuland, on the Cape’s frontier, in 1894.19 The facility enabled the
Medical Department to both project power further geographically and to begin spatially
subdividing leprosy patients by race. Emjanyana’s original design was as a ‘model village.’
Officials imagined rondavels situated on a hillside would ‘reproduce home-life’ for the
entirely African body of patients. This layout was abandoned after two years, however,
because residents were ‘continually escaping and returning to their homes.’ In its place
‘two large compounds were built, about a mile apart, one for males and one for females,
which, being enclosed, could be locked up and guarded at night.’ The compound system at
Emjanyana served as the primary model for Botšabelo two decades later.
In colonial Lesotho medical officers and administrative personnel began to express
alarm about local rates of leprosy prevalence and transmission over the 1890s. The
administration’s concern was heightened by suspicion that South African policies were
exacerbating local rates of infection. Resident Commissioner Marshall Clarke complained
about a dangerous inflow of persons suffering from leprosy in 1893: ‘these unfortunates
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have taken refuge in Basutoland to escape the repression laws of the Cape Colony and the
Orange Free State’ and unsuccessfully lobbied to transfer highly symptomatic Basotho to
Robben Island.20 Responding to the request for data from the Cape’s leprosy commission
in 1894, Lesotho’s district medical officers were ordered ‘to furnish returns...and
investigate the history of each known case.’21 The investigation concluded that while the
malady had been ‘virtually unknown’ only 50 years earlier, ‘immigration from
neighbouring states’ had led to 148 ‘undoubted cases of leprosy,’ and potentially quite a
few more, in the territory. The report suggested that the most alarming dynamic was the
state of local responses to the infection, with isolation ‘being the exception rather than the
rule.’
The report noted a diversity of views amongst Basotho about both the causes of
leprosy and the nature of the threat posed by the malady. One thing that Bantu-language
speaking peoples in the subcontinent could agree upon, however, was that the affliction
was a recent arrival. Lexical data supports this notion, as there is no Sesotho-based name
for the malady most commonly referred to as lepera. Sesotho nosology further reveals an
intellectual association between San people and leprosy, with the infection sometimes
called lefu la Baroa (‘sickness of the San’).22 Period Basotho understandings inscribed in
the mission-press provide similar clues:
Old people in Lesotho claim that leprosy… was affecting the San who lived near the
Basotho at Mekuatleng. During Senekal’s war [in 1858], a Mosotho married a San wife
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Report, 10.
22
In Sesotho the malady also used to frequently be referred to as liphatšoa, a noun made by
pluralizing the adjective ‘phatšoa,’ meaning ‘black and white coloration.’

168

who was infected by leprosy. He was infected...and died. They say he was the first Mosotho
who they saw having that illness. They say, it entered this nation through him.23

Other Highveld lexicons and orally transmitted histories corroborate the present-day theory
that migrants from the Cape carried leprosy across the subcontinent over the mid-19th
century.24
To construct knowledge about the new malady, Basotho drew upon a host of
intellectual traditions. The colonial medical department was one key source of
information.25 A parallel tributary of biomedical knowledge flowed out of mission stations,
spread into communities by way of European and African evangelists, mission presses,
and, also, in the schools associated with mission stations. As we will see, bahlalefi,
mission-educated Basotho elites, represented a strong pillar of support for the isolation of
balepera. Other Basotho social groups drew upon older idioms and traditions relating to
the drivers of sickness, including sorcery.
3.3 On the meanings of leprosy in Lesotho
With no settler population and little stigma of leprosy amongst local people, a small and
resource poor colony seems a strange location for a large and costly leprosarium. The
decision to build Botšabelo makes more sense, however, when viewed in the context of the
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colonial politics of the era. As discussed in proceeding chapter, the Moorosi conflict and
Gun War imparted a smarting lesson for imperial policymakers about the potential
explosiveness of legal reforms and the dangers of alienating the aristocracy. This led early
administrators to tread lightly when it came to policies which would arrogate or limit the
powers of lords. The building of new medical infrastructure was perceived as a safe,
apolitical intervention that served to improve both health outcomes and economic
performance. Moreover, the ‘cultural work’ of winning over converts to biomedicine was
imagined to enhance goodwill and respect for Western technology amongst the local
populace.26 While Maseru largely left the work of building schools to the mission churches
and roads to private traders, officials proved more willing to invest in dispensaries and
hospitals during the 1890s. The growing popularity of these facilities inspired further
investment, as officials saw increasing visits as Basotho effectively ‘voting with their feet’
in favor of Western medicine over Sesotho medicine.27
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Edward Long was the central architect of colonial Lesotho’s biomedical
infrastructure, as well as the territory’s aggressive segregationist approach to leprosy,
during his tenure as the territory’s Principle Medical Officer, spanning from 1894 through
1922.28 Only weeks after taking on this role, Long took advantage of a request for data
from the Cape Leprosy Commission to survey the state of the malady in Lesotho. The
doctor’s obsession with leprosy dates to at least this point. After using the data collected
for the Cape Commission to create a ‘Leper Register,’ the PMO submitted a lengthy study
on leprosy in the territory to his superiors, and requested clearance to systematically isolate
the sick.29 Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, not only read Long’s
report but took the time to pen a lengthy critique: not only was segregation of dubious
public health value but it represented a grave violation of imperial subjects’ right to
liberty.30 As such, the Secretary advised Maseru to work with nobles to mount a different
sort of campaign to fight the malady: he envisioned using the aristocracy to distribute
biomedical information about hygiene and diet into the nation, and model best practices of
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keeping distance from the sick within the context of villages. Local lords would thus serve
as educators rather than as jailers or police.
The Medical Department based in Maseru followed the letter of these instructions
from London, if not the spirit. The PMO ordered his team of district medical officers to
conduct outreach to lords, but primarily to enjoin nobles to banish the sick from village
centers and report new cases of infection. The two approaches call to mind Michel
Foucault’s observation that distinct rationalities of government give rise to differing
‘techniques of power.’31 Chamberlain envisioned efforts to improve the health of Basotho
broadly while Long wished to instead mark out ‘lepers’ as a distinct population. For the
latter, distinguishing the sick as a different class of people marked a first step towards
creating a system of surveillance of the few by the many, which he believed provided the
best chance of detecting sick people in a territory where colonial officers were few and far
between.32 Although barred from detaining infected persons, Long continued to record and
monitor all ‘confirmed’ and ‘suspected’ cases in the territory. In 1902 and 1906 district
medical officers were ordered to survey prominent lords in their jurisdictions about the
presence of leprosy, examine those cases which were reported, and submit updated lists to
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Maseru.33 Across populations suffering from various chronic illnesses, only balepera were
logged and surveilled.34
Over the closing years of the 19th century and first decade of the 20th, the political
economy of Southern Africa shifted in ways that buttressed Long’s claims about the
urgency of segregating balepera. During this period there was a dramatic increase in
Basotho migration to work on mines and farms in South Africa.35 The administration
generated the bulk of its revenue by taxing these wages, and officials viewed themselves
as stewards of the migrant labor system.36 Medical department personnel argued that an
uptick in leprosy infections might adversely impact colonial coffers by scaring South
African industry away from Basotho labor.37 Particularly in the wake of the South African
War, with the Transvaal facing acute labor shortages, the High Commissioner in South
Africa, and a new generation of metropolitan officials, were keen to ensure that Lesotho
remained a healthy pool of bodies for industry. Long continued to highlight the supposedly
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insufficient progress being made via education and efforts to segregate the sick at the local
level: even in those instances in which lords and village headmen were convinced to push
balepera to the margins of communities, seclusion was not as stringent as necessary.38 In
some cases balepera received visitors and continued to participate in village life, including
communal labor, beer drinks, and feasts.39
In 1906 Maseru believed it had found a breakthrough. The principle lord of Leribe
District, Jonathan Molapo, set aside a swathe of land in the remote Menyameng River
Valley for settlement by balepera of the district.40 Shortly after the settlement’s opening,
over forty sick persons, many accompanied by family, moved to the area. Long was
cautiously optimistic that Menyameng might ‘induce other leading Chiefs to follow
Jonathan’s example,’ and eventually lead to placing the ‘leper colonies under the
supervision of the Medical Authorities.’41 Jonathan’s decision to create the settlement,
however, was fueled as much by political maneuvering as by a commitment to the
administration’s public health goals. Locked in a bitter dispute with his half-brother, Joel
Molapo, over control of Leribe, Jonathan adroitly curried the administration’s favor while
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also using the community as a territorial buffer against his rival. The same forces that
catalyzed the Menyameng experiment also fueled its dissolution. When Jonathan moved
to set aside more land for the settlement at the junction of the Menyameng and the
Menyamaneng Rivers – ostensibly to make room for new arrivals, but also pressing into
territory beyond his own command – Joel and allies blocked the effort.42 The Menyameng
community thus found itself wedged between two leaders quickly edging towards violent
conflict. In a dangerous position, and dubious about the settlement’s long-term prospects,
residents scattered over 1908-09.
Frustration over the failure of village-level isolation efforts and the larger
experiment in Leribe, combined with the growing consensus of international experts that
compulsory segregation was the most effective means of checking the spread of leprosy,
spurred Long to once again begin agitating for the building of a central leprosarium. The
collapse of the Menyameng settlement registered in the PMO’s mind as evidence that
Basotho were incapable of administering facilities or communities involving custody: this
conclusion paralleled the larger thread of colonial mythology, discussed in Chapter 2,
inducing that Sesotho culture was incompatible with jails because the facilities didn’t exist
in the Mohokare Valley prior to the arrival of Europeans. The International Leprosy
Conferences held in Berlin in 1897 and, especially, in Bergen in 1909, meanwhile, heartily
endorsed compulsory segregation: it was the only public measure for governments which
were serious about eradicating leprosy.43
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Long approached Resident Sloley with a proposal to build a state of the art asylum
in 1910. The ambitious scheme looked to cash out much of the nest egg of tax surpluses
the administration had accrued over the previous quarter century.44 The main challenge, in
the PMO’s eyes, was how to round up the hundreds of people on the leprosy registry at the
outset and continue to detect newly symptomatic individuals over time. This task was quite
clearly too large to foist on a small and thinly spread colonial police force, much less a
handful of district medical officers. Long argued to his superior, however, that this
quandary should not be viewed as insurmountable obstacle so much as a rich opportunity.
Even if Basotho lords were unable to administer jails, they were demonstrably capable of
apprehending criminal suspects and remitting these individuals to the administration for
trial. Key challenges from the experience of pursuit of criminal justice, however, had been
the reticence of some lords to hand over suspects, on account of both a lack of stigma of
offenses and opposition to ceding juridical power to the administration. Sloley agreed with
Long that leprosy detention should not present either of these challenges: after all, Basotho
harbored latent stigma of the disease and lords should only look to Menyameng to see that
they were incapable of effectively dealing with the malady on their own.45
3.4 Building the Physical and Legal Infrastructure for Segregation
Despite the lack of success in mobilizing lords to decisively support the segregation of
balepera over the previous decade and a half, officials hoped the recently constituted
National Council might serve as an instrument for shaping opinion. After having briefly
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touched upon leprosy in earlier sessions,46 Resident Herbert Sloley and PMO Long looked
to the 1911 meeting as an opportunity to lay out a detailed case for segregation to all the
top nobles in one sitting, as well as a chance to gauge the reception of these ideas.47 Before
spilling ink on new leprosy laws, or laying down stone and barbed wire on an asylum, the
first materials for building a segregation regime were biomedical knowledge and emotional
appeals. Long and Sloley believed that if the aristocracy could be convinced to genuinely
fear leprosy, the position of balepera in society could be fundamentally altered, both in the
physical world and as a matter of subjectivity. The sick would be inspected, classified, and
detained as ‘lepers,’ and these persons’ existing social networks would wither away as their
very bodies succumbed to disease.
Long addressed the council over the course of three days in May 1911, carefully
scaffolding the government rationale. He began with an exposition on germ theory,
describing bacteria as a ‘very small insect’ that could be ‘carried in the food which lepers
have handled, the spoons they eat with and the clothes they wear.’ Long noted that there
were more than 700 names on the leprosy register, and maintained infections would
continue to multiply so long as the sick were allowed to move freely about the country.
Having sketched the problem, the PMO outlined his solution: ‘The only way by which we
can hope to stamp out Leprosy is to prevent the lepers mixing with healthy people.’ He
explicitly noted the need to sever friendship and break apart families: ‘We must be prepared
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Rev, Nicola Mpiti and Chief Josias, on whether the government should be doing more to emulate
South Africa’s leprosaria system, Sloley expressed support for the ongoing Menyameng
experiment as a more cost-effective means of managing leprosy (BNA CO646/1: BNC 1908, pp.
22-5.). Sloley broached leprosy again after the dissolution of Menyameng, when closing the 4th
Session (1910) he enjoined councilors to ‘make little efforts at your own places, and see how you
can work about these lepers’ (BNA CO646/1: 1910 National Council, 14).
47
BNA CO646/1, 1911 BNC, Addresses by Sloley and Long.

177

to harden our hearts… remembering that it would be for the good of the whole nation that
the lepers suffered the loss of their liberty.’ Long pointed to South Africa as a model for
infrastructure:
I have thought out a method by which we can deal with Leprosy in Basutoland. It is a result
of a great deal of thinking and looking out through South Africa and elsewhere to see what
other people are doing... All lepers must be brought to one place, in that place there will be
buildings for them to live in, they will be provided with food and clothing ... but they will
have to live always within this ground. The women will have to be kept separate from the
men, any child that happens to be born there will have to be removed.48

Following the PMO’s presentation, councilors spent hours asking questions and
sharing opinions. The transcripts of the session suggest that Long’s pitch struck a cord, as
the council was overwhelmingly in favor of proceeding with segregation. Lord Philip
captured the mood prevailing in the hall during the discussions:
It is the duty of every member of this Council to urge [fellow] chiefs to take this advice of
Dr. Long seriously and to point out a place where these people shall be kept. We are glad
to hear that these people will be looked after by Government, it would be difficult for us to
look after them.

Based on the interactions in council, Sloley and Long were convinced that,
notwithstanding the difficulties inducing the traditional authorities to enforce localized
isolation, the existing infrastructure of the aristocracy could be used to find sick people and
usher them into the asylum. As the project moved forward, high-level nobles did little to
question government narratives, knowledge, and policy proposals. Indeed, representatives
reiterated their strong support for the project again at the 1912 and 1913 sessions of the
National Council; councilors rose, one after another, to express concern about leprosy and
express support for the project.49 Lord Tšoloane’s remarks in 1912 suggest the extent to
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which officials had sought to instrumentalize fear to win councilors’ support for
compulsory segregation: ‘This must be done. We must fear leprosy as we fear fire.’50
After touring several South African leprosaria, and corresponding with officials at
others, Long drew up blueprints for the facility.51 In January 1912, Paramount Letsie, in
consultation with the Resident Commissioner, allocated a 1,500-acre piece of ground for
an asylum. The site lay at the foot of Berea Mountain, approximately four miles from
central Maseru. Before construction could commence, however, the site needed to be
cleared of residents.52 The act of dispossessing a fellow lord of followers proved to be the
biggest point of contention within the National Council.53
An early priority for Sloley, meanwhile, was the selection of a name for the
facility.54 Writing later in the Journal of the Royal African Society, the former Resident
Commissioner explained his sense of urgency:
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Anyone who has had anything to do with African natives must have observed how readily
and quickly they give names to new arrivals or to new institutions... As an instance, the
medical officer in charge of the Maseru Hospital told me that his operating theatre was
known to the native public as “Madimong,” or “the Cannibal’s Cave,” a gruesome allusion
to the butchery that is supposed to be carried on there. In order that no such disagreeable
suggestion might be made with reference to the new settlement, it was decided to give it...
an attractive name.55

In an August 1912 telegram, Paramount Letsie referred to plans to send patients to a facility
‘which we can name Botsabelo.’56 Sloley and Long were delighted by the name, meaning
‘refuge’ in Sesotho. The name itself hints at the radical experiment in institutional security
which the administration was embarking upon: instead of using high walls, roiling seas, or
unscalable cliffs to ensure inmates stayed within the facility, Maseru intended to promote
such rigorous policing and foment such social antipathy so as to eventually make it
impossible for people grappling with leprosy to live outside the asylum. The name thus
expressed the pleasant face of a two-sided colonial aspiration: Botšabelo might indeed
become an island of refuge, but only when the rest of the nation was transformed into a sea
of hostility.
Long drew up the initial plans for the facility.57 The design was based on medical
needs, with physical security features observed in South African institutions grafted on top.
The blueprints centered around two compounds, one for females situated at the southern
end of the facility and another for males at the northern end. One low wire fence surrounded
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the entire facility, and another ran from east to west to bisect the facility into the gendered
halves. Each compound was comprised of a square of 20 dormitories (each with 4 rooms
with 6 beds) positioned around a courtyard, and surrounded by 10-foot high fences
crowned with barbs. Located within both compound courtyards was a dining hall,
bathhouse, and a 20-bed hospital. The fence dividing the two compounds was interrupted
in the middle of the facility by a shop and common room, and to the east by staff quarters.58
A Paris Evangelical Mission church sat to the west of the male compound. The church and
dormitory walls were made of heavy corrugated iron sheets procured from leftover British
materiel from the South Africa War.59 These sturdy sheets were set on stone foundations
with timber frames. When construction began in mid-1913, a cheap source of construction
labor was secured by turning to the Industrial School in Maseru. Students in the trades built
the facilities under the supervision of a handful of instructors, apparently with ‘the
experience gained there…of the greatest service to the boys.’60
The Leprosy Proclamation (Proclamation No. 41 of 1913) was designed to knit
together the existing infrastructure of policing by chiefs with the new biomedical
infrastructure of the colonial state. The legal terms of confinement drew heavily from South
African codes, particularly the Transvaal Leprosy Ordinance of 1904 and the Orange River
Colony Leprosy Act (No. 26 of 1909).61 A draft of the law was placed before the National
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Council in 1913, at the specific behest of the Colonial Office.62 The legislation detailed
policing responsibilities within and across the administrative hierarchies of the chieftaincy
and medical department, and made it a criminal offense, punishable by a fine of up to £10
or six months imprisonment with hard labor, to harbor or fail to report any ‘suspected
leper.’ Each resident was bound to report suspicions upward: people to headmen and lords,
headmen and lords to colonial officers, and officers to the Assistant Commissioner (AC)
of the district. The primary area of concern for Councilors were questions over whether
‘people may report lepers to the Government without first reporting to their chiefs?’63
Sloley allayed fears by describing a one-directional system of reporting, acknowledging
that ‘every chief has a chief above him to whom he is responsible, up to the Paramount
Chief.’
The legislation also outlined the paperwork governing the process of detention.
Upon being alerted of potential cases by nobles, the AC notified the district Medical Officer
(MO) to arrange a physical exam. If the MO concurred with the suspected diagnosis, an
order for removal was issued and the patient rendered to Maseru. The removed person
would then be examined by two more MOs tasked with the decision of whether the
individual should be released or the Government Secretary should issue a detention order.
The law also stipulated that all patients be examined at least once a year by a medical board
and, if deemed no longer contagious, provided with a discharge order to present to her/his
lord.64 The legislation further created a visiting committee tasked with periodically
inspecting and reporting on the facility, authorized the Asylum Superintendent to mete out
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discipline to inmates, and empowered the Resident Commissioner to make new rules for
the asylum as necessary.
On January 2, 1914, Sloley used the powers conferred by the leprosy proclamation
to declare the official establishment of Botšabelo.65 By February construction was nearly
complete, and preparations were underway to receive staff and patients.66 In what might
have been an early sign that the aristocracy was not projecting the message the
administration intended to convey, rumors swirled around the territory that the facility was
a bridgehead for white settlement.67 In May 1914 there were 39 persons employed at
Botšabelo, 23 Basotho and 13 Europeans.68 The facility’s first Medical Superintendent,
tasked with overseeing both the facility and the treatment of patients, was Dr. Orrock
Arnott.69 The first chaplain was Hermann Dieterlen, who transferred, along with his wife,
Anna Busch Dieterlen, to Botšabelo in December 1913, following the couple’s retirement
from the Paris Evangelical parish in Leribe.70 Dieterlen provided metropolitan readers of
the Evangelical Mission Journal with a vivid account of the system of receiving patients
into the asylum between February and April:
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One day... a young woman [named Masesilane] came in, brought by her husband... She
was placed in house A, room 1, bed 1, and a leather bracelet with a copper plate bearing
the number 1 was placed on her wrist... Then began the real occupation… In one day, we
received ten, twenty, thirty! And what a spectacle this is! I see on the road a caravan…led
by a black guard carrying a large official fold...of signed detention orders... The stewards
of the leprosarium receive them without a lot of words: “Men here, women there.” … These
unfortunate lepers…are directed towards an open door in a palisade of thorny wire. They
cross this threshold. They disappear into a courtyard. And, we know, it is for life!71

3.5 Desertion and division of biomedical police labor in the asylum’s early years
Maseru was ecstatic with the aristocracy’s efficiency tracing and transferring the people
listed in the government registry to Botšabelo in early 1914. More than 600 patients
reported or were delivered to the facility between its opening in February and the uprising
in May. After the administration’s self-congratulatory reverie was shattered by rebellion,
however, an investigation highlighted how lies and misinformation served as a key
lubricant in the smooth operation of the initial round-up: ‘The lepers’ grievance is mostly
against their chiefs and headmen, who, it is stated… led them, both male and female lepers,
to believe that they would be only temporarily detained, and that as the result of medical
attention… they would be cured and released from detention.’72 In the weeks following the
rebellion, the superintendent set about trying to set the record straight: he repeatedly
emphasized to patients that because there was no known cure for leprosy, patients would
be detained in perpetuity rather than temporarily. Many inmates, nonetheless, remained
suspicious of the latter claim and defiant towards the former.
Once the threat of bitter winter cold passed, a patient exodus began.73 Night after
night during October 1914 small groups of patients slipped through the barbwire fence and
began the trek to their homes in the brisk spring air.74 By the end of the month some 250
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inmates had fled. These escapes (or desertions, in colonial parlance) continued at a high
rate into the summer. Yet, Maseru remained sanguine about asylum security, making no
effort to install more fencing or hire more guards. Officials maintained that the most farsighted response was, instead, to break the very will of patients to escape:
The hardships of the journey, the want of help or assistance on reaching their villages
resulting in hunger and privation, and finally their return to Maseru by their own chiefs and
not the Government Police, would show [deserters] that to escape from Bots’abelo entailed
discomfort and misery and could not be successful, and that it was really by the will and
action of their own people that they were confined there.75

The administration’s wish to instill greater fear of punishment for desertion amongst
inmates, by transporting a few recaptured escapees to Robben Island (a scheme first floated
locally in the Sesotho-language progressive newspaper Mochochonono), was dashed when
Union officials refused the transfer request.76 After three weeks of mass ‘desertions,’
Maseru sent a circular to nobles observing ‘your duty under the law to arrest such lepers
and send them back.’77 By early November, however, only 36 escapees were back inside
Botšabelo, and this group included several inmates who returned on their own after finding
themselves unable to make the trek home. 78
The administration began to get increasingly worried with each passing week. It
was clearly impossible that hundreds of individuals could trek across the nation, many with
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conspicuous bodily disfigurement, without being observed.79 It dawned on Resident Sloley
and High Commissioner Sydney Buxton that while administrative and medical officers had
discussed leprosy a great deal with prominent nobles and mission educated elites, much
less was known about perceptions of the malady amongst other social groups.80 Colonial
personnel stationed throughout the territory were directed to conduct informal interviews
with headmen and male commoners. These interlocutors expressed significantly more
sympathy than fear when asked about escapees, and voiced particular disapproval at the
way institutional life broke up families and friendships.81 Indeed, even ardently
lepraphobic Basotho men expressed qualms about how segregation trampled on husbands’
conjugal rights.
The survey further revealed widespread skepticism about the contagiousness of the
malady. The continuing existence of a diverse array of etiological knowledge about leprosy
stood as a profound and unexpected obstacle to the success of compulsory segregation.
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Acceptance of the contagiousness of the malady was essential for the growth of social
stigma and personal fear, the motives which Long had counted upon to fuel the entire
system of surveillance and reporting. The personal journals of Hermann Dieterlen are rich
troves of information on Basotho perspectives on the malady over the early years of the
20th century.82 Some sources blamed witchcraft, including one man who attributed his
infection to an encounter with a malevolent familiar in the form of a skunk.83 The Alsatian
missionary himself gave credence to local suspicions about the exploitation of sexual
temptation by already afflicted people seeking to harm others.84 One rumor was of a siren’s
den of leprosy, a household where ‘one would find some beautiful women, but leprous
ones’ who had seduced and infected several men. The missionary withheld his sympathy
for individuals who reportedly gave in to their lust, noting a group of herdboys ‘all chose
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the[ir] leprosy by going with Moapesa’s girls.’ Other interlocutors blamed the wrath of
ancestors85 or contact with the bodies of deceased balepera.86
Long’s miscalculations went further still: he presupposed that Basotho would either
accept or reject, in toto, the veracity of his biomedical pronouncements. All evidence
suggests, however, that Highveld medical practices were predicated on a more inclusive
understanding of maladies and healing.87 Thus, while few Basotho rejected the idea that
colonial doctors had valuable knowledge about leprosy, it was also unreasonable to see
these men as the exclusive authorities on the matter.88 Colonial politics also played an
important role in levels of trust: Dieterlen journaled of several Basotho confidants relating
their certainty that medical officers possessed a cure for leprosy but were withholding it
because of lobbying or bribery from local healers.89 This speculation makes it quite easy
to imagine how a rumor of cures being doled out at Botšabelo proliferated: it not only
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promised what many fervently desired but also confirmed what was widely suspected. The
persistence of the idea that there was a cure out there, even after hopes had been dashed at
the asylum, influenced sympathy for desertion: Basotho surveyed by colonial officers did
not begrudge patients for leaving the establishment in hopes of finding deliverance.
There were some local healers, moreover, who openly professed to have a cure.
The Apostolic Faith Mission, southern Africa’s first Pentecostal church, gained a foothold
in Lesotho as news of the preacher and prophet Edward Lion curing leprosy circulated
through the territory.90 Lion’s practice itself wove together strands of Western biomedical
knowledge, Highveld healing practices, and Christianity. The evolving relationship
between patients and healers (including both Lion and asylum doctors) is discussed in far
more depth in Chapter 4. What is important to note for this chapter’s purposes is that the
political battle lines envisioned by colonial planners were complicated morally by dint of
divergent epistemological frameworks. Long’s ask of lords and communities, in the name
of public health, took on a more sinister character to the great many people who thought of
Botšabelo not only as not providing a cure to patients but potentially denying them one.
Indeed, in this light biomedical confinement could be construed as a capital sentence.
After the administration came to appreciate that the experiment in ‘breaking’
patients was failing, officials stood at a crossroads. No one, of course, continued to buy or
sell the fiction that a cure was waiting at the asylum. High Commissioner Sydney Buxton
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summarized the choice ahead as one ‘between abandoning the scheme and using forcible
measures.’91 While certain nobles who genuinely feared leprosy demonstrated they were
willing to use coercion, most traditional authorities simply ignored the increasingly shrill
stream of directives flowing from Maseru over late-1914 and 1915.92 Some escapees,
moreover, ‘retreated to wild and inaccessible portions of the country’ or ‘opposed recapture
by the use of fire arms.’93 The question of how to proceed prompted a tense discussion at
a special session of the National Council in August 1915.94 While the nation’s highestranking lords continued to express ‘unanimous support’ for the project, they also implored
the administration to take on more of the violence work necessary to combat escapes.95
Lord Lekhafola noted how difficult it was to drive the sick to Botšabelo, ‘“When we
threaten to use force to return them to Botsabelo they invite us to kill them.’”96 Lord Sempe
echoed this sentiment, noting cudgels often failed to do the job, and calling on the
administration to coercively detain asylum residents.97
Despite these setbacks, Maseru continued to see leprosy control as a cause which
could – and, for the sake of the nation, must – lead to greater coordination in policing and
detention between traditional and colonial authorities. The sunk costs of over £37,000 on
infrastructure and a yearly recurrent expenditure in excess of £15,000 already weighed
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heavily on the administration.98 Botšabelo staff introduced more coercive and consentbuilding initiatives over 1915 and 1916 as stopgaps designed to buy the aristocracy time to
diffuse fear of the malady and institutionalize surveillance in the countryside.99 In addition
to bringing in the seasoned policeman Frank Jenner to serve as superintendent and doubling
the number of guards to thirty, the administration built two jails inside the asylum: the
matching facilities for women and men were used to punish escape attempts and other
infractions.100 Once in command, however, Jenner, and his medical officer Neil
Macfarlane, quickly came to the conclusion that efforts to build inmate consent to detention
were likely to be far more useful for reducing escapes than coercive measures.101 In the
next chapter I explore the bevy of policies designed to make asylum life more palatable:
measures included increased visitation rights, improved diets, beer distribution, more
biomedical care, and opportunities for productive work and wages.102 With these changes
in place, desertions declined significantly over 1916: there were 45 escapes over the
calendar year, compared with 213 in 1915 and 296 in 1914.103 Escapes did continue year
after year, nonetheless, as the administration refused to give up its goal of lords acting as
biomedical police by fully converting the asylum into a heavily securitized prison. Indeed,
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dispatching a flurry of correspondence with Matsieng, pushing for the paramountcy to
prioritize searching out deserters and new cases, and with district medical officers,
encouraging friendly visits to lords to discuss the dangers of leprosy and the necessity of
cooperation, emerged as a rite of spring and early summer for Maseru over the late-1910s
and 1920s.
3.6 The poverty of obligations: colonial public health claims and subjects’ moral
claims
By late 1917 the majority of inmates who escaped Botšabelo in 1914 and 1915 were again
living in the asylum: some persons returned under pressure from lords or family, others
voluntarily in search of medical attention or to gain access to cash wages to support loved
ones, and a few individuals were even escorted back in scotch carts under the watchful eye
of messengers.104 The administration was pleased, moreover, with the growing swiftness
with which nobles were tracing new escapees. Yet, even with these developments, Long’s
designs for leprosy control initiatives facilitating closer coordination between lords and the
administration appeared more fantastical than ever. Only a handful of nobles were actively
surveilling their communities for newly symptomatic people. The disinterest of customary
authorities in Botšabelo –– and, particularly, of many lords towards their own interned
subjects –– was quickly emerging, moreover, as a source of profound concern for inmates
and a leading cause of desertions.
John Iliffe’s work on the history of leprosy in Africa paints a haunting portrait of a
vicious cycle of social determinacy and infection on the continent dating to the era of
colonial rule — politico-economically subaltern people suffered from disproportionately
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high rates of infection, and people afflicted with the malady consistently faced limited
access to economic resources and political power.105 A great deal of circumstantial
evidence suggests that the National Council’s strong support for compulsory segregation
was influenced by generalized frustration with the material poverty of balepera as a social
group, rather than stigma rooted in fear. These historical traces linger most suggestively in
the subtext of events which perplexed colonial officials at the time. Botšabelo’s Board of
Inspections did not know what to make of several dozen individuals being sent to the
asylum in early 1914 bearing symptoms of acute malnutrition, but no evidence of leprosy.
Officers also could not fathom why the same lords who so efficiently delivered people to
the asylum gates at this point in time, subsequently appeared so indifferent to re-detaining
escapees or ferreting out new cases of infection. These phenomena make a great deal more
sense, however, when viewed as questions of labor and socio-political responsibility rather
than public health.
The Sesotho aphorism ‘a leader is a bag for feces’ (morena ke khetsi ea masepa),
evocatively describes a Highveld social contract in which political leaders were expected
to address the thorniest and most enduring problems, notably including intra-communal
strife and arranging a baseline of support for destitute people.106 The opening of Botšabelo
promised that the colonial state would take responsibility for housing and feeding a cohort
of people who were, by and large, greatly in need of material assistance. The sending of
non-symptomatic people to the asylum most likely involved nobles misinterpreting, or
seeking to exploit, the opening of the asylum as a chance to divest themselves of
obligations to a wider cohort of vulnerable community members than just persons infected
105
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with leprosy. The work of populating the asylum in early 1914, meanwhile, initially
appeared to offer a trade-off for nobles: a large one-time input of energy and resources in
exchange for a reduction in future work and material obligations. But the desertion crisis
changed the calculus. Lords were asked to act again, opening the vexing possibility that
the compulsory segregation scheme might consistently demand high levels of attention and
resources. The wave of escapes in 1914 and 1915 thus became a crisis because of a double
protest: inmates actively against detention, and lords passively against the newly onerous
requests of the colonial state. Even after the administration was able to leverage Matsieng’s
influence to break the aristocratic strike on pursuing escapees, very few lords took on the
work of actively policing their jurisdictions for newly symptomatic cases.
Asylum inmates soon discovered that detention changed their social and political
status in the eyes of many lords. Indeed, several prominent nobles gave voice to the legal
and moral argument that detention in the asylum dissolved the political association and
mutual obligations between lords and subjects. This claim was rooted in an innovative
interpretation of the Ninth Law of Lerotholi, outlining the tradition of ‘turning the door of
the house’ (ho reteletsa ntlo monyako), inscribed at the first session of the National Council
in 1903. The statute read: ‘It is not lawful for any person to be deprived of his place or
fields without good reason… but a person living under one chief, if he turns the door of his
house against the chief and looks up to another chief he must be aware that he will be
deprived of his place.’ The law was designed to stave off conflict between nobles vying for
followers, by forcing decisions about precisely to whom each commoner swore fealty.107
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What was formulated in an earlier era to stabilize communities and work forces, became a
headache for asylum officials and a nightmare for patients and their families. Inmates found
that their families were being dispossessed of lands and property in their home
communities, and also that many were unable to get so much as a response from their lord
to their inquiries, much less to lodge injunctions or compensation claims. When Maseru
began asking questions, several nobles stated that their behavior was legal and natural: after
all, the asylum superintendent was now ‘chief of the lepers,’ and this meant that inmates
had effectively ‘turned the door.’
An irate British Resident, Edward Garraway, lay this matter before the National
Council at the 1918 session.108 Asylum superintendent Frank Jenner was summoned before
the body, and his testimony vividly illustrated the precarious situation of the affected
patients and their loved ones:
The lepers say that their cases are not settled… These people come and complain that their
families are starving and are without blankets and there is only one way in which they can
provide for them, and that is when fines are paid. It takes years to get these fines. I have
been at Bots’abelo four years and there are four cases which I have been fighting ever since
I came there. None of these fines have been disputed but we cannot get them paid. These
are complaints brought to me daily.109

Jenner went on to connect the failure of lords to fulfill their legal duties to the
ongoing trickle of patients illegally absenting themselves from the asylum:
A few months ago a leper called Motsemela came… This man was at Bots’abelo about 3
or 4 weeks and…deserted, but a week after he came with his wife and children… I asked
this man why he deserted and he said because he received word from his wife that his lands
had been taken, and I said, why did you not tell me about it? He said, because time of
ploughing was near and that he knew it would take long to wait for replies… There are
several other [cases] of the same sort.110
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The superintendent’s testimony provoked an extended and tense debate over the
ethics of noble-commoner relations. Tempers flared as a small group of councilors
denounced the conduct of their fellows. Lord Motsoene expressed outraged at the
dereliction of duty reflected in ignoring legal claims or revoking lands: ‘It is not a nickname
to say “chief”, a chief is one who settles people’s complaints.’ Lord Moshe maintained,
moreover, that nobles should be working to protect balepera as a specific class of
vulnerable people.111
Several nobles pushed back, however, by noting traditional law, as well as the
supposedly impudent behavior and unreasonable claims of inmates. After being singled
out for non-responsiveness to patients’ claims, Lord Masopha II spoke forcefully in defense
of his actions. He critiqued patients for routing complaints through the colonial
bureaucracy rather using traditional pathways. It galled the great grandson of
Moshoeshoe’s third house that instead of humble requests from subjects he was receiving
curt orders from the district colonial officer. Masopha further contended that the
impropriety of the dynamic was even more pronounced with the families of Botšabelo
patients, who also felt empowered to speak directly with government officers. ‘I know
these lepers in the settlement belong to the Government but their children and wives are
still under me and should report to me their complaints.’112 The discussion closed with
Resident Garraway agreeing to instruct Supt. Jenner to route complaints through the
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Paramount rather than through government officers.113 Although implemented, this change
had little immediate impact: the issue of neglect of patient’s legal cases was raised again
in the council in 1919, 1920, and 1921, before the administration simply gave up.114
The institutional setting made it easier for patients to wrest concessions from the
administration but harder to do so from lords. A bitter irony hanging over the planning of
Lesotho’s leprosy control scheme was that despite the focus on the malady’s highly visible
symptoms, Long and other colonial officials treated the targets of their interventions as if
they were invisible. As we have seen, however, people suffering from leprosy were able to
force their way into the colonial field of vision by making Botšabelo un-administrable: as
a one-time superintendent wrote in a retrospective report on the facility, ‘the lepers… found
out that if they made a lot of noise and outcry they got most of what they wanted.’115 The
spatial separation involved in institutionalization, on the other hand, made it virtually
impossible for inmates to secure an audience with nobles. An experiment with a Visiting
Committee, including two powerful lords, failed when female residents drove the group
from their compound with a torrent of invective over the visitors’ failure to redress
grievances from earlier inspections.116 Thereafter, despite pleas from colonial officials that
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‘whenever any Chiefs come in the neighbourhood of Maseru or Botsabelo they should go
and see these people,’ when polled in 1921, only two of the one hundred persons on the
National Council had visited the asylum over the previous half decade. Patients sought to
force themselves onto their lords’ agendas by slipping out of the asylum –– usually during
the day, when inmates were allowed to tend their own fields in the sprawling grounds and
only had to contend with a perimeter fence made of a few strands of barbed wired, instead
of at night when locked inside a residential compound surrounded in closely-spaced hightensile fencing and actively surveilled by guards and inmate ‘head(wo)men’ –– to appear
in lekhotla la morena (noble’s court).
By the early 1920s, the growing alienation of inmates from traditional authorities
at home bolstered colonial confidence in security at the asylum. Maseru moved to scale
back concessions made in the wake of the desertion crisis. Resident Garraway, himself a
former medical officer, wanted to turn Botšabelo into an imperial model of excellence
which would justify the facility’s high cost, amounting to over ten percent of yearly
colonial expenditures. Officials still held out hope, moreover, of using the asylum to
facilitate closer bureaucratic entanglement and coordination with the aristocracy.117 New
visitation regulations, which went into effect in 1922, required prospective asylum visitors
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to secure signed passes from their lord.118 Officially, the move aimed to guard against
transmission of infections to guests.119 Administrators wanted to stamp out the practice of
‘natives from all round who had no business in the settlement flock[ing] in to get a feed.’120
By subjecting lords to requests for asylum visitor passes, officials also arranged
bureaucratic procedure in such a way as to keep the asylum front of mind for nobles.
Although lords did carry out the new work, this responsibility did not spur any noticeable
growth in aristocratic interest in the asylum or leprosy policing.
3.7 A better way to police: the birth of the leprosy inspectorate
In 1929, exasperated with the continuing lack of cooperation from many nobles in looking
for new cases of infection, and nervous that the High Commissioner or Colonial Office
might insist Botšabelo be converted into a site of voluntary treatment, Maseru undertook
its first experiment in direct policing of leprosy in Lesotho’s countryside. At the beginning
of the year, the asylum guards Eliel and Patrick Mojakisane were promoted and trained in
the new position of Health and Welfare Inspectors.121 In April, Eliel and Botšabelo Supt.
Peter Strachan rode from the asylum towards the Melikane River Valley in Qachas Nek
District, the ostensible epicenter of leprosy infections in the territory. The pair,
accompanied by various police and chiefs’ messengers, spent two-weeks traversing the
bridle-paths leading along the escarpments and ravines between villages, carrying out
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hundreds of exams. They identified ‘three uncertified lepers, one already certified and two
deserters.’122 In Strachan’s report on the tour he mused enthusiastically about the potential
of an inspectorate. Eliel demonstrated not only a keen eye for symptoms, but was also able
to deftly read reactions to the appearance of officials in order to ferret out new cases and
deserters. The superintendent recommended outfitting the new hires with equipment and
legal authority to commence with aggressive surveillance operations in rural areas.
The creation of the inspectorate was the culmination of the administration’s efforts
to preserve the policy of compulsory segregation in Lesotho. Beginning in the mid-1920s,
metropolitan expert opinion turned decisively against compulsory segregation as a means
of combatting leprosy. The British Empire Leprosy Relief Association (BELRA), founded
in 1923, played a central role in reorienting metropolitan opinion, and promoting the
standardization of public health policies and treatment regimes within the empire.123 Public
health rationales were at the heart of the emerging critiques of medical detention.124 Experts
began to realize that leprosy sufferers faced with the prospect of indefinite confinement
often chose to hide their infection. Concealment at the first onset of symptoms was
understood to be particularly problematic, as new cases of infection were believed both to
be most contagious and most treatable. Compulsory segregation was also criticized for
being far more expensive than voluntary segregation. As Meghan Vaughan observes in
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The League of Nation’s Leprosy Commission compiled a variety of period arguments against
compulsory segregation: BL, League of Nations, Health Organisation. 1931. The Principles of the
Prophylaxis of Leprosy: First General Report of the Leprosy Commission. LON.
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Curing Their Ills, ‘by the time colonial medical departments were on firmer footing and
were more able to intervene to control the disease [of Leprosy], “expert” opinion was very
firmly against compulsory segregation.’ In Lesotho, the prevailing leprosy control scheme
predated the paradigm shift.125
Maseru-based administrative and medical officials reacted to changing
metropolitan opinion with dismay. The idea of reversing course and admitting a mistake to
lords was anathema to officials. Over the late-1920s, as criticisms of the inefficiency of
compulsory segregation gained strength, local officials experimented aggressively with
mechanisms for detecting sick people at large in the countryside. The administration’s aim
was to transform the territory into a model of medical detention. The administration set
about educating not only lords but also school students to identify symptoms, in hopes of
encouraging more reporting. Maseru also criminally prosecuted a handful of individuals
for harboring the sick in contravention of the Leprosy Proclamation. When these schemes
failed to deliver the desired results, Maseru turned in desperation to an inspectorate, thereby
abandoning the project of forging a biomedical policing apparatus which fused together
the administration and aristocracy. The administration further bolstered its surveillance
efforts with a 10-shilling reward for information leading to the detention of a person
suffering from active leprosy.
Colonial doctors had reason to suspect that lords were turning a blind eye to
infections in their communities. Over the 1920s a high percentage of new asylum
admissions suffered from advanced infections; it was hard to reconcile the appearance of
people whose bodies were ravaged by years of disease progression with the idea that nobles
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were making good faith efforts to monitor their communities for symptoms. After a series
of particularly ‘flagrant cases’ over 1927, Maseru looked to send a shot across the bow of
the aristocracy by pursuing prosecutions.126 While the law vested assistant commissioners
with broad powers to sanction individuals for the failure to report any ‘suspected leper,’
only one charge had been pursued since the law was promulgated in 1914.127 The primary
difficulty in prosecuting nobles was plausible deniability; it was easy for lords to blame
subordinates or the families of infected persons for failing to inform them of new
infections.128 Recognizing that it would ‘be next to impossible to obtain convictions against
Chiefs and Headmen if the prosecution is directed against them in the first instance,’
Strachan recommended a strategy of prosecuting families of the sick in order to roll up
cooperating witnesses in hopes that ‘evidence against the Chief might come to light.’129
This approach failed; commoners and headmen uniformly chose to absorb the fines and
jail-time rather than testify against their lords.130
Actively investigating case histories also brought colonial personnel into
uncomfortable contact with the moral issues faced by traditional authorities when deciding
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LNA S3/17/2/11: LNA S3/17/2/11: PMO to Gov’t Sec., 7 May 1928, and Gov’t Sec. to all ACs,
DACs, and OICs, 11 May 1928; Supt. Strachan to PMO, 7 Apr. 1928; Gov’t Sec. to Mafeteng AC,
14 Apr. 1928; Gov’t Sec. to PC Griffith, 18 Apr. 1928.
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In August, 1922, shortly after being appointed as Mafeteng Assistant Commissioner, former
Botšabelo Superintendent Frank Jenner had tried and convicted Chief Lesala under the
proclamation’s statutes; Lesala opted to pay £10 in lieu of six months of hard labour in prison (LNA
S3/17/2/11: Response telegrams from each district; Synopsis in Gov’t. Sec to PMO, 12 June 1928.)
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LNA S3/17/2/11: Gov’t Sec. to ACs of Mafeteng, Leribe, Qacha’s Nek, and Butha-Buthe, 3
Sep. 1928; Chief Lerotholi Mojela to Mafeteng AC, 7 Sep. 1928.
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LNA S3/17/2/11: Supt. Strachan to PMO, 16 Oct. 1928.
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LNA S3/17/2/11: Leribe AC Sims to Gov’t Sec., 2 Aug 1929. Ultimately, two family members
and a village headman were sentenced to a £10 fine or 6 months in hard labour. While the
punishments each party opted for in this case are not specified, the potential class-biases of the
optional fine system of punishments (detailed in Chapter Five) likely drove a bifurcation of
punishment for contravention of the Leprosy Proclamation: fines for the chiefs and jail-time for
ordinary villagers.
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whether to report and hand-over the sick. When Assistant Commissioner Frank Jenner, a
former asylum superintendent, set out to investigate and punish family members of
advanced-case admits, he was staggered by what he encountered.131 Each of the three
homesteads Jenner visited were not only wracked by hunger and want, but had recently
been deprived of their primary caregiver. The leprosy sufferer in each of these cases, now
detained at Botšabelo, had been tending to a loved one: a young woman to her grandmother,
a young man to his elderly father, and a woman (who had deserted in 1914 and evaded
recapture for fifteen years) to her sick husband. It was easier for administrative and medical
personnel to rail about saving the nation when the breaking up of families took place out
of sight, with the difficult emotional work foisted on Basotho authorities. Faced with these
realities Jenner opted to issue warnings rather than proceed with prosecutions.
The drive to coerce greater levels of reporting was paired with a campaign to train
the traditional authorities and schoolchildren to spot leprosy symptoms. At the National
Council session in October 1928, Dr. Strachan gave the councilors lessons in diagnosis.132
In an inauspicious sign for the value of this training, Lord Azariel Theko chose this moment
to raise the idea of creating an inspectorate: ‘The Government and Paramount Chief should
employ detectives, if they rely on us [the chiefs] only, the state of affairs will be worse.’133
The administration pressed ahead with the education campaign. Maseru printed 2,000
copies of a Sesotho-language booklet detailing how to recognize and report balepera, and
distributed the materials to lords and schools across the territory.134 When, in the months
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LNA S3/17/2/12: Mohale’s Hoek AC Jenner to Gov’t Sec., 6 Mar. 1929, and Supt. Strachan to
PMO, 8 Feb. 1929.
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BNA DO 92/1: 1928 Session.
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BNA DO 92/1: 1928 Session, 29-30.
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LNA S3/17/2/11: Strachan to PMO, 14 Nov. 1928. The booklets, entitled Notes on leprosy
compiled for Schools & other Educational Centres in Basutoland, were authored by Dr. Slack and
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following the 1928 council session, the education campaign failed to yield demonstrable
results, officials pursued Azariel’s idea.
With the launch of the leprosy inspectorate in early 1929, the administration set
about building its own coercive infrastructure for detecting ill people, thereby divesting
itself of complete dependence upon the aristocracy. This was a sign of how desperate
Maseru was becoming to show results. As metropolitan pressure to pivot towards voluntary
segregation throughout the empire was increasing, Maseru was confronting the possibility
that it would eventually be forced to abandon compulsory segregation. This possibility was
odious to local officials. Part of the utility of pursuing compulsory segregation was the idea
that it would boost surveillance cooperation and support for confinement schemes within
the aristocracy, and a change in policy might deliver a resounding blow to these goals.
While these concerns were subtextual in most missives, buried in descriptions of the sunk
financial costs of the asylum and optimistic statements about how the territory was just
about to turn a corner, Resident Commissioner Sturrock did level with his superiors in
1930:
Even to hint to the Basuto that the policy adopted 16 years ago in the face of much
opposition from the natives and supported by statements glowing with optimism, was
wrong and is to be abandoned, would be disastrous both from the point of view of obtaining
any [future] sympathy and support from the Chiefs.135

For Maseru the stakes involved in defending compulsory segregation was nothing less than
the epistemological hierarchy undergirding colonial rule. The administration had chosen
leprosy policy as terrain for waging an aggressive campaigns to capture the intellectual and

printed by the Cape Times for a fee of £16:7. There are no indications in the colonial records that
members of the general public informed on their neighbors.
135
BNA DO35/408/6: Sturrock to Burmester, 23 Dec. 1930.
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political support of the aristocracy, and they were keen to hold the line, changing scientific
consensus be damned.
The inspectorate quickly looked to be showing quantifiable results. After six
months, the two inspectors had detected 45 new cases of leprosy, including 22 persons who
had been successfully detained at Botšabelo.136 Eliel and Patrick faced cold receptions from
many lords, who bristled at unfamiliar commoners showing up unannounced to carry out
inspections.137 The pair were nevertheless able to carry out their work armed with
government uniforms and a copy of the circular letter instructing nobles to assist the
inspectors. The inspectors’ efforts dovetailed with a new system of informant payouts:
ordinary villagers could surreptitiously alert inspectors of their suspicions about infected
persons in hopes of securing the half pound reward, which the inspectors would then
investigate, without necessarily alerting the lord. After one year, the inspectors were
credited with boosting the asylum population by more than 100 patients and with
stimulating ‘a more lively interest on the part of the Chiefs.’138 The administration
appointed four additional police at the start of 1930, and also dropped the euphemistic job
title ‘Health and Welfare Inspector’ in favor of ‘Leprosy Inspector.’139
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LNA S3/17/2/12: Strachan to PMO, 29 Oct. 1929.
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BELRA was unimpressed, however, with the numbers coming from Lesotho.140
The association came into direct conflict with Maseru over 1930.1 41 After Robert Cochrane,
the association’s secretary, visited Botšabelo in June, he sent the Dominions Office a report
detailing why ‘leprosy inspectors and methods of tightening up compulsory measures will
not succeed,’ and recommending an immediate move to voluntary treatment.142 Lesotho’s
administration objected vigorously.143 When it became clear, however, that supervisory
officials in Cape Town and London were no longer receptive to the logic of sunk costs,
Resident Commissioner Sturrock changed tack.144 Instead of framing the epistemic stakes
of the debate in local terms, Sturrock situated Lesotho within an empire-wide research
agenda: ‘It would be a great pity to abandon the experiment... before it has had a fair trial’
given that existing policy ‘is of general interest to leprologists, for it should demonstrate in
a few years to what extent and for what length of time a system of compulsory segregation,
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LNA S3/17/2/12: Under-Sec. of State to HC, 13 Nov. 1929; Cochrane to Under-Sec. of State,
26 Sep. 1929.
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BNA DO35/408/6: Cochrane’s ‘Report on Visit to Botsabelo Leper Institution, and Notes on
Leprosy Situation in Basutoland’ forwarded under cover letter to Under-Sec of State, 18 Sep. 1930.
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Ibid. Cochrane observed that despite a wave of new admissions effected by the inspectorate,
very few of these patients were in the early stage of the disease. He took this as evidence that the
inspectorate was not finding the highly contagious and potentially treatable early-stage patients that
the Association maintained could only be coaxed out of hiding under a voluntary treatment regime.
Cochrane speculated on further problems that might soon beset the new inspectorate: the surveillors
would come to be surveilled as spies, leading the sick to take flight before their arrival; the police
would also be tempted to take bribes. Cochrane advocated four specific steps: (1) the establishment
of voluntary treatment facilities; (2) the replacement of inspectors with Basotho ‘health visitors’ to
treat rural populace and build up goodwill; (3) a leprosy survey; and (4) a propaganda campaign
about the hope of a cure for persons who came forward in the early stages of infection.
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BNA DO35/408/6: ‘Comments on Dr. Cochrane’s Report,’ forwarded by Sturrock to Burmester,
23 Dec. 1930. Lesotho’s administration pushed back to defend both the inspectorate and the
principle of compulsory segregation. There were no signs of timidity or corruption influencing
detectives’ work. Sturrock, moreover, made the case that a ‘perfectly efficient system of
compulsory segregation would stamp out the disease sooner than any other,’3.
144
BNA DO35/408/6: RC Sturrock to HC Burmester, 23 Dec. 1930; see also, same folio, Sturrock
to Vice-Admiral HJ Tweedie, 3 Mar. 1931.
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enforced as rigorously as local circumstances permit, can succeed in diminishing the
incidence of leprosy.’
Helen Tilley details how the early 1930s represented a ‘seminal moment in African
imperial history when scientific knowledge and colonial development had begun to assume
pride of place in the international arena.’145 The Colonial Office looked to metropolitan
experts to generate standardized policies – ostensibly based on scientific research on a
range of issues – which could be implemented across the empire. At the same time, with
the launch of the African Research Survey in 1929, ‘colonial states’ research efforts also
began to influence inter-territorial and inter-imperial coordination.’146 Imperial territories,
and particularly African territories, were explicitly conceptualized as laboratories which
might provide new insights into almost every field of scientific inquiry and, perhaps above
all, into disease. The same forces which put Lesotho’s policy of compulsory segregation
into doubt thus provided an opening for its preservation; faced with imperial efforts at
standardization based on scientific research, the administration leveraged scientific
research as legitimate reason for deviation. Although this maneuver was based on parochial
political interests, Lesotho became the imperial research station for leprosy policing and
compulsory detention.147 Based upon this rationale, the forced detention of hundreds of
people continued to grind on for another quarter century, until the arrival of sulphone drugs
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rapidly transformed the malady from a pressing public health concern into a less socially
urgent matter of pharmacological treatment.
3.8 Chapter Conclusion
The colonizer versus colonized binary can obscure the extent to which the hardships and
injustices of the colonial era impacted various social groups differentially. Balepera
embodied perhaps the most colonized sub-population in Lesotho during a period spanning
from 1914 through the early 1950s. Officials in the colonial headquarters in Maseru viewed
people suffering from leprosy, from the first encounter onwards, as little more than objects
for larger schemes and experiments in social control. The colonial fixation with this
population became more intense over the early years of the 20th century, as a result of both
biomedical alarm about the malady and, critically, the administration’s growing desire to
expand its capacity to surveil and project coercive force into the countryside. Because the
administration feared stepping on the toes of local lords by arrogating too many criminal
cases too swiftly (and did not want to pay for a sprawling police force), colonial planners
fixed their attention on balepera as an ideal target for a new model of policing and detention
which would require greater collaboration between officials and lords. Indeed, officials
imagined a category of ‘the leper’ could be readily reified – both as a matter of law and,
unlike ‘the criminal,’ popular perception – because of the conspicuousness, and supposed
repulsiveness, of leprosy’s symptoms. The malady did not require extensive biomedical
diagnostic training to identify, seemingly making it readily policeable by lords; at the same
time, the threat of leprosy to the public health and the free flow of migrant labor into South
Africa, paired with the lack of preexisting agreement or coordination amongst traditional
authorities about how to handle cases of infection, left a perceived need for the intervention
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of the colonial state. Expressions of support from prominent lords for the construction of
an asylum registered in the colonial imagination, moreover, as further evidence of a latent
stigma which could be exploited to facilitate cooperation of Basotho nobles and
commoners alike.
The trial in collaborative control over leprosy floundered because of the passive
indifference of a great many lords, in addition to the active resistance of patients. No more
than a handful of lords ever demonstrated fearing the malady as one might viscerally fear
fire, notwithstanding statements to the contrary. Maseru nonetheless continued with the
scheme, keeping people suffering from leprosy as active experimental subjects, while
testing policies aimed to stimulate more responsive participation of nobles in policing.
These efforts also failed to yield the desired results. In 1929 the administration assumed
direct responsibility for policing leprosy, deploying professional inspectors trained at
Botšabelo. This move was catalyzed not simply by frustration in Maseru but alarm:
officials worried that London might unilaterally redesign the territory’s approach to leprosy
mitigation –– based on a new metropolitan public health consensus which prioritized
consensual segregation and imperial standardization as pillars of sound leprosy
management campaigns. The discourse of imperial scientific research, however, ultimately
enabled Maseru to maintain its policy heading. The Colonial Office accepted Maseru’s
proposal that Lesotho be used as an imperial control for testing the comparative efficacy
of compulsory segregation, as the rest of the empire embraced a voluntary segregation
model. Although Basotho as a nation were technically the object of study, the sick were
the people whose actual life possibilities were circumscribed by policies hashed out by
British officers in Maseru, Cape Town, and London.
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Even as the administration in Maseru looked at Botšabelo inmates as if they were
human laboratory animals, officials failed to observe how their social engineering
transformed inmates into metaphorical canaries in the mine. The indifference, and later
outright abuse of balepera by many lords, was an early warning sign of larger sociopolitical transformations underway in the colony. While much critical attention has been
paid over the years to the ‘eating up’ of petty bourgeoisie by nobles –– beginning with
missionaries and colonial officials perturbed by dispossession of Christian and affluent
Basotho –– the people least capable of mobilizing community support to shield against
aristocratic abuses were also early victims of unscrupulous lords. As discussed in the
chapter, leprosy infection and abject poverty have long been mutually reinforcing. While
the administration saw nobles abusing the sick as evidence of an emerging stigma towards
leprosy, this population also became a target on account of their subaltern social status:
frustration and contempt for subjects who made claims, while offering little of value back,
certainly shaped the decisions of more than a few lords to send the sick to Botšabelo and
repossess institutionalized peoples’ fields. The economic abuses and a lack of legal redress
complained about by patients in the 1910s were widely observed across Lesotho’s social
strata by the 1920s and 1930s. This deteriorating relationship between lords and subjects
eventually led the colonial state to restrict aristocratic powers in the so-called Khubelu
reforms of 1938, discussed in Chapter 2. The creation of a territorial leprosy inspectorate
was a forerunner, moreover, for the expansion and professionalization of the Basutoland
Mounted Police in the 1940s: the colonial effort to build a new machinery of surveillance,
crime interdiction, and coercion in the countryside, independent of the aristocracy, is
examined in Chapter 5.
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The leprosy management scheme launched in 1914 clearly failed to facilitate a
more integrated policing relationship between colonial and traditional authorities, as
envisioned by Maseru-based officials like Dr. Long and Resident Sloley. The initiative
ultimately created more new tensions and conflicts than reasons and moments for
collaboration. The opening of the asylum also brought lords and ill subjects into opposition
in new ways. Ironically, it seems the most vibrant, and at times reciprocal, relationship
brought about by new leprosy policy was one which colonial planners had thought very
little about beforehand: asylum staff and inmates were forced into daily contact within the
(largely) closed world of Botšabelo. In the absence of lords committed to a police role,
inmates had leverage to help define and shape the parameters of a patient role. In the next
chapter we turn our focus away from the way that Botšabelo fit into security policy in the
territory broadly, and focus on the ways that balepera – perhaps the most objectified and
subjugated members of Lesotho’s population for a half century – managed to seize upon
and repurpose colonial discourses to carve out pockets of autonomy and control within a
total institution.
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Chapter 4

Sickness, morality, and social life in a colonial leprosarium: Botšabelo,
1914-1965
4.1 Introduction
On October 4, 1914, the Mohlala sisters ducked under the wire fence surrounding the
asylum and began walking home beneath a waning gibbous moon.1 The three girls – aged
fourteen, thirteen, and ten – were, along with 58 other inmates, part of the first mass
desertion from the facility. The destination for the Mohlalas, as well as three other
escapees, was Lesiba Posholi, a village over 100-miles to the south. On the night of the
Mohlalas’ escape, over 600 other patients remained inside the facility. Some, like the girls’
father, were on the verge of death, or otherwise too frail to undertake a long journey across
the territory’s rugged, mountainous terrain. During the next seven months, however, an
additional 250 inmates capable of flight would take their chances, fanning out over roads
and bridle paths for homes scattered across the territory. The hemorrhaging of patients over
the spring and summer of 1914-15 forced colonial officials to reconsider the ways they
engaged with inmates at the new, state-of-the-art leprosarium.
After Botšabelo opened in February, 1914, the institution continuously held the
largest population of detained people anywhere in Lesotho until the mid-1950s. The
medical records of the Mohlalas, and other inmates who passed through the facility over
the decades, are today preserved in an outbuilding of the bustling Senkatana Centre, an
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The data on the pseudonymously named ‘Mohlala’ family is from the Senkatana Clinic Archives
(SCA), MO’s Records, ‘Females, 1.1914-8.1914,’ case nos. 96-99. Thanks to Dr. Pearl Ntšekhe
for allowing me access to the old asylum records. I’m also deeply indebted to Stephen Gill for
bringing the records to my attention, and for generously sharing his vast knowledge on the asylum
and Lesotho more broadly.
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active clinic located on the site of the old asylum. Explaining the existence of these
archives, Dr. Pearl Ntšekhe, Senkatana’s director, wryly observed ‘the place is named
Botšabelo after all;’2 and, indeed, the clinic continues to be ‘a refuge’ for documents, as
well as people. Beneath a thick layer of dust and heavy leather covers, are traces of the
lives of over three thousand patients. These pages provide glimpses into the evolving
challenges, responses, priorities, and strategies of asylum residents over the decades.
In the previous chapter I examined how the colonial administration’s desire to enlist
the aristocracy in the work of biomedical policing was a key goal, alongside the obvious
drive to combat the spread of leprosy infections, animating the decision to compulsorily
detain all Basotho infected with leprosy. A major part of the appeal of traditional authorities
serving as biomedical police, for colonial planners, was the assumption that this
arrangement elided the need to give any concessions to either patients or nobles. With sick
people hounded by their community leaders into the asylum, the administration could
dictate terms to their new charges. Nobles, meanwhile, would be compelled by the
demands of public health and personal fear to diligently surveil the countryside for leprosy
infections. The state would thus bolster its bio-political power, and forge new bureaucratic
relationships with traditional authorities, without needing to reward lords for the additional
work. Ultimately, colonial expectations proved to be doubly wrong: a police role did not
preclude the need for a sick role, nor were nobles ready to take on additional duties without
earning new privileges and prerogatives. After fifteen years of failing to institutionalize a
biomedical police role for nobles, the administration quit trying in 1929, and instead
created its own ‘leprosy inspectorate.’ The flaws with the basic premise of non-reciprocity,
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P. Ntšekhe, author interview, Botšabelo, 19 Jul. 2017.
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however, had been visible since shortly after the asylum opened. Indeed, the desertion of
the Mohlala sisters, and hundreds of other inmates over late-1914 and 1915, set in motion
the creation of an institutional sick role at Botšabelo.
In this chapter I shift my focus away from the relationship between the Basotho
aristocracy and colonial officials, and turn to the intra-institutional relationship between
inmates and the administration. Insofar as planners gave any forethought to the emotional
well-being of asylum patients, they were expected to be people who were already socially
alienated and close to physical death. And who would, therefore, be content to while away
their remaining days in relative comfort at the expense of the state. When confronted with
early expressions of patient discontent, including a rebellion by male inmates in May,
described in detail in the previous chapter, the administration rejected the legitimacy of
patient claims. The wishes of inmates were trumped by a higher moral duty, rooted in the
sure biomedical knowledge that without heavy-handed intervention to check the spread of
leprosy, the health and fortunes of the territory were liable to decline. Mass desertion
changed the moral calculus, however, by making the success of compulsory leprosy
segregation – and by extension the health of the territory – contingent upon securing a
modicum of buy-in from asylum residents.
How these events played out plainly contradict the meta-narratives of imperial and
liberal historiography, on one hand, and complicate the narratives of more radical bodies
of scholarship, on the other. Pace propagandistic visions of colonial officials working to
transplant more humane and universally-suitable European approaches to sick persons onto
African soil, it was Basotho who foregrounded patient living conditions and social
entitlements as essential questions in larger political debates about morality and public
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health. Anti-colonial polemics, meanwhile, have been tremendously valuable for dispelling
heroic narratives of British officials motivated by biomedical necessity, rigorous scientific
epistemology, and enlightened humanitarianism. Yet, insofar as these correctives are still
largely overdetermined, there remains room for more nuanced understandings of the
processual elaboration of obligations and rights.
The one existing piece of scholarship specifically examining Botšabelo, Owen
Kalinga’s rich but sadly as yet unpublished paper ‘Prison or Place of Recovery?,’ argues
that the facility was effectively a biomedical jail, rather than a hospital. Kalinga draws into
focus the human tragedy and ineffectiveness of the administration’s approach to leprosy
control from 1914 through the early 1950s. Although the ‘jail versus hospital’ binary is
useful for demonstrating the continuity of injustice, the framework also serves to occlude
real changes at the asylum over the years. The piece predates the scholarly turn towards
agency and resistance during the 1990s, and therefore does not consider the ways that
inmates shaped asylum policies and conditions: clearly, however, rebellion, and the
‘weapons of the weak’ tactic of mass desertion, enabled subaltern persons to collectively
negotiate with the administration. In the beginning of this chapter, I pick up this thread. By
relying on the august body of scholarship which has established negotiation and agency in
colonial relationships as givens, I am able to quickly explicate the specific institutional
dynamics. This move provides critical scaffolding for later efforts to answer the research
question animating the chapter: how did the persistent struggle by balepera to have social
lives, interface, over time, with an institution – itself situated in a larger colonial
bureaucratic political structure and biomedical systems of knowledge production –
premised on treating this basic human impulse as radical, dangerous, and unhealthy?
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My use of the concept of social life is extrapolated from existing literature on social
death. While the latter is a big tent theory within the discipline of sociology, Jana Kralova
has identified three elements which span across the varied literature on social death:
alienation (loss of purpose and emotional health), corporal degeneration (loss of the
sensation of physical health), and isolation (loss of connections with family and friends, or
social health).3 From my earliest forays into the archives, these three dynamics leapt from
the records as the dominant veins of patient complaint about life at Botšabelo. These three
dynamics, moreover, dovetailed with key mistakes made by the colonial administration in
its planning for Botšabelo: officials imagined that inmates would be rendered into custody
already emotionally and physically broken, and would, therefore, put up little resistance to
the effort to impose social isolation. As alluded to above, patients could and did resist
colonial designs. In order to staunch the desertion crisis of 1914-15, officials were forced
to desist, for a time at least, with efforts to systematically impose social death on inmates,
and instead work to manage expressions of extra- and intra-institutional social life.
The reforms which patients wrested from the administration during this time fell
into the three buckets of emotional, physical, and social health. To offset lost senses of
purpose, patients were granted jobs and the ability to send home cash wages. To address
inmate terror at the visible progression of leprosy and its often gruesome impact on bodies,
asylum medical personnel rolled out aggressive therapeutic regimes which dangled the

3

Kralova, J. 2015.‘What Is Social Death?’ Contemporary Social Science 10: 235–48. The big tent
theory has been used to explore processes of negating people’s value in contexts ranging from
slavery to genocide: Patterson, O. 1982. Slavery and social death. Cambridge: Harvard University;
Card, C. 2010. Confronting evils: Terrorism, torture, genocide. Cambridge: Cambridge University;
Guenther, L. 2013. Solitary confinement: Social death and its afterlives. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota. See also: Agamben, G. 1998. Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. Stanford:
Stanford University. Goffman, E. 1961. Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients
and other inmates. London: Penguin.
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prospect of preserving the health of patients and, even, of social resurrection through
remission of infection. To find some respite from the loneliness of institutional
confinement, inmates secured greater visitation rights from outside, and the ability to call
upon inmates in the compound of the opposite sex. At the start of the policy recalibration,
colonial administrators expressed profoundly cynical motives: Maseru hoped to forestall
the collapse of the asylum, and planned to claw back privileges once they shored up internal
control of the facility and, especially, secured more sedulous cooperation of nobles with
the violence work of tracking down and remitting escapees. Within Botšabelo, however,
particular sets of obligations and entitlements were baked into the institutional meaning of
the sick role over time.
The patient imprint on institutional policies also shifted over the years, moving
beyond tit-for-tat acts of subaltern resistance and colonial response, into the realm of
performative cooptation and invention. In a process reminiscent of Derek Peterson’s
analysis of the logics and behaviors of litigants in church courts in Tanganyika, asylum
residents squeezed themselves into, leveraged, and redefined institutional roles.4 These
social positions provided platforms for making principled demands on the administration.
While inmates petitioning asylum brass on moral grounds dates back to the very inception
of the facility, these early claims were ineffective. The administration was prepared for
residents to invoke familial bonds to call for release or reunification, and responded with
its own morally-tinged counter claim that patients comply with segregation measures in
order to save lives.
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Despite a lack of early success utilizing moral discourse to move asylum policies,
residents became increasingly adept at doing so over time. Whereas claims based in preand extra-institutional sociality overwhelmingly failed, inmates had greater success as they
created new, intra-institutional lives and roles. Botšabelo was institutionally unique in
Lesotho in the way that it brought European colonial officials into close and long-term
contact with a Basotho social cohort who were both socio-economically subaltern and – as
a matter of colonial policy, if not always ideology – morally blameless for their detention.
Out of these relationships patients both secured powerful advocates and, especially, versed
themselves in the moral language and pretenses of colonial policymaking. Over time
Botšabelo residents were able to successfully bend asylum policies and loosen purse strings
by voicing claims as dutiful patients, penitent Christians, helpless outcasts, and aspiring
citizens of an inchoate nation state.
To be clear, the imprint of patients on policy did not follow a Whiggish trajectory
of ever-increasing liberty and inclusion. The depth of moral entanglement between patients
and officials, and the rights and privileges flowing from these relationships, instead look,
from the vantage of the present, like a wave oscillating over time. The moral claims-making
power of inmates was contingent upon several factors, notably including the personality
and style of successive superintendents, and how these men responded to pressures from
above and below. Asylum superintendents and doctors (referred to as medical officers, or
MOs), themselves engaged in contests of moral claims-making with groups of patients,
donning hats as negotiators, patient advocates, founts of healing, benevolent patrons, rules
enforcers, and biomedical didacts. The discursive footing of patients and officials
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interfaced, moreover, with bio-technological innovations, shifts in the demand and
accessibly of resources, and the exigencies of local and imperial politics.
The arrival of sulfa drugs in the early 1950s marked the beginning of the end of the
morally-entangled relationship between Botšabelo patients and the state. Dapsone
transformed leprosy, virtually overnight, from a problem combatted solely with public
health interventions into a far simpler pharmacological question. Over the proceeding
decades, patients, dragging the asylum administration behind them, had not only
institutionalized a cluster of obligations and rights which they were invested in defending
collectively, but had also built vibrant social lives on a site that was originally constructed
only to usher them towards social death. With the sulfa revolution, however, the old set of
sick role obligations, which underwrote a reciprocal set of sick role rights and social
entitlements, became bio-medically superfluous. Asylum residents were thus transformed,
in the eyes of the colonial state, from individuals who were sacrificing liberties on behalf
of the nation into a cohort of loafers living off the largesse of their taxpaying compatriots.
In this time of flux, with the political capital from abiding by the sick role
evaporating, as dozens of asylum residents were discharged each month, the community
looked inward for strength. Dischargees settled in mass in the environs of Botšabelo, and
worked with inmates and asylum staff to preserve old patterns of social life. This chapter
traces how and why inmates, over time, leveraged confinement in a grim biomedical
institution to build a communal social life that offered meaningful refuge to Basotho
suffering from leprosy.
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4.2 Masters of the situation: a desertion-crisis and the subaltern resistance
paradigm
In October 1914, groups of patients began ‘slipping through the wire fence on the first
favourable opportunity and starting for their homes.’5 By the end of the month some 250
individuals, out of a population of just over 700 inmates, had escaped.6 The growing
‘desertion crisis’ forced Maseru to reconsider several of the basic premises underpinning
security and order in the asylum. The administration had neither expected inmates to wish
to leave nor be capable of it. In Sloley’s words, the ‘comfort and wellbeing of existence in
the asylum’ was surprisingly not, in and of itself, sufficient to ‘compensate for the loss of
freedom previously enjoyed.’7 Maseru had imagined, moreover, that inmates would be
physically half-dead and, therefore, too weak to resist. Hermann Dieterlen, a Frenchmissionary serving as asylum chaplain, pithily captured the government’s perspective on
what leprosy diagnoses meant: ‘little by little, the disease will gnaw at them and suck out
their few remaining drops of life.’ Sloley was soon forced to concede that this view was
also flawed: ‘The task of administering the Settlement has proved greater than was
anticipated. The fact that, instead of being helpless cripples, the great majority of the lepers
both male and female are strong and to outward appearance health men and women has
much to with this.’8
As the number of escapes mounted, Maseru rushed south the medical officer (MO)
in the district of Leribe, Dr. Neil Macfarlane, to assume temporary command and
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investigate just what was going on.9 His predecessor, Medical Superintendent Orrock
Arnott, could not handle the stress engendered by the first few days of desertions, and
abruptly took his leave. Macfarlane reported that desertions, paired with the apparent
‘indifference of the chiefs and people,’ was leading patients to understand that they were,
at least temporarily, ‘masters of the situation.’10 He further identified several factors
pushing inmates to flee: a lack of ‘medical care and attention which [inmates] thought their
disease demanded,’ loss of connections with family (particularly mothers with children),
and boredom and lack of purpose.11 Macfarlane’s report and recommendations would lay
the groundwork for a new relationship between the administration and patients.
The new superintendent believed Dr. Arnott had blundered by openly disregarding
the wishes of inmates for care, busying himself with day-to-day administration rather than
interacting with inmates as patients. Macfarlane responded by offering ‘as much medical
attention as it was possible for one man to put in in a day.’12 Unlike Arnott, the new MO
saw no ethical problems with deceiving patients about the potential efficacy of his
biomedical treatments. Indeed, the good doctor later recounted that ‘much of this treatment
was useless, but it tended to inspire confidence and so bring about contentment which, with
these primitive people, is everything.’13 Macfarlane also discharged eight patients with
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arrested infections, thereby reinforcing confidence in his medicines and ‘the good
intentions of the Government.’14 In order to ensure that the optics of patient care were given
adequate attention going forward Macfarlane further recommended separating the
responsibilities of Medical Superintendent into two roles: a Superintendent responsible for
operations – preferably someone with a background in policing – and a Medical Officer
responsible for dispensing drugs and laying on of hands.15
Maseru followed Macfarlane’s advice, appointing the policeman and combat
veteran Frank Jenner as Superintendent in November 1914.16 Like Macfarlane, Jenner was
keen to imbue life at the asylum with a sense of purpose. While the doctor dangled the
prospect of corporal salvation and social resurrection through therapy, the new
superintendent held out meaningful work.17 Within a matter of months Jenner had arranged
to purchase cereals and vegetables from over 100 patients, grown on plots at the asylum,
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and employed several dozen other residents in the asylum hospital, carpentry shop,
kitchens, and laundry.18 The administration continued to purchase inmate labor power and
crops even when it became clear it would be cheaper to purchase services and foodstuffs
from outside vendors.19 Officials recognized the multi-dimensional value of patient labor.
Indeed, looking at the matter through the lens of social life, work bolstered each the three
elements––physical health, social connectedness, and emotional affirmation of purpose.
Physical exertion was good for the bodies as well as the spirits of patients. The question of
social connectedness interfaced with the question of personal usefulness: through the
paying of wages and purchasing of crops, inmates generated wages which could be
remitted to kin.20 Inmates thus became breadwinners, providing a lifeline to families which
were often eking out a hardscrabble existence in the countryside.21 This turn, of course,
also invested families in the continued detention of their cash-generating relative.
Steps were also taken to cut through the pall of isolation and loneliness which hung
over the facility by promoting intra-institutional social life. The policy of rigidly
segregating the sexes was amended to allow for visitation on Wednesdays and Sundays,
supposedly resulting in a twice weekly ‘exodus of most of the able bodied men from the
Male Compound to the Female.’22 Jenner also listened to patient requests to overhaul the
18
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regulations surrounding food. The problem was not what the patients were fed, but rather
how: inmates resented being herded into dining barracks at preset hours, preferring the
liberty to decide when and how to prepare their own rations.23 The new rationing system
further stimulated contacts between patients and boosted the internal economy of the
asylum: many male inmates reportedly paid females to cook for them. The addition of a
maize ration for brewing beer did the same, as well as allowing for periodic bouts of
libation-assisted revelry. The most significant change in policy made in the wake of the
desertion crisis was the alteration of rules for visits by outsiders: in late-1915 asylum
officials began to allow friends and family of inmates entry into the facility every day for
a period up to two weeks.
The reforms of 1915 represent a paradigmatic case of James C. Scott’s ‘subaltern
resistance.’24 The act of fleeing the asylum was a decision made by virtually powerless
inmates. The collective impact of hundreds of escapees, however, forced the administration
to take notice. In order to staunch desertions, the administration was forced to ‘negotiate’
with patients, offering up concessions which were previously inconceivable. Indeed, as
noted in the previous chapter, Macfarlane noted, in the 1920s, that the desertion crisis drew
into high relief for patients ‘that if they made a lot of noise…they got most of what they
wanted.’25 From the administration’s vantage these concessions were not a correction to
institutionally unworkable and morally problematic policies, but rather a delaying tactic to
prevent the facility from collapsing while nobles learned to track down and remit escapees.
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Thus, while negotiation-by-desertion must be included in the story of how social life was
made at Botšabelo, its impact was largely confined to a set of institutional reforms during
the asylum’s infancy. By the time that the administration felt secure enough to begin rolling
back privileges in the early 1920s, relationships between residents themselves, as well as
between inmates and officials, had changed, and new mechanisms of pushing for
institutional change had emerged.
4.3 Failed claims: motherly and conjugal love in an age of eugenics
The most contentious debate over asylum policy, and the area where the administration
was least willing to concede ground, related to family separation. In the Leprosy
Proclamation promulgated in 1913, signed detention orders were required to admit persons
into Botšabelo. Absent leprosy symptoms, family members of inmates – including spouses,
children, and parents – were not eligible for these papers, and therefore barred from
residing inside the facility. Separation was a goal in its own right, not just a side effect of
policy. Principle Medical Officer Edward Long had emphasized the need for dividing
relatives from the very moment he began pitching prominent Basotho nobles on the idea
of building a leprosarium:
You must understand from the beginning…if a father were a leper he would be separated
from his wife and children if they were not lepers or a wife suffering from Leprosy from
her husband and children if they were healthy… This is a very hard thing to propose, but I
assure you that if we want to stamp out Leprosy we must be prepared to harden our hearts.26

Unsurprisingly, persons grappling with leprosy were shocked, horrified, and
outraged to learn of the policy. The first person detained at Botšabelo, a young mother,
immediately began to beg to be reunited with her children. The asylum chaplain described
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how this one woman’s pleas transformed into a cacophony of lamentation as new inmates
streamed into the facility over the early months of 1914: ‘Masesilane was agitated,
talkative, anxious, irritated: … “I want to go back to my children” ... Ah! the cry of women,
of mothers: “My children! I cry for my children!” How many times we hear it here! And
each time it upsets my heart.’27 When heartsick mothers found asylum administrators
unwilling to relent on family reunification, some looked to the local aristocracy for support.
A group of over a dozen women, who escaped the same night as the Mohlala sisters, opted
not to head directly for homes, instead marching to Matsieng to demand an audience with
the paramount.28 Griffith Lerotholi cabled Maseru about the encounter: ‘I tried the whole
day to return back all the lepers here but failed they will not move themselves from the
ground they wish their children be given them to take them to the asylum otherwise they
will rather be hanged what must I do please advise.’ The mothers were reinterned, alive
but without daughters and sons.
The official moral conundrum posed by leprosy segregation in Lesotho was one
which historians of public health, and colonial medicine in particular, know well: while
colonial officials acknowledged that leprosy policy inflicted real emotional harm on
Botšabelo inmates, the supposed benefit of preventing greater levels of death and suffering
warranted this cost. Yet, despite these officials repeating this argument to inmates, lords,
superiors in Cape Town and London, and amongst themselves, the aggressiveness of the
territory’s segregation laws were out of step with most leprosy control policies of the day.
The Norwegian and Hawaiian schemes were used, in public health circles of the era, as
shorthand for differing approaches to segregation: at the former, patients were housed at a
27
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network of hospices and hospitals – a veritable leprosarial archipelago – which enabled
keeping patients close to home and, therefore , well positioned to regularly receive friends
and family; in the latter, persons suffering from leprosy were relocated from around the
sprawling geographic archipelago to a central settlement on a remote peninsula in Molokai,
where patients were cut off from the outside world by seas and a towering cliff.29 For
historians, the two systems are further emblematic of the ways that race lore, and the
capacity for empathy by planners, influenced leprosy policy during the late 19th and early
20th centuries. Despite dramatic differences between the Norwegian and Hawaiian models,
however, both systems allowed spouses and children of patients to reside within
leprosarium grounds regardless of their infection status. Meanwhile, in the Union of South
Africa, where leprosaria were wrapped up in the political project of dehumanizing and
dominating the non-white majority, conjugal separation was on the books but not
enforced.30
The stringency of family separation in Lesotho interfaced with the metastasization
of eugenicist ideology inside the territory’s medical department. Over the 19th century,
contagionists and anti-contagionists grappled for intellectual supremacy within the North
Atlantic biomedical establishment.31 Anti-contagionists like Daniel Danielsen and Carl
Wilhem Boeck sought to discredit the perception of leprosy as contagious, and argued that
the malady was instead passed hereditarily.32 Their argument cited the clustering of
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infections within families and the inconsistent levels of endemicity in nations like Norway.
These theories famously suffered a resounding setback after Hansen’s discovery of m.
leprae in 1873. Yet, even after identifying the mycobacterium, it remained unclear just
how transmission of the tiny organism occurred. In the late 1890s Rudolf Virchow posited
the theory of ‘hereditary predisposition.’ Although Virchow was a famous anti-racist, the
idea of predisposition was quickly seized by metropolitan lepralogists for cross-pollination
with degeneration theory and newer theories of race science.33 Predisposition theory does
not, on first glance, seem to recommend compulsory segregation. After all, if traits –
whether inherited directly, or the product of ‘degenerative behaviors,’ per neo-Lamarkist
theories – are viewed as the key determinant of levels of infection, why quarantine? The
equation changes, however, when segregation is not viewed simply as a matter of forcing
spatial distancing, a technique with continued purchase in public health circles, but also as
an instrument of eugenics.
Slightly different rationales animated Lesotho’s policies of separating leprosysymptomatic individuals from non-symptomatic spouses, on one hand, and other classes
of non-symptomatic genetic relatives (e.g. children, parents, and siblings) on the other. The
desire to prevent the latter class of patients from living at the asylum was fundamentally
rooted in fears of contagion, particularly amongst genetic relatives who were believed to
share susceptibility to the malady.34 When it came to conjugal separation, however, Long
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emphasized the need to prevent balepera from having children. In internal correspondence
the doctor wrote of his desire to ‘improve the Basuto race,’ by weeding out susceptibility
to the ravages of m. leprae.35 In the early 1930s, as the administration fought to beat back
calls to transition from compulsory to voluntary segregation (a political contest described
in the preceding chapter), the asylum superintendent argued that artificially selecting out
‘susceptibles’ promised to condense into a period of a few decades a process which would
otherwise take a century or two – marked by far more suffering and death– to play out
naturally.36
Although patient claims based on the bonds of parental love, and particularly
maternal love, struck colonial policymakers emotionally, the register did not yield political
results. The administration had indeed ‘hardened their hearts’ before the asylum opened.
Leprosy,’ in Report of the Advisory Committee for the Tropical Diseases Research Fund for the
Year 1911. London: Darling & Son. See also BNA, CO 646/2, BNC 1913, Sloley’s remarks, 8-9.
35
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A truer expression of love, officials maintained, would be to reduce the chances that
existing children would be exposed to contagion and, even more so, to forego creating
children who would be marked by the psycho-social and physical pain of infection––not to
mention the anguish of passing such suffering on to their own children. Interned mothers
pleading for their children also did not receive much support from Basotho political and
intellectual elites. Just as the National Council supported the leprosy proclamation and
Griffith rebuffed the group of escaped mothers, the newspapers of the missions and
bahlalefi (mission-educated elites) called for inmates to sacrifice for others. In November
1914, as hundreds of escapees were in flight from the asylum to their homes, the Paris
Mission paper Leselinyana invoked moral parenthood in call for these individuals to turn
back: ‘What is of utmost importance is for the good patients to embrace… a great spirit of
compromise and courage so that they alone will be infected by this awful illness, not their
children.’37
While Maseru convinced most mission-educated elites and a fair number of nobles
about the necessity of separating some family members, officials faced significantly more
pushback on the question of conjugal separation. Basotho men from across the social
spectrum expressed the view that, in marriages where only one partner was found to have
leprosy symptoms, the husband should decide whether both spouses or just the sick
individual would be detained.38 One of the earliest and most ardent Mosotho supporters of
leprosy segregation, the Paris Evangelical Reverend Nicola Mpiti, led spirited opposition
against segregation of spouses within the National Council chamber. This campaign led
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the administration to agree to provide married couples, in cases in which both partners
displayed leprosy symptoms, with special huts where they could live together inside the
asylum, rather than being fenced off from one another in the two gendered compounds.
While this policy obviously supported the ‘contagion control’ mission of the asylum, it
also undermined Long’s eugenicist ambitions, because married couples could (and did)
continue to have children.
The idea of preventing male married inmates from having children was an even
harder sell for the administration. The unions that Long viewed as threatening to poison
the genetic well of the nation, looked quite different to observers steeped in divergent
cultural, intellectual, and religious sensibilities. Arguing against separation, prominent
nobles on the National Council explained that marriage in Sesotho custom was primarily a
transaction between families, rather than a personal and religious contract between partners
and their God: once lenaka (the ‘horns’ of livestock) were transferred from the groom’s
family to the bride’s, it was not the place of the state to restrict a husband’s access to the
body of his wife, nor to thwart his (and his family’s) lawful expectation that the wife would
bear them children.39 Leprosy, especially in cases of an ill husband, did not void this
contract. In the weeks following the opening of Botšabelo, a similar debate raged in the
pages of the Paris Evangelical newspaper Leselinyana. Male Christian elites were divided
over whether physical separation should effectively annul marriages: if a wife was
incapable of providing children, did it make sense for their union to remain binding in the
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eyes of state and church?40 Unlike during the era of Cape Rule, when European male
officials gleefully attacked local familial structures and mores, colonial policymakers in
the late 1910s and 20s expressed their own moral misgivings about the ways that leprosy
laws clashed with the supposedly rightful prerogatives of Basotho husbands. A particularly
pithy expression of patriarchal solidarity shows in administrative correspondence relating
to a male inmate whose wife wished to move to South Africa to find work:
There is of course no question of compelling the woman to live with her husband as a leper
confined at Botsabelo, but [the law] distinctly prohibits native women leaving the Territory
without the consent of their husbands... The Resident Commission is not prepared to rule
that the advantages of that law should be denied to a Mosuto because he is a leper.41

Cohabitating spouses were hardly the only inmates who maintained sex lives. Even
as the administration held the line on its eugenicist ambitions by preventing nonsymptomatic spouses from living at the facility, the shifts in visitation policies over 1915
made it easier for patients to maintain inmate relationships and, even, find new partners at
the asylum. By allowing in outsiders, the administration enabled inmates to continue preconfinement sexual partnerships. By enabling residents to move between the male and
female sides of the asylum, there were new opportunities for heterosexual encounters and
relationships. The cries of newborns emerging into the world in the asylum hospital
reverberated through the facility an average of eight times each year during the period
between 1915 and 1921, providing certain evidence for officials that inmates were
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continuing to have sex within the asylum.42 By 1917 the presence of a growing cohort of
asymptomatic children living at the asylum prompted the High Commissioner to inquire
whether it was perhaps time to build a creche on site.43 Maseru rebuffed the idea, stating
that such a move would been read as a tacit blessing of illicit sexual relations.
Unable to fully enforce its eugenicist ambitions on inmates, the Medical Dept. in
Maseru imposed a harsh approach to the custody of newborn children.44 Babies born inside
the asylum were weened at 15-months, and swiftly transferred to the custody of a parent,
cousin, uncle, aunt, or grandparent outside the asylum. The official rationale for this policy
was that children were more susceptible to infection than adults, and therefore needed to
be removed from the facility post haste. In a few cases where no outside family could be
located, children – and especially girls, who the administration seemingly was more
comfortable living in the women’s compound than it was with boys in the men’s – were
permitted to stay at Botšabelo longer. These children were transferred by early adolescence
into the custody of some other willing party, including extended kin and, in at least one
case, an asylum guard.45 Although it is unclear whether inflicting emotional anguish on
parents by snatching away their young children was an explicit goal of the policy, it is
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difficult to imagine a more painful punishment for violating the asylum’s prohibition
against sex.
As inmates fraternized across the compounds over time, and heterosexual romantic
relationships developed, some inmate couples asked for permission to marry. This reality
led to a clash between eugenicists in the Medical Dept. and the three powerful mission
churches operating in the territory. The former opposed sanctioning any new marriages,
certain than such unions would lead to the birth of more children susceptible to infection.
While leaders of the Evangelical, Roman Catholic, and Anglican churches were unprepared
to argue against the biomedical necessity of separating families based on the status of
symptoms, clergy also earnestly believed in the moral necessity of allowing inmates to
marry so that they might enjoy sex without sin. The churches carried significant political
as well as moral authority in Maseru, not least because of their role as the purveyors of the
vast majority of schooling in the territory. The administration also prized the work of the
mission churches inside Botšabelo, providing communion, guidance, and absolution to
people grappling with a painful, terrifying, and often terminal infection. Indeed, Hermann
and Anna Busch Dieterlen were signed on as chaplain and schoolmistress at the facility
before construction even began.
Ultimately three inmate marriages took place at the asylum during the era of
compulsory segregation. Two of the unions involved inmates who stepped into staff
vacancies created when the Dieterlens abruptly took their leave in mid-1914, with Herman
haunted by the blows he received during the May 1914 uprising. When the administration
struggled to find either an ordained minister or a schoolteacher willing to take up work in
the asylum, the Anglican inmate Philip Sebolo began providing religious instruction while
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the Evangelical inmate Edward Tsoetse took over duties as schoolmaster.46 On account of
their professional and moral status within the institution, Sebolo and Tsoetse were allowed
to wed fellow inmates (Tebello Mothobi and Elisa Mokoai, respectively, in June 1918 and
February 1921).47 A third couple, Molelekeng Mele and Jonas Sehleko, were allowed to
wed in late-1918 on account of intense lobbying by the Anglican Rector of Maseru, James
Cottrell. In his missives to Jenner, the rector explained that the couple were under active
church censure for having had a child out of wedlock, despite their desire to ‘to marry &
live good lives.’ The rector’s missives went further in critiquing the way that asylum policy
put social life and religious duty in conflict: Cottrell warned if patients were forced to
choose between companionship and sex, on one hand, and Christian morality, on the other,
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they were liable to choose the former.48 Shortly after the third marriage went ahead, an
outraged Dr. Macfarlane, soon to take over the role of principal medical officer from his
mentor Dr. Long, prevailed on the High Commissioner to formally outlaw all marriages at
the asylum.49 A state-sanctioned wedding would not take place inside the asylum again
until the 1950s.
Immediately upon arriving at Botšabelo inmates began to lodge claims with the
administration. Motherhood and other familial roles proved, however, to be largely
ineffective registers. The disruption of pre-existing familial and social institutions were not
side effects of compulsory segregation but, rather, key policy goals in their own right,
bolstered by morally-tinged renderings of eugenicist and public health dynamics. Yet, even
as the administration systematically rebuffed inmates’ efforts to restore lost social
connections and lives, officials proved better disposed to hearing out claims based on new
institutional realities over time. Planners had a better idea of what they wanted to prevent
than what they were willing to allow, and inmates leveraged this ambiguity and uncertainty
to reformulate asylum regulations, relationships, and roles.
4.4 Waiting for deliverance: hope, faith, and epistemology
The dismissive attitude of asylum officials towards the demands of residents for medicine
and healing proved an immediate source of tension between the two parties. Many people
suffering from leprosy eagerly reported to Botšabelo in 1914, after learning from
community leaders that treatment awaited. These individuals subsequently received the
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news that no effective therapies existed with a mix of disappointment, bewilderment, and
suspicion. Rumors were already rife about colonial doctors withholding leprosy cures at
the behest of local doctors concerned about losing business. There were also murmurings
about the successes of local Zionist healers curing leprosy and, even, of similar feats being
performed over a century earlier by Mohlomi, a healer and philosopher of great renown
across the Highveld. What truth could there be to the claims of Dr. Arnott and Chaplain
Dieterlen that this sickness was caused by an animal too small to see which found new
victims when people shared eating utensils and clothes? Such claims strained the credulity
of many inmates, particularly given the existence of more plausible etiological
mechanisms, including malevolent sorcery and the ire of ancestors.
The general dismissiveness of colonial medical personnel with the concerns and
queries of commoners and sick people, in favor of outreach to powerful Basotho who
officials hoped would impose segregation from above, meant that mission presses and
personnel emerged as leading public advocates for the necessity of the asylum. Dieterlen
mocked the patients he observed in the early days of the asylum: ‘For [inmates], after eating
and sleeping, there is only one desire: “Give us medicine.” Scarcely had they arrived, they
would like to be administered drugs which heal, ignorant of the science.’ The chaplain
wielded fluent Sesotho and an unshakeable confidence in the veracity of his knowledge
when proselytizing the gospels of biomedicine and Evangelical Christianity inside
Botšabelo. Dieterlen was also fixated on combatting the growing purchase of Zionist, or
Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM), teachings amongst balepera. Only days after arriving at
the asylum in December 1913 – a few weeks before the institution began receiving inmates
– the elderly missionary hiked to the nearby home of Edward Lion to publicly denounce
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the Zionist prophet’s claims to be able to cure leprosy. In Dieterlen’s view, Lion was
cynically playing on the emotions of desperate people in order to aggrandize himself, and
thereby drawing people away from legitimate purveyors of biomedical science and spiritual
salvation. Whatever Lion’s intentions, it is certainly true that his success winning converts
in Lesotho, and the broader story of Zionism as an institution in the territory, cannot be
properly told without accounting for the fear, and yearning for a cure, caused by leprosy
and compulsory segregation.
Lion spent his childhood in both Lesotho and Natal.50 In the years following the
South Africa War, Lion learned the healing arts from the pioneering, peripatetic Zionist
preacher Edgar Mahon. Lion went to work at Apostolic Faith Mission in Johannesburg in
1910, before returning to Lesotho in 1913. Although chased out of the first community
where he sought to ply his trade, the Zionist healer found greater success operating on the
slope of Berea mountain, overlooking the plain where a leprosy asylum was being built.
Despite an odd, early altercation with an irate, elderly European man sporting a long beard,
Lion quickly built up a reputation for performing miraculous feats from this perch.51 The
Zionist proclaimed he could channel God’s healing power through his touch, contingent
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on the subject’s absolute faith in the divine grace of the medium himself. One man related
his experience:
[Lion] told me to convert myself to him... If you believe, you will heal... He put us in a
line, on our knees… The members forcefully grasped me, from head to toe, and prayed for
my healing… He drove me to the Mohokare River, and there immersed and baptized me:
“You will depart partially cured!”52

The emergence of Botšabelo as an early territorial hotbed of Zionist support was
not only because of the proximity, persuasiveness, and power of Lion’s feats of healing,
but also because this church provided an institutional expression for hope.53 Lion insisted
that there was something which people faced with leprosy could do to liberate themselves
from the physical and emotional anguish of the malady and confinement: ‘convert
themselves to him.’ During the period in which Lion was nearby, neither asylum
biomedical personnel nor the mission churches offered patients a comparable plan of action
to restore their physical bodies and social relations to health. While a succession of medical
officers who succeeded Arnott were all careful to offer heroic looking treatments to
inmates, they made no promises about cures.
The Zionist monopoly over claims to a cure for leprosy evaporated over the early
1920s. Asylum biomedical personnel, as well as allies in the mission churches, spread the
good news about hydnocarpate drugs. This class of drugs were widely embraced by
Western public health experts, particularly within the sprawling British and growing
American empires, during the interwar years. While chaulmoogra oil, derived from the
hydnocarpus tree, was part of topical leprosy treatments in India, Burma, and China for
centuries, biomedical practitioners developed increasing interest in the medicine’s leprosy-
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checking properties as they discovered new methods of preparing and administering the
substance.54 Patients provided with the oil for oral consumption, beginning in the mid-19th
century, faced intense nausea and gastric distress. In the early 20th century, doctors began
injecting the oil, eliminating the nausea but instead causing prohibitive amounts of pain
with heavy gauge syringes. A major breakthrough came in 1916, when the Black American
chemist Alice Ball, working at the College of Hawaii, discovered that the oil could be more
manageably injected if esterized.55 Over the late-1910s and 1920s biomedical doctors at
leprosy clinics around the world began preparing and experimenting with their own
variations on Ball’s method, using different combinations of oils and ‘soap salts’ (fatty
acids).56 In 1927 the pharmaceutical company Burroughs Wellcome (the antecedent of
GlaxoSmithKlein) began manufacturing and marketing sodium hydnocarpate as Alepol,
providing a new standard of treatment within the British Empire.
Hydnocarpates revolutionized therapeutic regimes at leprosy asylums over the
1920s and 1930s. A sense of heroic possibilities washed over many doctors who had
previously spent much of their time cutting lesions and appendages, hoping for the malady
to ‘self-arrest.’ Eric Slack served as Botšabelo’s medical officer between 1919 and 1932,
a period coinciding with particular optimism about the leprostratic efficacy of
hydnocarpates. The Cambridge-trained MD followed developments in the research
literature and vigorously experimented with an array of treatments. He began preparing
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ethyl-esters of chaulmoogric acids for intravenous injections in 1921.57 After returning
from a half year tour of leprosaria in South Asia and the Pacific over 1925-26, Slack
procured hydnocarpus anthelminthica nuts from colonial Thailand, which he prepared as
an emulsion known as Tai Foong Chee.58 Although the doctor temporarily desisted
dispensing antimony in 1922, after the metalloid induced cardiac arrest in three patients,
Slack resumed its use in 1926.59 Slack embraced Alepol as soon as it came to market.
The emergence of the new therapeutic regime in the early 1920s interfaced with
colonial administrative changes and new investments in asylum religious life. There was
mounting pressure on the local colonial regime to produce quantitative data which could
help to justify spending more than 10% of their annual budget on the facility.60 Maseru
hoped that a greater church presence at Botšabelo would provide valuable support for
asylum administrators working to roll out new pharmacological technologies and reform
asylum policies. Macfarlane was transferred back to the facility in 1921, taking over the
superintendency from Jenner, and quickly moved to ban patient marriages, as noted, and
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tighten visitation rules.61 Peter Strachan, a medical officer in Serowe (colonial Botswana)
assumed the superintendency at the end of 1922.62 The Reverend HJ Edney took up a post
at Botšabelo in 1920, taking over the work of Philip Sebolo leading the asylum’s Anglican
community and becoming the first official chaplain since Dieterlen’s departure.63 Between
1917 and 1928, the charismatic preacher Joseph Moleko, who lived in nearby Lithabaneng,
was allowed access to the asylum to provide Evangelical catechism.64 Roman Catholic
mass and confession, meanwhile, were performed by the parish priests of the Loretto
Mission, beginning with Father Philippe in 1914.65 Maseru welcomed construction of two
large stone churches inside the asylum – the Roman Catholic St. Damien and the Anglican
St. Mary’s and John– which were completed within months of one another in 1922, and
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complemented the more ascetic sheet metal Evangelical church put up during the asylum’s
initial construction.66
The growth of new treatment regimes and mission churches were integral to the
shifting social life of the asylum, providing inmates with the opportunity to step into dual,
mutually reinforcing roles as faithful congregants and dutiful patients. Although less
agonizing than the earlier iterations of hydnocarpates, the ester injections were still far from
pleasant – the medical literature of the era is replete with descriptions of 18 or 16 gauge
needles being ‘rammed’ into bodies and of ‘suppurating lesions’ developing at injection
sites.67 Biomedical personnel, and above all the cadre of nurses, who provided inmates
with day-to-day care, enjoined patients to lean on their faith to persevere through the
physical pain involved in treatment. The ascendent biomedical confidence in hydnocarpate
treatments simultaneously enabled mission churches to expand their footprint in the lives
of inmates, advising congregants not only on attaining salvation in the next life but also
their moral duty to pursue deliverance from temporal woes through biomedical therapy.
Although Zionist healers offered balepera a better deal in terms of (the lack of) physical
pain required for a cure, the AFM lost support at the asylum during the 1920s by insisting
that no recovery would come to those who sought out biomedical therapies, at a time in
which clergy and asylum personnel were extolling the value of pharmacological
breakthroughs.
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4.5 Good and bad patients: politics, pain, and reciprocal obligations
Patients initially responded to growing colonial faith in hydnocarpates with shared
optimism. One of the few photographs of Botšabelo from the 1920s shows patients queuing
outside the dispensary to receive injections. In 1922, 113 patients sat for 20 or more
injections, and 219 did so in 1923. The early wave of hopefulness amongst asylum
residents surrounding the drugs crested and subsided over the mid-1920s. The majority of
physically robust patients discontinued therapy in 1924. By the final quarter of the year,
only 125 residents underwent 5 or more injections, down from 206 in the first quarter.68
Superintendent Strachan later described the emergence of a cycle of patient
disillusionment: those individuals who were cured, ostensibly by hydnocarpates, were
discharged, and therefore unable to extol the virtues of the therapy; the persons who had
undergone dozens of injections in vain, on the other hand, remained at the facility
‘poison[ing] the minds of the newcomers against the treatment.’69 By the early 1930s, a
medical officer observed ‘there are so few lepers receiving antileprotic treatment, that it
must be frankly admitted that this Institution has ceased to be a treatment centre.’70
The colonial expectation that residents would show up for injections created a
rubric for morally grading patients. Officials described the difference between dutiful
therapy-seekers, who deserved deliverance from infection and institutional discharge, and
therapy-shirkers, who, at least in the colonial imagination, prioritized pain-aversion and
cushy asylum living over the prospect of personal liberty and the social good of stamping
out leprosy. As inmate participation in injections bottomed out over the early 1930s zealous
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proponents of biomedical epistemology in the administration and mission churches took to
not only broadly blaming inmates for continuing to be ill, but for the continuing presence
of leprosy in the territory. An emblematic 1933 article in Leselinyana read, ‘There are
countries in which the lepers living there heal quickly and in large numbers. In Lesotho
that is not the case, and the blame…lies with the patients, because they are too lazy to come
for injections.’71 Asylum staff, meanwhile, sought to use an archetype of the bad patient to
shame residents into undergoing treatment. But moral hectoring did not prove to be an
effective means of boosting dispensary visits. Inmates faced little social or material cost to
foregoing therapy. Within the bureaucratic institutional framework of the asylum –
governed by standardized regulations on rations, visitors, and allocation of employment –
no material differences in privileges were based on statuses as ostensibly dutiful or derelict
patients.72
This reality was underscored by a tacit, if inconsistent, institutional recognition that
therapies produced differing somatic experiences of pain in individual patients. Asylum
staff were keenly aware of the ways that the suffering caused by therapies, interfacing with
disillusionment, led their charges to cease showing up for treatment. Doctors and nurses
confronted visceral evidence of the ways that their work induced suffering on a daily basis.
Slack himself withheld hydnocarpates from some inmates after witnessing their reactions
to the drugs. The doctor repeatedly sent away a ‘brave woman’ who continued to seek
therapy despite responding to both injections and emulsions with violent rigors and a
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temperature in excess of 102ºF. Slack’s discomfort in this case was seemingly stirred by
the visibility and quantifiability of the inmate’s pain. In other instances, officials expected
that patients simply stiffen their upper lips. A particularly extreme example involved the
institutional posture towards the illicit, but evidently widespread, smoking of dagga or
matekoane (cannabis, in Afrikaans and Sesotho) by patients.73 Slack was well aware of the
anti-emetic, orexigenic, and analgesic properties of the drug, having sought to procure
dried cannabis indica when preparing the recipe for Tai Foong Chee in his laboratory.74
Unable to purchase ‘Indian hemp’ from abroad, because of a League of Nations sponsored
embargo,’ the medical officer continued to push the therapy minus this ingredient. Even
while noting that violent nausea and loss of appetite resulting from the emulsion led
patients to cease visiting his dispensary, Slack supported punishments for inmates who
self-medicated with dagga. The potential recreational use of an intoxicant was framed in
the institutional imagination as a greater potential harm than inmate pain and, even, the
discontinuation of therapy. Moral patienthood required enduring any side effects of therapy
without looking to take the edge off.
In the patient records from the early 1920s, there is conspicuous difference between
the case histories covered in notes, for patients who regularly received hydnocarpates, and
cases with lots of white space: the former more frequently list a date of medical discharge
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in red (now brown) ink.75 While patients who eschewed treatment were still examined on
a yearly basis, discharges amongst this population were far less frequent. This trend did
not raise any concerns at the time: of course there would be a correlation between consistent
therapy and discharge. It meant that the patients willing to consistently endure the pain and
uncertainty of treatment had a better chance of release than their ostensibly more fickle and
faint-hearted counterparts. By the early 1930s, however, the precise relationship between
therapy and discharge, as well as the moral meaning of decisions to seek out or avoid
asylum doctors, was becoming increasingly muddled to adherents of biomedical
knowledge. In the 1980s, looking back on Western optimism with hydnocarpates during
the interwar period, the historian John Iliffe suggested that the entire affair had been ‘an
enormous, unintentional, and brilliantly successful confidence trick.’76
Various diagnostic biases certainly played a role in the higher rates of discharge
amongst Botšabelo inmates who regularly sat for hydnocarpate therapy in the 1920s. Slack
exhibited some obvious ego and affective biases in his work, looking harder for evidence
of remission on the bodies of the patients who he was more professionally and personally
invested in having good outcomes. Physicians who prided themselves on their heroic and
dutiful applications of healing understandably wanted the best for the patients they viewed
as most heroic and dutiful. Indeed, despite their rationalist training, asylum doctors
maintained faith in the ultimate deliverance of patients who diligently visited the
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SCA, author’s qualitative assessment of Botšabelo Patient Record Books. For a discussion of this
phenomenon: LNA S3/17/2/2 Garraway to HC, 4 Aug 22; OBL, Garraway Papers, Box 6, 7 Mar.
1924; SANA GG1240: No. 33/1519.
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Iliffe, 225. The root of this mistake, identified by Iliffe in building upon the critiques of
epidemiologists and public health experts, was the failure of boosters of hydnocarpates to account
for improvements in nutrition and hygiene available to people suffering from leprosy when at the
facilities where they also received shots: bolstered immune systems suppressed the infection but
the drugs spuriously got the credit.
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biomedical temple, and endured the trials therein.77 Selection bias also played a role. Slack
and Strachan specially pressured inmates suffering from ‘tuberculoid’ and ‘neural’ leprosy
to undergo treatment, suggesting that they were likely candidates for discharge. These
forms of leprosy were well-established to have higher rates of ‘self-arrest’ or ‘burn-out’
than lepromatous cases. But in the cases where patients undergoing therapy for neural and
tuberculoid infections were deemed ‘cured,’ hydnocarpus was cited as the reason.78 While
important to identify these biases, it is also vital to maintain a sense of humility about the
limits of contemporary knowledge about healing: the psycho-somatic impact of Alepol
flowing through veins, for example, or the reassuring power of Lion’s firm grasp and
stentorian voice, very well may have played an important role in the trajectory of inmates’
infections.
In the early 1930s, asylum administrators were forced to revisit their earlier
assumptions about what constituted moral conduct by inmates and doctors. The correlation
between treatment and discharge had vanished, simply because only a dozen or so patients
were continuing to regularly sit for injections. In 1932, Supt. Strachan sought to quantify
the efficacy of hydnocarpates, motivated by a growing sense of puzzlement over why
discharges had continued even as therapies had waned over the previous half-decade.79 Dr.
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Vaughan 1991, 77-99, examines how Judeo-Christian ideology infused colonial interactions with
people infected with leprosy. European officials came from religious and cultural traditions steeped
in ideas of ‘the leper’ as wicked and/or piteous. While the administration officially advanced a
rationalist line – leprosy was purely a biomedical matter of bacterial infection – the notion that the
malady was evidence of backwardness and immoral behavior on the part of the afflicted is scattered
throughout asylum correspondence. An offshoot of this ideological construct, which took root at
Botšabelo during the era of high confidence in hydnocarpates, was that patients had a chance for
redemption through biomedicine.
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LNA, S3/17/2/2. Macfarlane to Long, 10 Oct 22.
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Strachan, P. 1933. ‘Chaulmoogra Oil in the Treatment of Leprosy.’ South African Medical
Journal 7/7: 210–14. The supt. noted that the discharge board had begun taking a harder look for
cases of ‘self-arrest’ over recent years. Yet, Strachan justified this move on the grounds that it took
longer for the passive improvements in living conditions (the institution’s diet and hygiene) to cure
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Robert C. Germond arrived at Botšabelo in 1932, and officially replaced Slack as medical
officer the following year.80 The son of Paris Evangelical missionaries, Germond brought
to his work both a knowledge of Sesotho amassed since childhood, and an energetic and
warm-hearted disposition guided by a powerful sense of Christian duty. After seeking out
patient opinions on therapies, the University of Lausanne trained MD replaced the
longstanding practice of administering Alepol intravenously with intradermal injections.81
Faced with less noxious side-effects, patient visits to the dispensary shot up.82 This
phenomenon belied the explanation previously offered for declining numbers of therapyseekers: patients were keener to maintain access to asylum rations and housing than
recover. Germond’s experiments with burning and cutting lesions using dry ice and
electricity (surgical diathermy) further refuted the criticism that patients were faint of heart:
indeed, Strachan expressed amazement at the procedure’s ‘demand despite its
painfulness.’83 Unlike with hydnocarpate therapy, patients purchased something tangible
for their agony: the sight, smell, and sensation of burning tissue were all evidence of hated
lesions under attack.

patients than the more active therapies (hydnocarpates) which had driven discharges in the early
1920s.
80
When Slack fell ill early in 1932, Germond stepped in at the asylum on an interim basis. After
the former’s unexpected death in August 1933, while convalescing in England, the latter was
immediately appointed Botšabelo’s MO: BNA, DO 92/3, BMDAR 1932-4.
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LNA Nos. 536I, II, & III: Quarterly Reports – Botsabelo, ‘Third Quarter, 1932;’ Strachan 1933,
212.
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The archetypes of bad and good patients had meaningful moral careers at
Botšabelo. While neither was ever inscribed in the territory’s laws or institutional policies,
these constructs nonetheless deeply shaped the terms of life and work at the facility.
Skepticism about the true blamelessness of people infected with leprosy was an unfortunate
part of the ideology and rhetoric propping up compulsory segregation: Botšabelo inmates
seeking to escape or eschew painful biomedical procedures confirmed widespread and
deeply rooted colonial prejudices about people suffering from leprosy as selfish and lazy.
As we have seen, these tropes were an enduring facet of the way colonial officials (and,
often, the mission press) publicly described people detained in the asylum. The policy
implication was that inmates were not merely sick with a bacterial infection, but also
afflicted by some pathological deviance which made them incapable of handling the
responsibilities of liberty and personal autonomy without undue risk to everyone else.
While the notion of bad patients was useful for public facing refutations of questions about
the legitimacy and morality of compulsory segregation outside the asylum, it was less
useful inside the fence.
Asylum officials and staff were confronted with the fallaciousness of the
administration’s rhetoric on a daily basis, in the form of inmates demonstrably keen to heal
and eager to work. Botšabelo residents who embraced the institutional mandate of trying
to get better by complying with biomedical instructions created a particular moral problem
for administrators. These individuals represented living obstructions to the functioning of
the colonial regime’s ideological matrix of ‘leper pathology,’ militating against the
classification of inmates, as a population, as tacitly blamable for their affliction. Moreover,
while some colonial recognition of inmates’ ‘right to be taken care of’ as an offset to stolen
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liberty was baked into Botšabelo from the start, the parameters of this entitlement were
perpetually subject to contestation. Inmates classed as good patients were consistently at
the vanguard of successful efforts to expand and defend maximal definitions of institutional
rights, just as colonial officials periodically sought to leverage tropes of indolent, spoiled,
and ignorant inmates to deny or claw back entitlements.
4.6 Laying claim to entitlements: the politics of rations and self-government
In 1928 a discharged former inmate, ‘Anna,’ appeared at the asylum gates, wasting with
hunger and pleading to be readmitted.84 She was unable to perform agricultural work,
having lost the ends of fingers and toes, and informed Strachan that her family would not
accept her into their home. Despite no sign of a reoccurrence of active symptoms, the
superintendent nevertheless accepted the legitimacy of Anna’s moral claim on asylum
resources. She was allowed to resume residence inside the facility and collect government
rations. It did not hurt Anna’s claim that she had actively participated in the hydnocarpate
therapy regime over preceding years, personally undergoing more than twenty injections.
Over the next three years, thirty-some discharged patients – some of whom had
discontinued therapy after only a handful of shots – leveraged the loophole in the
bureaucratic institutional regulations, pioneered by Anna, to be readmitted, not on account
of recrudescence of symptoms but for sheer want.
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SCA, Patient Case Histories, No. 414. Anna’s situation was also discussed in LNA S3/17/2/11,
Strachan to Nattle, 21 June 1928. A similar case came up months later, see notes on ‘readmission
from starvation’ of Patient No. 407. There was also an earlier instance of a man – who was
discharged in May 1924, readmitted in Sep. 1926, and lived at the asylum until his death in Apr.
1951 – without a discussion of the potential moral hazard: ‘this poor unfortunate boy [who was in
his 40s] was born deaf and dumb, and his parents are both dead’ (Patient No. 556).
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In 1932 a number of stone houses, labelled a ‘pauper village,’ were built in a far
corner of the asylum.85 This community, maintained by Basotho taxpayers, was the first
state-funded welfare program in the territory. It was a direct result of the emotional and
moral claims-making power exerted by patients, and institutionalized into the bureaucratic
fabric of the facility over time. The formation of an officially-sanctioned community of
settled inhabitants, in addition to the larger population whose political status was officially
as long-term convalescents, marked a turning point in the asylum’s social and political
environment. The moral entanglement of patients and the administration involved both
powerful emotional and political dynamics.
The leprosarium was an atypical colonial institution in the way that it served as a
site where European personnel were in sustained contact with Basotho individuals who
were both socially subaltern and, unlike in other custodial facilities, legally – if not
ideologically – blameless for their own detention.86 Inmates and staff developed
relationships built upon treatment and conversations carried out day after day, month after
month, year after year. Inmates themselves, moreover, learned to leverage their power,
both collectively and as individuals to secure concessions from officials. The politics of
government rations is illustrative of these dynamics.
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On the construction of stone houses for some 50 recognized paupers, see Pim, 122. On the growth
of the community see, BMDAR 1938, 12-3.
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Unlike the missionaries who lived in Basotho communities and schooled children from a broad
swathe of social classes, colonial administrative officers’ relationships with Basotho were
overwhelmingly confined to strata of noble lords and the mission-educated elites who staffed the
civil service. Colonial judges, doctors, and police officers, meanwhile, did not have the sort of
sustained encounters with socially subaltern individuals which might serve as the basis of mutual
understanding. And gaolers in the large penal facilities in Maseru and Leribe, insofar as they had
any prolonged contact with prisoners, were tasked with disciplining and punishing their charges.
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Officially, readmission of non-contagious former patients was reserved for
individuals who were both unable to support themselves ‘on account of permanent
disabilities due to the effects of leprosy in the past’ and lacked close relatives to rely upon
for food and care.87 The reality was more complex, as many of the former patients simply
had families who were unable or unwilling to support the discharged patient. The de facto
criterion for readmission – complete with rations and housing – was demonstrable need or,
in Strachan’s words, persons returning to the facility after a home visit in ‘an obviously
starved condition.’88 Readmissions were absolved of blame for their indigence, on account
of physical disabilities limiting their capacity for labor. Moral blame was displaced instead
onto the relatives of returnees. In Macfarlane’s words:
Discharged patients, especially the more helpless ones, are not well taken care of at their
homes, in most cases being left to fend for themselves, with the result that indifferent
feeding and neglect drive them back to the Asylum. The people make much of the lepers
when they are in the institution––they are a source of revenue to many of them through
wages received for work performed, but when they are discharged and no more money
comes in, they are treated with callous indifference.89

While the Principal Medical Officer’s vision was maximally unsympathetic, it is certain
that the discharge of inmates did place profound strain on some households’ financial
resources – presenting the double burden of another mouth to feed and the loss of
remittances.
Maseru’s primary concern about the pauper village was moral hazard. In 1928, the
administration looked to make an example of the family of a man who came back to the
asylum in a particularly ‘piteous condition.’ All the police investigation turned up,
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however, was an entire homestead teetering on the brink of starvation.90 Maseru responded
by looking to the aristocracy, inquiring ‘is there any reason why…chief[s] should not
arrange for…support in accordance with Sesuto custom.’91 Paramount Griffith rejected the
customariness of this vision, however, arguing, ‘The only thing the chief can do is to supply
a land.’ Obviously, agricultural plots were of little value to patients in no condition for
physical labor. With families and the aristocracy standing as dead ends, Maseru accepted
that the pauper community was likely to have a longstanding presence at the asylum. But
officials also stressed the need to keep it as quiet as possible, arguing ‘once it was known
among the relatives of arrested cases it would be sadly abused and only lead to the
Government maintaining more and more lepers.’92
Cases like the one above, involving the police investigation into why a discharged
man was starving, offer traces of a special sense of colonial obligation towards balepera:
faced with a story of horrific familial poverty rather than neglect, the administration
responded by seizing responsibility for the former patient while turning away from the
deeper well of need. While the debate over supporting ‘discharged paupers’ played out in
a register of generalized morality, the administration intervening to ensure the welfare of a
subject was a rare occurrence, to put it mildly. A more specific question of moral
responsibility roiled beneath the surface: what was owed to the people who the colonial
state had swept up and involuntarily detained for years, despite having committed no
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criminal act? This question, as we shall see, became all the more urgent over time because
of the incremental success of the administration’s campaign to stigmatize the malady.
Efforts to prevent ostensibly undeserving outsiders from gaining access to asylum
resources emerged as a perennial concern for colonial officials beginning in the 1920s.
This impulse clashed, however, with inmates’ wish to host families and friends as
frequently and generously as possible. The lax visitation rules put in place during the Jenner
superintendency represented a means for inmates to maintain connections with the outside
world, and a major status distinction from criminal prisoners. Under orders to reduce
asylum costs and involve lords in the bureaucratic work of issuing asylum passes, Supt.
Macfarlane tightened visitor regulations in 1922. Characteristically, he also took the
opportunity to impugn the morality of Basotho involved: ‘the lepers’ exploited
administrative generosity so ‘that natives from all round who had no business within the
Settlement flocked in to get a feed.’93 In the early 1930s, faced with some local lords who
liberally provided subjects with passes to visit the asylum, as well as fear that frequent
visits and sharing of food might lead to some guests being infected with leprosy, Strachan
moved to impose new restrictions. Patients loudly protested, insisting that cooking for their
guests was not only a cultural but practical and moral obligation, given that reaching the
facility often required an arduous, multi-day trip.94 In February 1932, with representatives
of the paramount present to ensure no repeat of May 1914, Strachan informed patients that
visitors would receive asylum rations for up to three days each quarter.95
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The implementation of these new rules immediately proceeded a tremendous rush
on asylum resources. As described in Chapter 2, the drought known as Lerole (the Dust)
destroyed both the 1932 and 1933 harvests, and led to thousands of deaths.96 The asylum
was thronged by outsiders, seeking help from family and contacts interned at the facility
and, therefore, entitled to government rations.97 For this window of time Botšabelo lived
up to its name, providing a refuge for inmates from the horrors unfolding outside. The
polarity of desires to be inside versus outside the asylum, as well as the perceived
directionality of quarantine, were temporarily reversed. The asylum population grew to its
apex of 736 inmates in 1933.98 As tens of thousands of people in the countryside were
reduced to eating seed crops, thepe grass, and, eventually, nothing at all, and opportunistic
infections gained pace, Strachan worried about the impact on the asylum: ‘The public
health at the Leper Asylum has never been better than it is at present, but it would be a
disaster of the first magnitude if typhus fever were introduced among the inmates.’99
Patients pooled their political capital, imploring officials to preserve visitation rights.100
When the superintendent went on leave in early 1934, patients took further steps to aid
those in need. Strachan returned to find,
Bagfuls of bread being taken home by visitors for their families… Patients were in the
habit of parting with their bread in groups of ten for one visitor… I found that no fewer
with visitors from the eastern Highlands allowed to stay three days, from other locales two, and
Maseru visitors only one.
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than 417 patients had parted with their half-loaves... I explained to the patients that they
are entitled to feed their visitors only while they are here and for their journey home… The
generosity of the patients is much to be admired, and I told them so, but… I also said that
the Government, if it was found that they gave all their bread away…might cease to send
it.101

In subsequent weeks, asylum personnel struggled with how to behave responsibly and
morally in the face of extreme suffering:
The starvation conditions are unprecedented. What is complained about now is that most
of the illnesses of the visitors’ children are associated with starvation, in consequence of
which the mere giving of medicine is useless; what the patients require is adequate
n[o]urishment for a prolonged period exceeding the normal maximum period of residence
at the visitors’ hut, viz three days… Do you advise me to send these children away after
the normal period of residence has expired, or to send them to Maseru Dispensary for
further treatment on admission to Hospital?... Dr Germond does not complain about the
little extra work associated with the treatment of visitors, what he fears is that he is acting
irregularly in ordering milk from the farm for visitors’ sick children. This practice I have
sanctioned as a temporary emergency measure.102

Strachan’s superiors ordered, however, that ‘regulations be observed, the people at the end
of three days be told to go,’ and certainly not with the suggestion that help might be
forthcoming in Maseru.103 While returnees were successfully able to leverage their
relationships inside the institution and status as blameless invalids to re/claim an
entitlement to asylum rations, Maseru insisted asylum staff hold the line on their
obligations: balepera were their only concern.
In the years following the famine, discharges of inmates by the asylum’s review
board picked up.104 At a time in which colonial administrative and medical officials were
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desire to reduce the financial footprint of the asylum coupled with shifts in the imperial public
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becoming less concerned about the public health dangers of leprosy, public opinion in
Lesotho trended the other way.105 The persistent promotion of the idea of the malady as
highly contagious, notably in mission schools and through outreach by leprosy inspectors,
fueled growing antipathy towards persons showing past or present evidence of infection on
their bodies. A stamped ‘certificate of discharge’ proved to be a flimsy shield for former
inmates. Discharged persons were subject to aggressive surveillance, and sometimes
harassment and outright violence, by fearful neighbors and community leaders.106 The
growing hostility towards ex-patients, as well as the family members who took them in,
contributed to the marked growth of Botšabelo’s ‘pauper village.’107 Communities just
beyond the asylum grounds also became increasingly popular places for able-bodied
discharged inmates to settle, on account of the presence of more sympathetic neighbors
(including ex-patients and staff, as well as lords versed in discharge protocols), ready

voluntary segregation model, thereby reducing Maseru’s sense of urgency to show results. On the
shifting guidelines and causes: BMDAR 1935, 11-3 and 43-7 (partially a response to Pim, 125-5,
and citing Int. J. Lepr. editorial. 1935, ‘The infectiousness of neural leprosy,’ in IJL 3/4: 485-8);
BAR 1936, 9; LNA, F281, BAR 1939, 17-9; BNA DO 35/923/9: Richards to Fforde, 9 Jun. 1936,
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access to biomedical care for old wounds, and opportunities for intermittent wage labor at
the asylum.108
Over the late 1930s and early 1940s, Botšabelo underwent significant reforms
aimed to improve the quality of life for patients. Walter Johnson took over asylum
administration in 1937.109 As with his predecessors, the new superintendent quickly left his
mark on the facility: while the Jenner period was characterized by an effort to keep the
peace while building up institutional protocols, the brief Macfarlane superintendency by
the clawing back of earlier concessions, and the Strachan era by scaling-up hydnocarpate
therapies and defending compulsory segregation, Johnson’s tenure was animated by an
impulse to build inmates’ sense of collective investment and control in the institution. This
mission, however, did not spring fully-formed from the mind of the English officer. A
woman born in the asylum hospital in 1935 recounted the view, ‘Sir Walter and Miss Mary
[Johnson, the Supt.’s sister] liked to speak with patients, to learn how they were living.
Mary was an angel for the sick people.’110 Indeed, the Johnsons worked from the basic
premise that inmates had unique insights on, and were invested in, facilitating institutional
harmony. Inmates themselves stressed they had more to offer than simply obedience, and
pushed for greater powers of self-administration and representation where they could fill
roles as the architects of rules and guardians of order.
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An asylum court, with patient ‘headmen’ and ‘headwomen’ elected by their peers
acting as magistrates, was created in August 1937.111 Originally experimental, the body
tried offenses previously subject to administrative discipline by the superintendent – e.g.
petty thievery, drunkenness, dagga use.112 The court was credited with dramatically
reducing petty offenses and, after one year, made permanent and empowered to impose
fines up to £1.113 Johnson collected these fines in a ‘recreation fund,’ used to buy
gramophone records, a 16mm ‘talkie’ projector, and party supplies. Despite BELRA’s
longstanding opposition to Lesotho’s system of compulsory segregation, the organization’s
Secretary Ernest Muir gushed, after a 1939 visit, that ‘concealment… the chief
disadvantage of compulsion’ was ‘being overcome by making the settlement…attractive
socially,’114 and heaped additional praise on the way a long-serving asylum nurse had
finally, successfully created a ‘creche for the untainted infants of leper mothers’ the year
before.115 Patients won another small political victory soon after, securing ‘a mouth which
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Ibid; BMDAR 1937, 4, 53, and 55; BNA DO 35/1183: ff. 4-7; Mary Martin – an asylum nurse
who worked under Matron MI Wildon between Feb. 1914 and Jun. 1937, and then briefly assumed
the matronship herself – was the driving force behind the project. With Strachan out of the way,
she prevailed on Mary and Walter Johnson to please think of the children. After securing Maseru’s
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to distant or unreliable family members – it also meant earlier and more systematic removal of
toddlers from institutionalized mothers. The Africanization of the asylum nursing corps began in
1938, when two Basotho nurses were hired to replace Martin (BAR 1938, 65). In the early 1950s,
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expresses their words in [the National] Council’ in 1942 (and lasting until the body became
a legislative council in 1960), in the person of Tsiame Motsoso.116
4.7 Sulfa amnesia and the persistence of communal social life

Although a select group of inmates began taking Avlosulphone tablets in 1950, in the
waning months of Dr. Robert Nixon’s superintendency, Dr. Auguste Jaques’ tenure,
spanning from 1951 until 1956, witnessed Botšabelo’s sulfa revolution.117 The advent of
cheap, effective, and plentiful antibiotics fundamentally reoriented the administration’s
view on leprosy as a biomedical and social issue. A floundering decades long campaign to
root out the foothold of m. leprae in the body politic gave way to a pharmacological blitz
targeting infections in individual bodies. The way that the drugs delivered people from
agony, terror, disfigurement, and premature death was, quite obviously, a godsend. Sulfas
also answered the prayers of many Botšabelo inmates who longed for lost liberties, not
least the chance to reunite with family. Yet, notwithstanding these glorious developments,
sulfas were not without a double-edge. For inmates whose social universe and livelihood
had been wrapped up in the asylum for years or decades, an abrupt discharge often tasted
more bitter than sweet.

as sulfones made leprosy curable and asylum discharges gained pace, the creche was converted to
care for orphans more generally (BMDAR 1956).
116
MRA, Box 249, Minutes of BNC Proceedings 1943, 149-51; LNA, 1948 BNC Session minutes,
385-88. Tsiame acted as the paramount’s court representative at Botšabelo, and first attended the
council in 1942. He successfully lobbied on behalf of asylum residents for a permanent seat on the
body the following year (the quote is from Councilor Bolokoe Malebanye, supporting the measure).
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BMDAR 1950, 6. Asylum doctors found Avlosulphone for effective than Sulphetrone (LC 26/2,
Gov’t. Newsletter, 26 Sep. 1952). For the history of sulfones and dapsone to treat leprosy and other
ailments see: Wozel, G. 1989. ‘The Story of Sulfones in Tropical Medicine and Dermatology,’ IJD
28/1:17–21; Zhu, Y. and M. Stiller. 2001. ‘Dapsone and sulfones in dermatology: overview and
update.’ JAAD 45/3: 420-34. When Johnson was promoted to Director of Medical Services for the
HCTs in 1937, Dr. Nixon transferred in from colonial Tanzania: BMDAR 1937, 6

261

From a biomedical and public health perspective, Dr. Jaques was an ideal emissary
for the new therapeutic regime. The son of missionaries possessed both deep understanding
of the new drugs at his disposal and the ability to speak Sesotho. Yet, notwithstanding his
piety, erudition, and ability to communicate directly with patients, the superintendent
displayed little sympathy for the way that sulfas threw the formerly stable lives of inmates
into disarray. For Jaques, delivering a cure neatly concluded his therapeutic and moral
entanglement with a patient. In 1953, after returning from a tour of leprosaria in colonial
Nigeria, the superintendent called for establishing a voluntary and decentralized model for
treating leprosy in Lesotho.118 He argued this system would improve cost efficiency and,
especially, promote the accountability of inmates and society:
Patients are unwilling to assist themselves nor are their families inclined to help them.
Segregated patients easily lose touch with their homes and when everything is provided for
them, they have nothing to do and seek entertainment in drink… Finally they may have
difficulty in resuming normal life on discharge.

Jaques also called for ‘cripples with arrested leprosy to be discharged.’ He did not care, or
was oblivious to, the ways that institutional stability had long been underwritten by a tacit
agreement that detention at Botšabelo meant a person would never have to go without food
or shelter.
During the first four decades of the asylum’s existence, inmates forced the
administration to acknowledge their collective and personal sacrifices, which amounted to
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In 1953, Eric Pridie, the Chief Medical Officer in the Colonial Office, arranged for Jaques to
spend five weeks touring leprosaria in Nigeria (BNA, DO35/4426, Routegal minute and
attachments, 9 Aug. 1954; LNA, ‘1954 BNC Session’, Appendix D, Jaques, ‘Report on Leprosy
Work in Nigeria,’ 52-7). Unlike Lesotho, the system in place in the West African colony had long
been established and run by Christian Missions: see Shankar, 78-97. The colonial state only took
over the work in 1945, using 54 outpatient clinics to facilitate voluntary treatment. When Jaques
returned to Lesotho, he filed a report calling for establish a decentralized network of clinics where
sick people could either care for themselves or be the responsibility of family while receiving
antibiotics closer to home.
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‘little less than imprisonment for life’ on behalf of the physical and economic health of the
territory.119 A cordial facade of reciprocal moral obligations was undergirded by mutual
recognition of the latent political power of asylum residents: inmates were collectively
capable of making Maseru’s prestige project ungovernable and, even, in the colonial
imagination, of sewing mass infection in the countryside by deserting in mass. The demise
of the idea of leprosy as a significant public health threat in the early 1950s nullified the
longstanding politico-moral contract between the administration and inmates: grumblings
inside the asylum were drained of political urgency and mass departure might well be met
with sighs of relief in Maseru. Rubrics for morally grading patienthood also shifted: the
standard of staying and persisting with treatment despite its painfulness and unclear
efficacy was replaced by the expectation for inmates to quickly get better and then get out.
Maseru demurred at Jaques’ 1953 proposal for voluntary segregation, offering a
pair of bizarre claims about the need to hold course because of South African and local
popular opinions.120 The Director of Medical Services, Dr. Reuben Jacobson, warned
superiors that abandoning compulsory segregation might upset the National Party
government in Pretoria, and thereby risk the livelihoods of the tens of thousands of Basotho
who crossed the Mohokare for work each year. This was a curious suggestion in several
ways, not least because other major labor reserves, such as Mozambique and Malawi, both
contained regions where leprosy was endemic and – as Maseru was well aware – had never
used anything more than rudimentary voluntary treatment regimes.121 Why the Union
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LNA S3/16/1/7: Buxton memo, 9 Dec. 1916. Sloley expounded on the loss of liberty and family
in ‘Recent Developments in Basutoland,’ 122-3.
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BNA, DO35/4426, Routegal to Swinton, including DMS report and Jaques report, 9 Aug. 1954.
121
Leaving aside the morality of reflexively mimicking an avowedly white supremacist regime,
this argument also elided widespread period discussion of the lax enforcement of compulsory
segregation legislation in the Union, and retrospective analysis of how leprosy control was yet
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would specially object to a Basotho labor force faced with only a voluntary system of
treatment was unclear. The second point was still more unsound:
Basuto, too, would be adverse [sic] to any immediate or too rapid move in this direction
[of voluntary treatment] because of their long established prejudice against the disease;
only by gradual education and propaganda would they come to understand that leprosy
should not be considered a loathsome disease, but that it should be regarded merely as an
unfortunate affliction.

This description turned the history of stigmatization in the territory on its head: the decades
old diachronic narrative of colonial officers toiling to build up a rational fear of leprosy
amongst Basotho was replaced with a synchronic portrait of an administration working to
mitigate irrational local lepraphobia.122
Despite significant flaws and omissions, the director’s arguments carried the day:
compulsory segregation remained the law of the land. The High Commissioner also
accepted Jacobson’s recommendation that no action be taken against ‘cripples with arrested
leprosy’ on the grounds that ‘many have no home to go to and are unable to fend for
themselves and so are permitted through humanitarian not medical reasons to remain

another pretext for the state to police and dominate the Black majority: Horwitz, 279-87. For
account of coordination between Lesotho’s administration and the Union government on leprosy
control: BMDAR 1937, 5 and 10-1; BMDAR 1938, 55. On leprosy in other labor reserves:
Zamparoni (Mozambique); Hokkanen, M. 2015. ‘The Government Medical Service and British
Missions in Colonial Malawi, c. 1891–1940: Crucial Collaboration, Hidden Conflicts,’ in Beyond
the State: The Colonial Medical Service in British A. Greenwood, ed., 39–63. Manchester:
Manchester University; Hearsey, H. 1909. ‘Leprosy in the Nyasaland Protectorate.’ Br Med J
2/25481314–15. McCoy, W. 2015 ‘Healing the Leper? Mission Christianity, Medicine, and Social
Dependence in 20th Century Swaziland.’ PhD Dissertation, Boston University.
122
When Dr. Long first began calling for the colonial state to get involved in fighting leprosy in
Lesotho, it was because of ‘Basuto…have not yet fully realized the true nature and danger of the
disease’ (BNA DO 119/194, Long memo, 1895). Forty years later a central strand of Maseru’s
opposition to implementing BELRA’s scheme of voluntary segregation, was that Basotho remained
unconvinced about the necessity of distancing themselves from infected persons (BNA DO
35/923/9, Dyke minute, 24. Jan. 1936). The specific pair of arguments Director of Medical Services
Jacobson used to rebuff Jaques’ call for reforms were so patently flawed as to raise some question,
today, of good faith. And if one was looking for an argument to scare the Dominions or High
Commissioner’s offices away from voluntary segregation, it would be hard to outdo the dual threats
of declining revenues and atavistic persecution of longtime charges of the state.
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indefinitely.’ Yet while the director’s arguments spared residents of the pauper village from
eviction, he also effaced the more complex story which had infused administrative support
for the community from the 1920s. The moral force sustaining the village was reframed as
colonial largesse without any inkling of accrued debt. The notion of timeless local hostility
to leprosy represented a particularly insidious stroke of revisionism: internal recognition
of the administration’s role in ginning up stigma, and the fact that this manufactured
hostility blew back on discharged inmates in households and communities, had previously
made the pauper village an obligation. In Lesotho, it seems, the arrival of sulfas not only
facilitated a broadside against m. leprae but also colonial administrative memory.
Although the population of Botšabelo plummeted over the 1950s, the facility
remained open. With compulsory segregation still on the books, a handful of people
suffering from lepromatous (paucibacillary) infections reported each year for in-patient
treatment. Despite the hostility of Jaques and his successor, Dr. Frank Mead,
superintendent between 1956 and 1959, the pauper village also remained.123 The impact of
the decreasing number of patients on the sense of community inside the asylum was also
moderated by a high percentage of discharged patients simply relocating to adjacent areas:
any withering of asylum social life was thus accompanied by the concurrent blossoming of
social life just outside. These shoots, moreover, grew over and through the asylum fence:
slackening institutional security measures meant former inmates and their descendants
became the majority of congregants for the asylum churches and guards did nothing to
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BMDAR 1956, 8; LNA No. 126/3, ‘Gov’t Bulletin, No. 24,’ 7 Nov. 1956; BNA DO 35/923/9,
Sykes to Chaplin, 21 Apr. 1960, forwarding Mead’s ‘Notes for Record.’
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discourage children from neighboring communities from playing football with young
inmates on Botšabelo’s enviably large and flat pitch.124
New institutional dynamics took shape as independence came into view. After
decades of vague statements from the British about preparing Basotho to one day take over
and run state institutions, a landmark event in the Africanization of top posts took place at
Botšabelo in 1959: Mahao Matete was appointed superintendent, becoming the first
Mosotho to run a major biomedical facility.125 Later in the year, British pronouncements
about equipping Lesotho with the infrastructural wherewithal to run a putatively modern
state contributed to the start of construction on a different sort of large, heavily securitized
biomedical facility in a corner of the asylum grounds: Mohlomi Mental Hospital opened in
1965, providing in-patient treatment for psychiatric disorders, and coercive detention of
‘Her/His Majesty’s pleasure prisoners,’ serving indefinite sentences for acts of criminal
insanity.126 The site was selected in part because of the nearby pool of current and former
staff of the shrinking asylum, who were eager for employment and already familiar
working inside a totalized biomedical facility with an ostensibly stigmatized population.
As the finishing touches went into Mohlomi, Botšabelo patients received visits from
representatives of the three large political parties, campaigning for legislative seats in the
1965 parliamentary elections, which would determine control of government at
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independence.127 These politicians addressed inmates as fellow citizens whose
participation would be required for building the nation, through healing, voting, and more.
Under the Basotho National Party, which won the pre-independence elections and refused
to cede power after losing the next ones (in 1970), a small but steady stream of resources
from government and international organizations continued to flow into Botšabelo well
into the post-colonial era.128
4.8 Chapter Conclusion
The structural remnants of Botšabelo are today scattered across a large elevated plain
overlooking a corridor of urban sprawl that snakes along the main highway southwards
from Maseru center. The asylum’s institutional legacy is embodied in the way that this
particular corner of the nation, in the shadow of Berea mountain, remains a biomedical
hub. Standing amidst the headstones and an even greater number of unmarked graves near
the old asylum gate, one can today see three active hospitals.129 Proceeding deeper into the
heart of the old facility, the three large churches remain: the social legacy of the asylum
resounds in the joyous harmonies and thunderous voices emanating from structures on
Sundays, with congregations largely comprised of former patients and their descendants.
Tucked beside a few remaining sheet metal barracks from the women’s compound, and
across a road from a cluster of large sandstone houses where asylum officials once lived,
is Senkatana Centre. The clinic serves thousands of patients annually. Most are grappling
with HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, but a handful of individuals each year receive help
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fighting leprosy. As noted in the introduction, the clinic also serves as a repository for old
records, which continue to provide a glimpse into the lives of patients and the institutional
life of the asylum.
The records of the three Mohlala daughters provide poignant snapshots of the ways
that leprosy laws inflected life trajectories in Lesotho over the first half of the 20th century.
Each of the sisters ultimately departed the asylum barracks in one of the three ways possible
to do so. The eldest, named ‘Grace,’ escaped for good on that night in October 1914. The
middle daughter, ‘Eunice,’ had a more advanced infection than her sisters, and was sent
back to the asylum by her village lord in 1917. While Eunice proved to be a dutiful,
therapy-seeking patient, who was swept up in the biomedical optimism engendered by
hydnocarpates in the early 1920s, her symptoms continued to worsen. She died in the
asylum hospital in 1926. The youngest sister, ‘Jane,’ seems to have sacrificed her own
freedom to accompany her ailing sister Eunice back to the asylum. Jane later entered into
a romantic relationship with another patient, and gave birth to a daughter in 1927. After
eleven years together, the child was removed from her mother’s care and sent to St. Agnes
orphanage in Leribe. Despite this profound loss, Jane continued to work as a laundress and
participate in the communal life of the asylum, including as a practicing Catholic. She
remained in good physical health when the sulfa revolution touched down at Botšabelo.
Jane was discharged in August 1955, after over four decades in the facility. The 51-yearold opted to settle just outside the asylum fence, rather than returning to a natal home she
had not known since adolescence.
For Jane and many of the other inmates discharged as part of the sulfa revolution,
the passage of time clearly transformed the facility from a grim jail, which she and
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hundreds of others had once endeavored to escape, into a home they did not wish to lose.
While this phenomenon might be negatively glossed as institutionalization, there was
certainly more to the tale than fear of change. These inmates had pushed and pulled the
administration to recognize a cluster of obligations and rights, and forged a sense of
community: residents thus transformed a place originally designed only to usher them
towards social death into a site overflowing with social life.
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Part III. The Lesotho Prison Service and the Politics of
Reform, 1938-1970
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Chapter 5

A tale of two rebellions: the scandalous elaboration of penal reform,
1938-58
5.1 Introduction
Inmates briefly wrested control of colonial Lesotho’s flagship penal institution away from
their warders twice in a period of a little over six years. In July 1949, inmates at Maseru
Gaol rebelled to liberate two prominent lords awaiting execution after being convicted of
medicine murder. The sole reason the escape failed was because the nobles themselves
refused to leave. This violence stands, in hindsight, as a powerful illustration of the
excesses, failures, and unforeseen consequences of the high colonial system of social
control in the territory. In addition to the crowded, unsanitary, and abusive conditions faced
by inmates on a daily basis, rebels sprang into action because the impending hangings of
two lords symbolized, for many, the deathly injustice baked into the colonial criminal legal
system. To period observers inside the administration, the same actions represented little
more than the last spasm of an antiquated and abusive order in the process of being dealt a
mortal blow. In November 1955, a much larger uprising took place at the new Central
Prison in Maseru, killing five people and seriously wounding fifteen. This action was led
by a man who was repeatedly tortured as part of the facility’s draconian disciplinary
regime. The resulting investigation revealed to metropolitan officials that eight years of
ostensible penal reforms were largely a mirage. Hoping to forestall a political scandal,
London stepped up the pressure and funding to backfill and expand upon earlier promised
reforms.
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In liberal narratives, the late 1940s was a time of sweeping improvements in
Lesotho’s penal system. At the end of 1947, the High Commissioner issued a new Prison
Proclamation, retrofitting the regulations governing incarceration in the territory for the
first time since 1917.1 This law carved out a new Prisons Department from its older status
as a sub-department of the BMP, and created a newly independent and professionally
distinct Basutoland Prison Service (BPS). In late 1946, prior to introduction of the new
laws, the commissioner arranged for the secondment of an officer in the English Prison
Service to serve as the organization’s first superintendent: Arthur Penter was expected to
bring to bear his training and experience to build a new sort of penal system, designed to
discipline and train offenders to be productive members of society, rather than aiming to
facilitate deterrence through fear of brutalization in jail. The new proclamation established
the legal framework to, one day, route different classes of offenders into a broader array of
institutional settings. Colonial officers argued that facilities designed to impose
individualized corrective measures on offenders would be both a more productive and a
more humane means of responding to criminal offenses. Before this work could
commence, however, the state needed to build the corresponding array of specialized penal
facilities. As a first step, Penter worked with a draftsman from the public works department
to draw up blueprints for a large prison in Maseru, explicitly designed to facilitate
classification and segregation of inmates.
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Prior to this proclamation (No. 77 of 1947), there were, however, meaningful alterations to the
1917 law implemented under a series of ‘Prison (Amendment) Proclamations’ over time: §8 under
Proc. 19 of 1921; §16 under Proc. 48 of 1936; §§1, 3, 6, 7, and 14 under Proc. 63 of 1937; and §§14
and 16 under Proc. 12 of 1939 (TML: Basutoland Proclamations and Notices for 1921, 1936, 1938,
and 1939).
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The shift in Lesotho during the 1940s and 1950s to a system officially predicated
on correcting rather than simply deterring crime, bore some similarities to the path blazed
during a period of penal reform in England in the 1890s and 1900s. For one, the penological
turns in England and Lesotho both emerged from popular disillusionment and public crises
surrounding the failings of the existing system of social control.2 In the former, the 1895
report of a commission on the prison system, headed by William Gladstone, gave voice to
the idea that prisons were not only failing to deter crime and prevent recidivism, but
exacerbating these phenomena. A second similarity lies in the rapid construction of new
legal and institutional infrastructure. The Gladstone commission argued that the English
government should abandon its decades-long ‘fetish for uniformity’ in prison conditions,
and instead aim to confront various pathologies in individuals with more specialized
institutional settings capable of imposing varied levels of coercion. The nineteen-year
period between publication of the commission’s report and the outbreak of World War I in
1914 witnessed the construction of an institutional ‘disciplinary continuum’ in England,
comprised not only of more securitized prisons, but also the proliferation of reformatories,
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The English central government seized administration for all penal facilities under the Prisons Act
of 1877, on account of the growing belief that differential conditions and rules across locallyadministered jails and prisons stymied the work of deterrence and rehabilitation. English
politicians, penologists, and social reformers were confident, at the time, that using trained
professional warders to create a uniformly austere experience of incarceration – with all inmates
facing precisely the same meagre diet, cramped cell size, complete solitude, and forms of drudgery
– would stamp out crime and recidivism in short order. In the landmark text Punishment and
Welfare, David Garland describes a historical rupture in the orientation of English disciplinary
institutions over a short period spanning from 1895 through 1914: the system became far more
geared towards individuating and classifying deviants than before, ostensibly as a way of correcting
various forms of poor behavior and engineering a better society. Garland’s narrative challenged
convention historical representations of the past, which saw continuity in penal rationales dating
back to the late 18th century, spurred by Enlightenment ideals and/or the political economic
demands of the dawning industrial age, while much scholarship on welfare focused on the postWorld War II moment as a watershed in which the state sought to address crime by providing new
social provisions and protections for citizens.
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borstal schools, mental asylums, and inebriate institutions, as well as sprawling systems of
parole, supervised release, and suspended sentences.3 A third notable area of overlap
involves shifts in rationales and ideologies of punishment. Nineteenth-century
metropolitan penality was predicated on the conceit that criminals and non-criminals
differed ‘only in the contingent and non-essential fact of their law breaking.’4 The
intellectual projects informing the new, turn of the century criminology, however, shared
a commitment to the capacity of ‘human sciences’ to categorize and address various forms
of deviance and, thereby, engineer a better society.5
At the space moment England was undergoing its penological turn, the fledgling
imperial administration in Lesotho was working to forge a system of social control. Yet,
even as Maseru built up and expanded upon its network of jails during the 1890s and 1900s,
the new metropolitan tactics had minimal impact on the design or structure of the colony’s
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Foucault presents the prison as the capstone of a ‘carceral continuum’ (Foucault 1975, 296-303)
with ‘assistance associations, residential apprenticeships, penal colonies, disciplinary battalions,
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century’ (300). He further maintains that the system exists to manufacture criminality: ‘the
delinquent is an institutional product’ (301). Scholars, notably including Garland, take issue with
both the periodization (which emerged a century after Foucault suggests: Garland 1985, 4 and 312), as well as the fact that all the evidence suggests that reformers were genuinely trying to combat
criminality and promote behavioral reform (even if they failed in practice: Garland 1985: 59-64).
Also see: O’Brien, P. 1978. ‘Crime and Punishment as Historical Problem.’ Journal of Social
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product of nurture, remediable with reformative incarceration and schooling, or nature,
necessitating harsher interventions and, even, sterilization and segregation so as to prevent
reproduction: Searle, G. R. 1976. Eugenics and Politics in Britain, 1900-1914. Leyden: Noordhoff;
Bland, L. and L. Hall. 2010. ‘Eugenics in Britain: The View from the Metropole.’ In The Oxford
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emerging penal system.6 Ideology infused this policy divergence. Period administrative
imaginings of criminality centered on the question of whether offenders remained steeped
in Sesotho values or had instead become alienated from their cultural moorings: criminal
and non-criminal Basotho differed on the contingent fact of continuing ‘tribalization.’
Viewed through this conceptual framework, the aristocracy certainly appeared to represent
the best instrument for effecting social control: not only did a system reliant on lords offer
slight administrative labor demands and low financial costs, but it also promised to use
supposedly traditional means for re/socializing persons to follow the specific society’s
traditional norms. Use of Western modes of punishment for crimes were framed, on the
other hand, as risking further alienation of people who were held to already be socioculturally maladjusted. Unsurprisingly, the prison system which emerged in Lesotho over
the first half century of colonial rule was framed as little more than a coercive backstop,
demanded for punishing – and thereby, perhaps, deterring – certain grave or politicallysensitive crimes, and not as an instrument for rehabilitating offenders.
Maseru’s frustrations with the way the aristocracy was performing the work of
social control in the 1930s fundamentally underpinned the colonial drive to remake
Lesotho’s police and prison systems during the 1940s and 1950s, notwithstanding much
period rhetoric about the longstanding intent to build up universal institutions with time.
Similar to how the notion of uniform penal misery was widely held up as a means of
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The impact was indirect and limited. As noted in Chapter 2, Lesotho’s 1917 Prison Proclamation
used the South Africa law, which was inspired by metropolitan changes, as a model. For this reason,
the law refers to Borstal schools, despite the fact that none existed. The administration largely used
a special wing of a prison for juvenile boys, while juvenile girls were detained with women.
Mentally ill people were largely detained in solitary in prisons, although the administration did pay
the maintenance for a few Basotho individuals to be detained in South African mental institutions.
See also: Thabane, M. 2021. ‘Public Mental Health Care in Colonial Lesotho: Themes Emerging
from Archival Material, 1918–35.’ History of Psychiatry 32/2:146–61.
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confronting putatively rampant criminality in England during the 1870s and 1880s only to
later be viewed as a driver of lawbreaking in the 1890s, it became increasingly clear in
Lesotho over the late-1920s into the 1930s that the colonial regime’s reliance on the
aristocracy and so-called traditional law was itself contributing to crime. A great many
lords saw themselves as above the law, and engaged in practices of personal enrichment
and exploitation of subjects in ways that fueled offenses against persons and property. A
handful of nobles were even suspected of running smuggling rings for stolen cattle and
other large criminal operations. When the Khubelu reforms were imposed in 1938,
reducing the legal powers of lords and making ‘chieftainships’ contingent upon the
approval of Maseru, the administration was also considering changes to scale up the work
of the state in policing and punishment. Indeed, within weeks of these measures going into
effect, the Resident and High Commissioner were already at work discussing the
elaboration of a new prison proclamation.7 The introduction of these reforms would likely
have come much sooner if not for World War II. In 1944, as an eventual Allied victory in
Europe looked increasingly assured, experts were sent to investigate potential reforms to
the system of social control in Lesotho. These planners waxed on about the need to build a
local version of the universal disciplinary continuum, thereby enabling the colonial state to
deploy the insights of penological science to build a better society by classifying,
segregating, and coercively correcting various forms of deviance.
Promulgation of new prison laws on December 31, 1947, presents both an easy,
ready-made date for periodizing the birth of reform-oriented penality in Lesotho, and also
a deeply specious one. Notwithstanding their similar origins in crises, shared ideological
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commitment to the capacity of states to improve societies, and similar legal frameworks,
the penal reforms which emerged in Lesotho over the decade following the 1947
proclamation were hollow shells of their metropolitan cousins of a half century earlier. The
latter system emerged in lock-step with a number of welfarist interventions, which merged
the political project of reforming deviants with an impulse to ensure that state resources
were allocated according to moral deservingness8. There was no discursive specter of the
undeserving poor living off state largesse or swamping society with their genetically
wicked and/or feeble offspring in Lesotho.
The one significant financial investment connected with the new legislation was the
construction of Maseru Central Prison. But the impulse for this construction, in point of
fact, lies not in the promise of segregation and classification, but rather simply that the old
Maseru jail, built in the 1880s, was literally crumbling and overflowing with bodies. With
plans in hand for a new prison, masses of male inmates were moved out of the jail to tents
on the site of the new facility, where they toiled to build the new institution surrounded by
barbed wire and men with guns. In the early 1950s, once building progress had reached the
point where all adult male prisoners in Maseru could be housed inside, construction of the
prison wings designed to facilitate segregation slowed to a crawl: classification and
segregation thus remained a pretense. The prospect of building specialized facilities to take

8

Garland 1985, 115, 122-7, 130-55. The two earliest forms of social insurance provision in England
were mandatory pensions, so as to spare persons who had lived unstintingly productive lives from
the indignity of the workhouse in old age, and contributory social security ‘designed… to preserve
a conception of individual thrift and a distinction between earned and unearned benefit’ (Garland
1985, 137). The Eugenicist fervor of the era meant policymakers were never willing to extend nonpunitive social protections to the poorest members of society, lest it encourage the so-called ‘feebleminded’ and ‘degenerate’ to out-breed the productive classes (Garland 1985, 140-55). See also:
Jones, G.S. 1984 Outcast London : A Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian
Society. New York: Pantheon.
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custody and productively treat other classes of law-breakers, including mentally ill
offenders and juveniles, were also not priorities for the regime. Prison life, meanwhile, was
marked not by counseling and job training, as in England, but by forced labor and draconian
discipline.
The problematic allure of the date is exacerbated by the way it dovetails with liberal
historical narratives which treat WWII as ushering in a complete paradigm shift in colonial
rationale and practice.9 This story holds that the metropolitan Labour government led by
Prime Minister Clement Attlee, which came to power in July 1945, was not only fixated
on building a welfare state at home, but also eager to promote universal techniques and
share resources across the empire: this shift in policy was supposedly evinced by a marked
shift in language framing metropolitan relationships with overseas territories (as colonies
were rebranded) as those of senior and junior partners in commonwealth. The liberal
narrative falsely presents financial investments and new political rights in colonies as
metropolitan gifts, thereby eliding just how contentious and prolonged the struggles to
wrest these concessions from the metropole were at the time. Attlee’s government was
indeed committed to rebuilding a war-ravaged English society with a bevy of new
entitlements – full employment, universal health care, social insurance, and so on – for
citizens at home, but it also intended to accomplish these things by drawing upon resources
extracted overseas. To shore up an empire which lost its ‘jewel’ with Indian independence

9

Hopkins, A. G. 2008. ‘Rethinking Decolonization.’ Past & Present 200: 211–47, especially 2167; Louis, W.R. and R. Robinson. 1994. ‘The Imperialism of Decolonization,’ Journal of Imperial
and Commonwealth History, 22/3: 462–511; Thomas, M. 2014. Fight or Flight: Britain, France
and their Roads from Empire. Oxford: Oxford University, 2014. On Malaya: Stockwell, A.J. 1993.
‘“A Widespread and Long-Concocted Plot to Overthrow Government in Malaya”? The Origins of
the Malayan Emergency,’ Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21/3: 66-88. For more
on the English welfare state: P. Thane, P. 2000. ‘Labour and Welfare’, 80-118, in D. Tanner, et al.,
eds., Labour’s First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
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in 1947, and faced further humiliating setbacks in Mandate Palestine and Burma, the
Labour administration dangled both the carrot of development assistance, in the form of
technical knowledge and capital funding, and the stick of brutal counterinsurgency in
places like Malaya. After the Conservative Government of Winston Churchill came back
into power in 1951, moreover, a more stridently imperialist tone reemerged in foreign
policy.
Instead of gifts, delivery of the promised reforms had to be wrested from the
colonial state. As multiple scholars have observed, resistance has different scopes spanning
from simply blunting or blocking the imposition of power, to the outright creation of
power.10 While the two rebellions described at the outset were both aimed to block the
unjust use of power, they ended up, over time, contributing to the creation and
implementation of new penal regulations. This process was not, however, a straightforward
story of using the existing legal system to lay claim to rights. The new regulations came
about as the colonial regime sought to hide and deflect from the rampant illegality of the
way its prisons were run. The events threatened to give rise to a political scandal,
mobilizing moral offense and discrediting the legitimacy of British rule in ways which
mobilized demands for reforming, or even outright ending, colonial rule.11

10

Buntman, F. 2019. ‘Prison and Law, Repression and Resistance: Colonialism and Beyond.’
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 47/2: 213–46, 230, and Buntman, F. 2003. Robben
Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid. New York: Cambridge University, 265; McEvoy, K.
2001. Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland: Resistance, Management, and Release.
New York: Oxford University, 33-6; Zinoman, 59; See also Hollander, J. and R. Einwohner. 2004.
‘Conceptualizing Resistance.’ Sociological Forum 19/4: 533–54, 33-4, as cited by Buntman 2019,
240n96.
11
My profound thanks to Dr. Stacey Hynd for her insights on the meanings and import of scandal
within the British Empire. See also: Dirks, N. 2006. The Scandal of Empire : India and the Creation
of Imperial Britain. Cambridge: Belknap, 33-5; Thomas, M. and R. Toye. 2017. Arguing about
Empire : Imperial Rhetoric in Britain and France, 1882-1956. Oxford: Oxford University, 9.
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Word of poor conditions and illegal conduct would likely have remained confined
to the internal world of the prison if not for the two rebellions described at the outset of
this chapter. The colonial interpretation of the 1949 incident and aftermath decisively
marking the end of the old order of social control reliant on lords proved to be accurate,
but not entirely in the way officials expected: the outrage over medicine murder executions,
which boiled over in rebellion, catalyzed the formation of new transnational links between
activists. These connections, enabling Basotho to swiftly spread word of colonial
malfeasances to metropolitan and world publics, lent far more urgency to reports of abuses
in Lesotho amongst officials in London. The 1955 uprising, meanwhile, emerged because
the administration had failed to deliver the reforms in penal practices which were promised
when the old order was destroyed. Recognition of this oversight, as well as fear of a
political scandal emerging should the truth of events come to light, pushed the colonial
establishment to plan and actually carry out another wave of reforms over the late-1950s
which oriented Lesotho’s prison system firmly towards a model designed to rehabilitate
inmates. The violence and destruction of rebellion by incarcerated people served,
ultimately, as a vital catalyst towards making prisons safer spaces to live and work.
5.2 The 1947 Prison Proclamation and the birth of the Prison Service
The question of penal reform became an item of significant interest in the Colonial Office
during the 1930s. In 1937 a commission chaired by George Tomlinson recommended the
creation of a Colonial Prison Service.12 Such a force, the report suggested, would facilitate

12

BNA, CO 885/71, Tomlinson, G., Report (Colonial Office, No. 476) on ‘Unification and Staffing
of the Colonial Prisons Services,’ 18 Dec. 1936. This Tomlinson Report should not be confused
with the more (in)famous South African report of the same name (named for economics professor
Frederick Tomlinson), which surveyed the economic viability of African Homelands (later
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standardization within prisons across the empire, as officers from the Home Prison Service
(of England and Wales) cycled through posts disseminating knowledge of best penological
practices and identifying problematic aberrations within particular colonies. Although
colonial Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland fell outside the mandate of the
recommendations, as High Commission Territories, Tomlinson did still solicit information
from these colonies all the same.13 Maseru conveyed growing administrative frustration
with the existing system of relying on the BMP. The administration forwarded an internal
study of potential changes to the police system: the High Commissioner was aware of the
need for reforms to both prisons and the police, and British Resident Edmund Richards was
confident that a large-scale study of these issues would be forthcoming, as a prelude to
substantial reforms.
The impulse for studies and reforms related to the coercive spine of the state were
placed on hiatus when war broke out in Europe in September 1939. During the early years
of WWII, when England was very much on its backfoot, the local administration was
profoundly short-staffed, and marked by acute paranoia about enemies within and at the
gates. Maseru therefore looked to lords to ensure security in the territory and, especially,
lead recruitment for the African Pioneer Corps. Nobles were instrumental in delivering
over 25,000 Basotho men to risk their lives defending England from Hitler.14 The question

‘Bantustans’) in 1950 and was cynically deployed as a foundational document for Hendrik
Verwoerd’s vision of Grand Apartheid.
13
Ibid, paragraph 23. See also: CO 850/130/16, Tomlinson, ‘Summary of replies to circular
despatch,’ 5; BNA, DO 35/921/4, Huggard to MacDonald, 26 Apr. 1939.
14
Thompson, R. 1980. Reminiscences, as recorded and transcribed by D. Ambrose, 40-6. With the
outbreak of war, the administration was racked by fear of external and internal enemies. This
paranoia spiked after a pro-German Afrikaner militia, known as the Ossewabrandwag, cut the
telegraph wires all along the border. Josiel Lefela was detained in prison in Leribe for several years
during the war, ostensibly for convincing three Basotho men to refuse to fight for the empire. A
handful of people in the territory who expressed pro-German sentiment or were of German descent
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of institutions of state coercion reemerged in 1944, once victory in Europe appeared to be
in hand. In June 1944, the High Commissioner handed down a new Police Proclamation
(No. 22 of 1946), based on the recommendations drawn up in 1936. At the time officials
noted: ‘It is proposed to separate the Police and Prisons Departments as far as possible
though for the time being they will have to remain under one head. Detailed proposals for
the Prisons Department will be submitted separately.’ A study of policing in each of the
HCTs was carried out in June 1946 by a former police commissioner of Mandate Palestine,
Nigeria, and Trinidad: Arthur Mavrogordato emphasized the need to move away from the
old way of thinking about police as merely security personnel (or, in the language of
chapter two, as ‘violence workers’) and instead focus on the specialized training and skills
of investigating crimes and imposing punishments. 15 This reorientation was all the more
important as the colonial state assumed more of the work of social control formerly
performed by lords.16 The official aim of the reforms, in the case of prisons and warders,
was to ‘give emphasis to the reforming aspect of prison life as well as the punitive.’17
Numbers of incarcerated people trended upwards.

were also detained, including a German Jew who had sought to flee persecution first in his
homeland and then in South Africa. Rivers Thompson was the district commissioner in Berea
during the war, and described the manner in which Gabashane Masupha ‘foxed’ his people: the
ward lord called a public meeting (pitso), but instead of speaking the assembled men were mustered
into service. At least one recruit died from injuries sustained when leaping from the truck carrying
him away from the Berea gathering. Less than a decade before he was hung by the British, Lord
Gabashane was heaped with colonial praise for delivering some 4,000 sons of Berea district to ship
out for the North Africa, the Levant, and Europe to beat back the Axis onslaught. On coercive
recruitment of soldiers by lords: Ntabeni M. 2008. ‘Military Labour Mobilisation in Colonial
Lesotho during World War II, 1940-1943.’ Scientia Militaria 36/2: 36–59, especially 49-53.
15
BNA DO 35/1174: f. Police Staff–BBS, ‘Confidential report on the police forces.’ See,
especially, 24-5 on Lesotho’s prisons. The divorce of the two forces had been contemplated since
the 1930s (see BNA DO35/921/4, Richards to Clark, 31 Jan 1938.
16
BNA DO 35/1174: Arden Clarke to Lord Harlach, 15 Nov. 1943.
17
Annual Report 1948, 10; Annual Report 1947, 7-8.
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Corporal and capital punishment were particularly sensitive political issues. After
some years of London gently nudging local colonial administrations to begin to scale back
the use of judicial corporal punishment,18 the abolition of the practice at home as part of
the Criminal Justice Act of 1948 led the Dominion’s Office to use more forceful language
in a 1950 circular:
The time has now come for Colonial Governments to adopt the policy that [corporal]
punishment should be abolished at the earliest possible date… the greater part of the
civilised world has found other methods of treating its offenders, whether adults or
18

A metropolitan committee formed in 1938 to examine the question of capital punishment, chaired
by Edward Cadogan, argued that the continuation of whipping in Britain and the empire was an
ineffective, inhumane, and anachronistic policy (Great Britain Home Office. ‘Departmental
Committee on Corporal Punishment Report [Cadogan Report].’ London: HMSO, 1938). The
following year, London solicited opinions on the prospect of abolishing corporal punishment from
local colonial administrations (BNA, DO 35/922/6, Circular No. 28, 17 Jan. 1939). The matter was
dropped in the HCTs in response to uniform opposition from Maseru, Mbabane, and Mafikeng
(ibid, HC’s Office to Inskip, with attached memos, 21 Aug. 1939). Discussion continued following
subsequent circulars from Secretaries of State George Lloyd (BNA DO 35/4103, 2 Jul. 1940) and
Arthur Creech Jones (ibid, 15 Oct. 1946).
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juveniles, and that the British Commonwealth is one of the few remaining groups
which make extensive use of a system of punishment… I shall find it increasingly
difficult to defend our record either in Parliament or before the United Nations unless
it can be shown that governments accept complete abolition as an aim of policy and
are working progressively towards it… I think it would be generally accepted that on
account of its degrading features corporal punishment of men is a matter of graver
concern than the whipping of boys. For this reason I hope that attention may first be
concentrated on this aspect of the problem.19

Corporal punishment of adult men did decline in Lesotho over the early 1950s, but the
practice was not abolished: colonial judges continued to make particularly heavy use of
caning of men for stock theft after the first conviction.20 London’s announcement that
abolition of the death penalty in British colonies was ‘a matter for consideration by local
Executives’ did not find a receptive audience in the HCTs: not only did Maseru want to
keep hangings as a means of crushing medicine murder (discussed in the next section) but
the Smuts government in South Africa warned that talk of abolition in the territories might
necessitate preemptive annexation.21
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BNA, DO 35/4103, Circular No. 12755/50, 1 Aug. 1950.
BNA, DO 35/4103: Rougetel to Ismay, 28 Feb. 1952; CRO to Rougetel, 9 Aug. 1952. On the
statutes enabling the continued imposition of lashes, see: BNA CO 859/241/6, King and Webber
correspondence, 26 Mar. 1952, 28 Mar. 1952, and 7 Apr. 1952, including clippings from gazettes.
The letters also note the inefficacy of whipping for curtailing stock theft, echoing the Cadogan
report and 1950 imperial circular.
21
BNA, FCO 141/885: Baring to Forsyth Thompson, with attachments, 12 May 1948; Baring to
Creech Jones, 29 Apr. 1948. The issue came up again in the late 1950s as London fretted over the
potential scandal arising out of racialized discrepancies for punishments for rape in its colonies
(invariably allowing for the execution of a black or brown colonial subject for rape of European,
but not the reverse). Although the Deputy High Commissioner Thomas Scrivenor advocated
removing raced-based sentencing in the name of justice and fairness, commissioners and
administrators in the HCTs pushed back by noting three factors: first, the South African government
was invested in the HCTs maintaining the law as written; second, no death sentence had been
handed down for rape in a HCT; third, the commissioner could and would immediately commute
any such death sentence should the political need arise (BNA, FCO 141/885: Fowler to Scrivenor,
19 Mar. 1956; Arrowsmith to Scrivenor, 11 Apr. 1956; Scrivenor to Lennox-Boyd, 8 Aug. 1958
and 24 Jan. 1956; CRO to HC’s Office, 24 Sep. 1958; HC’s Office to Lennox-Boyd, 31 Jan. 1959).
20
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Table 3. Judicial hangings in Lesotho, 1939-70
Year
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954

Hangings
2
0
1
7
2
2
13
4
11
19
13
3
11
11
14
24

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

12
7
0
13
11
15
0
0
4
0
0
4
0
1
4
0

*Data compiled for both tables from annual
reports of central administration, health
department, and prison department.
To help plan and implement penal reforms, the High Commissioner requested an
officer on secondment from the Home Prison Service. Arthur Penter arrived in November
1946 to fill the new position of Prison Superintendent.22 He took command of a protoprison service administering nine jails: the two largest, in Maseru and Leribe, were
administered by European Senior Gaolers, while the 7 smaller district jails were managed
by African Gaolers.23 The rank and file was comprised of 55 African warders, including 3

22

LNA 1334 II: f. 139, Chief of Police to Gov’t Secretary, 9 Dec. 1946.
BAR 1947, 60-1. LNA 1334 II: f. 139, Chief of Police to Gov’t Secretary, 9 Dec. 1946. For
records of European prison personnel during the 1930s and 40s: LNA 1334 I, f. 128. The Senior
Jailer in Maseru, Vivian Farquharson, arrived in Lesotho from the English Prison Service in 1939,
and after a short tour back in English facilities after the arrival of Penter, returned to serve as
Lesotho’s Superintendent of Prisons throughout the 1950s (LNA 1334 I, f. 128; ibid, F281, f. 117).
23
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women who worked in the Female Annex at Maseru Gaol. The new superintendent’s tenure
got off to a rocky start, when a handful of prisoners not eligible for remission were
mistakenly given discharge papers to celebrate the royal visit of 1947.24 When the
Secretariate investigated the matter, officials discovered that there were also several
incarcerated persons who had been held weeks or months too long. These debacles were
indicative of things to come: the Penter superintendency was marked by a series of errors
and lost opportunities for Lesotho’s prison system.
The specific tasks the administration had sought assistance from London were twofold: reviewing impending prison legislation to ensure it met muster from a penological
standpoint, and working with a draftsman from the Public Works Dept. to produce
blueprints for a new prison in the colonial capital.25 The 1947 proclamation, and
accompanying notice of regulations drew heavily on language borrowed from metropolitan
laws.26 It signaled aspirations to one day classify and segregate inmates, provide job
training, and be able to detain juveniles and mentally ill people in securitized schools and
hospitals rather than penal facilities, but not making these things legal requirements. In
addition to drawing upon inspiration from British laws, the administration created a
‘licensing board’ modeled on a program in colonial Tanzania, with greater discretionary
power to parole (‘license’) incarcerated people. To help relieve overcrowding in district

24

LNA, No. 219, F877: Penter minute, 18 Apr. 1947, peppered in handwritten memos of frustration
from secretariat. See also: How minute, ‘Release at Coronation,’ n.d.; Kennan to Priestman, 22 Jan.
1947.
25
LNA No. 1334 I. Chaplin minute, 16 Nov. 1946; Commissioner of Police and Prisons minute, 6
Dec. 1946.
26
Basutoland Proclamations and Notices 1947, Proc. 77. For discussion of law’s aims: BAR 1947,
6-8, and internal correspondence (LNA, 1334 II). Chunks of legal text also came from a book,
which remains in the colonial file, by a Liverpool University sociologist: Simey, T. 1944.
Principles of Prison Reform. Bridgetown, Barbados: Colonial Office Social Welfare Advisory
Committee (LNA, 1334 II).
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jails, the law also expanded judges and administrators capacity to impose ‘extramural
imprisonment’ on offenders: persons under judicial sanction carried out unremunerated
road work and other forms of hard labor in the countryside, while eating rations and
sleeping in tents provided by the administration.27
The urgency of Penter’s second task was underpinned by the ‘dangerously
overcrowded state’ of Maseru Gaol.28 Medical officers were particularly dire in their
warnings about the facility: cramped cooking and eating facilities, teeming with flies from
adjacent pit latrines, represented a poliomyelitis outbreak waiting to happen. Penter used
the confidence placed in him to draw up plans modeled on Pentonville Prison: a central
administrative block would serve as the single access point to five spoke-like wings, each
reserved for a different class of inmate. The superintendent did deviate from the 1840
design of the English prison with one unique addition: the conical top of the central tower
emulated the roofs of the rondavels dotting the territory’s landscape. Regrettably, the
administration did not vet Penter’s plans with any outside experts before commencing with
construction. As we shall see, in the wake of the 1955 rebellion, several metropolitan
authorities versed in prison design expressed utter astonishment that Pentonville was used
as a model for a new prison in the 1940s, given that the shortcomings of the facility had

27

The introduction of extra-mural penal labor had been debated since the beginning of the 1940s.
See BNA: CO 859/73/3, ‘Summary of responses to circular dated 30 Dec. 1939,’ n.d.; Gov’t
Secretary minute, 3 Aug. 1940, including extract of correspondence from paramount; CO 859/73/4,
‘Report on the working of extramural system in [HCTs],’ 1943.
28
BNA FCO 141/689: Supt. Penter to Gov’t. Secretary, 28 Apr. 1948; GS Circular, 10 May 1948:
over 1947 and early 1948 the number of prisoners swelled, some 250 persons were crammed into
a facility designed for 150 people. For earlier assessments of Maseru Gaol conditions, see, for
example, BNA DO35/921/4, Dr. Dyke to Gov’t. Secretary, 14 Feb. 1938. A key aim of transferring
men out was to repurpose the facility for female prisoners and, later, juvenile males (BNA, CO
417/545). The first female jailer (supervising female ‘wardresses’) was hired in 1948 (BAR 1948,
90).
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been widely commented on for decades.29 The architectural core of the facility, which was
antiquated when built over the late-1940s and 1950s, remains the flagship of Lesotho’s
prison system today.
Over 1948 hundreds of inmates at Maseru Gaol were marched a half mile south to
a four-acre field surrounded in barbed wire and littered with canvas tents30: the site for the
new Maseru Central Prison. At the outset the administration announced, ‘It will be some
years before the new prison is completed, but as each section becomes habitable it will be
occupied.’31 And, indeed, while inmates were out of the tents into the first wing by the end
of 1949, it would take over a decade for the design in the blueprints to be completed.
Financing for the construction came from Colonial Welfare and Development funds. The
inmates themselves provided all the construction labor: they worked under technical
instructors hired to teach stone dressing, carpentry for framing and doors and cabinetry,
and a blacksmith for sharpening and repairing the tools. These workshops served as germs
for the prison’s trades program that would grow dramatically over the late-1950s and
1960s. During the period between 1948 and 1952, over one hundred men continued to be
detained in what was now called Old (Maseru) Gaol: this number included both individuals
still awaiting trial as well as those under sentence of death.
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C. Notsi, author interview, 2 May 2017, Maseru; see also BNA DO35/4555: f. 19c. On the flaws
of the design: Alford, R.G. Notes on the building of English prisons, Vol. I, Parkhurst: HM Prisons,
1-9; BNA, PCOM 7/29, ‘Pentonville Prison, proposals to dispense with prison,’ 1926.
30
BNA, FCO 141/689: Penter to Gov’t. Secretary, 28 Apr. 1948; Forsyth-Thompson minute, 11
June 1948.
31
BAR 1948, 10.
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5.3 Medicine murder and the growth of new transnational activist networks
Both Bereng Griffith and Gabashane Masupha could have escaped Maseru Gaol.32 On the
afternoon of July 28, 1949, a group of dozens of prisoners launched a rebellion inside the
crowded and dilapidated facility in order liberate the two lords. Using pipes torn from the
bathroom walls and other improvised weapons, the rebels overpowered and disarmed the
warders in the jail yard. The group then hauled the two nobles from their holding area to a
yawning front gate. Gabashane reportedly dawdled, repeatedly walking to the threshold
and then back into the facility. Bereng, meanwhile, quietly but decisively walked back to
his cell and closed the door. A few minutes later police reinforcements stormed through
the front gate and the chance for escape disappeared. Although their appeals of last resort
had already been rejected, Bereng and Gabashane simply did not believe that the British
administration would follow through with executing, respectively, the second and fourth
highest ranking members of the aristocracy. Six days later, at 6:30 in the morning, the catch
on the gallows trapdoor was activated and the two nobles, and five other men standing
abreast, plunged to their abrupt deaths.33
The execution of two of Moshoeshoe’s great grandsons had roots in a pair of
succession crises flowing from the death of Paramount Griffith Lerotholi in 1939.34 An
32

BNA, DO 119/1374, Clark report, 'Attempted release from custody of condemned chiefs: Bereng
Lerotholi and Gabashane Masupha,’ 16 Aug. 1949. TML: Moeletsi, ’Polao ea marena a mabeli a
lihloho a Lesotho,’ 16 Aug. 1949; Basutoland News, ‘Big Chiefs Executed,’ 9 Aug. 1949, and ‘Rule
of fear removed,’ 23 Aug. 1949; BNA, DO 119/1374: f. 10.1. Clark minute, 16 Aug 1949;
Thompson 1980, 35; LNA, No. 144, F404, Covering minute for ‘Annual Return of death sentences,
1949.’
33
LNA, No. 144, f.404ii: Makione Mphiko and Moloi Ntai were convicted in the same case as the
lords, and Khetisa Molapo, Setenane Mothebesoane, and Kooko Molaba for a separate medicine
murder in Mokhotlong (see Jones, G.I. 1951. Basutoland Medicine Murder: A Report on the Recent
Outbreak of “Diretlo” Murders in Basutoland. London: H.M.S.O. 98, Case 74).
34
Jones 1951, 33-4; Murray, C. and P. Sanders. 2006. Medicine Murder in Colonial Lesotho: The
Anatomy of a Moral Crisis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 30-5; P. Bereng, author interview,
14 July 2017, Maseru (for background, despite his rejection of medicine murder as a phenomenon).
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agnatic council, called the Sons of Letsie, passed over the late monarch’s preferred heir,
Bereng, to give the throne to Griffith’s senior son, Seeiso (featured for his stringent
punishments in Chapter 2). Before the acrimony caused by this dispute could ease, the
aristocracy was again cast into turmoil: Seeiso unexpectedly died in 1940, leaving behind
an heir who was less than three years old. Urged on by the late Seeiso’s chief councilor
and interim paramount, Gabashane Masupha, the Sons passed over Bereng as regent,
fearing he might opt ‘to sit on the throne with both buttocks,’ and instead appointed
Seeiso’s senior widow, 'Mantsebo.35 This move did little to pour oil on troubled waters,
however, as the new regent clashed with many lords by seeking to exercise her office to
wield real power. A handful of alienated lords, including Gabashane, joined with Bereng
in seeking to oppose and undermine the regent.
In the story told by the Crown prosecutor, 'Meleke Ntai was set upon by a dozen
men as he returned to his home in 'Mamathe, Berea on the evening of March 4, 1948.36
After knocking 'Meleke from his horse, the party seized and pinned down the stunned man,
and one attacker sliced off the victim’s lips. The bloody tissue was brought to Gabashane
and Bereng, observing the ambush from a motorcar parked a short distance away. 'Meleke’s
body was discovered the following morning, face down in a shallow pool of water. The
motive for the liretlo (ritual murder), the prosecution maintained, was the procurement of
human medicine to charge up the medicine horns (manaka, sing. lenaka) of the prominent
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This turn of phrase was actually the announced intent of Bereng and Seeiso’s father, Griffith,
when he assumed the paramountcy in 1914. Griffith became monarch after refusing to produce an
heir for his late brother Letsie II by levirate marriage: see BNA, CO 417/501, Gladstone to
Harcourt, cited by Machobane 1990, 107.
36
BNA, DO 119/1374; Murray and Sanders, 107-11; Jones, 97; see also ibid 93-4 on the supposed
involvement of Bereng and Gabashane in the dissection and murder of Paramente Khotatso in late
1946; Eldredge 2007, 168-76.
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lords as they vied for power with 'Mantsebo.37 The lords and eleven other men were
arrested, implicated by four men who claimed to have been present for the planning and
commission of the murder. Nine of the defendants were convicted and sentenced to death
in the High Court of Basutoland, but the High Commissioner commuted five of the
sentences to imprisonment. The Privy Council in London heard the final appeal – rooted
in objections to a Crown case built entirely on accomplice testimony, which the defense
further argued was coerced – but declined to intervene in the heavily publicized and
politically charged case.38
Word of two African lords involved in a gruesome form of occult created a
sensation in the Western press. A moral panic about an uptick in medicine murders was
already simmering in colonial circles in Maseru, Cape Town, and London, and boiled over
after the arrest of Gabashane and Bereng.39 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office
commissioned the Cambridge University anthropologist Gwilym Jones to investigate.
Jones found a trove of writings on Sesotho culture and medicine murder waiting for him in
the country, produced by E. Hugh Ashton, a colonial official who grew up in the territory
and held an anthropology doctorate from the University of Cape Town.40 Ashton’s
emphasis on the historical and political economic context of the putative crisis deeply
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informed Jones’ Basutoland Medicine Murder. This 1951 report argued that the taking of
human medicine was an old Highveld practice, but one which had changed with time: as
the end of intermittent raiding and warfare between communities and polities made it
impossible to procure litlo (flesh from fallen enemy combattants), people and lords
yearning for more power, wealth, or success with a military or romantic conquest, began
to eye neighbors and subjects as alternative sources of medicine.41 The squabbles and
deployment of dueling medicine horns by the royal family represented, in this telling, only
the most visible exterior blemish on an aristocratic apple which was teeming with worms
beneath the skin.42 The Khubelu reforms of 1938 and the creation of a National Treasury
in 1946 had not reined in aristocratic excesses, as anticipated by Maseru, but rather given
rise to a significant uptick in medicine murders: the sharp paring back of the number of
traditional authorities, and prohibitions on lords pocketing court fines, fomented intense
competition for the paid official positions, and even pushed some desperate nobles and
communities to turn to human medicines for an edge. The Jones investigation turned up 23
likely cases of medicine murder in the period between 1895 and 1938, and 70 between
1939 and 1949.43
Despite the growing consensus amongst Basotho over the 1940s had ‘there had
been an unusually large number of cases of [medicine] murder,’ to the extent ‘that people
were increasing nervous about being out late, answering remote calls, and so on,’ the
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execution of Bereng and Gabashane was widely seen as tragic and outrageous.44 In a
testament to the grief engendered by the executions, some 5,000 people attended Bereng’s
funeral in Matsieng, nearly one percent of the territory’s population.45 While the hangings
proved to be a stark inflection point for the nation, it was not as a strong deterrent as
envisioned by the administration. The executions instead poured fuel on long smoldering
grievances, catalyzing popular suspicion of a colonial conspiracy. Many people were
horrified at how common executions were becoming over the late-1940s (see chart above).
The apprehensiveness of the colonial regime to use the judicial system to aggressively
attack the aristocracy and lords themselves, informed by recognition that such an approach
had fueled the collapse of the Cape administration in the 1880s, was gone. At the center of
the growing public anger about the handling of the murders was Lekhotla la Bafo (LLB):
after initially denouncing the murders as an appalling side effect of the Khubelu reforms,
Josiel Lefela pivoted to cast the whole affair as a case of European officials propagating
racist fantasies about African brutality and black magic.46 In so doing, Lefela argued, the
British were seeking to delegitimize the chieftainship, the bedrock institution of society, in
order to weaken the nation and facilitate a transfer of the territory to South Africa.47
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The colonial regime responded to this challenge brutishly, mobilizing the police
and judiciary to punish political critics. The Deputy High Commissioner sardonically
reported to superiors in London that LLB ‘enjoys some official recognition only in that it
is under constant police surveillance.’48 In late 1948, as LLB loudly denounced the
administration’s conduct in detaining dozens of people suspected of involvement in
murders, the Lefela brothers and two other members of the organization’s executive board
were arrested. They were charged with orchestrating the burning of a dormitory at Pope
Pius XII College in Roma (later the National University) in August 1947, resulting in the
death of four students.49 Subsequent events suggest that the case was baseless. Maseru’s
cynical attempt to leverage the tragedy of the fire – initially thought to have been caused
by an electrical short – to destroy LLB also backfired: not only did the accusations further
antagonize savvy and dogged critics, but the case linked Josiel Lefela with a network of
leftist activists who helped to project LLB’s messages beyond the borders of Lesotho and,
even, Southern Africa.
Michael Guthrie Scott’s temper was piqued by the demand that he immediately
read the sheaf of soiled papers, shoved into his hands one evening by a strange visitor to
his office at St. Alban’s Coloured Mission in Johannesburg, but he nonetheless complied.50
The assistant priest had gained some subcontinental fame as a founder of the Campaign for
Right and Justice in 1944, including the work of reforming the criminal-legal and penal
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systems, and therefore found himself inundated with pleas to help various causes.51 As the
Anglican pastor read the tightly scrawled handwriting of a man named Josiel Lefela,
evidently smuggled out of a Lesotho jail (in Teyateyaneng), his personal irritation gave
way to real concern. An hour later Scott had borrowed a car from a friend and was driving,
with his new acquaintance, southwards towards the Mohokare. After the pastor spoke with
Lefela in jail, he immediately helped to secure the activists a South African attorney. The
arson charges against LLB’s four executives were dropped a few days later. The priest then
lingered in the territory, conducting an ad hoc independent investigation of ‘ritual murder.’
Not only did Scott listen to the protestations of innocence from Bereng and Gabashane in
Maseru Gaol, but he also collected numerous statements on ways that the police used bribes
and coercion to secure the testimony of accomplice witnesses in medicine murder cases.52
One of the men charged alongside Bereng and Gabashane reported:
It was suggested to me that I should say that the chief offered me money to kill the
deceased. For four and a half months the police hammered this into me… I was told that if
I accepted…I should not be charged with murder. My feet suffered from the cold which
was in the cell. I had only one blanket… I was also mentally tortured by being told lands
were being seized, cattle killed, wife had gone to hospital.

Scott went to England to report his findings shortly after leaving Lesotho.53 He
hand delivered a letter to the Secretary of State Philip Noel-Baker, and spoke with
individuals and organizations on the British left, including the Fabian Society. After Scott
returned to South Africa, Labour Party MPs Frederick Skinnard, Richard Acland, John
Parker, and others, kept up the pressure on their colleague Noel-Baker, by repeatedly
raising the question of police abuses on the floor of the House of Commons. They also
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called on the Secretary to investigate ‘complaints about the treatment of prisoners and
people held in prison as potential witnesses,’ provide a conduit for lords to lay grievances
before the United Nations, and postpone death sentences pending the release of Jone’s
report.54 Although these actions failed to save already condemned persons from the
gallows, the campaign was hardly ineffectual. Reports of coerced testimony declined, the
judiciary felt pressure to expedite its work so that remanded persons would not languish
for months on end awaiting trial, and, making use of the 1947 prison proclamation, judges
also began to more systematically use suspended sentences for first time offenders.55 The
medicine murder affair also, critically, created links between Basotho activists and the
British Left which continued to strengthen and grow into the 1950s. When word of fresh
custodial abuses in Lesotho reached the Commonwealth Relations Office in late 1955, fear
of Basotho activists and Labour MPs airing the dirty laundry to the world pushed colonial
officials to preemptively launch ambitious and expensive penal reforms, in addition to
burying the story.
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5.4 The Maseru Central Prison uprising of 1955 and its aftermath
On November 19, 1955, Leuta Mahao initiated an insurrection at Maseru Central Prison.56
As Warder Masilo Makatse watched a group of inmates play a Saturday afternoon game of
soccer near the front gate, Leuta walked up and clubbed the unsuspecting guard with a
stone. Horrified onlookers watched as Leuta wordlessly seized Masilo’s service revolver
and fired a single shot into the stunned man’s head. Pandemonium erupted in the yard:
most inmates scurried for safety, either in their cells or by climbing the prison fence, but
around thirty moved to join Leuta. The attackers swarmed a guard named Kolobe,
fracturing his skull with blows and leaving him for dead. The other armed staff member,
Warder Resethuntsa, rushed to the yard to fire on the rebels with his service shotgun but
could not figure out how to operate the weapon’s safety and, overcome with adrenaline and
fear, joined eleven colleagues and over one hundred inmates fleeing the facility via the
perimeter fence. Leuta’s party then attacked the staff offices, containing the prison
switchboard, armory, and file cabinets. Warder Albert Matsiea opened the office door to
surrender, and met a hail of blows. He was saved by an inmate, Mohale Masupha, who
carried the bleeding guard out of the fray and hid him in an empty cell. As the rebels
smashed open the weapons locker and commenced burning prison records, they failed to
notice another guard in the office, Warder Hlalele, who had secreted himself inside the
telephone switchboard cabinet. The insurrectionists proceeded to liberate the solitary cells
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and opened the front gate. Leuta exhorted the remaining prisoners to take up defensive
positions for an impending counterattack. Witnesses later told investigators that rebels
killed inmate Mapupu Mosotho, with a revolver round through the heart, for denouncing
the violence.
The destructiveness of the rebellion involved a combination of luck and planning.
The uprising was staged when both the de facto and de jure commanders of the facility,
Chief Gaoler Khomari and Asst. Supt. Cornish, were on leave, and the jailer on duty,
Seosane, was out of the facility on lunch. Although guards energetically cranked the alarm
siren for a few minutes prior to the rebels seizing the staff office, it was largely inaudible
in central Maseru as an intense northeasterly wind carried the blare towards the border.
Word of the rebellion instead reached the police barracks via a civilian horseman, who
galloped the mile from the prison after encountering a fleeing warder. Around this time the
smoke from a bonfire of prison records was also becoming visible. The police sounded
their own siren and set about telephoning reinforcements. Police Inspector Nkherepe
Molefe armed himself with a Lee Enfield rifle, and zoomed towards the facility with eight
privates in a police truck. As they arrived at the facility, the police encountered Maseru
District Commissioner Hughes, staggering about and bleeding profusely: having heard the
first siren, the commissioner drove over to investigate, but was forced to retreat after being
struck squarely in the mouth with hurled stone.
Molefe and his troop proceeded towards the gate in tactical formation. As the group
entered the wire enclosure, inmates apparently charged. The inspector opened fire. One of
the two inmates killed was young man named Liphareng, who was still awaiting trial.
David Masupha, an off-duty prison guard, borrowed Warder Resethuntsa’s shotgun (after
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encountering his colleague outside the facility) and dashed inside: he single-handedly
drove inmates out of Cell Block D. As Molefe’s men secured the rest of the prison, Hughes’
secretary, Vivian Gillett, assumed command of the operation to retake Cell Block A, where
Leuta and other committed rebels were holed up. After exchanging gunfire down a hallway,
and a period of tense negotiations during which Gillett warned that the next step would be
flooding the wing with tear gas, the insurrectionists surrendered. Meanwhile, outside the
gate, a large crowd of African civilians who had come to investigate the commotion, as
well a handful of warders, many of whom were just learning of Masilo’s death, took to
assaulting inmates who emerged from hiding places in the Mohokare River Valley.
Maphohola Moshobi was clubbed and stomped to death by the crowd as he sought to
reenter the prison. After the situation calmed, inmates were assembled under armed guard
in the prison yard. Warders proceeded to put out fires and thoroughly search the prison.
The nation took stock of the three hour rebellion over the next several weeks: five people
killed; fifteen individuals hospitalized, four with grave wounds; and 22 inmates escaped
into South Africa. The operation of prisons in Lesotho would never be the same.
In the hours after the uprising the government promised a swift and public
commission of inquiry into how such a disaster could come to be.57 Preliminary
investigations, however, turned up the makings of a scandal.58 One prisoner after another
reported the draconian disciplinary regime presided over by Senior Gaoler Khomari, and
how they had been systematically thwarted from lodging complaints. Likely the most
incendiary piece of information was that Leuta Mahao had, on the very morning of his
attack, been released after a week straight in solitary confinement imposed ultra vires by
57
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the jailer. In internal correspondence, British officials fretted about how Basotho activists
would seek to cast the events as a ‘political demonstration,’ rather than accepting a
preferred narrative of an irrational explosion of violence initiated by one madman.59 Of
particular concern was when and to what extent questions would be asked in parliament.
As a result of these concerns, the FCO decided to roll back earlier promises of a public
commission.60 The High Commissioner announced that because an inquiry was urgently
needed, but also risked prejudicing the upcoming trials of 25 inmates potentially facing
charges of ‘public violence’ for their role in the rebellion, the hearings would be held in
camera.61 In the words of the FCO’s legal secretary, the secret commission provided ‘a
satisfactory escape from an awkward situation… & we are lucky that the matter has not
been raised in Parliament (so far!).’ Although the colonial establishment sought to blunt
criticism of this reversal with promises to publish the commission’s findings, these
assurances were also lies: the report never saw the light of day in Lesotho, and only recently
was made available to researchers as part of a tranche of secret archives migrated from
Hanslope Park to the British National Archives.62
Over the 1950s, the center of nationalist and anti-colonial organizing passed from
LLB into the hands of a younger generation of activists. Indeed, at the time of the uprising,
the 60-year-old Josiel Lefela was serving out a year of incarceration with hard labor for the
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‘sedition’ of continuing to publicly rail about the state murder of not only Bereng and
Gabashane by hanging, but also Seeiso, who the activist suggested had been poisoned by
colonial medical officers.63 Ntsu Mokhehle – a long time discipline of Lefela and, since his
time at Fort Hare University in the 1940s, an active member of the African National
Congress Youth League – had, by this point, already eclipsed his mentor at the forefront
of nationalist political agitation: in 1952, the young teacher and trained biologist founded
the first political party in Lesotho’s history, the Basutoland African Congress (BAC). In
1957, Lefela and Mokhehle organized a ceremony on top of Night Mountain to
symbolically pass the mantle of champion of the Basotho commoner from the former to
the latter.64
In the wake of the Maseru Central uprising, with Lefela in jail, colonial officials
were explicitly worried about the BAC. Mokhehle had not only inherited contacts in the
British parliament from Lefela but also made new ones through his own involvement in
the ANC. While the growing stink of British imperial atrocities of the era – notably
including massacres and mass executions in counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and
Kenya – placed additional pressure on colonial officials to head off any scandal in the
Maloti, the immediate seriousness with which London took this threat was a direct product
of previous experiences with Lesotho politics. The medicine murder crisis had seeded
networks which enabled Basotho activists to quickly and loudly broadcast their complaints
and allegations, both in the metropole and internationally. Internal conjecture within the
FCO pegged the socialist, pacifist, and anti-imperialist parliamentarian Fenner Brockway
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– who was friends with Michael Scott, and had himself done time in Pentonville and
Walton prisons for campaigning against the First World and, later, refusing conscription65
– as the most likely local mouthpiece.
The secret commission of inquiry submitted a scathing report, criticizing both
prison design and administration.66 It was not lost on the investigators that there had been
never been such a deadly or destructive rebellion in an English prison.67 The experts
interviewed by the committee were appalled that Pentonville was used to draw up prison
blueprints in 1948, despite the ‘obsolete’ English facility’s architectural deficiencies
having been a matter of penological commonsense for decades.68 Nonetheless, the report
continued, ‘Unfortunately, the building is too far advanced to permit of a change in the
plan and all that can be done is to decide on alterations and additions which will, as much

65

Eckel, J. 2019. Ambivalence of Good: Human Rights in International Politics since the 1940s.
New York: Oxford University, 127 (also talks about Scott, 127n48); Howe, S. 1993.
Anticolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire 1918-1964. New York: Oxford;
Brockway, F. 1977. Towards Tomorrow: The Autobiography of Fenner Brockway. London: HartDavis.
66
Commission report, 9 Mar. 1956.
67
BNA, DO 35/4555, Hart to Emery attached to Hone to Hart, 24 Jan. 1956. The memo noted that
there were two instances in which prison administrator’s lost effective control of facilities in
England, at Chatham Prison in 1861 and at Dartmoor Prison in 1932. Neither instance resulted in
fatalities. See: Brown, A. 2008. ‘Challenging Discipline and Control: A Comparative Analysis of
Prison Riots at Chatham (1861) and Dartmoor (1932).’ In Punishment and Control in Historical
Perspective, Johnston, H., ed. 199–214. London: Palgrave Macmillan; ——. 2007. ‘The Amazing
Mutiny at the Dartmoor Convict Prison.’ The British Journal of Criminology 47/2: 276–92. ——.
2013. Inter-War Penal Policy and Crime in England: The Dartmoor Convict Prison Riot, 1932.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Peter Zinoman trenchantly notes the similar dynamic within the
French penal system absent major rebellions, even as there were constant uprisings in the colonies
(136-137). On the prevalence of rebellions and mass jail breaks in 19th-century India: Anderson,
C. 2007. The Indian Uprising of 1857-8 Prisons, Prisoners and Rebellion. New York: Anthem, 27
and 59-62. See also Adams, R. 1994. Prison Riots in Britain and the USA. , Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
68
BNA DO 35/4555, Hilton memo, 3 Dec. 1956: A key reason why the design was ‘condemned as
unsuitable for the detention of large numbers of long-term prisoners’ was that ‘the “Star” plan gives
prisoners considerable strategic advantages and deprives the prison staff of a secure concentration
point from which to act.’
302

as possible, correct the more undesirable features of the present structure.' The design flaws
were exacerbated by a number of additional oversights: the wings were not self-contained,
providing inmates unimpeded access to the entire facility, including the staff office; the
single high fence was only useful for slowing but not deterring escapes; a lack of nearby
housing for administrators and warders impeded prison staff’s ability to detect and respond
to unrest; and, especially, the fact that parts of the facility was still under construction, by
inmates themselves, provided potential rebels with detailed knowledge of the prison layout,
as well as ready access to weapons and cover. By the time the report arrived in London,
installation of a double wall of razor wire, grates separating wings, and the expedited
construction of Wing D, were underway to the tune of £5,400.69 Indeed, a month after the
uprising, Secretary of State Alec Douglas-Hone read the preliminary investigation report
and approved funds, noting, ‘I agree that it seems urgent to complete the building.’70 The
report also criticized lack of a specialized facilities for detaining juveniles and, especially,
mentally ill people in Lesotho, which led to ‘the lodging of criminal and other lunatics in
the prison.’71 As we shall see in the next section, the report cleared the way for rapid and
significant investment in penal infrastructure over subsequent years.
Prison personnel were also singled out for blame. Asst. Supt. Cornish came off the
worst in the report, first for having run a lax facility until 1951, and then, subsequently, for
passing off his official responsibilities for prison administration, training, discipline, and
grievances, to his subordinate, Ernest Khomari. The senior jailer, who the findings noted

69

BNA, DO 35/4556, ‘Maseru Central Riot–Add’l Expenditure’ folder, especially Liesching to
Hone, 2 Nov. 1956.
70
BNA, DO 35/4555, Hone minute, 19 Dec. 1955.
71
BNA, DO 35/4555, HC and CRO correspondence, 16 Nov. 1956, 20 Nov. 1956, 21 Nov. 1956;
Home to Liesching, 11 Dec. 1956.
303

was ‘an ex-soldier, with considerable experience in the administration of military prisons’
(and whose story features heavily in Chapter 6), was subject to more qualified criticism:
‘Before the arrival of Khomari the warders were largely untrained, knew little of their
duties, and lived in fear of their charges.’ The report continued, ‘having regard to the
untrained staff which Gaoler Khomari had at his disposal,’ measures like ‘beatings and
forcible incarceration in the solitary confinement cells without trial… in the course of the
re-establishment of discipline…. was almost inevitable.’ Cornish was also faulted for
establishing a grievance process whereby inmates were instructed to complain directly to
warders, who were then required to pass anything they did not deem ‘frivolous’ up the
chain of command.72
When criticism relating to the circumstances surrounding the uprising did come, it
was not as expected. In February 1957, Fenner Brockway wrote to the FCO about
irregularities reported to him by the ANCYL activist Elias Monare and Michael Scott:
I am informed that Mr. Leuta Mahao… was a prisoner in Nasiro Central Prison [sic].
During his term of imprisonment there was a strike in the prison of which he was regarded
as the ring-leader. An enquiry was instituted but I am informed that even before the
Committee submitted its report he was placed on trial and sentenced to death. Subsequently
the sentence was commuted to imprisonment… I am told that in January Mr. Leuta Mahao
was transferred to Barberton Prison [in South Africa]. Could you inform me the reasons
for this transfer and whether the Basutoland Government has legal authority to transfer
prisoners in this way?73

Internally, the High Commissioner’s decision to commute Leuta’s death sentence to 12
years imprisonment, despite the vigorous objections of Maseru, was based on the ‘strong
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indication’ that ‘illegally inflicted’ solitary confinement ‘had influenced Mahao’s mind.’74
The decision to make Leuta the sole Lesotho national incarcerated in South Africa,
meanwhile, was motivated by the commissioner’s desire to forestall rather than impose
additional suffering: continuing to detain the erstwhile rebel leader at Maseru Central
invited violent reprisals, either by Leuta against inmates who testified against him at trial
or by prison staff against the man who had so viciously killed a colleague.75 Because ‘the
report of the Commission of Enquiry reveal[ed] some disturbing facts about the way the
prison had been run’ which the FCO was ‘not at all anxious to have…brought to light,’
officials decided ‘the less said the better’ in response to Brockway’s ‘very tendentious’
characterization of events, lest their response provoke ‘a demand for publication of the
Commission’s Report.’76 Although the irregular treatment of Leuta did continue to be a
talking point for the BAC, and ultimately come up in the House of Commons in 1961, the
colonial regime successfully deflected inquiry and digging into the makings of a deeper
potential scandal buried beneath.77
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The attention and publicity surrounding the colonial response to medicine murders
and the 1949 Maseru Gaol rebellion conditioned the colonial regime to expect political
criticism from Lesotho. In an illuminating study on British counterinsurgency in the face
of anti-colonial movements and rising human rights discourse, historian Brian Drohan
argues the Colonial Office was ‘most concerned with avoiding public scandal,’ leading
officials to prioritize the construction of ‘new ways to hide their methods from scrutiny,’
rather than focusing on ‘stopping their abuses.’78 And, indeed, as news of events which
‘would bring considerable discredit on the Basutoland Administration’ trickled in, the
colonial bureaucracy first moved to conceal information about the rebellion from public
view. But, in the case of Lesotho’s prisons, if not in political policing in the territory and
counterinsurgency elsewhere in empire, the British also took real steps to improve the
facilities and practices of incarceration in the territory. In the late 1940s the local
administration had updated the official orientation of the prison system, but this was largely
a hollow shell of what was internationally considered best penological practices. With the
bloody consequences of feigned penology made evident internally, and seemingly on the
verge of being made public, London decided to make good (or, ‘make better,’ at least) on
the previous pretenses of territorial penal administration. The declassification of long
hidden imperial records has shined new light on the tremendous impact of anti-colonial
organizing on metropolitan investment in Lesotho. Although indirect and not planned, the
activism of Lefela and Mokhehle shaped prison reform and helped ‘deliver the goods’ in
terms of infrastructure, training, and jobs.
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5.5 The 1957 Prison Proclamation and the emergence of a welfarist penal regime
In late 1957, the high commissioner introduced yet another new prison proclamation.79
This time, the laws were not derivative of those in place in the British metropole or empire,
but instead a recently emerging international consensus on best penological practices. A
former director of Lesotho’s prisons emphasized precisely this point:
I disagree when people tell me these laws are no good because they are old… or that these
words are from the colonial rulers… In actual fact, the proclamation is an extract. When
you take a copy of the Prison Proclamation of 1957 and hold it up against the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules of 1957, you will see something [holds up hands, and
looks back and forth]… [laughs]… The words are the same… And this law, it was so
democratic, it was channeling the prison officers to apply a human rights framework well
before we were using this language in the Prison Staff Training School.80

Perhaps more significant than the legal changes on their face, was the demonstrable
commitment of the imperial establishment spanning from London down to Maseru to see
the laws were diligently implemented. The uprising was largely driven by the inconsistent
application and outright contravention of the 1947 laws. With the report on events of
November 1955 still fresh in mind amongst policymakers in the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, and lingering concern about a potential scandal, a tide of financial
and technical resources flowed into the nation which would have been out of the question
prior to the uprising. The changes focused on four principle areas of concern: first, staffing
and training of penal facilities; second, institutionalizing processes for inmates to file
grievances beyond the jail fence; third, facilitating specialized treatment of vulnerable
populations, and particularly the hospitalization and reformatory schooling of mentally ill
persons and juveniles, respectively, as an alternative to penal incarceration; and, fourth,
reducing practices most liable to give rise to scandals, such as the flogging of adult men.
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The conduct of the staff prior to and during the rebellion was a major focus of
criticism in the confidential report on the 1955 uprising. The inability of a warder to operate
his firearm and the general decision of the guards on duty to flee at the outset of violence
demonstrated, rather incontrovertibly, a lack of training and morale.81 The inquiry focused
on four key problems with staffing at the time of rebellion: first, jails across the country
were understaffed; second, the physical and educational requirements for warders to join
the service were too lax; third, officers lacked training; and, fourth, Maseru warders’
largely lived in Maseru village, rather than close to the facilities, militating against a quick
response in case of emergency.
The report loosened imperial purse strings to address these issues. Funds were
allocated for hiring an additional 30 permanent staff, explicitly with the notion that this
move ‘released more warders for training courses.’82 In early 1957, Edward Dove, a jailer
with 23 years of experience in Kenya was brought in to replace Cornish. Serving beneath
the newly created position of Director of Prisons, the superintendent was responsible both
for overseeing Maseru facilities, and for the training and recruitment of new staff.83 In
1958, recruitment ceased being on an ad hoc basis and instead was carried out in cadet
troops of eight people.84 Efforts were made to standardize the requirements, requiring
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completion of primary schooling (Standard 6), and meet height and weight guidelines.85
Some £18,000 in Colonial Welfare and Development (CWD) funds were used to build
dozens of houses for warders adjacent to Maseru Central over 1958 and 1959.86 The new
housing arrangement also increased staff morale and a sense of tightly knit community:
recalling his childhood in the settlement in the 1960s, a former professional footballer and
high-ranking government official, Tseliso Khomari, described his appreciation about how
officers and their families officers ‘helped raised me and train me.’87
A second key element of the commission of the report was the way that prisoners
at Central Prison were denied access to an institutional grievance process. This problem
emerged from a failure to implement the laws as written, rather than an oversight in the
statutes: under the 1947 proclamation and notice of regulations inmates were supposed to
be able to express concerns and complaints to the district commissioner, either orally
during a mandated weekly inspection or in writing. Based on the limited number of written
complaints still extant in archives – all in the Leribe collection, and therefore limited in
scope to the jail in Hlotse or to the concerns of the district’s residents incarcerated in
Maseru – it appears that inmate letters were more diligently passed upwards by prison staff
in the wake of the uprising: a handful of complaints date back to 1950, but the archive has
nearly one hundred letters of complaint beginning with a seeming wave in March 1956,
and continuing into the early 1960s. Notably, one Leribe prisoner began his letter by
reminding the Leribe DC of his words at a recent prison assembly: ‘you told us… that if
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we have complaints we should report them to you and you are going to assist us.’88
Grievances spanned all manner of subjects: asking for colonial intercession in conflicts
with lords, arranging inheritances, and, critically, complaining about the conduct of prison
personnel.89 Internal correspondence suggests that the administration took complaints
seriously: each letter contained notes about what steps had been taken to investigate and
address the issue, and to communicate these actions to the complainant. Maseru was well
aware that another incident of serious prison unrest would outrage superiors. Under the
1957 prison proclamation, following from the Standard Minimums, visiting committees
were formed, which included Basotho civilians, to inspect each carceral facility monthly
and speak with inmates, explicitly to provide ‘a guarantee to the public that no abuses take
place in the prisons.’90
A third central area of concern in the report on the uprising was the problem of
housing mentally ill people in jails. Replicating the 1957 Standard Minimum guidelines,
the 1957 proclamation and regulations were obliged to provide specialized facilities,
capable of providing treatment, for mentally ill persons who had committed crimes against
others.91 The question of where to house persons considered had become a deeply
problematic issue over the proceeding decades. Up until 1942, the administration,
By arrangement with the Union Government, sends lunatics, who are danger to others and
themselves, for treatment in Union Mental Institutions: milder cases are detained for
indefinite periods in local gaols. There are in addition a large number of mentally deranged
88
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people, imbeciles and feebleminded, in the Territory, who are generally left to the care of
relatives and friends.92

The following year, however, the South African government ‘informed the administration
it simply no longer had the room to accept any new patients,’ and the old approach ‘had to
be suspended.’93 Scrambling for an alternative, the administration threw together an ad hoc
‘Mental Detention Centre’ in Mohale’s Hoek camptown as an ‘emergency measure,’
noting, ‘admittedly this is not a satisfactory scheme, but it is a reasonable expedient to
obviate the only other and objectionable alternative of detaining lunatics in gaols.’ The
facility continued to operate for the next 23-years, swelling from an original patient body
of 32 past the 70-person maximum occupancy to 130 patients in 1959, even as more
persons were routed in jails and, eventually, the solitary cells of Maseru Central.94
Conditions in the Mohale’s Hoek facility were nothing short of horrific. Members of the
National Council queried the administration about seeing inmates standing about naked in
the cold along the perimeter fence, as well as unceremonious pauper burials in which
patient corpses were dumped into unmarked graves.95 While attending the Council as a
representative of a Leribe lord in 1952, Josiel Lefela declared, ‘it is a hospital which is
required and not a prison, we like these mental patients, we do not want them to go there
and be put in prison.’96 A story about the conditions faced by one young man who had a
psychotic break, was detained in Mohale’s Hoek, and died in a matter of days, featured in
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the Catholic and largely administration-friendly newspaper Moeletsi: ‘he told me how cold
it is in that asylum, and that the blankets were so infested with lice it was hard to believe…
He was there with his two feet tied, and his hands were also tied so that he could not escape
or even make an attempt to fight.’ Further complicating matters was a steady increase in
the number of cases of psychoses coming to government attention. Later, in 1959, the
administration would confront evidence that the structural poverty of Lesotho was, in fact,
driving an increasing number of people mad.97
By the early 1950s there was extensive discussion about the need for a psychiatric
hospital for the HCTs. Lesotho represented ‘the obvious choice… since it is centrally
situated and provides the largest number of patients in need of treatment.’98 The Chief
Medical Officer in the Colonial Office, Sir Eric Pridie, pushed forward this conversation
after a visit to Lesotho: ‘The detention centre at Mohales Hoek is appalling and must be
replaced at once. It is one of the worst institutions of its kind I have ever visited and cannot
be improved because the accommodation is so bad.’99 Pridie has been as impressed by the
Holmwood Hospital in Zanzibar as he was disgusted by the MDC, and arranged for a 1954
visit of Lesotho’s Director of Medical Services, Reuben Jacobson, who was equally
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impressed and took home schematics of the facility.100 Despite the agreement from all three
HTC’s and London about the need for the facility, and the existence of blueprints for the
facility, the hang up remained the cost of a 220-bed hospital estimated to cost £131,000,
and only £75,000 that amount on offer from a CWD grant.101 After the rebellion and 1957
legislation, CWD funds for the hospital materialized finally in 1959 and construction began
the following year.102 Mohlomi Mental Hospital, modeled on the Holmwood design,
opened in 1965. Its first medical officer was Victor Ntsekhe, a Mosotho psychiatrist trained
in England.103
A second urgent question over the late 1950s and early 60s was how the colonial
state might most productively respond to crimes committed by youth.104 During this period
Lesotho underwent dramatic demographic shifts, with the population rapidly becoming
younger and more urban. In rural village communities, young people were subject to the
constant surveillance and corrective interventions of parents, neighbors, and lords.
Itumeleng Kimane, a noted Mosotho scholar on childhood and juvenile justice, noted, ‘in
Sesotho we have the maxim, “thupa e otlolloa e sale metsi,” which describes children, and
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well-adjusted children, as the concern and responsibility of everyone.’105 In urban spaces,
however, the tasks of policing and disciplining young people fell to the colonial employees
in the BMP and judiciary.106 The punitive repertoire for colonial courts was incredibly thin
when it came to young people. Faced with the options of sending young people to penal
incarceration, many judges opted to deploy corporal punishment instead when it came to
punishing young men between the ages of 15 and 18. Indeed, rates of judicial canings
soared over the late 1950s and 1960s, even as the practice was outlawed as a punishment
for adults (except for crimes of violence committed while incarcerated).107
Juvenile corporal punishment was carried out by a trained prison officer, wielding
a quarter inch thick rattan cane to inflict cuts on the target individual’s buttocks. One officer
who was tasked with carrying out many such canings in the 1950s and 60s noted that if
done ‘correctly,’ the medical officer required to be on hand would intervene after ‘only one
or two strokes,’ because of the sight of blood.108 The same officer argued that this
punishment was highly effective, as ‘we very rarely saw the same boys twice.’ The
administration justified the practice by invoking the old language of tradition: ‘Basuto
opinion is generally still in favour of the retention of corporal punishment for juveniles. It
is not regarded as a humiliation… [but] as a salutary corrective.’109
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Judicial Corporal Punishment by Caning of Adult Men and Juveniles (Age 16-21),
1946-70
Year
Juveniles
Adults
Total
1946
10
21
31
1947
17
11
28
1948
22
3
25
1949
17
3
20
1950
30
29
59
1951
89
8
97
1952
85
2
87
1953
88
11
99
1954
81
1955
202
16
218
1956
306
1957
255
3
258
1958
144
10
154
1959
154
3
157
1960
180
3
183
1961
191
4
195
1962
306
8
314
1963
564
7
571
1964
559
4
563
1965
534
0
560
1966
428
0
428
1967
306
0
306
1968
548
0
548
1969
522
0
522
1970
566
0
566
*Data compiled from annual reports and annual reports of prison service
The lack of a reformatory in the territory was a perennial concern, which became
all the more sensitive in the wake of the 1955 rebellion. Only weeks after Mahao launched
his rebellion, the colonial office began to ask questions about what damage to individual
young men and society as a whole was emerging from subjecting younger and more
morally-salvageable juveniles to ‘contamination’ by older and more criminally ‘hardened’

Lechese to 7; Molapo Nto to 10; Kaiser Rafalatsane 18 (BLO, MSS.Afr.s.1681: Box 219, f. 3.
Minutes of BNC Special Session, 1951).
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peers. 110 London sent WGM Lugton, the Director of Welfare and Probation services in
Colonial Zambia, to conduct the inquiry and issue findings on how best to handle the
juvenile question in Lesotho. Lugton’s 1956 report conveyed alarm at the colony’s reliance
on caning boys, as well as the ‘the high number of recorded first offenders who are
committed to prison.’111 He further recommended the speedy construction of a Juvenile
Training Centre (JTC) in Maseru, which could help to address juvenile delinquency in all
three High Commission Territories by offering a curriculum centered around the
‘cultivation and handcrafts plus an active programme of sport and group activities.’ While
accepting the proposal in principle, the administration also did not immediately take steps
to build the facility. They argued that notions about the sanctity of childhood and reduced
moral culpability of young people for criminal acts were out of place in Lesotho. At the
same time, the colonial state scaled up efforts to promote the welfare of urban youth outside
the criminal justice system.112
After passage of the new 1957 Prison Proclamation mandated that juvenile boys
under judicial sanction be detained in reformatories rather than jails, the administration
responded by moving young men from around the territory to a portion of Old Maseru Gaol
recently vacated by the last of the male prisoners transferred to Central Prison; to give the
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facility an educative sheen, Maseru hired three ‘special warders’ to work at Old Gaol,
instructing young men and women in the facility on remedial reading and arithmetic, as
well as market gardening.113 Unrest at the schools in 1960 and anti-colonial protests in the
streets over 1961 finally convinced the administration it needed to equip itself with new
infrastructure and strategies to handle the changing political landscape.114 Designs for a
reformatory were drawn up in 1961 and construction began in 1962.115 Anticipating the
move of juvenile males out of Old Gaol, and seeing the opportunity to phase-out and
eventually demolish the dilapidated facility, the administration also undertook the planning
and building of a Women’s Prison, which was completed in 1965 and occupied by inmates,
and a staff of 2 female jailers and 6 wardresses, in 1966.116 The opening of the 72-bed JTC
in June 1965 did not trigger a dramatic reduction in the use of judicial corporal punishment
on juveniles, as metropolitan officials had hoped.117 The completion of the facility did,
however, mean a new cycle of life for the young men who were marched the quarter mile
under guard to a new temporary home: instead of confinement in tight and squalid
conditions, the inmates had access to proper classrooms and better sanitation facilities. The

113

Prison Report 1957, 10.
Concern about youth political radicalism spiked after May 2, 1960, when students at two
prominent Maseru educational institutions, Basutoland High School (BHS) and Lerotholi
Technical School (LTS), launched violent strikes, leading to the shuttering of schools in the capitol
for a period of weeks (NUL: Harragin Report, 10-11; the report was named for its chair, Chief
Justice for the High Court of the High Commission Territories Walter Harragin). See also: AerniFlessner 2011, 257-8. Just as the political scandal and fears caused by the 1955 uprising at Maseru
Central catalyzed broad penal reform, the scandal and fears caused by the 1960 student actions
played an important role in pushing the administration to finally build a juvenile reformatory.
115
Prison Report 1962, 1.
116
Prison Report 1966, 4 and 10.
117
FCO 141/837: British Gov't Rep to Poynton, 17 June 1965; BAR 1965, 60-3. Political change
had outpaced the construction of the reformatory: when the JTC opened, in June 1965, it was a
little over a month after the implementation of the new constitution, and new judges and the prison
bureaucracy (now within the Justice Department) were appointed by locally-elected officials, rather
than colonial officers.
114

317

young men also had increased access to organized games and athletics, and the JTC soccer
squad regularly played matches against Maseru high schools.
5.6 The ghost of Leuta Mahao: Concluding remarks on repression, morality, and
reform
Fran Buntman notes that prisons and colonialism share an inherent repressiveness. Both
aim, by definition, to negate or diminish ‘a person’s or group’s power, control, autonomy,
[and] liberty.’118 Yet, prisons and colonial spaces have also been subject, over time, to
much legal regulation. For reasons both practical and principled, British penal planners and
colonial bureaucrats sought to legitimize the exercise of repressive power with laws and
regulations, thereby dangling to the people subject to repressive authority the promise of
certain rights and means for claiming these rights.119 A continuing problem in both prisons
and neo/colonial situations, however, has been inconsistent access to legal protections and
courts by people subject to repressive authority.120 Unwritten regulations and those laws
broken as a matter of practice have, therefore, been a particularly major part of the meaning
of the law in prisons and colonies.
Even in these situations where authorities displayed little deference to official
regulations and actively worked to stymie rights-based claims from below, colonized and
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incarcerated people still found ways to summon external politico-legal scrutiny. The reason
that uprisings worked so effectively in Lesotho was that they called into question the
imperial pretense of legality. London’s desire to maintain this facade proved to be a
meaningful substitute in the absence of a principled respect for the law in its own right. But
for objections of illegal practices to endanger the pretense of legality with scandal,
prisoners often needed to clear two bars: first, to convey word of abuses beyond the prison
fence and, second, beyond the boundaries of the colony. These tasks were particularly
challenging because of subcultural dynamics of prison and colonial personnel: in both
spaces, the authorities tasked with enforcing and maintaining the law were positioned as
gatekeepers equipped to suppress complaints of illegality within their own ranks; this
power, compounded by sensations of needing to maintain internal unity against a more
numerous group of antagonistic charges, contributed to the formation and
institutionalization of professional omertas.121 Even when incarcerated persons could pull
off the first step independently, alerting local colonial supervisory authorities to abuses
inside prisons, whether by formal institutional challenges or by transgressive resistance,
they remained largely dependent on help from political activists beyond the prison walls to
121
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help clear the second hurdle. These relationships took time to build, but once established
they proved enduring, and extended legal protections beyond the scope of incarcerated
people and those caught up in the so-called criminal justice system to cover society more
broadly.
Theorists of prisoner resistance –– like Buntman and Kieran McEvoy– note
different scopes of actions, ranging from efforts to blunt or block the imposition of power
to efforts to shape or seize control of power.122 Such actions, moreover, are often infused
with appeals to morality and justice, and their relationships with laws as written or not, and
as implemented or not. Claims to rights and assertions of il/legality using court systems
clearly encompass both scopes. This chapter demonstrates how the most institutionally
transgressive and illegitimate form of prison misconduct – violent mutiny – involved
similar questions of blocking and creating power. With the 1949 rebellion, and the refusal
of Gabashane and Bereng to leave, the relationship between law and justice was popularly
inverted: for many Basotho, jail rebellion was a righteous response to unjust laws and
prosecutorial mis/conduct, and the adherence of the lords to the law, even in the shadow of
the gallows, made these men into martyrs. Even if this bid to challenge colonial laws failed
to block the hangings – or deliver more than cursory improvements in the judicial system
over the short-term – the deeper impacts of the rebellion would come to light in the wake
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of 1955 rebellion. What began as a protest of illegal abuses inside Maseru Central catalyzed
the wholesale reformation of the territory’s penal system.
The unintended effects of illegal violence far outlasted the more immediate designs
of cowing protest or protesting injustice. This reality deeply complicates any narrative
involving binaries of right or wrong and good or evil when it comes to acts of illegality by
guards and prisoners.123 The colonial state itself endorsed this idea when it came to its own
officers: while acknowledging that Khomari’s use of disciplinary violence was illegal, it
was also framed as being for the greater good of establishing the order necessary to protect
innocent warders and society at large from violent criminals. Activists like Lefela,
Mokhehle, and the 1949 rebels glossed over butchery of ordinary fellow citizens by lords,
but in so doing pushed imperial policymakers to be more sensitive to reports of vicious
abuses by local officials, priming the political landscape for later judicial and penal reforms
which ameliorated colonial and penal affronts to human dignity. Perhaps the greatest irony
in the history of Lesotho’s prisons remains the fact that the system’s most notoriously
rebellious and anti-social inmate likely did more to catalyze progressive and pro-social
reform, and institutionalize a culture of abiding by written statutes, than any other
individual: Leuta Mahao set out to violently harm people and destroy structures to lodge
his anger with the abuses he had suffered, giving rise to architecture improvements and
sweeping policy reforms. As we will continue to examine in the next chapter, these shifts
bettered the conditions of life and work for warders and inmates alike.
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Chapter 6

Anti-politics on guard: professionalism, partisanship, and the prison
service, 1959-1971
6.1 Introduction
Leabua Jonathan informed the nation of his coup over state radio on the afternoon of
January 30, 1970.1 The sitting Prime Minister denounced vote tabulations which seemed
to show that the rival Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) defeated his Basotho National
Party (BNP) in the election held three days before. Jonathan claimed that these polls, the
first in an independent Lesotho, had been irredeemably tarnished by voter intimidation and
fraud perpetrated by the BCP. The Prime Minister declared that these ostensible
shenanigans left him with no choice but to annul the results, suspend the constitution, and
institute Qomatsi (a state of emergency). In the days and weeks following this address,
Special Branch police rounded up the leadership of the BCP and its youth league (BCPYL),
as well as prominent royalists and communists, for detention in Maseru Central Prison.
Ironically, the rapid arrest of opposition figures meant that many of the most high profile
and militant critics of the regime were protected by the prison fence over subsequent
months, as Nationalist repression escalated. Government opponents on the outside were

1

OBL, Africa Bureau, Box 220 f.10, ‘Lesotho, post-election prisoners, correspondence, 1970.’
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fired, harassed, assaulted, and even gunned down by members of the security forces and
BNP youth organizations.
Although the political detainees suffered from a depravation of liberty, and great
frustration at being sidelined while the BNP brutally consolidated power, they also found
that corrections officers treated them with respect. Over time, moreover, the prison
administration allowed detainees increased privileges, eventually including the opportunity
to run a school amongst themselves. Recent high school and college graduates in the
BCPYL spearheaded the initiative, taking turns serving as instructors for a wide array of
subjects, including remedial literacy, Afrikaans, radio repair, and economics.2 The
detainees were also allowed to partake in a regimen of physical exercise each morning. The
goals of the school participants were straightforward: they sought to help pass time and
maintain morale, and also to develop the minds and bodies of individuals who might one
day lead the nation into a more prosperous and free future. The official aims of the Prisons
Department, meanwhile, were similarly transparent: personnel sought to professionally
implement the welfarist-oriented penal policies of the nation. Unofficially, however, many
LPS personnel had a more expansive set of motives.
This chapter examines the relationship between national politics and the Lesotho
Prison Service (LPS) in the years spanning from 1959-1971. The political historical
narrative begins with the formation of a number of political parties in the late-1950s. The
rise in party politics and nationalism, particularly in the lead-up to the nation’s first
parliamentary elections in 1960, interfaced with the penological orientation of the colonial
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state. With independence coming into view, the colonial administration pivoted away from
a controllist, or retributive- or deterrence-oriented, model of criminal justice towards a
welfarist, or rehabilitation-oriented, model.3 The colonial state launched a program of
building and retrofitting penal infrastructure, and increased efforts to professionalize
Basotho prison officers, who were now asked to facilitate the personal growth and reform
of incarcerated persons, in addition to coercively maintaining institutional order.
Even as partisanship became more acrimonious over the early 1960s, inflamed both
by ideological disagreements and by the marriage of parties with social groups, there was
a drive to transform the LPS into an institution more governed by strict rules and routine.
This operation ran parallel to the colonial government’s belated push to reify bureaucratic
norms – à la Max Weber’s ideal type of impersonal, rules-obsessed government institutions
– in Lesotho’s police and military over the late 1950s and early 1960s, as recently detailed
by historian Motlatsi Thabane.4 While Thabane shows that the outgoing administration fell
far short of re-forging institutional cultures so that police, ministry workers, warders, and
other government employees were obsessed with regulations and disinterested in party
politics, it is also safe to say the late colonial state did nevertheless successfully burnish a
bureaucratic mystique. The idea of building up a technically proficient and modern prison
service appealed to politicians across parties. Penal welfarism too had broad appeal; the
notion of rehabilitating individuals with checkered pasts resonated with independence-era
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optimism about the opportunity for the nation to start fresh and improve living conditions
in the wake of colonial rule.5
Although the National Party won the 1965 elections, held to determine which party
would usher the nation into independence the following year, the new government faced
stiff political opposition. Unable to advance legislation and resentful of the high percentage
of supporters of the Africanist-oriented BCP and progressive royalists of Marematlou
Freedom Party (MFP) in the security forces and civil service, the BNP government
responded by ousting a handful of high-profile government employees known to support
the opposition, including within LPS. This move both installed BNP allies in key positions
of leadership and sent a message to public servants that a new professional expectation was
to eschew involvement in party politics if one did not back the BNP. At the same time,
Prime Minister Jonathan wanted to progressively improve the conditions of life and work
in Lesotho, including within prisons, and was wary about sacrificing technical expertise
for party loyalty in low-level government staffing.6
The events of the coup created an atmosphere of uncertainty within the LPS. As
dozens of opposition figures were detained and a wave of political firings washed across
government departments, the leadership and rank-and-file of the service were confronted

5

Morija Royal Archives [MRA]: Box 353, Basutoland Times, ‘Two select committees called for,’
and Box 354, f. ‘Voluntary societies,’ 1963.
6
The imperative to modernize and develop the nation dominated much political debate during the
early post-colonial era. The 1965 and 1970 campaigns were dominated by questions of which party
was best positioned to diversify and expand the domestic economy so that more of the tens of
thousands of Basotho constantly engaged in labor migration to South Africa might find
opportunities at home: Aerni-Flessner, J. 2018. Dreams for Lesotho: Independence, Foreign
Assistance, and Development. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame; Richard F. Weisfelder, R.
1999. Political Contention in Lesotho: 1952-1965. Morija: Morija Printing Works, 51-77; Gill, S.
1993. A Short History of Lesotho from the Late Stone Age until the 1993 Elections Morija: Morija
Printing Works, 214-15.
325

with the question of how the treatment and management of detainees would impact their
professional and personal security. In the weeks and months following the coup, even as
new political detainees were deposited in Maseru Central, LPS returned to the language of
bureaucratic professionalism and penal welfarism to recuperate institutional control over
penal facilities. Prison administrators argued for the need to watch over and rehabilitate all
inmates, including detainees, without fear or favor. Safeguarding the LPS’ status as an
organization governed by regulations, of the sort vaunted by the erstwhile colonial regime
and international penological experts, was described as essential for protecting the
services’ long-term capacity to facilitate rehabilitation and, indeed, promote penological
and national progress.7
While these developments look, at first glance, like an effort to defend the
apoliticalness of a bureaucracy, I argue that the events should instead be seen as an
instantiation of anti-politics. A specific, negative type of anti-politics has become deeply
associated with Lesotho amongst scholars since the publication of James Ferguson’s classic
work the Anti-Politics Machine. Ferguson demonstrates how foreign donor agencies
abetted BNP-authoritarianism in the 1970s and 80s by obfuscating (or being oblivious to)
local political dynamics; development discourse served as an ‘anti-politics machine’ which
framed dam projects and agricultural schemes as straightforward moral imperatives,
whisking away consideration of the winners and losers accompanying these projects.8 The
groundbreaking work has inspired a robust scholarship, compounding Ferguson’s use of

7

L. Monyobi interview, 22 May 2017, Lithabaneng. Lesotho Prison Department 1971, Annual
Report, 1970. Maseru: Lesotho Government, 1. Hereafter all reports of the prisons department cited
as ‘Department of Prisons [Year].’
8
Ferguson, J. 1994. Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic
Power in Lesotho, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
326

the concept. John Aerni-Flessner’s 2018 Dreams of Lesotho offers, for example, a rich
analysis of the processual creation and internalization of modernization narratives by
Basotho over the 1950s and 60s.9 I argue, however, that the case of LPS officers invoking
their professional obligation to treat political detainees as they would any other prisoners
– warranting both physical protection and the opportunity for reformative enrichment –
represents a different sort of anti-politics.
Instead of anti-politics being foisted upon Basotho by foreign donors or seeping
into local political discourse and ideology, LPS employees leveraged the moral imperatives
saturating development discourse as a means of offering protection to government
opponents and simultaneously protecting themselves from dismissal or other reprisals.
What makes the actions of LPS personnel anti-political, rather than apolitical in the
classical Weberian sense, was the degree to which the protection of detainees in 1970 was
tentative and instrumental, rather than automatic and procedural.10 Over the late colonial
period, professionalism and welfarism emerged as commonsense priorities for a modern,
effective prison service. Later, in the lead up to independence, Jonathan disciplined
government employees that he would brook no overt partisan opposition from within state
institutions. Drawing from these institutional precedents, LPS administrators and staff
responded to the 1970 the emergency by cleaving to regulations and promoting an ethos of
penal welfarism. This approach proved to be an effective, if limited means of pursuing the
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moral end of protecting some regime opponents and, for some guards, a means of quietly
supporting Congress and/or King Moshoeshoe II.
6.2 The political and penal landscape in the lead up to independence, 1959-1965
Clement Notsi was hired by the prison service in 1957.11 He had strong educational
credentials, having graduated the year before from St. Agnes High School in Teyateyaneng.
As an athlete with a tall, wiry frame, Notsi was also physically well suited for the work.12
Yet, the nervousness the day before reporting for duty at Maseru Central went well beyond
the jitters one might expect when starting any new job. Less than two years before, Notsi’s
uncle had related the tale of an ill-timed visit and narrow escape from the facility at the
outset of an uprising in November 1955 which left one warder and four prisoners dead, and
scores of people gravely wounded.13 The first person Notsi met upon reporting for work at
the facility was Chief Gaoler Ernest Khomari, the top Mosotho official in the Service.
Confronted with a senior officer Notsi snapped his lanky frame to attention and began to
fire off his credentials, but Khomari simply laughed and said, ‘calm yourself man, you’re
already hired.’ While technically correct, it was also true that to be a full member of the
warder corps at Maseru Central, one had to continuously pass muster with Khomari. Over
the next two years Notsi served day to day under the Senior Gaoler. Khomari’s particularly
stringent standards for protocol, and professional and physical training, would serve Notsi
throughout the course of a distinguished 29-year career. Notsi was part of a generation of
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recruits who lived through a late colonial drive to professionalize the Prison Service and
an architect of independent Lesotho’s penal system.
At the time Notsi enlisted, both the prison system and the nation’s political
landscape as a whole were in a state of transition. The laws governing incarceration had
been retrofitted only weeks before the new recruit’s first encounter with Khomari, both in
response to the scandal caused by the violence of the 1955 Maseru Central uprising and
growing international support for the United Nations’ guidelines for prison conditions.14
The founding of the Basutoland African Congress (BAC) by Ntsu Mokhehle a few years
earlier, in 1952, had revolutionized the territory’s politics by providing an institutional
home for nationalist organizing and activism.15 Over the mid-1950s the BAC enjoyed the
support of a broad social coalition (including both Catholics and Protestants, nobles and
commoners, urban workers and rural agriculturalists) and prized significant reforms from
the colonial administration, notably including the creation of a Legislative Council and
acceleration of the Africanization of the civil service.16 By the late 1950s, however, the
broad Congress coalition was splintering.
The fragmentation of the BAC was driven both by ideological disagreements and
by the very success of the party in opening the door to democratic reforms. As self-rule
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came into view, different sectors of society formed new parties to look out for more
narrowly defined sets of collective interest. The lead-up to the nation’s first elections,
which were ultimately held in early 1960, witnessed the founding of the royalist Marema
Tlou Party (MTP) in 1957 and the Basotho National Party in 1959, as well as the renaming
of the BAC to the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). The social divisions underlying the
formation of new parties were reinforced through electoral campaigning: the MTP drew on
higher-ranking lords for support; the BNP courted Catholics, lower-ranking nobles, and
rural agriculturalists; and the BCP particularly appealed to commoners and city dwellers,
as well as a growing number of Protestants. Although Congress won a majority of seats in
the polls, the party soon found its ability to legislate stymied by BNP representatives
aligned with the unelected ‘ex officio’ lords and colonial officials on the council.17
Following the monumental events of 1960 across the continent, in the region, and
at home, it became clear to both the Maseru administration and to the Basotho political
classes that independence for Lesotho was likely coming sooner rather than later.18 The
riven state of domestic politics, however, presented a significant obstacle to any negotiated
exit from empire.19 The BCP, despite holding a narrow margin in seats, was boxed in within
the Legislative Council. The party was also ripping itself apart from within as Mokhehle
battled for control with South African activist exiles belonging to the African National
Congress (ANC). The nation’s king, who had returned home from studies at Oxford to be
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sworn in as Moshoeshoe II in March 1960, was also deeply frustrated with a political
system that denied him executive powers or access to a National Treasury. In 1961, the
young and politically inexperienced king launched a constitutional review commission.
The findings of the commission, published in 1963, recommended the creation of
Westminster style government with an elected lower assembly holding legislative powers.
Elections were announced for 1965, and intense campaigning began in 1964.
As the constitutional commission was carrying out its work in the early 1960s, the
colonial administration began to dramatically scale up training and promotions of Basotho
in the civil service and security forces. Officials in London and Maseru played up the
British commitment to ensuring Lesotho had the infrastructure and local technical expertise
to thrive under self-government.20 The administration scaled up work on infrastructure,
both refurbishing old jails in the countryside and building new specialized facilities for
juveniles and women in Maseru. While officers seconded from British prison bureaucracies
had directed the service since its founding in 1947, the early 1960s witnessed the arrival of
more British penological experts in advisory and training roles.21
Basotho employees in the LPS and across government, many having endured years
of vague discussion about potential future promotions, were pleased to see previously
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blocked paths to leadership positions opening before their eyes.22 Shoring up and filling
the employee rolls, or ‘establishment,’ as well as securing a pay increase for warders, had
been a priority for the prison brass since the 1955 rebellion. When the uprising began the
majority of the undertrained and underpaid warder corps had fled, scrambling over the
prison fence.23 Prison administrators believed that in addition to training warders as
professionals, paying warders as professionals was critical not only for morale but security.
Being a member of LPS became a career, offering wages and a pension that would ensure
a comfortably middle-class life.24 The hiring process was also revamped, with eight
officers enlisted in a single class rather than one by one on an ad hoc basis.25 London also
assisted in arranging and securing funding for prison officers (as well professionals in other
fields) to visit England, or other locales within the empire and Commonwealth, for
specialized training.26 In 1965, as construction on a Women’s Prison entered the final
stretch, all official disparities in pay between male and female officers were abolished.27
The move recognized women officers as genuine breadwinners and professional
employees of the LPS.
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6.3 The service during the era of national liberation, 1965-1969
Over the course of his life Ernest Khomari was never afraid of a fight. As a lone herdboy
armed with only a molamu (shepherd’s stick) he chased off a group of men trying to steal
the family livestock.28 When the Second World War began, he answered the call for
volunteers from the British colonies to fight Nazi tyranny. Khomari guarded detainees in
the British prison camp in Alexandria, and commanded an anti-aircraft gun in the desert
during the second battle of El Alamein. When his transport ship was blown wide open by
an air attack in the Mediterranean, he clambered over the panicked crowd in the stairwells
to escape, and defended a piece of driftwood from other desperate, drowning men.29 When
he returned to Lesotho, he lobbied to get himself hired as a warder in the newly created
colonial Prisons Department. By 1957 he was promoted to Chief Gaoler, becoming the
only Mosotho to hold the rank.30 In this capacity he worked, sometimes brutally, to impose
his vision of discipline on inmates, doling out and suffering numerous blows (and a few
stab wounds) in the process.31 He also endured the criticism of subordinates as he
introduced and enforced new standards amongst the warder corps.32 He prevailed upon the
colonial apparatus to provide greater professional training for Basotho prison officers, and
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was selected for and completed an officer training course with the British Home Prisons
Service at the Wakefield facility in 1961. He smashed further glass ceilings by being
promoted up the ranks, and was ultimately appointed as Acting Director of Prisons, the top
job in the service, at the start of 1966. Around this time he also protested, with his fists, his
exclusion from the Maseru Club because of the color of his skin. One battle Khomari did
not win, however, was his bid to shepherd his homeland’s prison system through the
moment of national liberation.33
The commitment of Basotho politicians to the continued existence of an
independent and professional prison administration faced its first real test over 1966. The
outcome of the 1965 election was a surprise to most observers. The BNP won a majority,
securing 31 seats in parliament, compared to 25 for the BCP and four for the MFP. Bitterly
disappointed with the election results, the opposition leadership appealed to the British to
delay independence. At a June 1966 constitutional conference in London, the Colonial
Office announced their intent to move ahead with independence in October.34 The BCP
and MFP responded with an effort to systematically obstruct BNP legislation.35 Unlike
during the preceding half decade, however, when the BCP held the edge in legislative seats,
the new BNP government had command over more ministerial portfolios, and more power
to hire and fire members of the security forces, judiciary, and civil service. Faced with
concerted political opposition, the BNP leadership was torn on the question of whether
government jobs should remain in the hands of the most experienced and technically

33

T. Khomari, 2 August 2017.
The Colonial Office was actually relieved that the Nationalists had won; a BNP-government was
deemed the least likely to embarrass the British by being swiftly toppled by the South Africans
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qualified individuals, who overwhelmingly supported the BCP or MFP, or instead be doled
out to party loyalists.36
During the June constitutional conference, Khomari was hard at work in the top
role in the LPS. He had been appointed Acting Director of Prisons on the recommendation
of the outgoing director Vivian Farquharson, who was retiring after more than fifteen years
in the position. During his training at Wakefield, Khomari had learned and participated in
the operation of distinctly welfarist penological operations. As Acting Director, he dove
into his work, hoping to make the prison system both a site and instrument for the
development of a soon to be independent nation.37 He scaled up the work of prisoners,
deploying ‘convict labor gangs’ away from their usual stations in gardens, fields, and
quarries.38 Within the Prison Service, Khomari oversaw further institutionalization of a
rigorous training program, which included ‘riot squad drill’ and a course on ‘inmate
control.’ Officers were also temporarily attached to other government institutions to learn
skills like accounting, farming demonstration, and field medicine, and enrolled in training
courses at both the local University and abroad.
In early September 1966, a month before independence, the English Prison Service
officer Robert Forman, seconded to Lesotho the year before under the Special
Commonwealth African Assistance Programme,39 was plucked from his post as a Training
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Officer and appointed Director of Prisons. Khomari had been passed over. The reason for
this snub was almost certainly Khomari’s vocal support for more powers for the king and
his association with the prominent MFP politician Herbert Taka.40 A bitter irony was that
when Jonathan - a man who had advocated for Africanization of government jobs since
becoming a politician – explained the promotion of Forman, he used the pretext long used
by the colonial regime to keep Basotho from positions of power in government: it was
necessary to employ an expatriate because there was no Mosotho qualified for the job.41
Rather than accept a demotion and transfer out of the capital to an outlying district,
Khomari opted to retire at the age of 44.42
Khomari was one of a handful of high-ranking officials in government service that
the new BNP government was able to punish professionally for supporting their opponents.
While a Public Service Commission offered government employees some protection from
politically vindictive dismissals, over the late-1960s the BNP government was successful
in positioning allies in key roles in ministries, the security forces, and the judiciary.43
Jonathan was particularly partial to Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans, who could
be counted upon to work against the Africanist-oriented BCP and whose presence,
40
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Jonathan hoped, would solidify relations with Lesotho’s powerful neighbor (and lubricate
the flow of aid). Select acts of passing over and demoting prominent Basotho officials
further served to discipline all government employees.44 The LPS rank-and-file understood
that a professional expectation was to either support the Nationalists or to keep opposition
sympathies close to the vest.45
On 30 September 1966, over half of Lesotho’s prison population was amnestied.46
Some of the individuals released early were on hand when, six days later, the Union Jack
was ceremonially lowered for a final time and sovereign Lesotho’s flag, with a white
mokorotlo (traditional straw hat) backed by blue, green, and red, was hoisted into the
Maseru sky. The mass remission of sentences symbolized a break with the wrongs of the
colonial past, and gestured to the idea that the work of bettering Lesotho required new
forms of conduct from citizens of the nation. While the amnesty did indeed occasion a
profound change in the lives of 1,096 liberated men and women, the institutional approach
of the state to crime and punishment was also marked by deep continuities: extant prison
regulations remained, drawing from the English Penal Code and seeking to meet United
Nations Standard Minimums; Basotho officers still occupied all but the top job in the prison
service; the judiciary persisted in looking to prisons as the rightful place to punish and
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rehabilitate Basotho who transgressed the law; and hundreds of individuals continued to
serve out their sentences in the nation’s 11 penal facilities.
Any possibility of post-independence detente between the BNP and the opposition
parties evaporated in short order. There was a confrontation between the Police Mobile
Unit (PMU) and supporters of the king in December 1966 at Thaba Bosiu, which left 10
people dead.47 In the wake of this incident, Jonathan seized the initiative to go after threats
to his power.48 In a speech to parliament on February 16, 1967, Jonathan stated that
although his foremost goal was to raise living standards and create new jobs so that fewer
Basotho would need to migrate to the mines and farms of South Africa, it was first
necessary to protect Lesotho’s constitution from ambitious BCP politicians and their spies
who had infiltrated government under the British administration.49 The BNP newspaper,
Nketu oa Mara, adopted an even more strident tone: ‘All such disloyal elements must be
weeded out ruthlessly and without mercy from the civil service.’50 A number of measures
to increase the power of the state to police and suppress dissent were rushed through
Parliament while the leaderships of BCP and MFP were being prosecuted on charges
stemming from the Thaba Bosiu incident.51
47
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While Jonathan’s incipient authoritarianism did intrude into the penal system in
select cases like Khomari’s – and when officers were called upon to guard political
prisoners in the aftermath of Thaba Bosiu – the late-1960s embodied something of a golden
age for the majority of correctional officers. Jonathan trusted the judgment of Director of
Prisons Forman, and after his secondment was up, Thomas Hinett, also from the English
Prison Service.52 While both men worked with the regime to implement new security and
classification measures in prisons, neither showed interest in the intricacies of local
politics, or cleansing their commands of secret royalists or socialists.53 Any potential effort
to ferret out opposition sympathizers, moreover, would likely have crippled the higher
ranks of the service, as most Basotho secondary school graduates gravitated towards the
king or Congress. MFP and BCP supporters who kept mum on the subject of politics were
thus able to continue to enjoy good pay, job security, a close-knit social community, room
for professional advancement, and the opportunity to travel both domestically and
internationally.
The late-1960s through the mid-1970s were also, sadly, a high-water mark for
living conditions inside of the nation’s custodial facilities.54 While the number of people
incarcerated in the three Maseru facilities (Central Prison, Women’s Prison, and the
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Juvenile Training Centre), and seven out of eight district prisons, already exceeded the
recommended population, the overcrowding was light compared with what has come to
exist over subsequent decades. Guards at Maseru facilities and in the districts were still
able to take inmates outside the cellblocks for productive labor, and the prisons made an
earnest effort at training long sentence inmates with skills that would facilitate employment
after release.55 The availability of Commonwealth funds also meant a higher ratio of guards
to inmates and a greater capacity to maintain and improve buildings.56 Jonathan, for his
part, had shown previous interest in ensuring humane prison conditions, including by
heading an inquiry into the issue in 1963 while serving in the Legislative Council.57
Aspirations to conform to international consensus on how ‘modern’ states treated
prisoners, outlined in the United Nations Standard Minimums, also likely weighed on the
BNP government. Up through the late 1970s Nationalist propaganda continued to tout the
party’s ‘progressive attitude’ towards penal administration, ‘highlighted by its emphasis
on the rehabilitation of prisoners.’58
6.4 Responses to political detention in Maseru Central Prison, 1970-71
Matsobane Putsoa was arrested at his place of work in a government printing office on July
3, 1970. He was one of the final BCP youth leaguers to be swept up by Special Branch and
deposited in Maseru Central in the wake of the late-January coup. Inside the prison Putsoa
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was reunited with comrades who had gone missing over preceding months, including
others who had also just graduated from the university in Roma that year.59 The young
accountant also encountered political refugees from South Africa, the majority of the BCP
candidates for parliament (regardless whether they had won or lost their seat), and
supporters of smaller parties like the MFP and Communists. The detainees were held in a
newly completed, and not yet inhabited, Maximum Security wing of the facility, and wore
ordinary clothes rather than prison uniforms. Putsoa learned that Mokhehle and other
members of the BCP Executive Committee were confined elsewhere in the facility.
Amongst the Congress detainees, party and youth league committees sought to exert rigid
control over the lives of party members. Putsoa, however, bucked the leadership on one
thing: he refused to give up public discussions with communists on the merits of different
economic systems.60 The formalization of these debates served as a germ of the school
described in the opening anecdote of this paper.
Upon arriving at Maseru Central, Putsoa related to his cellmates news on incidents
and rumors of the different sorts of violence unfolding around the nation. Over the days
following the start of Qomatsi, as the first round of opposition politicians and activists were
rounded up for detention, other prominent citizens – including Ernest Khomari – were
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given orders of home detention.61 Two armed rebellions emerged and were violently
suppressed:62 Mooki Leepa, the former Deputy Commissioner of Police, and a small group
of supporters fought the PMU from February into March; and independent diamond
diggers who dubbed themselves liphokojoe (jackals or foxes) over early April.63
Meanwhile, BNP controlled youth organizations and the PMU harassed and attacked
ordinary opposition supporters. When the government did not take concerted action to stop
this violence – which was largely organized by Deputy Prime Minister Sekhonyana
Maseribane and PMU Commander (and later Commissioner of Police) Fred Roach –
groups of people banded together to organize defense committees and, sometimes, launch
reprisals against BNP supporters and officials.64 MFP politician Bennett Khaketla suggests,
in his authoritative study of the coup, that such acts played into the BNP’s hands: ‘When
people began to resist, the stage was set for enacting a Reign of Terror,’ as Jonathan could
‘claim that it was calculated violence, perpetrated by the Opposition, which had compelled
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him to seize power.’65 A growing number of people were snatched from their homes and
off the street, and tortured to confess to electoral fraud and name ‘co-conspirators.’66
In early February 1970, the BNP government issued a circular letter calling for the
immediate resignation of all employees who ‘showed themselves by word and deed to be
Opposition supporters.’67 The regime quickly followed up on the letter by sacking some
600-800 government employees, between 15 to 20% of its workforce.68 The dismissed
public servants –ranging from hospital attendants to civil engineers, from magistrates to
office custodians – were also blacklisted, expelled from government housing, and lost
pensions.69 Although precise reasons for each of 22 firings of LPS staff over 1970 are not
recorded, certainly some of the dismissals were a result of names being on lists of
opposition ‘spies.’70 Even if all these firings were politically motivated, a sack-rate of 7%,
on an LPS establishment of 304 persons, was less than the national average. One former
warder who was working in a Maseru facility in 1970, and wished to remain anonymous,
recalled the mood in the LPS:
The loudest ma-Congress [BCP supporters] were gone [fast]... There were one or two
[officers] sent away for no cause: personal rows, not politics... Many of us [who supported
opposition parties] thought we were finished... Many [bosses] were opposition, and they
knew us and we knew them, but we stood in the jobs and continued to work.71

As the violence of the emergency intensified, and Maseru Central was buffeted by
waves of extra-judicial detainees, the penal system was in the hands of a new director,
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Clifford Hurst. Like directors Forman and Hinett before him, Hurst was serving in Lesotho
on a secondment from the British Ministry of Overseas Development. The new director
inherited a series of projects to enhance the welfarist orientation of the Prisons Department,
notably including efforts to more rigorously classify and segregate inmates for different
courses of rehabilitation.72 Although eager to press on with this work, many rehabilitative
measures and programs were deprioritized to grapple with overcrowding. The most
extreme case occurred in Mokhotlong, the epicenter of the liphokojoe uprising, where the
number of prisoners detained in the small district prison (with an official capacity of 40
persons) rose from 43 in January to 213 in December.73
Amongst the officers below Hurst, the presence of detainees in Maseru Central
posed ethical and professional problems. From the start some officers risked more than just
their jobs by conveying messages between detainees held in different parts of the prison as
well as with the outside world.74 For most LPS supervisors and officers, however, the
presence of political detainees was bewildering and stressful.75 The desire to show empathy
to detainees clashed with the drive for self-preservation. Complicating matters was the
wave of public servant firings. After having been disciplined in one set of rules governing
professional behavior during the BNP’s period of legitimate tenure in office, the purge of
civil servants forced prison staff to rapidly recalculate the rules of the job. How to engage
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and control the detainees was largely unclear. The prison administration reverted to a
defensive crouch, providing basics like food, water, and physical security for their new
charges but also strictly limiting access to the yard and contact between the prisoners
clustered in different cells, and wholly barring communication with the outside world.
The newly incarcerated individuals, meanwhile, had little to do but let their minds
wander.76 They had no news on their families save for what tidbits could be patched
together from sympathetic guards and from any new detainees deposited in their cell. The
political prisoners were racked with loneliness, boredom, uncertainty, and even guilt at
being sidelined while threats loomed over loved ones, compatriots, and the nation. At the
end of February detainees launched a hunger strike in a bid to secure visitation rights. After
three days, Hurst and the government backed down. Family members were allowed to have
short visits with detainees through the chain link of the prison fence. The government
capitulated because of concern that bodily harm to detainees – and particularly the BCP
leadership – threatened the prospects of a speedy resumption of British government aid
payments, which had been shut down following the coup and represented a major threat to
the regime’s hold on power.77 Shortly thereafter a prominent government spokesman,
Desmond Sixishe, toured the facility with the Red Cross. 78
The hunger strike proved to be an inflection point not only for the detainees, but
also for officers at Maseru Central. The government’s response to the strike clarified the
status of prisoners as subjects warranting humane conditions. This data point allowed the

76

Putsoa interview, 28 July 2017; Monyobi interview, 22 May 2017; Mphanya, 89.
BNA FCO 45/487: Financial position of government of Lesotho, March 1970, also cited by
Aerni-Flessner, 162-163. Without further aid the government would exhaust all its funds before the
end of the year. On the British demand that BCP leaders not harmed see Sixishe, D. 1984. ‘Give
Him an Army Too:’ Leabua Jonathan, a Biography. Maseru: Mokorotlo, 71.
78
Mokitimi, 62; Mphanya, 88-89.
77

345

bureaucratic machinery of the LPS to begin to churn. Over the subsequent months the staff
incrementally introduced – or allowed detainees to take – new privileges. After waiting for
the changes to harden into institutional routine, the LPS could take or allow further
measures. In this way the LPS effectively worked with the detainees not only to improve
conditions for the political prisoners but also to slowly reassert its bureaucratic authority
and status as the purveyor of penological expertise. The prison school represents a clear
example of how this phenomenon played out.79 When the detainees launched their school
in 1970, the administration of Maseru Central did not quash it. After the passage of some
weeks, and after having observed the students struggling to keep their course schedule on
track by observing the sun, a senior officer instructed guards to provide timekeeping to the
detainees. After more time had passed, the prison administration accepted a donation of
stationery and textbooks, both to replace the rudimentary notebooks crafted by detainees
out of food wrapping and toilet paper, and to supplement the knowledge of the detaineeinstructors.
LPS took care to ensure that new rules governing detainees were penologically
sound. The prison school resonated with rehabilitationist ideas. Inmates themselves were
offering one another valuable sets of knowledge and skills. These tools might theoretically
allow the detainees to ‘mend their ways’ upon release, shifting their priorities from party
politics to remunerative labor. Some of the detainees did indeed leverage their skills to
change professions once they left the facility, but few gave up activism.80 Moreover, for
Putsoa and many of his comrades, the education was about biding time and preparing for
the struggle to come. Hurst provided valuable support for the school in his role as liaison
79
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between the LPS and the regime. It stands to wonder, however, if he might have felt
differently if he could have understood the Sesotho language diatribes against the regime
that punctuated many of the lectures.81 The lingering bureaucratic mystique of the prison
service, the presence of a rehabilitation minded English director who enjoyed the full trust
of Jonathan, and the incrementalist approach to reforms meant that regime allowed the LPS
to manage political detention without constant regime oversight.
Max Weber writes, ‘Bureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for
carrying through... a discharge of business according to calculable rules and “without
regard for persons.”’82 By these standards, the LPS was missing essential elements of a
bureaucracy when it came to dealing with detainees. Even after the rules became more
calculable for staff, a regard for persons continued to permeate the work. Observing the
conduct of LPS personnel first hand, Putsoa came to believe that LPS personnel were
overwhelmingly kind to detainees not just out of a sense of duty but a sense of solidarity.
Most officers did not behave as apolitical bureaucrats but as women and men uninterested
in stringently imposing regulations on detainees. The good will of the majority, moreover,
was drawn into high relief by the animus of a handful of ardent Nationalists on staff.
Capricious use of regulations, notably the late night fotho (contraband search, plur. lifotho),
presented bureaucratically sanctioned methods for harassing and intimidating detainees.
The fact that the prisons had emerged as a safe harbor for prominent opponents vexed some
of the more pugnacious elements of the regime. In June 1970 the PMU commander Fred
Roach spent an entire day burning BCP party materials, and the books and writings of
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detainees, just outside Maseru Central.83 LPS officers were ordered to march Mokhehle
out of his solitary holding cell to the gate to witness the destruction, and a group of BNPsupporting officers made a point of directing the attention of the detainees to the smoke.
As winter frosts hardened over Lesotho in June 1970, the acute political violence
in Lesotho tapered off with Jonathan firmly in control of the country. Over the preceding
two months, the BNP had hosted a series of seven official talks with jailed opposition
leaders. In hopes of release from detention and fresh elections, Mokhehle agreed in May
to set aside the results of the January poll, but Jonathan continued to delay.84 The BNP’s
hope that the British would resume aid without first demanding democratic concessions
was strengthened by an ongoing drought and poor fall harvests. A week before British
Parliamentary elections on June 19, the Labour government opted to resume aid, feeling
that withholding aid from a government grappling with famine was a bad look.85 In
October, with his most vocal opponents still detained, Jonathan used the nation’s fourth
independence anniversary to announce a five-year ‘political holiday’ during which the
nation could focus on facilitating development without the distraction and disunity caused
by elections. The holiday would ultimately last for 23 years.86 The release of detainees was
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a drawn-out affair lasting over much of 1971.87 Putsoa walked free from Maseru Central
in late-November. He would be incarcerated in the facility again less than 3 years later.88
6.5 Chapter Conclusion
Over 1970 prison administrators and staff worked to establish their dominion over penal
space and policies. In the unofficial arrangement which emerged with the BNP-regime,
LPS had much say on matters concerning the ‘inside world of prisons’ and no say when it
came to the ‘outside political world.’ While this territorial distinction was useful over the
short term in allowing the service to determine the conditions of detention for political
prisoners, it also came with significant costs. Since the first groups of detainees were
deposited at Maseru Central in 1970, the role of LPS as caretaker of government political
opponents has been repeated and even normalized. Partisan hiring practices have also
become more problematic over time, hollowing out the ranks of well-qualified and welltrained staff.89 These two developments, moreover, have been part and parcel of a broader
ideological shift by government away from valuing welfare-oriented programs and
institutions in prisons and society as a whole.
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During the late-1970s and 80s, as independence-era optimism about revolutionizing
Lesotho’s economy and society faded, and the government was racked with declining
foreign aid, reduced migrant remittances, and structural adjustment, the interest and
capacity of the state to invest in social programs declined. Government austerity meant the
LPS had fewer resources to spread across a growing population of incarcerated Basotho.
At the same time the penal welfarist model came under attack as ineffective by politicians
calling for the service to begin imposing harsher conditions on inmates, ostensibly as
means of punishment and deterrence.90 Even as rehabilitation has remained the de jure
focus of the service over subsequent decades, continued government underfunding,
overcrowding, and the presence of unqualified but politically connected staff means
controllism is the de facto model.
What politicians hostile to the idea of rehabilitation conveniently neglect to
consider is that the penal welfarism of the 1960s was never meant to function
independently: rehabilitation of incarcerated persons was intended to serve as the coercive
extreme in an array of social interventions and programs aimed to address the causes of
crime and societal disharmony. When populists heap blame for criminal re/offending on
the prison system and its employees for not being tough enough, these rhetoricians elide
the simple truth that there is no way to effectively punish away a lack of jobs, a dearth of
mental health care, a shortage of hope, or other underlying drivers of crime. Tackling these
social problems will require government and policymakers, not prisons and correctional
officers. Faced with this reality, it may soon be time for prison officers and administrators
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to reconsider the old calculation that the best way to guard the conditions of life and work
inside Lesotho’s correctional facilities lies with eschewing discussion of public policies.
This approach worked only so long as politicians saw the penal institution as a vital piece
of maintaining social order and valued the technical expertise of officers. In a scenario in
which more responsibility is being heaped on prisons, even as the knowledge of prison
personnel is increasingly belittled, officers may soon have no choice to speak up on behalf
of themselves, their charges, and the nation as a whole.
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Epilogue

Lesotho in an era of Southern African freedom: fortress or jail?
In July 1995, Nelson Mandela, the first democratically elected president of South Africa
and likely the most famous political prisoner of the 20th century, gave a speech before tens
of thousands of joyous Basotho at Setsoto National Stadium in Maseru.1 Mandela’s visit
coincided with the joint flowering of democracy in both nations. A military junta had ruled
Lesotho from the toppling of Leabua Jonathan in 1986 until allowing for new elections in
1993: Ntsu Mokhehle was sworn in as Prime Minister in March after the BCP won nearly
75% of the votes and secured all 65 seats in the National Assembly. Just over a year later,
on 27 April 1994, South Africa celebrated Freedom Day: polls carried out with universal
suffrage swept Mandela and his African National Congress (ANC) into power.2
The charismatic South African president wove a gripping narrative of Lesotho’s
history: battered back into a defensive crouch by white settlers and creeping British
imperialism, Basotho kept their nation intact. In so doing, the polity served not only as a
potent symbol of African resilience and determination, but also ultimately as an actual
refuge and fortress for freedom-fighters challenging apartheid: ‘Because of your sacrifices
and your understanding, South Africa is today free.’ The speech circled, but did not directly
address, an urgent issue for Basotho in the democratizing subcontinent: should Lesotho
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surrender its national sovereignty and become a province of South Africa?3 The militant
South African National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), with a strong Basotho cohort in its
rank and file, had recently adopted a resolution calling for precisely such a move.4 Prime
Minister Mokhehle, meanwhile, had himself previously argued that ‘when South Africa is
Liberated, there will no longer be a need for an independent Lesotho.’5 After all, there was
a far greater population of Sesotho-speakers in South Africa than Lesotho. Mandela’s
narrative, moreover, spoke to the shared political economy of the two nations: unification
would mean that Basotho would have access to a share of the enormous wealth of South
Africa, which the daughters and sons of Lesotho had long contributed to building with their
sweat and blood.
But unification was not to be. After a quarter-century of fighting with ballots and
bullets to take the reins of Lesotho’s state, Congress Party officials were unwilling to
discuss the idea of surrendering their hard-won powers to higher political authorities in
Pretoria and Cape Town. In rebuffing any suggestion of union, these politicians invoked
the same arguments which were used during colonialism and apartheid: they were
custodians of the culture of the nation and could not risk any political changes which might
dilute or threaten traditional institutions and, above all, the monarchy. In so doing, these
leaders refused to acknowledge that the geopolitical and economic situation in the
subcontinent was dramatically different than in the numerous previous battles by Basotho
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to prevent incorporation, dating back to reconstruction from the South African War. As an
experiment in multi-ethnic democracy flowered in the regional hegemon, supplanting a
long and brutal campaign for domination by the white minority, the tiny nation of Lesotho
clung to the idea of the ethnic enclave. Indeed, local politicians preferred to publicly muse
about irredentism – calling for the return to Lesotho of the conquered territory, or swathes
of rich farmland in the Free State seized by commandoes in the 1850s and 60s – in place
of talking about how joining South Africa provided a more realistic prospect for Sesothospeaking people to become compatriots.6
Mandela was certainly correct that Lesotho came into being, and has endured, as a
fortress. The high sandstone cliffs of Night Mountain acted as a physical keep for
Moshoeshoe’s people first during the troubles of lifaqane and, later, from Free State
commandoes. The protectorate status of 1868 offered a different sort of barrier, a political
one: while British imperialism came with its own high costs, Basotho lords, commoners,
and mission-educated elites worked jointly to prevent the colonial government from
dissolving the border and handing direct political control over the territory to white settlers
and industrial capitol in South Africa. The official separateness of Lesotho from South
Africa was instrumental in the accumulation of shared national identity, even as tens of
thousands of Africans traversed the border each year: on the east bank of the Mohokare,
Africans should, in theory, be free of the grinding indignities and violence of race
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discrimination enshrined as law in Makhooeng (the place of the whites). As Pretoria further
demonstrated its viciousness in the months and years following Sharpeville – including by
militarizing Lesotho’s border in 1963 and launching a series of raids and assassinations
across the river during the 1970s and 80s – fortress Lesotho continued to keep its doors
open to Africans of myriad national origins, offering a penumbral space for people and
families seeking to build lives in a so-called ‘front-line state,’ just beyond the creeping
shadow of white supremacist domination and violence.7 The absorptive quality of the
popular political culture, which had enabled Moshoeshoe to forge a kingdom in the first
place, continued to prevail in Basotho communities which welcomed and acculturated new
arrivals decade after decade. But when the evil which the political fortress was designed to
hold at bay vanished in 1994, what was the purpose of keeping the old bulwarks in place?
The national borders continued to compound the artificial and arbitrary distinction between
Sesotho-speaking people on the two sides of the border. It seems that – swept up in a
combination of fast-moving events, collective conservatism, and elite self-interest – it was
easy to forget that prisons, like fortresses, are made of walls.
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Yet, even as politicians in Lesotho shut down any conversation about unification in
the early 1990s, tens of thousands of nationals of Lesotho sought out the benefits of South
African identity documents and citizenship. In 1995 and 1996 the ANC government passed
amnesty legislation to grant permanent residency and pathways to citizenship for all miners
living in South Africa as of 1994.8 Approximately two-thirds of the amnesty applicants
hailed from Lesotho.9 The nation’s professional classes embarked on a similar exodus.
Under apartheid-era Bantu Education legislation, South Africans classed as nie-blankes
(non-whites) faced tightly restricted access to schools, as well as a wider host of policies
aimed to stymie any chance of thriving in academia, medicine, law, and other professional
fields. As such, many educated and politically-active black and brown people, and
particularly individuals seeking asylum after being ‘banned’ in South Africa, sought out
the vibrant intellectual community in Roma, Lesotho – home to the University of
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (UBLS) and, later, the National University of Lesotho
(NUL). After the end of apartheid, however, African intellectuals and professionals
understandably sought out the better wages and higher living standards on offer in South
Africa, and had more of the political, educational, and financial capital necessary to
navigate the bureaucracy involved in immigration. The 1990s thus witnessed a tremendous
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downturn both in remittances from mine labor, the territory’s economic lifeblood, and a
so-called brain drain.
The lack of resources did not prevent less-privileged and connected Basotho from
also seeking a better life across the border, but these individuals have faced a growing
number of obstacles. After a brief honeymoon in the mid-1990s, the xenophobic discourses
of the apartheid era surged back to the forefront of South African politics. In an effort to
quell violence in Kwazulu-Natal and coopt a serious threat to the democratic transition, the
ANC leadership decided to bring the founder of Inkatha Freedom Party, Mangosuthu
Buthelezi, into their governing coalition from 1996 through 2003. The notorious AmaZulu
ethnonationalist was handed the Home Affairs portfolio.10 In his new role, Buthelezi riffed
on longstanding segregationist discourses: the minister extended ownership and belonging
of the nation to a few additional ethnicities beyond whites, while leaning into the idea of
the state as machinery for protecting the finite resources of insiders from pilfering by
outsiders. The historical relationship between the formation of tribal and national divisions
with the arrival of foreign conquest and segregation was effaced in Buthelezi’s blend of
ethnic chauvinism and pugnacious nationalism. Undocumented people from Lesotho
occupied a strange position in the emerging ethnopolitics of South Africa: insiders by
ethnicity and outsiders by nationality.
In a haunting 2015 article in the New York Times, scholars Daniel Magaziner and
Sean Jacobs note how out of sync ANC governance has become with ‘one of the most
celebrated chapters of its history,’ the 1955 outlining of principles in a Freedom Charter,
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notably including the pronouncement that, ‘“South Africa belongs to all who live in it.”’11
The fact that bureaucratic processes for acquiring South African work visas and legal
residency have become increasingly onerous over time has not reduced migration so much
as pushed a growing number of Lesotho nationals into the shadow economy. In trying to
prosper and contribute to the wealth of the new South Africa, these undocumented
individuals face systematic exploitation by employers and extortion and abuses from
police.12 Sadly, the mountain kingdom’s status as an open air and porous custodial
institution inside another nation, manufacturing legal and social difference even as it fails
to deter movement, continues to appeal to entrenched political interests in both Lesotho
and South Africa: for the former, gatekeeping over state resources continues to take place
in Maseru; for the latter, the failure to materially improve the lives of domestic constituents
can be blamed on foreign migrants, redirecting anger away from leaders’ waste, graft, and
failure to adequately address structural iniquities.
Although the failure of Lesotho’s political classes to claim a full seat at the table of
democratic South Africa deeply inflected the opportunities and resources available across
society, the trajectory of certain communities and sectors were impacted more than others.
Viewed counterfactually, the people living and working in Lesotho’s prisons were amongst
the communities most harmed by the continued separation of the two nations. As the ‘tough
on crime’ policies of right-wing politicians in the United States and England of the 1970s
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and 1980s were embraced by center-left parties in the 1990s, nations around the world
pivoted from the common sense of welfarist penology towards a more controllist approach,
based on the idea of deterring crime with penal discipline and suffering.13 While the prison
populations of both South Africa and Lesotho continued to balloon after the restoration of
democracy, putting pressure on infrastructure and budgets, policymakers in the former
embraced the idea that slashing prison budgets made good politics. First, prisoners – the
people most adversely impact by austerity – had little political voice and even less clout.
Second, cuts to the Corrections Department’s budget could be framed not as hard choices
necessitated by economic circumstance, but rather as productive policy moves in their own
right: harsher prison conditions, politicians repeatedly claimed, served to deter crime and
recidivism. The prison system was not only asked to make due with less every few years,
but also faced significant new challenges over the 1990s into the 2000s, including the
emergence of South African number gangs in Lesotho’s prisons and, especially, of
HIV/AIDS infections and the attendant opportunistic infections like tuberculosis. Crime
and levels of imprisonment in Lesotho have soared over recent years, refuting controllist
arguments. In a vicious cycle, overcrowding and underfunding in prisons has made it
increasingly difficult to provide the classification and job-training, and aftercare services,
which became a matter of course in Lesotho’s penal facilities over the late-1960s into the
1970s. The Corrections Service as an institution has pressed on, admirably, in trying to
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protect and rehabilitate inmates as best as it can in the face of endemic shortages in space,
staff, training, and basic supplies for prisoners such as rations and detergent.
These acute shortages were highlighted in a 2020 episode of the Netflix docuseries
Inside the World’s Toughest Prisons.14 The subject of the installment, beyond the
supposedly ‘primitive’ conditions, is the prevalence of sexual violence in Maseru Central
Prison and Lesotho. The central argument is that subcultural animosity towards sexual
offenders is normative in prisons around the world, and that the apparent failure of Maseru
Central inmates to meet the rapists in their midst with violence illustrates the permissibility
of rape in Sesotho cultural traditions as a whole. A vital question that the episode rushes
past in making this sweeping claim, however, is the role of institutional structures in
generating stigma.
The production of moral alterity emerged as a key function of carceral institutions
as the social technology was engineered in the West over the last two and a half centuries.
This aim was also at the heart of Lesotho’s carceral project since the Cape built the first
lock-ups in the territory in the 1870s. Over the course of this dissertation, however, we
have examined several reasons why incarceration consistently failed to generate the types
and degrees of otherness that political authorities desired. While the first cause can be
glossed as an enduring culture of inclusivity in Lesotho, it is not the hard and timeless
culture as thing of the docuseries, but rather a process. In the 19th century, an integrationist
ethos – paired with institutions for facilitating acculturation such as initiation, patronage,
and public forums – produced the social cohesion which gave rise to the creation and
reproduction of Highveld societies and solidarities. Although legally sanctioned violence
14
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existed in the Mohokare Valley during the formation of Lesotho, it was used with an eye
towards inculcating social discipline rather than retributively. Punishment was deeply
instrumental, and transgressing laws did not confer a status of moral otherness on
offenders. A far more prevalent system of fines, meanwhile, provided pathways for
individuals to heal social breaches. The colonial regime established in Maseru in the 1880s,
looked at the ways that Cape predecessors had ginned up local resistance by impetuously
attempting to use the criminal legal system and carceral institutions to manufacture new
moral statuses in the colony, and opted to prioritize effective control.
Progress and tradition became key discourses for Basotho social groups and foreign
officials to try to advance, check, and defend institutions for re/producing order. As we
have seen, what was claimed as Western, universal, progressive, Sesotho, particular, and
traditional shifted a great deal, over time, and depending on who was making claims about
what an institution should do, morally and instrumentally. Yet, even as Maseru gradually
built up its carceral infrastructure and abrogated punitive powers from lords for a greater
array of offenses over the early decades of the colonial era, the administration struggled to
impute deviance and alterity onto either individuals or entire social groups, whether as
criminal deviants or contagious people. A popular political ethos of re/integrationism
largely prevailed, even as a few of the noxious weeds of moral otherization began to sprout
from and exacerbate the social fissures wrought by grinding structural poverty, escalating
levels of crime, and reverberations of decades of colonial and missionary fear-mongering
about criminal deviance and contagion. In the waning years of colonial rule, the
administration moved towards a largely re/integrationist criminal legal framework,
predicated on the logic of welfarism (while also continuing to persecute and prosecute
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Basotho nationalists). As local elites battled in the independence era over the reins of state
power, they uniformly avowed a commitment to welfarist penality, but also began to use a
language of moral wickedness when speaking of political opponents and their
constituencies. Officials in the prison service were able to use their professional
commitment to welfarist penology to blunt the tip of the Jonathan administration’s coercive
spear inside of penal institutions, if not outside: political prisoners were not only not moral
others but, for many guards, moral exemplars. Sadly, the inability of the government to
pay for upkeep in prisons, or support much in the way of social investment or services,
particularly from the 1990s onwards, has interfaced with demagoguery by politicians
wielding promises to redirect (meagre) funds away from prisons so as to better reward
deserving citizens and better punish the wicked. For the time being, at least, the Prisons
Service (rebranded as Corrections) has held firm in its commitment to rehabilitationism,
even as this task has become increasingly impossible on account of overcrowding and
understaffing.
Any potential window for Lesotho to join South Africa has likely closed for the
time being. Even as political will in the former increases, the latter is very much in the
throes of the populist ethnonationalism sweeping our globe, exacerbated by worsening
economic inequality.15 In a South Africa where a few people have so much and so many
people have so little, blaming of ethnic and national others for poverty sadly strikes a chord
in many of the communities left on the outside looking in. In this political environment any
discussion of absorbing Lesotho would almost certainly be framed as a matter of outsiders
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cutting ahead of those already waiting for state assistance to help fulfill their dreams and
potential, rather than as a matter of welcoming in kin bearing troves of knowledge,
creativity, and labor. The more extreme South African voices in these conversations are
reminiscent of the discourse of South African President Henrik Verwoerd when he sought
to securitize the border in the early 1960s, effectively approaching the territory as yet
another island in a carceral archipelago of homelands (of course, Lesotho was never
officially a Bantustan). While there has recently been some discussion of providing for
freer movement between the two nations, Lesotho shall likely remain a boat anchored in
the sea of its turbulent neighbor for the foreseeable future.16
But even with their economic and political subordination, Basotho nonetheless
have choices about how to weather the populist hurricane raging in the subcontinent and
corners of globe, inflecting the way that national communities are thinking about the
problems of crime and belonging. Prisons and other custodial institutions will certainly be
important sites in these conversations, as front-line institutions in the manufacturing of
moral alterity inside of nations. Will a deluge of otherization and controllism dowse the
torch of social re/integrationism, which the earliest Basotho lit during the dark days of
lifaqane, and kept alive through border wars, colonialism, the independence struggle, and
being at the very vanguard of ‘front-line states’ during the struggle to defeat apartheid?
Basotho will likely draw strength and inspiration if they look to an august past – including
the legends of moral reform and profound forgiveness modeled by Moshoeshoe, the
resilience of Botšabelo inmates, the doggedness and prescience of organic intellectuals like
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the Lefela brothers, and the cunning solidarity of LPS officers in 1970 – while crafting
strategies for the present.
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